



£"> ♦ 




,* . - • * 


* A % * 



v a 

> v *1 
*° ^ & *4 

: *U* • 


5> v ^ H 


V "' <v 
"> v t 
% <> A / 

° V ; 

“ $ V « 

** «y ^ °. 

. ..* ,o v ^ '•a - a 

A o< ^ «■* ^ o< 

'o '....»“ 0° V^-* ,A °°^ '**'^'»' > 

»V% C\ .<A ♦••<>* ^ \> C\ <0 V 

\ U # .* £fef* <fc A 

;> <: ,<=,<?„ i^mm: ,■>■>■ 


•i° 






*°+ 




V* A * 

Vp V • 


•»* A 


• A♦♦ • 



A v .»“% > 


<> ♦*7v« % <0 


A o * 

?y &. • 


3 


i 


\ - - - * # r£ . *••* ^c 



r V, * 



BNS?Y 

o, "o . . * A 

o A 0 ®V* * ^ 

% ° A ,*<^^. ^ 
: 

° 5-° - V V 



9*0 



<^ *9 


> . t • 


{ 


* ^L, 

*: t* 0 « • 

«t -A *b • 

V A °^ * 

»•«* *> \> c. * 

\ %A : £fjk'. *+ A •*’ 

/ /\ : fl# • 

• .<y a <> 

/ ,.• ^ °o A ^ 

>* $ *o & 

: : 

^ ♦TfT 9 .0 5 ^ * * #*' v$> 

• v '«, CV AA **•*-’ ^ V % Ai^Lr* c\ ,0 

; ^ :gj^\ 


^0 






*%> *7 ^•' 

•- ^ v % t 

% o ^ ^ • 

°. W ; 

® A ° 

* v ^ °. 

0^ , • 1 L*-• ^O 
. C ♦W%>>'' v - 

* « - mi/6&> * 

. •** cr 

* 4 0 * 

n k A ^ 

^ ^ * • O ® 





* t * 4^ 


‘ ♦* ^ • 



^ • 



A V 0 0m • o ^ 



• ■* ^ 
♦ /V V\ • 

^ 4 ^ ^ * 

,G V 'o A <V 

.. i -IK. ♦- 0> <s>, 

% V o'- ■tfSSSW. ^ 



V ‘*TT,*’ .4' 


^f> ^ * 

. W : 

• 4 ° 

,* A ^ •>. 



: W - 

/ A'\. • 

^ '••*•'■<• ... ^.'^' A . v 







%. o o 

K " • - • • ’ a* °4. * •° A 0 

<>_ -Or .<••# ^ 0 *L^L% A.V • * • ° 

» • %S titte, \/ : 

‘ /\ ** V \ '. 

. ..... .o* %'-* 

L* ’J' 


0- <r. ' • • • a° 

► 0 0 ' • * <**> ,-cr . • v ' * * 



+*0« 


A . 

^ ty °i 

O r * 




* 


^ o* 




. «, o .-w a 

S', *••’■ /.....A *• * 0 >° ..... %**”' & ..V. 

* » JHHs' **** 

A v 'O 'o.,*' A^ .0* ^ *° • ‘ 

£ A'*, aO *°V* -CT *•**-•* °- 

o **L G w * 




Jy ^ on/ 
** %> • - 






.^vv^ . : »' < 

v °o .o° 

V - - V% <0 . » • « 

« T^k 4'' * 

. % o * 

; ^ v : 

• vO*^ j , 

A V v 




$► " * • ' ' - V °*U 

> v' -j> , 

f; c,?* aV-*. - 

* G * ** c > *•©•*'» 4 A 

0* % • *V 

• >° ^ 




"C*- *' * • * * A^ 

»s <$> cr .•*■•'* 

^Vk * *#» <*V -r 


A? AWl* ' : <_ C' 


* * " 0 ° A 0 

o. <0 

«* Vv- » 

I ' vf> V 

t: .v^, 

. ^ • 



to- *♦...•* .«*■ 




> V .♦ 

% ^ <0 • 

: W • 



o 


• C? vP^ 

♦ 4/ *> 

/> V f^A # 



^ A^ ¥ ^ 


• A V -a ' 

* / % • 







/ 









MYSELF AND DREAMS 






























































































* 




















































































































































MYSELF AND 
DREAMS 


tV 


r 


BY 


FRANK &: CONSTABLE, M.A., 


MEMBER OF THE S.P.R., 

AUTHOR OF “ THE CURSE OF INTELLECT ” ; “ THE LIMITS OF 
HUMAN EXPERIENCE”; “ PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY”; 

“ TELERGY.” 



NEW YORK 

DODD, MEAD & COMPANY 






PREFACE 


In the year 1867 personal human experience convinced 
’ne not only that personality survives death but that 
ve, still in the body, may have communion with the 
disembodied. Since then I have lived for more than 
eighteen thousand days and nights and, like my fel¬ 
lows, had innumerable waking and sleeping dreams. 
All have passed away, leaving not a wrack behind. 
But that experience of 1867 and two, later, of a like 
kind, remain as clearly impressed in my memory of 
the present as when they occurred. They have cer¬ 
tainly affected my direction of thought : I believe they 
have changed my life and conduct. 

Why have I stated this at the outset ? Because I 
want to give to the reader as honest a book as I possi¬ 
bly can. In The Curse of Intellect, written in 1895, I 
tried to get at an independent point of view for the sur¬ 
vey of human experience. The book in one sense 
was successful, but,as regards the main object, it was 
a failure,—the point of view was not independent. 

At the outset, then, the reader must understand that 
nothing now written can be claimed to proceed from 
an independent point of view. I, who write, am 
tarred by the same brush as the most stubborn of ma- 


VI 


PREFACE 


terialists. But I have written conscious of this defect 
and have done my level best to hold the balance even. 
I have criticized opinions adverse to my own, but have 
striven to put any such opinion before readers in full 
strength. Before 1867 I was myself what is generally 
termed a materialist and believe there is in me still 
some lingering sympathy for the opinion of my com¬ 
rades of old. 

In the year 1867 I began to study Kant’s Transcen¬ 
dental Philosophy and to pursue what has since been 
termed psychical research,—the first results of the pur¬ 
suit were eminently unsatisfactory. I think, now, 
telepathy is established by evidential proof : I held 
this in Personality and Telepathy. But, in the pres¬ 
ent work, I do not rely directly on telepathy or the 
strong evidence we have in human experience towards 
proof of communication with the disembodied. 

In 1904 I wrote The Limits of Human Experience. 
I think I must then have been under the influence of 
Hume’s philosophy. I never so greatly delighted in 
writing a book. I used thought and proved by its use 
that contradictions are real realities ! The argument 
was the same to prove time real as to prove it unreal; 
to prove the universe started from nothing as to prove 
it started from infinity, to prove Being was immanent 
as to prove it existed in unity. I enjoyed profoundly 
the humour of incomprehensible contradictions into 
which thought carried me. 

Continuing my study of Kant and comparing his 
philosophy with that of others I next, in 1911, wrote 
Personality and Telepathy. Therein I tried to bring 


PREFACE 


vii 

Kant’s philosophy into relation with telepathy 1 and 
then, considering telepathy itself, put forward the 
theory that it offers evidential proof of our existence 
as what is generally termed “ souls.” 

While writing the last book 1 had the great advan¬ 
tage of long correspondence with C. C. Massey. 
From him I got insight into what the really real ulti¬ 
mate is. For it I use the term “ the accomplished in 
the accomplishing.” A great light slowly dawned 
on me : I was freed from the stumbling block of real 
contradictions which exist for thought. For the first 
time I understood Kant’s explanation of his antino¬ 
mies and got out of my way his use of the term “ per¬ 
manence.” 

But how could I transcend thought? For I did 
transcend it in awareness that the real contradictions 
which exist in and for thought had no real reality for 
myself! 

I was driven to the conclusion that there must be 
power in me, as a subject, transcending thought. 

When 1 wrote Personality and Telepathy I had 
merely read Kant’s Dialectic, had studied but the 
/Esthetic and Logic. Now I studied the Dialectic and 
persuaded myself I understood it. 

Since 1912 I have been writing the present book. 
The first part Myself proceeds on broad and gen¬ 
eral lines : students of Kant and Spinoza will notice 
how closely I follow the two. The second part Dreams 
breaks, I think, new ground. 


l Kant ignored telepathy simply because in his time human experi¬ 
ence did not support it sufficiently. 


PREFACE 


viii 

If the argument of the first part be accepted as sound 
it follows that not only does self-consciousness con¬ 
tinue during the state of sleep, but that the “ myself ” 
therein has still human experience,—has even wider 
human experience than in the waking state. For in 
sleep, physical activity in relation to our little objective 
universe being subsumed, the field of psychical ac¬ 
tivity is widened. 

I offer the second part Dreams as giving argument 
which is sound in principle. I have taken long, long 
time to make the argument sound in detail. But the 
ground travelled is new ground, and, as I who travel it 
am but one of at least fifteen hundred million fellows, 
the probability is that I cannot have taken the best 
road to the ultimate goal. 

In writing I have tried to make each question con¬ 
sidered in itself as complete as possible, and this has 
led to no little repetition. 1 must ask the well-read 
student not to be annoyed at this : some readers want 
what is put before them to be so clear in itself that they 
are not called on to use memory. 

“ Myself,” though it cannot be defined in words, 
is not an empty abstraction, for, in relation to Trans¬ 
cendental Being, it exists in the accomplishing. 
Kant’s statement that imagination is deep buried in 
the soul of man 1 accept and this further accentuates 
the fact. 

Imagination can be no more defined in words than 
can “ myself.” But, transcending thought and even 
insight, we may, paraphrasing Coleridge, hold that 


PREFACE ix 

it is groundless because it is the ground of all other 
activity. 

I owe much to William McDougall’s Body and 
Mind, to Riehl’s Science and Metaphysics, and to 
Laurie’s Synthetica. Riehl, especially, gave me 
great assistance for insight into the contradiction be¬ 
tween free-will and the categorical imperative. 

In the second part I have largely used William 
James’ The Varieties of Religious Experience. In 
that remarkable book he appears to me to have 
widened the purview of metaphysical philosophy. I 
have used his name as an authority. What I owe to 
the S.P.R. is obvious. 


i st August, 1918. 







CONTENTS 


MYSELF 

PAGE 

KNOWLEDGE IS RELATIVE.I 

INSIGHT. 9 

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.16 

A CONSIDERATION OF INFINITE BEING 32 

THE INTELLIGIBLE UNIVERSE AND THE SENSIBLE 

UNIVERSE (i).46 

IMAGINATION AND THOUGHT.54 

THE LAWS OF NATURE.64 

IDEAS.68 

THOUGHT, BRAIN AND MOTION - - - - 75 

THE INTELLIGIBLE UNIVERSE AND THE SENSIBLE 

UNIVERSE (il).94 

THE SENSIBLE UNIVERSE BEFORE MAN'S APPEAR- 

v ANCE.96 

FEELING (i). 103 

POTENTIALITY OF THOUGHT AND FEELING - - II4 

FEELING (il).1 17 

SELF-EXPRESSION AND THE CATEGORICAL IMPERA¬ 
TIVE . 131 

THE UNIVERSE WITHOUT SELF-CONSCIOUS SUB¬ 
JECTS . 145 

FREE-WILL AND THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE - 154 

PLEASURE AND HAPPINESS. 177 

THE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE ACCOMPLISHING - - 200 

xi 






Xll 


CONTEXTS 


DREAMS 

PAGE 

SLEEP 239 

PHYSIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES - 242 

WAKING AND SLEEPING DREAMS .... 256 

MULTIPLEX PERSONALITY.261 

HALLUCINATION AND ILLUSION IN DREAMS - - 27 1 

IGNORANCE, HOPE AND FAITH - - - 280 

DREAMS. 300 

ROMANCE AND FAIRIE.303 

THE LIMITS OF ROMANCE AND FAIRIE - - - 314 

PHANTASY .326 

ECSTASY. 339 

THE ETERNAL. 354 






MYSELF 


ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS 

KNOWLEDGE IS RELATIVE 

We sense our universe as consisting of unrelated ob¬ 
jects : what we sense is merely the occasion for 
thought which is external to it. We cannot think 
objects, we can only think about them. For thought, 
it is not objects but the ideas of objects that we use. 
Ideas exist in relations between objects, and these re¬ 
lations are not given to us when we sense objects. 
So when we say we think an object, what we really do 
is to think its likenesses and unlikenesses to other ob¬ 
jects : we think about objects. 

Ideas are useless for thought without schematic 
ideas, that is, ideas of the schemata of objects. But 
just as ideas give us information only about objects, 
so schematic ideas give us information only about the 
relations between the schemata. The genesis of 
thought cannot be traced back to our universe as 
sensed, our universe is merely an occasion for 
thought: objects can exist in our objective universe, 
the schemata of objects cannot therein exist; they have 
existence only in what is hereafter termed the intelli¬ 
gible universe. 


INSIGHT 

Knowledge is relative and so necessarily exists be¬ 
tween limits of contradiction. In ordinary parlance 
our universe is, to us, a universe of contradictions, 
ziii 


XIV 


ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS 

We cannot know these limitations of knowledge, for, 
if we did, knowledge would transcend knowledge 
which is impossible. But we are aware of these limit¬ 
ations and this awareness marks a power in us as 
subjects transcending knowledge. This power is here¬ 
in termed insight. Insight gives us awareness and 
must be related back to imagination. Thought is an 
inhibited form of imagination, its form determined by 
the motion of the brain. The term intuition and its 
meanings are criticized. 

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 

Self-consciousness exists as a thing-in-itself. I do 
not exist because I think : even as a subject of insight 
I transcend myself as a thinking subject. I exist to 
myself because “ I am conscious of myself, not as I 
appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that 
I am.” Thought, even insight, cannot be mine unless 
exercised by or presented to “myself,” as a self-con¬ 
scious subject, as “ I am I exist in self-conscious¬ 
ness not in any content of self-consciousness. 

Self-consciousness simply is for each one of us : we 
cannot determine it in any way by its own content of 
thought or even insight. It is sometimes defined as 
permanent. But the term permanent contains in it¬ 
self its contradiction, it is a limit of thought and so 
cannot be used. Self-consciousness transcends the 
permanent and its contradiction, change. If we make 
the self-conscious subject permanent then it cannot be 
a thinking subject, for as a thinking subject it would 
exist in change, that is, in contradiction. But, by the 
theory of transcendence, change is in the self-con¬ 
scious subject though subsumed in its existence : for 
this subject transcends permanence and change. So 
the self-conscious subject may be—as it is—a thinking 
subject. The relation of “ I am ” to transcendental 
Being is considered. 


ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS 


xv 


A CONSIDERATION OF INFINITE BEING 

If we define God as Infinite,—as infinite goodness, 
infinite power, infinite presence, for example,—we use 
limits of thought for our definition and so the contra¬ 
dictory limits are always in our mind. The ideas we 
use for definition are meaningless to us unless their 
contradictions are also in our mind. Hence if we de¬ 
fine God in idea we are driven to one of two conclu¬ 
sions : either, with Laurie, we must make our God 
responsible for evil as a thing-in-itself or we must also 
predicate a Devil of evil. Neither conclusion can be 
held false for thought. But here insight steps in and 
makes us aware that, in the ultimate, contradictions 
cannot exist. It is insight which leads us to such 
terms as Being—Becoming, All—One, for God. But 
even when such terms are used there is often confusion 
between thought and insight. For God is treated as 
Being and Becoming, All and One, whereas such 
terms, rightly used, import transcendence of All and 
One, of Being and Becoming. The terms, rightly, 
have no meaning for thought, they are but expressions 
of something which insight compels us to hold exists 
and yet which transcends thought. 

The term, herein used for the ultimate, is “ the ac¬ 
complished in the accomplishing.” 

THE INTELLIGIBLE UNIVERSE AND THE SENSIBLE UNI¬ 
VERSE 

The distinction be ween the Intelligible Universe 
and the Sensible Universe is marked and considered 
and the subjection of the latter to the former is shown. 
The Sensible Universe as it now exists is largely the 
result of creation by man. And it is shown that man 
can have created no new object in the objective uni¬ 
verse without first formulating an idea of it in the in¬ 
telligible universe j 1 that is, that creation in the intel- 


*The schematic idea of any object must be in the mind before the 
idea of the object can arise. 


xvi ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS 

ligible universe is a condition precedent for cre¬ 
ation in the objective universe. 

IMAGINATION AND THOUGHT 

Thought is an inhibited form of imagination. 
Thought is correlated to the motion of the brain, it 
cannot proceed beyond the field of possible motion of 
the brain : and this spells inhibition of the power of 
imagination from which the power of thought is de¬ 
rived. 

Thought is imagination inhibited within the pur¬ 
view of the possible motion of the brain. So imagin¬ 
ation “ deep buried in the soul of man ” uses the brain 
as a machine of motion in relation to the sensible uni¬ 
verse : thereby the sensible universe becomes an oc¬ 
casion for thought. 

THE LAWS OF NATURE 

Unless the universe as presented were governed by 
the laws of nature the subject could not think about 
his objective universe; he does not think about this 
universe, he thinks about it as governed by the laws 
of nature. It is the laws of nature which give to the 
subject the relations he requires for thought. Further, 
man could not exercise the power of variation over and 
creation in the objective universe, a power which he 
does exercise, unless these laws existed and he had 
observed them and kept them in memory for use : man 
can command nature but only by obeying her. 

The laws of nature exist in the intelligible universe, 
they govern the sensible or objective universe. Imag¬ 
ination is free, deep buried in the soul of man : even 
its inhibited form of thought is subject to the laws of 
nature only when thinking about the objective uni¬ 
verse or things possible therein. 

IDEAS 

Ideas exist, in their simplest form, in relations be¬ 
tween objects. The universe as sensed cannot set 





ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS xvii 

up thought of or about it, for relations are not sensed. 
It is when the subject reads into the objective universe 
the laws of nature that he reads in relations between 
the objects he senses, it is only then that ideas can 
come into existence. With ideas thought about these 
objects becomes possible. 

Human thought is necessarily related back to a self- 
conscious subject capable of thought. To find any 
relation between thought and the laws of nature, which 
both exist in the intelligible universe, we must relate 
back the laws of nature to self-conscious Being. 

The fact of relations existing between objects marks 
their reference back to the relatively permanent, the 
thing-in-itself. But to the thing-in-itself transcend¬ 
ence of unity and diversity is given by the present 
argument. 

There is precedent necessity for schematic ideas be¬ 
fore ideas can arise for thought : we think the rela¬ 
tions between schematic ideas. Transcendental self- 
conscious Being and the thing-in-itself are considered. 

THOUGHT, BRAIN AND MOTION 

Objects do not exist in any continuity of the materi¬ 
al ; they exist in etheric forms, the forms determined 
by the motion of a comparative few entities (particles 
or electrons). The resistance of matter results from 
the motion of these entities. 

Thought, an inhibition of imagination, is correlated 
to motion of the brain. 

The subject can create objects in the objective uni¬ 
verse, but must first create the object in the intelligible 
universe, that is, must first have an idea of the object. 
Energy and the motion of the entities are determined 
by the laws of nature; all the subject wants for his idea 
is the idea of restricting within imagined boundaries 
the area of motion of certain entities. 

When the idea is arrived at it is correlated to mo¬ 
tion through the brain, which is an object, so the sub¬ 
ject can imagine the object it has created in the intelli- 

2 


xviii ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS 

gible universe as an object in the objective universe. 
But, so far, there is no power to create it in the object¬ 
ive universe. 

But the subject is embodied and embodied in a body 
of motion, which body has been evolved under the 
laws of nature. The subject, embodied, has thus 
given to it, under the laws of nature, a master-tool of 
motion. If the subject be considered as a mere auto¬ 
maton, it is an automaton of motion ; it moves its body 
automatically. The living organism, without self- 
consciousness, moves under action and reaction be¬ 
tween it and its environment : possibly delirium mani¬ 
fests the automatic action of the brain. 

When, then, the embodied subject has imagined for 
the objective universe an object which might but does 
not yet exist in the objective universe, it finds to its 
hands an automatic master-tool of motion in the ob¬ 
jective universe. Just as the laws of nature exist in 
themselves, iron, eternal, so does this master-tool exist 
in itself as an evolution under the laws of nature. The 
subject must bow to both. But, just as when obeying 
the laws of nature the subject can use them for its own 
purposes, so it can use the automatic master-tool pre¬ 
sented to it, for its own purposes. To man is given a 
master-tool of motion; it is thus he can make objects 
in the objective universe. 

By use of this master-tool of motion the subject can 
objectify the object it has created in the intelligible 
universe for the objective universe. A conceit of im¬ 
agination is given suggesting a reason for the sub¬ 
ject’s embodiment. 


THE INTELLIGIBLE UNIVERSE AND THE SENSIBLE UNI¬ 
VERSE (il) 

- Man, as a subject of the intelligible universe, in 
exercising his power over the sensible universe, does 
not act as an automaton : he uses his power for person¬ 
al purposes. No man could thus exercise power un¬ 
less self-conscious; man must be a subject of self-con 


-con- 





ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS xix 

sciousness : self-consciousness is, to each of us, a 
thing-in-itself. The laws of nature are supreme over 
the sensible universe, but as they exist in the intelli¬ 
gible universe it is argued they point to the existence 
of some ultimate self-conscious Being. 


THE SENSIBLE UNIVERSE BEFORE MAN'S APPEARANCE 

We read into nature the existence of the laws of na¬ 
ture before self-conscious subjects or even living 
“ things ” existed. Man’s conscious exercise of power 
over environment, for his own purposes, depends on 
the pre-existence of the laws of nature. And these 
laws have no existence in the sensible universe, they 
govern the sensible universe from their existence in 
the intelligible universe. Man uses the laws of nature 
for his own purposes and we must refer the fact of his 
exercise of power to the transcendental fact (?) that he 
is a self-conscious subject. If, then, we give real 
reality to the laws of nature as existing in unconscious¬ 
ness, we are faced by the impossible ,—one process of 
evolution in nature under evolution, with a sudden ap¬ 
pearance, in the one process, of self-conscious sub¬ 
jects, where the self-conscious subjects change the pro¬ 
cess of evolution for their own purposes . 1 

Any such conclusion is opposed to reason : antino¬ 
mies cannot exist in real reality. We are driven to 
assume that as the use of the laws of nature is by self- 
conscious subjects, so the laws themselves must pro¬ 
ceed from some ultimate, transcendental Self-Con¬ 
scious Being. 

FEELING 

If man were but an organism of thought, then he in 
possession of the finest brain would turn out the finest 
work. Human experience informs us that what is 

iWe have one process existing in two contradictory successive pro¬ 
cesses. 


XX 


ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS 

above stated is in disagreement with fact. It is feel¬ 
ing (desire, will) which determines the output of work, 
so that a comparatively feeble machine may turn out 
better work than one comparatively strong : it is some¬ 
thing external to thought which sets thought to work 
and directs it : feeling directs thought. The thinking 
subject is subjective to itself as a subject of feeling. 

The meaning of the term “feeling” is considered 
and the question of whether desire exists potentially 
for the subject free from the influence of physiological 
or psychical presentation is raised. 

It is argued that the subject must be one of potenti¬ 
ality of feeling before any given presentation. 

POTENTIALITY OF THOUGHT AND FEELING 

Potentiality of thought exists for all human subjects, 
quite apart from manifestation of thought. For hu¬ 
man experience informs us that, as to the vast majority 
of mankind, there is no full manifestation of thought 
and its possible resultant action. But we must not 
hold that this potentiality is sheer waste because never 
manifest in our sensible universe : evolution in our 
universe can offer no explanation for the greatness of 
man’s thought and imagination and the littleness of 
their accomplishment in our sensible universe. 

At first thought we must hold there is the same ap¬ 
parent wastage of feeling as of thought. But this 
question cannot be considered until we have more fully 
considered the meaning of the term feeling. We can 
only hold the “ I am ” to be a feeling subject when 
faced by resistance to its self-expression. 

FEELING (il) 

The question is considered whether, as subjects of 
insight, we are aware of feeling which cannot be re¬ 
ferred to feeling, proper, of pleasure or pain, of desire 
or will. The argument is in the affirmative. 


ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS xxi 

All forms of feeling are traced back as ancillary to a 
“ blind desire ” of the subject to express itself as “ I 
am.” The psychological “ I ” may be termed the 
human personality. The higher personality in each 
one of us—the “ I am ”—strives for freedom from the 
bonds of its human personality or to change the bonds 
into adjuncts for such freedom. Herein is found the 
categorical imperative for us all. 


SELF-EXPRESSION AND THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 

Every man has a right to think and do what is best 
for himself : the meaning of “ best ” depends on what 
man himself is. 

Various philosophies are considered and it is argued 
that full consideration of human experience of man’s 
thought and conduct points to his being something 
more than a mere subject coming into existence on 
birth and ending on the dissolution of the body : it 
points to his period of embodiment being a mere 
passing stage in a, relatively, spiritual existence. Any 
satisfactory philosophy for man must cover all human 
experience and, if man be considered merely an em¬ 
bodied thing, there is failure to account for all his 
thought and conduct. Man’s thought and conduct, 
considered generally, not only can be but are of such 
a nature that his mere desire as a thing of passing time 
cannot explain them. 

The categorical imperative is found in man’s ” blind 
desire ” for full expression of himself as “ I am ” as 
against resistance to self-expression. It is founded 
not on the arguments of the most enlightened moral¬ 
ists or on the moral judgment of every man who will 
make the attempt to form a distinct conception of such 
a law, but on a consideration of human experience. 
For this consideration not only is thought but insight 
used. Free will and moral good are not, as yet, con¬ 
sidered. 



XXII 


ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS 


THE UNIVERSE WITHOUT SELF-CONSCIOUS SUBJECTS 

The laws of nature we must recognize and use before 
we can think about our objective universe; it is their 
existence which makes such thought possible, and 
these laws were in existence before man appeared on 
earth. 

Until self-conscious subjects appear, feeling sub¬ 
jects cannot exist, for feeling is dependent on self-con¬ 
sciousness. The laws of nature show no contempt 
for life, they simply use it for manifestation in numer¬ 
ous bodily forms and nothing can be charged against 
the laws because these manifestations come and go at 
longer or shorter periods in time. 

So long as self-conscious subjects do not exist, sin, 
suffering, pleasure and pain cannot exist, nor can love, 
beauty, truth or justice . 1 There may be manifesta¬ 
tions in appearance, but love, beauty, truth and jus¬ 
tice, in themselves, exist only for self-conscious sub¬ 
jects. At the lowest the laws of nature are a-moral. 
It is not the laws of nature, it is man himself who 
introduces sin and suffering into our universe. Evil 
first appears when self-conscious subjects first appear. 

FREE WILL AND THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 

Free will is a contradiction, for thought, of non-free¬ 
dom of will. And the question of freedom or non¬ 
freedom only arises with the existence of self-conscious 
subjects. For freedom and non-freedom of the will 
to have meaning for the subject there must be a 
standard of determinism and this standard must be in 
the consciousness of all, not in one self-consciousness. 
In thought, we must have the contradictions of free¬ 
will and a categorical imperative. 

The categorical imperative is found in the subject’s 
“ blind desire” to express itself as “ I am.” But 
this desire lies at the back of self-consciousness : in 


1 Unless we bring in transcendental self-conscious Being. 


ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS xxiii 

the fore-front, that is, in thought, the subject finds 
free-will in self-determination of the form of struggle 
to express itself as “ I am.” The contradiction ar¬ 
rived at is one necessary for thought in our universe 
of contradictions. 

The categorical imperative exists in the subject’s 
blind desire to express itself as “ I am.” And, in 
human experience, this blind desire is manifest in the 
ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice to which all 
mankind moves. 

The contradiction between free-will and the categori¬ 
cal imperative is implicit for thought. The contra¬ 
diction is explained away, hereinafter, by the use of 
insight. 


PLEASURE AND HAPPINESS 

The meaning of the terms pleasure and happiness as 
now used is defined. The subject is considered (i) as 
a bodily thing, (2) as one of conduct, (3) as a subject 
in the intelligible universe. Happiness is found to 
exist not in itself but as an appanage or the atmo¬ 
sphere of duty : the nearer the approach to fulfilment 
of duty the nearer the approach to happiness. 

Pleasure is relative, it exists but for moments in 
time. In the series of moments of any subject’s life 
moments of pleasure demand for their existence an 
average level of moments which are, relatively, not 
of pleasure. For moments of pleasure can exist only 
in contrast with—in relation to—moments empty of 
pleasure or, at the lowest, less pleasurable. 

THE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE ACCOMPLISHING 

The contradictions that exist for our universe of 
thought are considered, especially the contradiction 
between free-will and the categorical imperative, which 
has been found in the struggle, implicit for the em¬ 
bodied self-conscious subject, to express itself as “ I 
am.” 


xxiv ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS 

It is a power in the subject transcending thought, 
which makes the subject aware of its limits as a think¬ 
ing subject and that contradictions cannot exist in real 
reality. This reconciliation or subsumption is found 
in the term the “ accomplished in the accomplishing,” 
a term meaningless for thought as it is transcendent 
of thought. We must in thought refer to God, as 
Transcendental Being, the categorical imperative and 
also give Him free-will,—necessary contradictions for 
thought. Insight gets rid of the contradictions by 
giving to Him transcendence of both. 

We can, dimly, interpret this reconciliation. For, 
to us, free-will exists only for a subject conditioned in 
time,—the past falls back into determinism, free-will 
can be referred only to, exists only for, the present 
passing now and the future : free-will is always falling 
back into determinism. Where time is transcended 
not only is free-will transcended but the categorical 
imperative. 

Again, we cannot know or even be aware why the 
subject is embodied in a universe of sin and suffering. 
But we can, dimly, explain sin and, dimly, get rid of 
suffering. Sin exists because we exist embodied in 
the accomplishing. Suffering and pleasure are but 
relative terms and, most strangely, we find that the 
subject which chooses what is best for itself may find 
suffering take on the aspect of pleasure and pleasure 
take on that of suffering. We may surmise a spiritual 
law which rewards and punishes justly, spite of the 
appearance of injustice which exists because of our 
burdens of sin and suffering. 


MYSELF AND DREAMS 

MYSELF 

KNOWLEDGE IS RELATIVE 


At first thought any consideration of the proposition 
that knowledge is relative must be held to be mere 
waste of time, for its truth is denied by no one. But 
the subject in hand requires some introductory con¬ 
sideration in order to make clear what follows. 

When we think, it is ideas 1 that we use 
for thought; and all knowledge is relative because 
ideas are relative. We sense the universe as pre¬ 
sented to our senses, that is, we sense objects which 
are the phenomenal form in which the universe is pre¬ 
sented to us sensually. What the universe may be in 
itself we do not know and cannot know, for there is 
presented to us only what is termed the sensible 
universe. 

We may say that these objects which are sensed 
set up images or result in percepts or concepts in or 
on or of the mind. But they cannot set up ideas. For 
these objects are sensed as unrelated, so that relations 
between them are not sensed at all. And ideas are not 
now treated altogether as concepts or percepts; ideas 
if we consider them as existing in themselves have 
existence only in relations between the objects sensed. 
Now Kant ignored the short road to prove that the 


1 Ideas are not used in the Kantian sense. 


2 MYSELF 

mere sensing of objects can in no way set up ideas : 
we want something else. What this something else 
is will be explained when we consider more closely 
ideas and the laws of Nature. 2 

At present we rest content with the fact of the dis¬ 
tinction now raised between ideas (which import re¬ 
lations) and percepts or concepts, as possibly, direct 
results of sensation. 

A little consideration may be given to the statement 
that objects, as presented, are unrelated to one 
another. 3 

You sense any object, a chair or tree, for instance. 
As sensed it is a thing-in-itself, existing unrelated to 
any other object. For, assume that you are a subject 
without power in your mind of relating the chair or 
the tree to any other object. You will find no relation 
is presented by the chair or the tree as sensed. Or, 
again, assume that you, as you really exist, sense the 
sensible universe as presented to you as all of one 
colour and one shade of colour : you would then have 
no idea of colour, you could not think colour at 
all. You could not think it even as a thing-in-itself. 
And this is because your sensation of colour would 
set up no relation to anything else : colour for you 
would be non-existent in thought. When many 
colours are presented to you, you can think them 
because you can think relations between them; but 
the relations are not presented to you through your 
sense of sight. 

Generally, we may reduce the sensible universe to 
form, colour, size and substance, ultimately to motion. 
But not one of these can be the subject of thought. 
We can only think relations between varying forms, 
etc. 


2 The chapters on “The laws of Nature” and on “Ideas,” 
may be here referred to, though their place in the sequence of argu¬ 
ment comes in later. 

3 Hume finds this a difficulty, Kant deals with ithe says that 
though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means 
follows that all arises out of experience. 


KNOWLEDGE IS RELATIVE 3 

We do not think objects, we think about objects. 
When we say we think a chair, we really are thinking 
about its likenesses and unlikenesses to other objects. 4 

How can we think in this way? 

If we sensed only one single object, unrelated in 
any way, we could not think about it at all. But we 
sense almost an infinite number of objects. Our 
sensing these objects is the beginning of knowledge 
of the sensible universe : the universe must, in some 
way, be presented to us before we can begin to think 
about it. 

When, however, we sense any object, it raises in 
the mind what is termed an idea of the object. 5 
We sense an object for a moment in time : the sensa¬ 
tion is passing. But it leaves behind it an idea of the 
object which, at least so long as the subject exists, 
remains in the mind of the subject. 6 This idea 
is what I have termed a relation of distinction. It is 
not of the object itself, it is of the likeness and unlike¬ 
ness of the object to other objects, of the relation of 
the object to other objects. A good example is to 
be found in mathematics. The symbols 1, 2, 3, etc., 
are meaningless in themselves. We sense them but 
we do not use them for thought. We use for thought 
their relations one to another. The most learned man 
uses the same symbols as the unlearned—the one man 
is more learned simply in that he knows more about 
the relations between them. Or, again, a wise man 
and a fool both sense the sun : the sensation on both 
is exactly the same. But the wise man is said to know 
more about the sun because he knows more about its 
internal relations and its relations to other objects. 

4 This leads to Kant’s magnificent theory of the schematism of 
the understanding, but this theory it is now unnecessary to consider. 

5 The term idea is used in its ordinary, not Kantian, meaning. 
How the idea can be raised in the mind is, as already said, con¬ 
sidered hereafter. 

6 Though memory is stored up in time, the storage is not condi¬ 
tioned in time for, at least, the life of the subject. Cf. Personality 
and Telepathy. 


4 MYSELF 

Whence comes this power to think relations ? The 
relations are not sensed, they are not presented to the 
subject with the presentations of the sensible universe. 

The power must be referred to the mind itself apart 
from the sensible universe. The sensible universe is 
the occasion for thought, it must be presented in some 
way for thought about it to begin : but the thought 
about it is external to the sensible universe. When 
we consider the intelligible universe we shall find 
thought exists in that universe as distinct from the 
sensible—the objective universe: we shall find 
thought can exist apart from the sensible universe : 
the mind exists in the intelligible not the sensible 
universe. 7 

This part of the argument is perfunctory because 
by common admission knowledge is relative. But still 
the argument is defective in that no nexus is shown 
between knowledge which is relative and objects given 
by sense which contain no relations. This nexus will 
be found in the chapter on Thought, Brain and 
Motion. 


SCHEMATIC IDEAS 

It is unnecessary for our purpose to enter on Kant’s 
magnificent theory of the schematism of the under¬ 
standing at any length, but as we use the term idea 
in its ordinary not Kantian meaning, something must 
be said as to what an idea is; as to what the ideas are 
that we use for thought. 

We can and do think about objects in general. For 
instance, we can think about a table in general. If I 
say to you “ I saw a table,” this calls up for you the 
idea of a table : but this is not the idea of any par¬ 
ticular table of determined size, form, colour and sub¬ 
stance which exists or can exist in the sensible 
universe; it calls up for you the idea of a table in 

7 We can think about an object which we have never sensed ; about 
an object, even, which cannot be sensed. 


KNOWLEDGE IS RELATIVE 5 

general. Following Kant we will term this general 
idea the schema of a table. What is really called up 
in your mind and what you use for thought is not the 
idea of any object, but the idea of the schema of an 
object. As against the idea of any object we will term 
this a schematic idea; in the particular case we have 
the schematic idea of a table. 

Now when you think, for instance, about a chair 8 
as different from a table, you do not think about it as 
different from any particular table but as different 
from a table in general, from the schema of a table. 
The idea you use for relation is not that of an objective 
table but of the schema of a table; the idea is a sche¬ 
matic idea. And this is true for all objects. You use 
schematic ideas, not ideas of objects for relation. 9 
This is why in Kant’s language : “ In truth, it is not 
images but schemata, which lie at the foundation of 
our pure sensuous conceptions/’ 

Very light consideration is required to understand 
that these schematic ideas which are used for thought 
cannot, for genesis, be traced back to the objective 
universe. For the general idea of a table cannot be 
represented in the objective universe as a table, and 
so can never be presented to us through our senses. 
All we can imagine or create in the objective universe 
is a particular objectified table. There can exist in 
the objective universe only objects which give rise to 
the beginning of ideas about them : no object can 
there exist which represents any one of the schemata 
of objects. Objects are really “ starting points ” for 
thought: these schematic ideas must exist for thought 
before ideas of objects can arise in the mind for use. 

That these schematic ideas exist in thought for ob¬ 
jects, before any such objects exist in the objective 
universe, will, later on, be seen. But we may here 
give an instance. Before any air-plane existed as an 


8 A chair in general or any particular chair. 

9 Schemata relate back, in Kant’s grand theory, to some ultimate 
schema. 


6 MYSELF 

object, many of us had an idea of the schema of an 
air-plane. And this schematic idea had to exist in 
thought before man could create an air-plane as an 
object. 

Again, until air-planes existed as objects, no one 
could use fully any idea of them as objectified in the 
objective universe as distinct from the idea of their 
schema. It was only when air-planes existed as ob¬ 
jects that distinctions between objective air-planes 
came into existence and the possibility of ideas about 
relations between objectified air-planes arose. 10 

But, still, we do not think these schemata any more 
than we think objects : we think about them. We 
must still hold that knowledge is relative in itself, 
though we can think not only about objects but about 
the schemata of objects. Indeed, thought about the 
schemata of objects must precede thought about ob¬ 
jects. We shall find the strange fact that man can 
create new objects in the objective universe, but that 
he must first have an idea about an object which does 
not exist in the objective universe before he can ob¬ 
jectify any such object. 

Let us consider the statement that, for thought, we 
do not use the schemata of objects as things-in-them- 
selves, but that we use their relations to one another. 

Our objective universe is one of limitation : imagine 
it still more limited than it is. Let us consider an 
universe of nothing but tables. Then we have pre¬ 
sented to us only a vast number of tables, and these 
tables are presented to us through our senses as un¬ 
related : there is nothing for thought to operate on. 
For though to arise we must have some centre for re¬ 
lations to operate round and, our universe being one 
of nothing but tables, this centre must be the schema 
of a table, of a table in general. With this centre for 
thought we can think about the objective tables pre- 


10 But with the schema of any “ class ” of objects in mind, we 
shall find there can be ideas also of particular objects of the class, 
though not yet objects in the objective universe. 


KNOWLEDGE IS RELATIVE 7 

sented as differing objective forms in relation to our 
schema of a table. To think about this limited ob¬ 
jective universe thought only requires one schema, 
the schema of a table : thought itself is not limited, it 
is its purview only that is limited. Thought has only 
tables presented to it and so, in relation to the ob¬ 
jective universe , only thinks about tables. The 
schematic idea of a table exhausts our objective 
universe : we have the schema of our universe. 

If we imagine our universe as one only of chairs 
or bedsteads or anything else, the same argument 
holds good. 

But our universe exists not only of tables, chairs 
and bedsteads as objects, but of innumerable other 
objects. Let us consider, however, for the sake of 
simplicity, a universe of tables, chairs and bedsteads 
only. 

Do we think about any one of these three things 
as distinct and unrelated to the other two ? We do 
not: we think about them as related. But to think 
about a table, chair or bedstead, we use schematic 
ideas, and so to think about the relations between 
tables, chairs and bedsteads we use our schematic 
ideas of such objects. How can we use them? We 
can only use them as relative to one another. 

In order to use ideas for thought about objects in 
the objective universe we must have schematic ideas. 
In a universe of tables the schematic idea of a table 
exhausts the universe : we have the schema of our 
universe. Where there is a universe of three objects 
we must have the three schematic ideas of these ob¬ 
jects for ideas of these objects, and the schema of this 
universe must be the centre for relations between these 
schematic ideas. In the same way, faced as we are by 
our universe as it exists of innumerable objects, we 
use schematic ideas for thought and the centre of re¬ 
lation of these schematic ideas is the schema of our 
universe. (Cf. Personality and Telepathy, p. 50.) 
This schema is not presented to us through our senses, 
we do not sense it, and we know nothing about it; 


MYSELF 


8 

we simply, as will be hereafter seen, arrive at its neces¬ 
sary existence, through a power in us as subjects 
transcending thought. But we do not think schemata, 
we think about them, think their relations inter se. 

What is above written the argument demands. But 
the sole object has been to show that knowledge is 
relative though founded on schematic ideas. 



INSIGHT 


Assume that the subject is no more than a thinking 
subject. Then the subject has no power to criticize, 
much less to determine, any limits for its own thought. 
It can only think; it has no power or faculty which 
can make its thought subjective. If thought itself is 
limited, thought cannot think its own limits. If I am 
nothing more than a thinking subject, there is noth¬ 
ing in me transcending thought which enables me to 
put any limit on myself as a thinking subject. 

Consider any subject existing only in thought, and 
within any limits you will. Then for that subject 
nothing at all exists outside such limits, it cannot 
think outside such limits. 1 It is impossible, then, 
for it to determine its universe of thought as one of 
limits : being a mere thinking subject, it can only 
think relations and it cannot even begin to think about 
what is external to its universe in order to get some¬ 
thing to relate its universe to. For what is outside the 
limits of its universe is related in no way in thought 
to that universe. If “ I ” can only think, by what 
possibility can 1 put any limit on my own thought? 
If I do, it means that I think my own thought as 
limited—my own thought transcends my own thought 
which is impossible. 2 

But, in fact, each one of us as a subject can deter¬ 
mine his own faculty of thought as limited. To us, 
as subjects, our power of thought only extends to 


l For such a subject limits of thought do not exist. 
a 2 The term sometimes used “ absolute knowledge ” I do not touch 
on. We cannot make absolute that which in itself is relative. 

9 


3 


IO 


MYSELF 


relations—knowledge is relative. More than this. 
Ideas existing only as relations we determine our 
universe of thought as one of contradiction : for 
thought (being relative) demands for its existence 
limits of contradiction. We cannot think evil or good, 
unity or diversity, infinity or nothing, in the absolute. 
For any idea of good there must be in the mind, also, 
the idea of evil—its contradiction. And so for unity 
and diversity, infinity and nothing. There is con¬ 
tradiction in our universe of thought. 8 

In fact, however, we have power to determine our 
own thought as relative; that is, that it has content 
only of relations. And, further, our reason leads us 
to a legitimate conclusion that behind or beyond these 
relations, which are the subject of thought, something 
exists of which these relations are phenomenal, or, 
more generally, that something necessarily exists be¬ 
cause relations require this something for their 
existence. What term we may give to this “ some¬ 
thing ” will be considered later on. 3 4 It is referred 
to, now, simply to emphasize the fact that, to us as 
subjects , knowledge is limited in that it is relative, 
and so to us, as subjects, something must exist be¬ 
yond the purview of thought. 

Again, our knowledge being relative, it can have 
existence only between limits of contradiction. 
But reason informs us that contradictions can only 
have phenomenal existence. In real reality they must 
disappear or be transcended by or subsumed under 
“something”: there must be transcendence of all 
contradictions. This again is true for us as subjects. 


3 We do not think good and evil, etc., they constitute merely the 
limits of contradiction of thought, limits which necessarily exist 
because knowledge is relative. We can only think up to and be¬ 
tween the limits. 

4 This “ something ” is not a mere negation, though it is not the 
subject of thought. Kant says the permanent in phenomena must be 
regarded as the condition of (for?) the possibility of all synthetical 
unity of perceptions, that is, of experience. The term permanent 
is considered hereafter. 


INSIGHT n 

But bear in mind that if the “ is ” and the “is not ’’ 
be classed as contradictions, it is more than doubtful 
if there can be transcendence for such contradictions. 5 

This “something” is beyond thought; the very 
ground of reason in assuring us it exists, is based on 
the' limited nature of thought. It is because we can 
determine thought as limited that we arrive at a con¬ 
clusion “ something ” must exist outside the limits 
of thought. 

We find that, as subjects, we have the strange 
power of criticizing our own thought, of determining 
that it has limits and that its limits are not real but 
phenomenal. 

Can we think this “ something ” which is beyond 
the limits of thought? We cannot: thought cannot 
use thought as its subject. When we get outside the 
field of thought, ideas can give us no assistance in 
discovering what exists therein, for ideas are relative 
and exist only in the field of thought. 6 

We are driven to the conclusion that, as subjects, 
we exercise a power which transcends thought. By 
determining the limits of thought, we make thought 
itself subjective to this power : the power we exercise 
transcends the power of thought. 

This power I would term “ Insight ” or “ Aware¬ 
ness.” 7 It is a power of the subject; there is 
nothing transcendental about it, in itself, though it 
will be found to be a link to transcendentalism. In¬ 
sight transcends thought, for thought itself is relative. 
We do not think that thought is relative : we do not 
think the transcendence of contradictions. There is, 
herein, no brain activity, there is but awareness of the 
limitations of brain activity. So no expenditure of 

5 Is it possible that confusion arises in Hegel’s philosophy be¬ 
cause he uses ideas for his consideration of the ‘ is ’ and the * is not.’ ? 

6 Perhaps it is incorrect to say ideas exist only in the field of 
thought. For if the greater include the less, Insight, hereafter 
referred to, does not destroy thought, but merely subsumes it. 

7 In this connection the term ‘ awareness ’ has already been in¬ 
definitely used in America. 


12 MYSELF 

physiological energy is involved, we are fully in the 
psychical. 

The immediate argument is confined to proof that 
this power exists and exists in the subject. But the 
very fact of the existence of the power is of the greatest 
importance, even for psychology treated as a science. 
For the argument, if sound, proves that, not tran- 
scendently, but by the reason of the subject alone we 
can show that the subject has, of itself, power to deter¬ 
mine its own limits of thought. The subject reduces 
presentations or objects to mere “ starting points ” 
for thought. For it cannot think these presentations, 
it can only think about them; that is, think them in 
relation : it can determine its thought as relative. 
Presentations are mere “ starting points ” for thought 
in that they do not originate thought, but merely give 
it occasion for exercise. 

Having power to determine its thought as relative, 
the subject has also, necessarily, power to determine 
that thought can only exist between limits of contra¬ 
diction, limits that it cannot think but up to and be¬ 
tween which it can think. Good, for instance, is 
meaningless for the mind unless its contradiction, 
evil, is also in the mind; and, in the ultimate, the 
reason of the subject makes him aware that these con¬ 
tradictions are phenomenal only, that is, cannot exist 
in real reality. 8 

What does this all mean ? That the relatively pure 
subject can, in transcendence of thought, determine 
the limits of thought of itself as a thinking subject. 

It has been said more than once by no few of our 
leading men of intellect that we have vital knowledge 
of our own ignorance. The statement contains a germ 
of truth, but is incorrect as it stands : knowledge can¬ 
not transcend knowledge. 

When, however, we say : “ Man, as a subject, has 
the faculty of Insight which makes him aware of the 

8 In the ultimate there must be transcendence of both. Herein, 
insight travels beyond the purview of thought 


INSIGHT 13 

limits of his thought as a thinking subject,” we get 
directly at the germ of truth contained in the state¬ 
ment which relies on vital knowledge. 

Insight or Awareness transcends Knowledge, is a 
link to transcendentalism. 9 

James Ward in reference to feeling defines the 
psychological “ I ” as: 

“ The subject of these feelings or phenomena plus the 
series of feelings or phenomena themselves, the two 
being in that relation to each other in which alone the 
one is subject and the other a series of feelings, 
phenomena or objects.” 

But he states also that: 

“ Psychology is not called upon to transcend the 
relation of subject to object, or, as we may call it, the 
fact of presentation.” 

In so stating, he has, I think, in mind the dis¬ 
tinction between the metaphysical and psychological 
“ I ” and does not make his psychological “ I ” ex¬ 
haustive of the ego. I venture to think he denies in 
no way the existence of Kant’s pure ego or tran¬ 
scendental subject. 

But if Insight be a power or faculty of the subject, 
which reason itself arrives at, must not the definition 
of the psychological “ I ” be widened? 

That there is room for this widening of the defini¬ 
tion of the psychological “ I ” is shown by James 
Ward himself. 

“ On the other hand, as has been said, the attempt to 
ignore one term of the relation is hopeless; and equally 
hopeless, even futile, is the attempt by means of phrases 
such as consciousness or the unity of consciousness, to 
dispense with the recognition of a conscious subject.” 

9 Cf. Kant’s Theoretical and Practical Reason. I do not think, 
as McDougal holds, Kant predicated two “ intellects,” but that his 
theoretical reason was given as transcending practical reason. 


i 4 MYSELF 

We are as conscious of this power of Insight as we 
are of thought itself. 

It will be shewn hereafter that the brain is a machine 
of motion whereby relation is established between 
the subject and the external universe, so that the sub¬ 
ject can have ideas about the objective universe. It is 
thus the objective universe becomes an “ occasion ” 
for thought. 10 Thought is an inhibited form of 
imagination, its form determined by the motion of 
the brain. 

The genesis of insight is thus made clear. The 
subject, by its power of imagination, is aware of the 
limitations of its power of thought: is aware that 
thought is an inhibited form of imagination. This 
awareness marks what is now termed insight. 

Insight is in some measure the same as, but must 
not be confounded with, intuition. The term intuition 
has been used as having many different meanings. It 
has been said that all these meanings have one thing 
in common—they all express the condition of an im¬ 
mediate in opposition to mediate knowledge. But 
now we deny the possibility of immediate knowledge 
—for knowledge is in itself relative; insight does not 
give immediate knowledge, it transcends knowledge. 

Again, Kant makes the following statements : “All 
intuition possible to us is sensuous-”; “intuition is 
nothing but the representation of phenomena ”; “ we 
intuite ourselves only as we are internally affected ” ; 
“ in relation to sensibility the manifold in intuition is 
subject to the formal conditions of time and 
space ” ; “a cognition may be an intuition ”; “ and 
intuition all his (God’s) cognition must be, and not 
thought, which always includes limitation.” 

Kant evidently uses the term “ cognition ” as of 
very wide meaning—it is used as meaning more than 
thought; he would appear to use it in a transcendental 
sense when referring to the cognition of God. When 
referring to God he also considers intuition (not 


10 (See page 75). 


INSIGHT 15 

sensuous intuition) as transcendent in meaning : how 
then can intuition be conditioned as sensuous ? 

What is above stated shows that “ intuition ” is 
used as having many and possibly conflicting mean¬ 
ings. We now, therefore, except for reference, do 
not use the term intuition. Thought is treated as 
limited in that it runs parallel with motion of the 
brain. Insight is a power of the subject whereby the 
subject transcends thought: this power is traced back 
to imagination. The subject is related to the objective 
universe through sensibility, so that it can sense its 
universe. Thought about this universe depends on 
the existence of the brain. 11 Understanding is a source 
of knowledge and if, with Kant, we hold that sense is 
also a source of knowledge we must hold that it is only 
so far a source in that, through sensibility, it gives 
“ occasion ” for knowledge. Sensuous intuition is 
now taken as an expression merely for effect from the 
external on the subject; so it can be no more than 
what we may term a possible content for thought, it 
cannot set up thought. 

We bring clearer light to bear on our power of 
reasoning by use of the term insight instead of the 
omnibus term intuition : we define thereby the limit¬ 
ations of thought; knowledge is relative and lies be¬ 
tween limits of contradiction ; insight makes us aware, 
as we are aware, of this limitation. 

I think the argument follows Kant in that he gives 
to reason transcendence of understanding; but no use 
is now made of Kantian ideas. 


ll Thought is not lost in insight, it is subsumed under it, the 
greater contains the less. 


* 

, 

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 

The “ Cognito, ergo sum ” requires explanation. 
“ I ” do not exist because I think; I exist because I 
am conscious of thought; even if, for thought, we 
read the word “ awareness.” Self-consciousness must 
exist as a thing-in-itself; thought, if it is my thought, 
is but a content of self-consciousness . 1 Thought 
may take place for ever and a day, even to the extent 
of a Newton or Shakespeare. But there is in such 
case only a thinking machine; there is no thinking 
subject in existence, unless there is a subject self- 
conscious of thought. The subject cannot exist solely 
in thought; its existence must be referred back to self- 
consciousness : for we do not use the term “ subject ” 
as defining merely what is a subject to others; we 
define it as meaning a subject in itself. And this can- 


l Sankara says, in substance: “Inasmuch, therefore, as con¬ 
sciousness makes both internal and external things its objects, it 
is not a material property. If its distinction from material objects 
be admitted, its independence of them must be also admitted. More¬ 
over its identity in the midst of changing circumstances proves its 
etemality. Remembrance and such states of the mind become possi¬ 
ble only because the knowing - self is recognised as the same in two 
successive states.” Huxley agrees with this; he writes: “ In the 
first place, as I have already hinted, it seems to me pretty plain that 
there is a third thing in the universe (that is third to matter and 
force), to wit, consciousness, which in the hardness of my heart or 
head, I cannot see to be matter or force, or any conceivable modi¬ 
fication of either, however intimately the manifestations of the 
phenomena of consciousness may be connected with the phenomena 
known as matter and force.” Collected Essays , Vol. 9, Page 130. 
James Ward, as we have seen, expresses the same opinion 
in other words. Coleridge says: “Self-consciousness is groundless 
because it is the ground of all other certainty.” 

16 



SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 17 

not be without self-consciousness. I suggest that for 
self-consciousness in itself there may be transcendence 
of subject and of object as generally understood. As 
to this, bear in mind the distinction between con¬ 
sciousness and content of consciousness. It is in 
thought that the “ Not I ” cannot exist for the “I” 
unless the “ I ” exist for itself in self-consciousness. 

Riehl’s argument that “ something ” exists in itself 
as distinct from consciousness is not denied. But does 
it not follow that consciousness must then exist in 
itself, as Huxley held? When, then, Riehl says “the 
experience I am is not simple but two-sided ” because 
what is originally given is the reciprocity of ego and 
non-ego, he confounds consciousness with the content 
of consciousness : he really holds that consciousness 
cannot exist without what is, to us, content. But he 
has already given real reality to “ something ” which 
in itself exists as distinct from consciousness, so he 
makes consciousness subjective to this something 
which is not consciousness, because consciousness for 
its existence depends on this “ something ” for con¬ 
tent. And yet he says again—“ The assumption of 
an unconscious creative power of our consciousness 
does not harmonize with the actual character of the 
world given in perception.” 

When Riehl gives real reality to “ something ” 
which is not consciousness and makes consciousness 
contingent on content for its existence, he forgets an 
underlying fact, incomprehensible though it be :—he 
could not have promulgated his theory unless he had 
precedent existence as a self-conscious subject. 2 

Thought is presented to the self-conscious subject, 
otherwise it could not be his thought. You may if 
you like say that the subject, when no thought is pre¬ 
sented, is merely a self-conscious subject in poten- 

2 Bear in mind we refer to a self-conscious subject , not to any 
being or ultimate Being of self-consciousness. Riehl himself says: 
Every possible explanation of consciousness must evidently pre¬ 
suppose consciousness itself. 



18 MYSELF 

tiality. 3 But that does not affect the argument, any 
more than the fact of a leakless, charged Leyden jar, 
which never does anything, proves its absence ol 
static force. You may even say that statically the 
subject is a self-conscious subject, its dynamic force 
being manifest only in thought. 4 But that, too, does 
not affect the argument. The fact that 1 write anc 
you read is, for us, definite proof of the incompre¬ 
hensible fact that each of us exists as a self-conscious 
subject: the subject must be distinguished from its 
content. 

To support what is above stated requires considera¬ 
tion of the relation of the self-conscious “ I ” to the 
thinking “I.” 5 

There may be action and reaction between a living 
organism and its environment under the “ laws of 
Nature ” without thought on the part of the organism. 
For thought to exist for the organism, the organism 
must be one self-conscious of itself; there must be the 
“ I ” and the “ not I ” for the organism. 6 But this, 
it will be argued, involves, as a condition precedent, 
that the subject must be self-conscious in order that 
it may be a thinking subject. The subject as a think¬ 
ing subject presents its thought to itself as a self- 
conscious subject. 7 


3 This is not admitted now as correct unless potentiality be con¬ 
fined to thought about the sensible universe. We know nothing o 
what the psychic activity of the subject may or may not be. 

4 I deny that self consciousness is exhausted by thought. 

5 Imagination is referred to at a later stage of the argument. 

6 If self-consciousness necessarily involves thought, the self-con 
scious I must be a thinking I, if we use the terms “ I ” and “ not I 5 
in their anthropomorphic sense, as apparently Descartes did. 
argue that thought is not exhaustive of self-consciousness. If th 
faculty of Insight exists, thought is clearly not so exhaustive. 

7 This makes the brain a mere machine, external to the subject 
which the subject uses for thought. The brain, “ inhibits ” the pur 
view of self-consciousness. We can determine the brain as a neces 
sary part of the thinking subject; but if, as Huxley held, conscious 
ness is a thing-in-itself, then thought is presented to the self 
conscious subject. Insight seems a power linking the thinking fc 
the self-conscious subject. Cf. Personality and Telepathy, p. 17 
where the argument is not as clear as it should be, oecause 1 bn* 
not then arrived at the faculty of Insight. 


SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 


i9 

This self-consciousness of the subject has been 
defined as “a too widely diffused consciousness 
which, for the concentration necessary for thought, 
requires the inhibition of the brain.” Though the 
author of this definition has great authority I affirm 
that it is on its face incorrect. The truth is that the 
inter-position of the brain is necessary for thought, 
but that this inhibition of the brain does not exhaust 
self-consciousness. 8 The brain simply acts as a machine 
for thought to exist. Thought, to us, is not exhaus¬ 
tive ; we can determine it as using only ideas which 
are limited to relations : the self-conscious subject is 
also conscious of the power of Insight or Awareness 
transcending thought. Can the machine, the brain, 
criticize its own output ? And can it be believed that 
self-consciousness is itself ‘‘too widely diffused?” 
That it is mainly sheer waste, useful only so far as 
inhibited for thought? 9 

But there is an implicit admission in the definition 
of self-consciousness referred to. It admits that self- 
consciousness is more widely diffused than is neces¬ 
sary for thought. If so, where is the subject ? Is the 
subject one oi this too widely diffused consciousness? 
Or, does the subject only come into being when the 
too widely diffused consciousness is concentrated by 
the inhibition of the brain for thought ? In the latter 
case the subject is a mere thinking “ I ” dependent 
for existence on the existence of its brain and so dis¬ 
appearing with the dissolution of its brain. And, if 
this be so, where is the too widely diffused conscious- 

8 William James in “ The Varieties of Religious Experiences ” 
says: Our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as 
we call it, is but one special form of consciousness, whilst all about 
it, parted from it by the flimsiest of screens, there lie potential 
forms of consciousness entirely different. 

9 If the subject is no more than an object in the sensible universe, 
then its self-consciousness is exhausted by thought. But, if so, what 
becomes of the “too widely diffused consciousness”? 


20 MYSELF 

ness, before the subject comes into being? 10 If all 
consciousness, concentrated or not, is, for the subject, 
exhausted by thought, that is, if the subject as a self- 
conscious subject, is nothing except so far as it is 
inhibited as a thinking subject, there is no escape 
from the conclusion that its existence depends on the 
existence of its brain. Descartes held that the sub¬ 
ject is always thinking and he held this because he 
held “ I am, because I think,” 11 and only by con¬ 
tinuity of thought could he explain the continuity 
of the subject. 

But by what possibility can we define consciousness 
as too diffused or concentrated or as conditioned in 
any way ? It simply exists, for us, beyond the pur¬ 
view of thought. Consciousness necessarily imports 
a self which is conscious, but no one can think his own 
self-consciousness : it simply is. Consciousness, as 
Huxley held, is a thing-in-itself, and even Haeckel, 
while declaring it must be an evolution from uncon¬ 
sciousness, admitted he could not produce any satis¬ 
factory evidence in support of his opinion. 12 

The question resolves itself into this : is conscious¬ 
ness exhausted by thought, or is thought merely a 
content of consciousness or something presented to 
consciousness? Presented to a self-conscious 
subject ? 

There is a passage in Kant’s Transcendental Philo¬ 
sophy which I have been told on the highest authority 
is most difficult to understand. Cousin holds what is 
therein stated to be incorrect. It appears to me to be 

10 What meaning has consciousness without a being who is 
conscious? We must ‘invent’ the term, apart from all experience, 
as Schopenhauer invented ‘will.’ If this ‘too widely diffused con¬ 
sciousness ’ be referred to some ultimate self-conscious Being the 
whole argument based on it fails. Spinoza’s theory may be referred 
to. 

11 Descartes, it would appear, held the subject to be merely a 
thinking and conscious subject, not a subject to whose self-conscious¬ 
ness thought is presented. But, possibly, if Riehl be correct, I have 
wrongly interpreted Descartes’ meaning. 

12 His argument would have been exactly the same if he had 
set out to prove the unconscious was evolved from the conscious. 


SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 


21 


*rect and easily understood. What the passage is 
11 be stated hereafter. The following consideration 
it touches the question before us. 

We appear to know ourselves. I can determine 
rself in relation of distinction from others, in bodily 
m, mental ability and the environment of property 
d social status. I can do this because I can think 
ations. I can think about myself in relation to 
lers. I can also think about myself as I existed at 
rious past times and can imagine myself as I shall 
in various future times because these “ states ” are 
ative and so the subject of thought. 

But what is this “ I ” that I have been thinking 
out ? It is a thing of constant change in time and 
ace. Moreover, it is an object to me ,—if it were not, 
:ould not think about it : I do not think it, I think 
out it only. And even the object I think about has 
permanence, it changes from moment to moment, 
'hat I do is to think about myself as a self changing 
>m moment to moment. 

If this changing thing is fully myself at no moment 
n it be true for me that I am. For at each moment I 
ange. Again, if I as myself can think myself as I, 
nake myself an object to myself, which is the same 
saying the “ I ” thinking is, for itself, the same 
the “ I ” thought of. The thing knowing is the 
me as the thing known. Therefore, subject is object 
d object is subject. 13 But any such merger or 
:onciliation is impossible for thought : the knower 
distinct from the known; thought is never its own 
ntent. 

The only solution is to be found in Kant’s state- 
;nts, “ I have therefore no knowledge of myself as 
im, but merely as I appear to myself ” : “lam con- 
ous of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I 
1 in myself, but only that I am” 

3 The self known is both object and subject to the self knowing 
l the self knowing is both object and subject to the self-known. 


22 MYSELF 

As Locke has stated, personal identity consists it 
consciousness, which, I think, must be taken to meat 
in self-consciousness. 14 

The subject, through the brain, has the power o 
thought. The subject, conditioned in time and spac< 
as a human being, thereby becomes an object in th< 
universe as presented. The subject takes on the ap 
pearance of an object and so, through thought, can b< 
presented as an object to be thought about, to the sel 
in self-consciousness. The really real subject marks 
for us, only the I am : it is a fact beyond the purviev 
of thought. 

The pure subject then is the I am , which, for us 
imports consciousness. And in relation to the sen 
sible universe it may be termed a receptivity. For ir 
its appearance as a human being it has a brain which 
through thought, relates it to the sensible universe 
whereby it is enabled not to think the sensible universt 
as presented, but to think about it. The “ I am ” car 
receive thought. Thought may be termed a conten 
of consciousness. 

Herein we find the relation of the self-consciou: 
subject to the thinking subject. The thinking sub 
ject is phenomenal 15 of the I am and presents though 
to it. So we cannot condition the subject I am in an} 
way as existing only as a thinking subject. Th< 
faculty of Insight, itself, proves the subject to be mori 
than a mere thinking subject. 

When we say “ I think myself,’* we state what is 
for us, impossible in thought unless we distinguisl 
between the I and myself. But how are we to distin 
guish ? For the / and myself express, each, the sam 
subject! 

The only distinction can be that the "I” think 
the “ myself ” as conditioned in some way. The pur 


14 Kant says the * I ’ intuites itself. 

15 It is a conditioned form of the I am. 


SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 


23 


1 ” exists, 16 for us, in the “ I am ” beyond the pur- 
iew of thought; the “ myself ” is the empirical “ I ” 
-the “ I ” conditioned in the sensible universe and 
linking about the sensible universe by the exercise 
f thought through the brain. 

The I am exists for each one of us. Try to think it, 

> determine it in thought. You cannot, it is elusive 
f thought. Your thought is merely relative, and the 
am being to you a thing-in-itself, is not a subject of 
lought which is relative. 17 You cannot think yourself 
s duke or guttersnipe, rich or poor, clever or stupid, 
loral or immoral. You can only think about any 
uch status of yours, can only think the relations be- 
veen your status and that of others. You cannot even 
link any absolute standard by which to determine 
diat morality or immorality is, what cleverness or 
tupidity is. All you can do, in thought, is to say 
loralitv and immoralitv, cleverness and stupidity, are 
imits of thought which you cannot think, but up to 
nd between which limits you can think relations. 18 
But how can you have insight into the fact of this 
mitation of your power of thought unless you are 
lore than a thinking subject ? How can you have in- 
ight into the fact that all change, variation, the very 
xistence of relations, demands the existence of what 
5 ordinarily termed permanence, 19 unless you are more 


16 In the Aesthetic and Logic Kant refers to the pure ego as the 

soul of man,” in his Dialectic he terms it the transcendental sub- 

jet. It is for the transcendental subject that Insight as a faculty 
f the subject, is so important; insight relates the subject to the 
ranscendental. 

17 If you argue that this I am must equally apply to an oyster as 
3 a man, I reply that it may or may not: I am ignorant on 
he subject. 

18 This does not import denial that a categorical imperative can 
xist for thought, though it cannot be thought about. 

19 The permanent can be thought as a contradiction of the non- 
iermanent. The “ permanent, ” as used in metaphysics must, I 
told, refer to “ something ” under which change and non-change, 
tc., are subsumed, as “something” which transcends these bruits 
>f contradiction. 


24 MYSELF 

than a thinking subject ? But this insight exists, you 
are more than a thinking subject. 

When then we say “ I think myself ” we mean we 
think only about ourselves in relation to others. The 
I am has thought presented to it about itself con¬ 
stantly changing as conditioned in the sensible 
universe. This constantly changing “ myself ” is the 
I am conditioned in time and space in our sensible 
universe. 

For this “ myself ” the “ I ” and “ not I ” holds 
good. But for the I am ? 

As we cannot either think the I am or think about it, 
the I and “ not I ” as it exists for the thinking subject, 
though it may exist phenomenally, cannot in real 
reality exist for the I am . 20 I doubt if Insight which 
transcends thought helps us to establish distinctions 
between one I am and another. The distinctions are, 
to us, but incomprehensible facts. Still, Insight 
opens an argument that the “ I ” and “ not I ” exists 
for the 1 am transcendentallv. 

The phenomenal exists, so “something,” generally 
termed the permanent, must exist. 21 For the pheno¬ 
menal must be phenomenal of something : the very 
term “ limited ” imports, for thought, the unlimited, 
though both (contradictions) must, as Insight makes 
us aware, be subsumed under the “ something ” tran¬ 
scendent. 

The “ I ’ r and “ not I ” exist for the thinking I. 
Can this phenomenal “ I ” create the distinction ? The 
distinction, as thought, is anthropomorphic, but it is 
necessarily so because of the limits of the thinking I. 
And, for the thinking I to think the distinction, it has 
been shown that the I am must exist. The distinction 
could not be thought unless the I am existed. 

It would appear impossible for the thinking I to 

20 Bear in mind that Gautama said he did not know what hap¬ 
pened to the self (the 1 am) when freedom from Maya or delusion had 
been obtained. 

21 The use of the term “ the permanent ” is hereafter criticised. 
The phenomenal cannot be thought unless, in any case, its contra¬ 
diction is also in the mind. 


SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 25 

reate the distinction. So it is fairly arguable that for 
le I am the “ I ” and “ not I ” must exist in some 
ranscendent form . 22 

I he following is perhaps a weak argument but it 
ppeals strongly to most: 

We all of us feel assured that we ourselves exist in 
ontinuity from the cradle to the grave. We do not 
ontemplate ourselves as different selves in youth and 
ge; we speak of my youth, my age. And it is to this 
bing of relative permanence that we refer our human 
xperience, our increase in growth and knowledge, 
ur change in form and intellect. The changing self 
> always, in freedom from time, presented to this 
elatively permanent self. 

I may lose part of my body but “ I ” remain the 
ame. My memory is not affected by the loss and, 
sing memory, I feel that “ I ” have not changed but 
iy body has changed. I make my body external to 
lyself as the I am. 

But my brain, as part of my bodily structure, also 
hanges from moment to moment; its effectiveness 
hanges at times in “jumps”; to-day I can use it 
/ith ease, to-morow with difficulty. But what do we 
lean when we say we use our brain ? We mean there 
5 something “in us ” which we can only turn into 
bought if our brains, as machines, will enable us to 
lo so. A writer is seeking for a word to express 
bought. The word is “ somewhere ” (perhaps in 
is memory) but he cannot express it in words unless 
is brain permits him to bring it into consciousness 
1 the present , 25 and in relation to the sensible 

22 Those acquainted with the Devanta, will understand that the 
bove line of argument is taken from that source. The “ I am ” 
ill exists, though all human distinctions which are necessary for 
srsonality as ordinarily understood to exist, have passed away as 
maya.” 

23 The word is in his consciousness, but it is useless to him for 
lought unless in consciousness in the present and in relation to the 
;nsible universe. Using Myer’s terms of distinction we may say 
ie word is useless for thought in the subliminal consciousness, it 
ust be brought up into the supraliminal consciousness before it can 
; of use for thought. 


4 


26 MYSELF 

universe. The artist, inventor, poet, striving for ex 
pression, is striving to get his brain to enable him t< 
think in the present and in relation to the sensible 
universe, something already in him. 

But whether we fail or whether we succeed in get¬ 
ting our brain to do what we want it to do, do we fee 
that we change? We do not. It is the same I an. 
whether successful or not successful. 

Just as change in the body does not affect the “ 1 
am,” so change in the brain does not affect the I am. 
And this is in agreement with the conclusion already 
come to. Though all thought is dependent on the 
existence of the brain, the I am is independent oi 
thought and so the conscious I is more than a mere 
thinking 1. The thinking I is not the same from one 
moment to another. The I am is relatively the per¬ 
manent, the ego. 24 

But here, again, if we use the term “ permanent ” 
in its ordinary sense as applying to the “ I am,” the 
argument fails. For if the “ I am ” is permanent 
and the “ thinking I ” is a thing of change, the one 
stands in contradiction to the other and by no pos¬ 
sibility can we make the one a conditioned state of the 
other. Change and permanence are, to us, pure con¬ 
tradictions which necessarily exist for us in our 
universe of thought. But for the “I am” we must 
get rid of the contradiction, though it must always 
exist in thought. 

The error is apparent, but its explanation is also 
apparent. 

When we define the “ 1 am ” as permanent we con¬ 
dition it in thought * 5 The “thinking I” we can 
condition in thought and so are justified in defining it 

24 Cf. Personality and Telepathy. Chapters on memory. 
Therein, contrasting the l am (termed, perhaps unfortunately, the 
intuitive self) with the thinking I, I show that memory in itself 
establishes the I am. 

25 For thought, the “I am ” is permanent in relation to the think¬ 
ing I. 


SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 27 

as a thing of change. But the “ I am ” is not a sub¬ 
ject of thought, so insight makes us aware that we can 
condition it in no way. We have the faculty of 
Insight which makes us aware that our thought is 
limited and that the limits of contradiction of our 
universe have only phenomenal existence. Insight 
tells us that the “ 1 am ” transcends the phenomenal. 

How does this affect our consideration of the “ I 
am ”? 

For the “ I am ” the limits of contradiction cannot 
exist as contradictions, while for the “ I am,” con¬ 
ditioned as the “ thinking I,” they do exist. For 
thought cannot inform us of its own limits; only in¬ 
sight can do this. 

For the “ I am ” there must, then, be transcendence 
of these limits. That is, for the “ I am ” there must 
be “ something ” transcendent under which perman¬ 
ence and change are subsumed. We cannot think 
this “ something,” while Insight itself tells us 
nothing about it except that it must exist. 26 

When we accept this transcendence for the “ I am ” 
the difficulties we have encountered disappear. For 
this transcendence of the permanent and the changing 
the term “ the accomplished in the accomplishing ” is 
now used. Its meaning is transcendental. 

We can now understand how the “ I am ” may be 
conditioned in limits as a “ thinking I ” : we can 
understand that in relation to the “ thinking I ” the 
“ I am ” is permanent: we can understand how the 
“ thinking I ” can present its thought to the “ I am,” 
the conscious self. For our faculty of Insight has 
enabled us to escape from the contradiction between 
the permanent I and the changing, thinking I. The 
thinking I is seen to be a conditioning of the “ I 
am,” not a contradiction. So the thinking I can be 

26 There is nothing original in what follows. Expressed otherwise 
all is to be found in the Devanta . 


28 MYSELF 

an object to the “ I am.” For the “ I am ” there is 
transcendence of the permanent and of change. 27 

The term “lam” for the self-conscious subject has 
been used deliberately because of its vagueness; we 
cannot think the “I am,” while Insight itself only 
informs us of its existence, without any explanation of 
what its existence is. 28 

Throughout, great stress is laid on Insight as a 
faculty of the subject. As before stated more than 
one of our leading men of intellect have suggested 
that the supreme power of man exists in man’s vital 
knowledge of his own ignorance. But, though the 
statement touches on the truth, it is incorrect as it 
stands. For, if correct, then man has knowledge tran¬ 
scending knowledge : which is impossible. 

But when we bring in the faculty of Insight we find 
the explanation which follows for the statement re¬ 
ferred to :—• 

Man as a subject has the power of Insight, which 
makes him aware of the limited nature of his know¬ 
ledge. Man has the transcendent power not of think¬ 
ing but of being aware that his thought is limited. 
The statement, then, corrected stands : “ Man has 

vital Insight into the limits of his knowledge.” 

This “ awareness ” forms a link between the subject 
and the transcendental subject or the “ I am.” It 
enables us to escape from the contradiction between 
the thinking I and the “ I am ” and to be aware that 
the former is a conditioned state of the latter. 29 

The thinking I as a subject is a subject of change, 

27 The “I am ” is the permanent in relation to the thinking 
subject, but the “ I am ” in relation to Transcendental Being is the 
accomplishing to the accomplished in the accomplishing. Unless 
we follow Spinoza we must hold that existence of the “ I am ” 
in “ the accomplished in the accomplishing ” is subject to some 
relative incompleteness as against ultimate Being. 

28 The term self-apperception equates the term “I am.” The 
statement of Kant that the ego intuites itself suggests the term 
“ Intuitive self,” which I used in Personality and Telepathy. 

29 Kant gives the same nexus between his subject and trancend- 
ental subject. I merely emphasise his theory by introducing 
Insight as a faculty of the subject. 


SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 29 

the “ I am as a subject is, relatively, a subject of 
permanence. But the subject is more than a thinking 
subject, it also has the power of Insight, and as a sub¬ 
ject of Insight it can make itself, as a thinking subject, 
an object to itself : it can determine its thought as 
limited. 

But the subject of Insight presents its Insight to the 
“ I am ” which, for us as subjects, exists, beyond the 
purview of thought or Insight, in self-consciousness. 
If, however, we give permanence to the “ I am,” 
again we are faced by a contradiction. We cannot 
condition the thinking I, a subject of change, under 
its contradiction, the “ I am ” which is permanent. 
Insight makes us aware that in real reality these con¬ 
tradictions cannot exist. There must be reconciliation 
or subsumption in transcendence. We are driven to 
give the “ I am ” transcendence relatively of both 
change and the permanent. We must have “ the 
accomplished in the accomplishing.” 80 

The meaning herein attached to the term self-con¬ 
sciousness requires some consideration as, through¬ 
out, I may have used it as having a different meaning 
from that generally given. 

I use self-consciousness as meaning a “ thing-in- 
itself.” We may be conscious of this or of that, but 
whatever the content of self-consciousness may be or 
may not be, self-consciousness remains unaffected. 
As it is beyond the purview of thought or even of 
Insight, we can condition it in no way by its content, 
whereas in science (and even metaphysics?) it would 
appear to be defined as dependent on some content. 
Huxley held that consciousness is a thing-in-itself. I 
claim that reason justifies us in assuming conscious¬ 
ness cannot exist without a Being or subject which is 
conscious; but this does not import any necessary 
content or content of consciousness. 31 I fully admit 

30 This phrase is to be often used. I took it from C. C. Massey. 

31 Unless for self-consciousness the self be held a content of con¬ 
sciousness. Bear in mind we can but dimly compass the question 
of possible psychic activity for the self-conscious subject, even 
though, following Kant, we give the “ I am ” free imagination. 


3 o MYSELF 

that consciousness without a content is unthinkable. 
But this means simply that, not being a subject of 
relation, it is beyond the purview of thought. If 
reason leads us to any conclusion we must accept it, 
however incomprehensible in thought or foreign, not 
necessarily opposed, to human experience. 

We get rid of the contradiction for thought between 
the phenomenal and the permanent by holding that 
the ultimate is not in the permanent, but in “ the 
accomplished in the accomplishing ” : there is tran¬ 
scendence of the contradictions of the permanent and 
phenomenal. It is only in thought, that is, relatively 
that the self-conscious subject can be termed per¬ 
manent. 

The Unity of God does not import denial of His 
Immanence just as the Immanence of God does not 
import denial of His Unity. If He exist in the “ ac¬ 
complished in the accomplishing ” we transcend these 
contradictions of thought. It is Insight which enables 
us thus to transcend thought. 

Kant says: “ I am conscious of myself, not as I 
appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only as 
I am.” With this I fully agree. But when he goes 
on to say : “ This representation is a thought not an 
intuition,” I disagree. In the first place I can find no 
_ representation (or presentation). In my consciousness 
that I am there is no exercise of contemplation : I do 
not contemplate this real myself. And how can 
thought be involved, how can the content of thought 
for the thinker be the thinker himself? Kant himself 
says intuition is not involved. 

My Self-consciousness exists in unity in relation 
to the congeries of lives to which I can refer back the 
apparent one life of my body : I, as a self-conscious 
subject, can by thought “ dissect ” my body and so 
learn that its apparent one life really exists as a mere 
synthesis of innumerable lives. My self-consciousness 
cannot be a function of my bodily life unless to each 
life of the innumerable lives going to make up the 
apparent one life of my body, self-consciousness is 


SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 31 

given and my self-consciousness is held to be a syn¬ 
thesis of these self-consciousnesses. 

Self-consciousness is for each of us our sheet-anchor 
of existence fixed deep, unknown, unseen, in the ocean 
of the universe, while we as subjects, like ships on the 
surface of time and space, toss about in storms of 
good and evil, happiness and misery, beauty and 
ugliness. It is insight, transcending thought, which 
gives us power to dive below our surface of time and 
space. 


A CONSIDERATION OF INFINITE BEING 


Our insight into the “ I am ” may be rendered 
clearer by a consideration of what is generally termed 
Infinite Being. It will be argued that the term In¬ 
finite is incorrect. For, if we use the term Infinite, 
we leave unbridged the chasm between the Infinite 
and the Finite. 

In considering the question before us we must al¬ 
ways bear in mind that in reasoning about anything 
we must necessarily start with an assumption that I 
who write and you who read exist as “ I am,” what¬ 
ever meaning we may attach to “ I am.” Unless I 
and you exist, I cannot write and you cannot read j 1 
and, when we assume our existence, this covers the as¬ 
sumption that I who write am not you who read : 
there must be for both of us the I and not-I. Even il 
I allege the theory of solipsism to be true for myself, 
this imports that, for me, it is true for you also. And, 
as I am not you, here again—a delicious contradiction 
for solipsism—we have the I and not-I. So, in any 
case, you and I are subjects, whether pure subjects 
or not. And this is why reason makes us aware there 
must be some ultimate all-embracing “ I am ” beyond 
the purview of thought. We arrive at what is or¬ 
dinarily, but, I think, wrongly termed “ Infinite 
Being.” 

Kant tells us that we cannot regard the world as 
finite or infinite. His proof would appear to be con¬ 
clusive and he thereby opens an explanation of all his 

l We write and read in the passing- moment. Something in us 
uses these passing momentary operations in, to us, an ever present 
now. Only a continuous “ I am ” can do this. 



A CONSIDERATION OF INFINITE BEING 33 

antinomies. But it is necessary here merely to state 
that the finite and infinite are contradictions which 
exist only in and for thought: thought cannot tran¬ 
scend the contradiction. It is Insight which makes 
us aware that in real reality the contradiction cannot 
exist. 

Now it is very generally held that finite being leads 
us, in reason, to an idea of Infinite Being. 2 And this 
is correct for thought. For when we use thought we 
use ideas which are relative, and infinity is, for 
thought, an ultimate as opposed to the finite or noth¬ 
ing. But Insight makes us aware of the limits of 
thought: it makes us aware that the finite and infinite 
are mere limits of thought, or rather, that we can only 
think the finite between the contradictory limits of 
O and OO- Insight, then, as transcendent of thought, 
informs us that infinity is no more than a limit of 
thought: our ideas are “things” of relation, and 
infinity is a limit marking one boundary of relations. 
Insight makes us aware that, in the ultimate, the con¬ 
tradiction of 0 and OO must be reconciled or subsumed 
under “ something.” 

Instead tfien of predicating Infinite Being we must 
predicate some ultimate Being transcending the finite 
and also transcending the contradictory limits of O and 
OO Only thus can we arrive at a Being free from the 
limitations of thought. 3 It is Insight which enables 
us to arrive at such a transcendent existence; we can¬ 
not fathom it in thought. 

If, transcending thought, we trust to Insight, we 
can imagine transcendence of good and evil, joy and 
sorrow, nothing and infinity, etc. Indeed, Insight 
obliges us to hold that, in some Ultimate, there is 
reconciliation or subsumption of all these contradic¬ 
tions which exist only in and for thought. But the 
contradictions—good and evil, for instance—as limits 

2 Those who start with a denial of the “ I am ” are not led to 
this conclusion. The subject is not, by the argument, a finite being. 
Any such theory leads to Pantheism. 

3 If such a Being can be thought it is a “ thing” of relation. 


34 MYSELF 

do not disappear, are not blotted out in the ultimate. 
They exist phenomenally for conditions, in the un¬ 
conditioned. The transcendence of the unconditioned 
does not mark destruction of the conditioned but sub¬ 
sumption of all conditions. At the same time not only 
this transcendence but this subsumption is beyond 
thought. 4 

When we define God as Unity or as the Manifold 
or as Immanent, or make Him Nature itself or define 
Him as external to Nature and Omnipotent and 
Omnipresent, what are we doing? Especially, when 
we say finite being implies Infinite Being in the 
ultimate, what are we doing? 

We are using ideas to define God. It is true we 
define Him at a limit of thought: but the contradic¬ 
tion of this limit of thought is still in our mind. 5 

For example, if we define God as unity, we must 
hold at the same time He is not diversity; if we say 
He is Infinite Being, we say at the same time He is 
not finite Being. If we say, even, He is Infinite 
Goodness, then where is Infinite Evil? The one has 
no meaning for us without the other. If we attribute 
to God Infinite Goodness we define Him in thought as 
in contradiction to Nature, whereas I think we must 
hold He is manifest through or in Nature, however 
dimly or mystically. Insight makes us aware of our 
error. 

It is quite true that those who define God as unity, 
do not deny His immanence, and those who define 
Him as immanent, do not deny His unity. 6 And 
this same form of denial of any exclusion attaching to 
God, applies to all definitions of Him. But what does 

4 I use the term “ unconditioned ” as meaning the “ ultimate ” not 
the infinite in contradiction to the finite ; it transcends or subsumes 
all conditions. 

5 The idea of two opposing Transcendent Beings, one of Infinite 
Goodness, one of Infinite Evil, is sound for thought. Laurie savs : 
Even the universe as thought of God unites Him, even though we say 
that the thought is within Himself. 

fi Laurie, in his “ Synthetica,” says we seek a one-universal. But 
this can be found only in transcendence of the one and of the 
universal. 


A CONSIDERATION OF INFINITE BEING 35 

this mean ? It means that all admit their definitions 
of God are not exclusive; each definition is of use 
practically but, in theory, no one definition is assumed 
to exhaust the Godhead. Each definition is but a 
partial of God : points, in the ultimate, to a tran¬ 
scendental Being—transcendent of unity, diversity ; 
immanence, externality; good and evil. That the “ I 
am ” in each of us leads us, through insight, to 
awareness of some Ultimate “ I am ” is fully admitted. 
But this Ultimate cannot exist in contradiction, so is 
beyond the purview of thought. For this Ultimate 
there must be transcendence of thought and so of the 
contradictions which necessarily exist for thought: it 
exists for insight not for thought. 

The “I am” is the transcendental subject; it 
exists, for us, in self-consciousness; it is not a subject 
of thought. Through Insight we are led to an ultimate 
“ I am,” the transcendental Being. 7 This transcen¬ 
dental Being we cannot limit in thought, for He is 
beyond the purview of thought, so for this Being 
there is transcendence of all limits of thought. Thus 
we get rid of the distinctions in thought of the differ¬ 
ing schools when considering the nature of God. 

In the Christian Church, for instance, some 
orthodox teachers preach the unity, some the 
manifold, some the immanence of God; some make 
Him external to Nature, some Nature itself, some 
hold God revealed in the laws of Nature, some that 
these laws are but a partial manifestation of His 
governance. 

The above are all honest and comparatively harm¬ 
less attempts to define God in thought : 8 they are use¬ 
ful in bringing home to the many the fact of God. 9 

7 If we relate back “ everything” to self-conscious subjects, reason 
leads us back to an exhaustive self-conscious transcendental Being. 
Cf. Berkeley. 

8 “ Our impulsive belief is here alwavs what sets up the original 
body of truth, and our articulately verbalized philosophy is but its 
showy translation into formulas.” James’s Varieties of Religious 
Experience. 

9 The great majority of men require some dogmatic form for wor¬ 
ship of the Deity. 


MYSELF 


y 36 

But if we abandon opposing Gods of good and evil, 
we must give transcendence to the Ultimate Being. 10 
And so all attempts to define God in thought, though 
useful for the passing time, must be held to fail. For, 
in the ultimate, we must get rid of the contradictions 
between good and evil, etc. There must be either 
reconciliation or subsumption under the transcen¬ 
dental. 

So long as we confine ourselves to thought there 
can be no reconciliation between God and Nature : 
contradictions have, for us in thought, real existence 
—especially, the contradiction between good and evil. 
In whatever way, then, we may use thought for our 
definition of God, we must do one of two things. We 
must make Him responsible for good and evil as 
ultimate facts, or we must predicate two Gods—one of 
good, one of evil. 11 Neither solution, I think, appeals 
to reason. 

But, here, Insight steps in and makes us aware not 
only of the limits of thought, but that in real reality 
contradictions must be reconciled or subsumed under 
“something.” Insight informs us that this real 
reality must exist. 

Though the sensible universe exists, it will be found 
it is subject to consciousness 12 and consciousness 
imports the “ I am.” It is the “ I am,” as a self- 
conscious subject, which, as we shall see, has created 
in great measure the universe as presented to us. But 
the “ I am ” as a subject leads us, in reason, to a tran- 


10 I would suggest that our Lord Jesus Christ did this and that 
the charges against Him of inconsistency as to the nature of God 
fail because in the transcendentalism of God, contradictions must 
appear for reconciliation. 

11 Laurie, in his Synthetica , gives real reality to evil and so is 
driven to hold that evil is the failure of God-creative to realise the 
ideal of the individual and of the whole on the plane of Being which 
man occupies. 

12 This statement is considered at length hereafter. 






A CONSIDERATION OF INFINITE BEING 37 

scendent “ I am ” in Being. So, in the ultimate, the 
universe itself is a subject of the Transcendental 
Being. 

Insight makes us aware that beyond the purview of 
thought there is, for this Transcendent Being, tran¬ 
scendent of all limits, even of good and evil. There 
is transcendence, for reason, of the I and the not-I, 
as we think them. But if for the Ultimate we use the 
term “ the accomplished in the accomplishing,” 13 and 
as we, as subjects, exist in the accomplishing, even 
reason may find evidence in human experience to hold 
that the I and the not-I exist for the ultimate in the 
transcendent: revelation too may supplement reason. 
The term “ the accomplished in the accomplishing ” 
is, I think, of great assistance for our reason. 14 

It is often forgotten that mathematics is subject to 
the limitations of thought. We use the symbols 1,2, 
3, etc., merely as starting points for thought. They 
have no meaning in themselves; what we use in 
mathematics are the relations between them. These 
relations necessarily exist between limits of contra¬ 
diction, the limits being o and 00. We cannot think 
these limits, we can only think up to and between 
them, for it is only between them that relations exist. 
If we give reality to these limits we are landed in a 
bog of thought. For instance, a straight line of in¬ 
finite length extends to opposite infinities. 15 But 
here insight steps in and informs us that mathematics, 
being a subject of thought, necessarily exist between 
limits of contradiction, which contradictions, though 


13 Cf. the Chapter so headed. 

14 This term I take from C. C. Massey. Cf. Thoughts of a 
VIodern Mystic (Kegan, Paul and Co.). The term as transcenden¬ 
tal gets rid of the difficulties surrounding any assumption of a First 
Cause ; it marks transcendence of cause and effect. And, indeed, 
when we regard the past as accomplished we find effect is cause and 
:ause is effect. 

13 The attempt to get rid of this impossibility by suggesting curva¬ 
ture of space simply explains the lesser difficulty by the creation 
af a greater. 


38 MYSELF 

real for thought, cannot exist in real reality. Mathe¬ 
matics, in Kant’s language, does not deal with things- 
in-themselves. 

At the same time mathematics does deal with a 
partial of real reality. The finite does not disappear 
or vanish in the infinite. 16 All we can hold is that 
we can think the finite and cannot think the infinite. 
We are justified in holding that thought, though 
infirm, presents us with a partial of real reality. 

Herein we see that the infinite is not the limit in 
the ultimate of the finite, we might just as well hold 
that nothing, the contradiction of the infinite, is the 
limit in the ultimate of the finite. But there must be, 
as insight informs us, an ultimate. If we term the 
finite (which is changing) the accomplishing and, in 
relation to the accomplishing, we term oo and o the 
accomplished, we find our really real ultimate in the 
accomplished in the accomplishing. But the term 
“ the accomplished in the accomplishing” is mean¬ 
ingless in idea, is beyond the purview of thought. 
For synthesis and analysis have existence only for 
thought, they have no existence for insight. 

Again, consider motion. Imagine one particle in 
vacant space. 17 Let it be at rest, motionless, or 
travelling in any direction, at any rate. You will 
find you can neither think it at rest, or as moving 
in any direction at any rate. You must have another 
place in space known to you, besides the place where 
the particle is, before you can think the particle 
either at rest or in motion. 18 For motion and rest 
are meaningless to you in themselves, they have 
meaning only in relation, you do not think rest or 
motion, you think the relations between them. 19 


16 When we hold that = oc, where x is any number, all we mean 
is that the expresion is outside all relations. We cannot relate x to 00 
and so neglect it. 

17 To do this you must assume you are not yourself an object in 
space. 

18 For motion in three dimensions you must have two other places. 

19 For rate of motion you must think conditioned in time; for 
place you must be conditioned in space. 


A CONSIDERATION OF INFINITE BEING 39 

Here again we find the limits of contradiction for 
thought in rest or motionlessness and infinite (?) 
motion. And neither can be the ultimate which 
insight demands. If we term rest (some hold to the 
theory that rest is the ultimate of motion) the accom¬ 
plished in relation to motion, and motion (which 
varies) the accomplishing, we find our ultimate 
again in the accomplished in the accomplishing. 

If we consider good and evil, we shall, at first 
thought, arrive at the same conclusion. That is, 
that we can think between the limits of contradiction 
of infinite good and infinite evil, and that insight 
makes us aware neither limit can be the ultimate. 

But when we consider good and evil 20 we are 
getting away from the environment of the objective 
universe, we reach out ultimately to the non-physical 
and shall find we must use “ second thoughts ” in 
dealing with the question. 

If we rely on the term the “ accomplished in the 
accomplishing” we may hold that the subject exists 
in the accomplishing, Ultimate Being in the accom¬ 
plished in the accomplishing. We thus get a nexus 
between the subject as the “ I am ” and transcen¬ 
dental Being as the ultimate “ 1 am.” And so we are 
free from any possible contradiction between the 
noumenal and phenomenal : the phenomenal is what 
may be termed a partial of the noumenal and this 
would appear not to be in opposition to Kant. But 
for the term ‘‘the accomplished In the accomplishing” 
we must not use synthesis or analysis in order to 
define its meaning. The term is beyond the purview 
of thought, it may be called “ an incomprehensible 
of insight.” 21 


20 The ultimate for good and evil is hereinafter found in love, 
beauty, truth and justice. 

21 Maimon says: But the greatest of all mysteries in the Jewish 
religion consists in the name Jehovah, expressing bare existence in 
abstraction from all particular kinds of existence , which cannot of 
course be conceived without existence in general. Cf. Spinoza’s 
theory. 


4 o MYSELF 

If, departing from the more or less definiteness 
of the Christian Church when attempting to define 
God, we indulge in the freer imagination of the 
Devanta we may say He is good and evil, everywhere 
and nowhere, rest and motion, nothing and every¬ 
thing. But thereby we still merely attempt, vainly, 
to define Him in thought. 22 What we really mean, 
what Insight makes us aware of, is that for Him 
there is transcendence of the contradictions that exist 
for thought. 23 

Laurie in his Synthetica uses for his ultimate the 
terms “ the one-universal,” “ Being-Becoming ” 
and, in the transcendental, such expressions mark 
closely the same as “ the accomplished in the 
accomplishing.” But he would appear to refuse any 
transcendental meaning for the terms he uses because 
that would lead to mysticism and he holds his theory 
is not mystic. He therefore argues at length to bring 
God home to us in knowledge : he holds there can 
be apprehension of God in idea. 24 This I deny, I 
hold God transcends all ideas, that we can only be 
aware of Him through our power of insight. God 
is an unknown God, He is not, in this sense, a God 
of knowledge. It is our power of insight that makes 
us aware of God, and in this sense He may be 
termed a God of insight. 

Laurie attacks mysticism directly. He says “ the 
mystic is impatient even of creation in his noble 

22 “It is as high as heaven, what canst thou do? Deeper than 
hell, what canst thou know? ” 

23 I suggest that if we hold contradiction exists necessarily for 
thought and that it is Insight which deals with the reconciliation 
demanded by reason, we elucidate rather than oppose what Hegel 
has theorized as to contradiction. 

24 Laurie as we have seen is thus driven to make God responsible 
for evil as a fact of our universe. In his own words, however, 
he does not consider the “ Great God Himself” but “only the man 
necessity of Him; that is to say the aspect of His eternal and 
immeasurable Being which has actualized itself on this plane of His 
infinite possibility ” (Synthetica. Vol. II. p. 193 ). Laurie considers 
merely a God of thought; I consider a God of insight transcendng 
thought. 


A CONSIDERATION OF INFINITE BEING 41 

passion for the All-One. For creation is particular- 
isation and is, so far, a departure from God, the Sole 
and Eternal. He abjures definite thinking on 
principle; for all that defines eodem actio limits.” 

If the charge of mysticism be brought against the 
present argument the reply is as follows: — 

God, in thought, is the All and is the One: 
creation, in thought, is particularisation and so a 
departure from God, the Sole and Eternal. But so 
far, we have only touched God in thought and so 
necessarily are involved in a universe of contra¬ 
dictions. Here our power of insight steps in and 
makes us aware that our “ All ” and our “ One ” are 
in themselves mere limits of thought and so 
necessarily in contradiction the one to the other. 
Insight impels us to the transcendent, impels us to 
awareness that “Something” exists transcending 
the “ All ” and the “ One,” something beyond the 
purview of ideas. What then does the mystic mean 
by the “All-One?” It is the nearest approach he 
can make in words to define the transcendent: its 
really real meaning may be said to exist in insight: 
but, as insight transcends ideas, ideas reduced to 
words can only be used to suggest this meaning as 
in a parable. 

Again Laurie says that mysticism is inverted 
Egoism and its attitude to life is the luxury of 
renunciation not the toil of sacrifice. If the present 
argument mark mysticism what Laurie says is 
incorrect. For it points not to inverted Egoism but 
to transcendence of egoism and altruism, 25 and the 
self-renunciation it preaches is not opposed to the toil 
of sacrifice : on the contrary it involves such toil. 

But Laurie says at last that “ the mystic is 
supremely right” and, again, “The Real is greater 
than the possibility of thought.” His only charge 
against mysticism would appear to be that it preaches 
an unknown God; gives to man no “ work-a-day ” 

25 In the limit pure egoism is pure altruism. 

5 


42 MYSELF 

proposition as to the God-head. Laurie, I think, 
holds that man wants a known God and therefore he 
raises against mysticism the charge which he 
ultimately withdraws. If this be so then his theory 
is fully pragmatic. 

God exists in “ the accomplished in the accomplish¬ 
ing,” He transcends all, nothing, the finite and the 
infinite. There is no reason, therefore, from the 
human point of view, why He should not be projected 
into or manifest in the accomplishing: manifest 
anthropomorphically. This would give, to man, 
what Laurie would appear to think man requires. 

No human subject is like to another : all differ, 
from the cretin to Sir Isaac Newton, from David to 
Goliath. The probability therefore, scientifically, is 
that at some time an approximately perfect human 
subject should appear. 26 And it must never be 
forgotten that Jesus Christ said “ Verily he who does 
the will of God the same is my brother and my sister 
and my mother.” If we hold to the infinite as a 
really real limit the incarnation of the Deity is, I 
think, impossible. If we hold to “ the accomplished 
in the accomplishing ” such incarnation is possible. 
The mere fact that man wants a God in idea for 
worship, establishes no ground for dragging down 
the Supreme into anthropomorphism : we must not 
drug reason for the sake of pragmatism. In what 
Laurie terms mysticism can alone be found for man 
reasonable explanation for dogmatic worship of the 
Deity. 

I set up no denial of the Being or the Becoming, of 
the All or of the One for God. All done is to define 
such terms as limits of thought and to introduce 
transcendence for them all for God. Even as to 
unity, it is sometimes forgotten that Kant gives unity 
to God in a unity of reason, not in a unity of 
empiricism. In this sense the present argument may 
be said to give unity of reason to God. 


26 Religious belief is not now in question. 


A CONSIDERATION OF INFINITE BEING 43 

What has now been written as to the ultimate “ I 
am ” may have made clearer what is meant by the 
subject “ I am.” It is a subject to the ultimate u I 
am.” But when we consider the relation between 
the t^o, we are met by a limit in, even, our faculty 
of Insight. Proof that the “ I am ” really exists in 
itself is beyond even the power of Insight : 27 the “ I 
am ” simply is : we must assume we exist in the “ I 
am.” Without that assumption I have not written, 
you have not read one single word. And this 
assumption leads us, in reason, to awareness of an 
ultimate “ I am.” 

At the same time, if the argument for the existence 
of each of us as “I am ” be sound, the mere 
dissolution of the body has nothing to do with the 
continuance or non-continuance of the “ I am.” 
And it is quite possible that we may have human 
experience of the continuance of the “ I am,” after 
it is free from the body. But such experience is not 
now considered. 28 

Though the question of the “ I,” and “not -1 ” for 
ultimate Being is beyond thought or even insight, 
we may, perhaps, exercise our imagination in 
considering it. 

For Ultimate Being there is “ the accomplished in 
the accomplishing,” a term which must be treated as 
transcendental: the subject, existing in time, has 
existence only in the accomplishing; the subject is a 
thing of change. But the “I am” (the trans¬ 
cendental subject) has, relatively to the subject, 
existence in the accomplished : the accomplishing, 


27 Revelation is possible- But revelation is not herein considered. 
But, in reason, we can arrive at a degree of probability which we 
are justified in accepting as proof. 

28 It is considered in Personality and Telepathy. Apart from such 
evidence and from revelation, reason may point to the ultimate ab¬ 
sorption of the “ I am ” in transcendental Being. Cf. Spinoza. 


44 MYSELF 

the change of the subject, is for the “ I am,” that is, 
for the relatively accomplished. 29 

Now for the subject and the “ I am ” we cannot 
hold that the “ 1 ” and “ not-I ” exists. For the 
subject is the “ I am ” in a conditioned state. We 
may then, in analogy, use imagination. As the 
subject is to the “I am,” so is the accomplishing to 
the accomplished and, as the ultimate “ I am,” the 
Transcendental Being, is to the “ I am,” so is the 
accomplished in the accomplishing to the accomplish¬ 
ing. The “I am” is the ultimate ‘‘I am” in a 
conditioned state, where one “ I am ” differs from 
another merely in difference of the transcendental 
accomplishing of each. 

So, as the ultimate ‘‘I am” exists in “the 
accomplished in the accomplishing ” we can see, 
dimly, that the “ I ” and “ not-I ” may exist 
transcendentally for the ultimate “ I am,” because, 
for the ultimate “ I am,” the' accomplishing has 
existence always. 30 

Whether the above argument of imagination be 
sound or not, the existence of the impassable gulf 
generally assumed between the finite and infinite, 
good and evil, rest and motion, the accomplished and 
accomplishing is denied. For the Ultimate Being, 
contradiction cannot exist. But, as every word I have 
written is meaningless unless we accept the incompre- 


29 The photograph of a man fixes for years what would otherwise 
be but the momentary passing appearance of the man. The accom¬ 
plishing from moment to moment, considered in itself alone at any 
future moment, is the accomplished. We may thus, by analogy, 
imagine, in the ultimate the accomplished in the accomplishing. 

so This must be treated as merely a conceit of imagination. It 
may be compared with Spinoza’s theory. We cannot hold that the 
ultimate purpose of man’s creation is his conquest of the material. 
For this gives but an anthropomorphic idea of the ultimate; the 
ultimate is in the accomplished,—a mere limit of thought. In the 
same way there can be no “ far off divine event ” for God for that 
would put an end to God’s activity. God is always accomplishing in 
the transcendent. But there can be a far off divine event for us. 


A CONSIDERATION OF INFINITE BEING 45 

hensible fact of self-consciousness for you and for 
me, so we must assume the incomprehensible fact of 
transcendental self-consciousness for the Ultimate 
Being. 


THE INTELLIGIBLE UNIVERSE AND THE 
SENSIBLE UNIVERSE 


The universe is revealed to us sensuously only so far 
as it is presented to us through our senses. It is 
presented to us in the form of objects : our senses 
are limited and so the form of presentation is, for us, 
determined by our power of receptivity through the 
senses. 

The brain is part of each one of us as a subject, 
and it is through the brain that we are enabled to set 
up thought which connects us with the sensible 
universe. 1 It follows that the sensible universe must 
be presented to us in some way for thought about it 
to begin. But mere presentation cannot give rise to 
thought. 

The universe of thought is termed the intelligible 
universe. It is a term now used for the universe as 
thought about. 2 And when we consider this in¬ 
telligible universe in relation to the sensible universe, 
we find a strange fact. This fact has already been 
considered but requires re-statement here:—The 
universe must be presented to us through our senses 
before our brains begin to operate for thought in 
relation to it. But we cannot think the sensible 
universe as presented : we can only think about it: 
knowledge is relative. 


1 It is our power of thought which gives us command over the 
presentations from the sensible universe. But for this power of 
thought we want more than mere presentations. See pp. 1 - 4 . 

We know one object from another by difference in form ; it is shown 
hereafter that motion sets up form. Thought is correlated to motion 
of the brain. 

2 Its ultimate meaning must be expanded, when we refer to in¬ 
sight and imagination. 


46 


INTELLIGIBLE & SENSIBLE UNIVERSE 47 

Objects are presented to us as unrelated “ things.” 
We may even “ cram ” our memory with images of 
mere presentations but still there are no relations 
between them in our memory. There might be 
innumerable images, percepts, concepts in or of the 
mind, 3 but if there were no relations in or for the 
mind thought could not exist for us as subjects. 

When we assume to think objects, we do nothing 
of the kind. It is ideas of objects that we use for 
thought, and these ideas are not of the objects them¬ 
selves, but of their relations inter se : knowledge is 
relative. 4 

So ideas are not presented with the presentation of 
objects. They exist in or for the mind alone. 
Thought has no existence in the universe as 
presented : it exists in the intelligible universe. 5 

This vital distinction between the intelligible and 
the sensible universe must be borne in mind through¬ 
out all that follows. 

Let us first consider the sensible universe. For the 
sake of simplicity, we will consider two periods : the 
first when man is not in existence; the second when 
he is in existence. 6 

Considering the first period which to us is past 
we find we know nothing of the sensible universe as 
a thing-in-itself ; 7 we know about it only in relation 
to the various forms in which we might have sensed 
it. But, also, by the use of ideas and memory, we 


3 That is, if images, etc., be defined as not importing relations. 

4 As already shown it is the schemata of objects that we use for 
thought, and these schemata can never exist in the objective 
universe. 

5 As presentation is assumed, I follow Kant, not Berkeley. We 
may speak of thought as a priori ; tfie affection on us through our 
senses of the universe as presented, must not be confounded with 
thought, even empirical thought. 

6 There is a serious hiatus in the argument here. For all lower 
forms of life than that of man are largely ignored. But, still, I 
think the argument will ultimately be shown to be at least approxi¬ 
mately sound. 

7 We hereafter reduce the sensible universe itself to the etheric in 
form. Cf. the chapter on Thought, Brain and Motion. 


MYSELF 


48 

can think about it in the present now as it has been 
in the past, and so can picture to ourselves its past 
history in change of form. We thus arrive at what 
is termed evolution. 

Evolution imports no change in the universe itself, 
which is unknown to us. It imports only change in 
form, that is, change in etheric form. Roughly, we 
find some primordial form of what may be termed 
chaos, which evolves in form and in complexity of 
form. 8 Matter in space takes on, for instance, the 
form of suns, planets, satellites, the matter of each 
body specializing in various forms. Then life 
appears, 9 vegetable and animal. 

The above description of evolution is perfunctory 
because the argument depends in no way on its 
exactness. 

The point is this :—Before man appears we can, if 
we consider nothing but the sensible universe itself, 
find no reason at all for evolution as it exists, no 
reason at all for the evolutionary change in form. 
Darwin, it is true, said that the mind of man revolts 
at the idea of the grand sequence of nature being the 
result of blind chance. But he went no further. And 
the explanation that the universe is supported by a 
gigantic tortoise is quite as reasonable or unreason¬ 
able as to say all results from the iron, eternal laws 
of Nature. 10 Nothing is thereby explained, for no 
one pretends to have been in a position to be able to 
cross-question either the gigantic tortoise or the 
eternal, iron laws of Nature. 

In the second period man appears. What is the 
change in the evolution of the sensible universe? 


8 From the first (!) this chaos must have had in itself the potenti¬ 
ality of evolution in form or the evolution must have been effected 
by some external power. 

9 It is indifferent to the argument whether life is or is not a 
function of matter. 

10 Haeckel thought this explanation. Is he himself eternal in 
that he assumed to think the eternal? 


INTELLIGIBLE & SENSIBLE UNIVERSE 49 

There is no change. The evolution goes on simply 
in change of form, change in etheric form. 

Bear in mind what we are now doing: we are 
scientific, we are thinking the sensible universe itself, 
not thinking about it. We are thinking the sensible 
universe, under the forms in which we sense it, as a 
reality. When we do this we find change only in 
form. 

A chair has come into being. This is nothing but 
matter (something unknown) in a new form. 11 An 
electric battery has come into being. This is nothing 
but matter in a new form. You object, by saying that 
electricity has come into existence and is used for a 
purpose it was never used for before ? 

Electricity has not come into existence : electricity 
is but a “form ” of energy, and energy in itself is 
not changed at all, it is merely made manifest in a 
particular form in the sensible universe. And of this 
particular form of energy you know nothing but its 
effect in relation to certain forms of the sensible 
universe: wireless telegraphy itself is meaningless 
unless in relation to certain forms of the sensible 
universe. You know nothing at all of electricity 
itself, you only know its manifestation in relation to 
the sensible universe. Destroy the electric battery 
referred to, then where is electricity? You say, also, 
electricity is used for a purpose it was never used for 
before. But we are considering the sensible universe 
scientifically, we are thinking it as a reality, not 
thinking about it. And the sensible universe has 
nothing at all to do with purpose 12 any more than it 
has with will or desire. Will is operative by volition 
on the forms of the sensible universe, it is external to 
that universe. 


11 What we sense as matter we hereafter reduce to motion, and 
this new object, quA form, marks only the confining of motion to 
a new form of the etheric. 

12 This is true simply for the passing argument. 


MYSELF 


5 o 

Now remember that, scientifically, we are quite 
ignorant why evolution in form exists as it does exist 
until man appears. 

But when man appears, does this ignorance still 
remain? It does not. We know why the chair and 
electric battery came into form. 

Man made them for his own purposes. If man had 
not appeared, we may assume they would never have 
appeared. More than this. Since man appeared the 
evolution of the sensible universe in form has always, 
in time, been more and more fully determined by man 
himself for his own purposes, good, bad or in¬ 
different. As evolution advances, man, more and 
more, determines his own environment. And “ his 
own ” must be read in a very wide sense as including 
individuals of a coming generation. The form of the 
sensible universe is very largely determined by man 
himself. 

Evolution, before man appeared, was, so far as the 
argument has proceeded, aimless. Is it aimless since 
man appeared ? Or can we determine whence his 
power over the sensible universe comes? 

If man thought the universe as he senses it he could 
have accomplished nothing : there could be nothing 
new in his thought, he would simply have power to 
think what is. For in such case he would not sense 
relations and, without thinking relations, no new 
relation can be thought. 

When a chair comes into existence, that is, 
becomes an object in the sensible universe, what is 
it? It is a new object in the sensible universe. 13 
But you cannot say it is a new object which has come 
into existence in form from the natural course of 
evolution; you cannot say that the innumerable new 
forms in the sensible universe which we can now 

13 Do not think about the purpose for which the chair was formed. 
There is no purpose in the sensible universe, though the sensible 
universe may be used for purpose. 


INTELLIGIBLE & SENSIBLE UNIVERSE 51 

mse and which are the creation of man have come 
ito existence from the natural course of evolution. 14 
If you worry the whole question back, you will 
nd that to explain the existence of these new forms 
1 the sensible universe you must have the self- 
Dnscious subject gifted with imagination. None of 
lese new forms came first into material existence in 
le sensible universe without a precedent idea about 
le form in the imagination of man (Cf. page 55) 
lan had the will that the form should exist, he was 
ifted with power to put his will into volition. But 
dthout the precedent idea in imagination,—the idea 
bout some form which as yet did not exist in the 
ensible universe,—he could not have willed the new 
Drm ; there was nothing for his will to operate on. 
Vill, without content, cannot be active in volition 
lanifest by effecting change in the form of the 
ensible universe. 

'No new form in the sensible universe which has 
ome into existence for the purposes of man can 
ave so come into existence without a precedent idea 
f it in imagination. 15 

But if we think the sensible universe as we sense 
:, that is think it directly, where is imagination ? 16 
f objects give images on the internal sense, and 
lese images raise ideas directly, where is 
nagination ? There is nothing to imagine : thought 
as for its content nothing but existing objects : in 
ny such case, we do not think relations between 
bjects, because we do not sense relations. 

You may think a million objects directly, but you 

14 If you follow Haeckel and hold consciousness is an evolution 
om unconsciousness, you can say this. But then you make your 
df-consciousness a subject of the unconscious in idea. What do 
du mean ? 

15 All conduct on the part of a self-conscious subject is the result 
f purpose unless to be referred to ‘instinctive action 

16 Kant says imagination is a power deeply hidden in the depths 
f the human soul; his schematism of the understanding opens my 
ne of thought. 


MYSELF 


52 

will find imagination still “ in the air.” Where is 
your power to think any object which has no existence 
in the sensible universe ? No object, as sensed, will 
give you the power; for, as presented, it is unrelated 
to any other object. Before the subject can objectify 
any new object in the sensible universe, the subject 
must first have an idea of the object in the intelligible 
universe. 

Locke understood, dimly, that relations form the 
essence of cognition; Hume treated an idea as a 
copy or image of an impression, he assumed we think 
objects directly. And he admitted that, thereby, he 
failed to solve the riddle of cognition. Kant, going 
beyond the footsteps of Hume, held that all intuition 1 ' 
is sensuous, but he held also that “ all in out 
cognition that belongs to intuition contains nothing 
more than mere relations.” We, ourselves, in 
ordinary parlance, all admit that knowledge is 
relative. 

But, even in Kant, the vital distinction between 
the impression or concept of an object on the one 
hand and the idea of an object on the other, is nol 
always kept in mind. The idea is not treated as, 
in itself, relative; it is generally treated as if it were 
an image on the internal sense of an external object, 
Kant marks the difficulty when he tells us the sensible 
universe must be presented to us for knowledge about 
it to begin, but that it by no means follows all know¬ 
ledge arises out of such experience, 18 and when we 
bear in mind that the ideas we use for thought are 
relations and that relations are not presented with 
objects, we can follow his meaning; we can fathom 
the distinction he raises between a priori knowledge 
and empirical knowledge, though the distinction is 


17 The term “ intuition ” has had an unfortunate career; it ha; 
been used, as before stated, as having - the most diverse meanings. 

18 I deny that any knowledge arises from presentations ; they ar< 
only the occasion for knowledge about the universe, as presented 
to begin. 


INTELLIGIBLE & SENSIBLE UNIVERSE 53 

ot now relied on. The vital distinction which I 
lise, between the intelligible and the sensible 
niverse appears, to all intent and purpose, in Kant. 

We must admit this vital distinction between the 
ltelligible and the sensible universe, and so never 
>rget that we must abandon the assumption that we 
link objects directly. In truth, we do not think 
bjects, we think about them; we think relations 
etween them, which are not given in “ sensuous 
ituition.” Our ideas of things are relative. We do 
ot think an object, we think its likenesses and unlike- 
esses to other objects. 19 The realm of the universe 
s presented is objects : the realm of the intelligible 
niverse is, so far as the argument has yet proceeded, 
stations between objects. 20 But for these relations 
> exist as ideas for thought, there must be, 
recedently in the mind, schematic ideas. (Cf. p. 4) 

Before completing our consideration of the present 
ubject it is advisable to consider the relation between 
nagination and thought and the taws of Nature, 
lereby opening an explanation of how ideas can 
rise in the intelligible universe. 


19 Any two men sense an object in approximately the same way; 
is the same one object to each of them. But if one knows more 

•out the object than the other, this is because he knows more about 
ie relations of the object to other objects. 

20 Dreams we shall find prove that we can exist in the intelligible 
liverse when our relation to the sensible universe, through our 
nses, is largely in abeyance. 


IMAGINATION AND THOUGHT 1 


You have sensed the objective universe as objects c 
varying size and form. Form involving quantity ; 
presented to you. 2 The sensible universe has to t 
presented to you for thought about it to begin. Bi 
these objects have not been presented to you with an 
fixity ol form and size, so you think into the sensibl 
universe which you sense, potentiality of change i 
form and size qua objects. 

Now the ideas that you use for thought about thee 
objects exist in relations between these objects. Bi 
this does not exhaust the ideas that you use. For yo 
can relate ideas to ideas, which gives rise to derivati\ 
ideas : you travel still further away from the sensib. 
universe as you have sensed it. You still use idee 
and so still think, but your thought is now shown t 
be based on imagination. For now you are thinkin 
beyond the sensible universe as you have sensed it 
the ideas you use are not ideas of relations existin 
between existing objects in the sensible univers* 
These derivative ideas may be of objects possible i 
the sensible universe, but such objects do not exist i 
the sensible universe : they exist only for you i 
imagination, that is, in the intelligible universe. 

Thought about the sensible universe required, f< 
commencement, the reception on presentation < 
objects already existing, qua our senses, in tl 

1 I think that now I simply deal with a deduction from Kan 
theory that imagination is a power deep buried in the soul of man. 

2 Form is etheric, but it involves mass- 

54 


IMAGINATION AND THOUGHT 55 

sensible universe. But when, in thought, an idea 
about an object arises which results from our relating 
an idea to an idea, to what must we refer this new 
object in relation to the sensible universe ? There is 
no corresponding object, no starting point for 
thought, in existence in the sensible universe which 
has raised the idea through our thinking about it. 
Where is the object? 

It exists in the intelligible universe, in imagin¬ 
ation. 3 But, once this new object is in imagination, 
man can, very possibly, create it /in the sensible 
universe through his will and power of volition. 4 
Without such previous existence in imagination, it 
could never exist in the objective universe. 5 

Let us consider an example of this power. 

Before 1831 the dynamo was not an object in 
existence in the sensible universe. How did it come 
into existence? Faraday, using ideas for thought, 
related his ideas to one another and so imagined an 
object which as yet did not exist in the sensible 
universe : he exercised, as a faculty of himself as a 
subject, the power of imagination. He imagined a 
dynamo, 6 that is, he made a dynamo which did not 


3 What we have done is this. By thinking relations to relations 
(relating ideas to ideas) wc have thought a new relation for ourselves 
in time quite apart from the objects existing in the sensible universe 
in space, which caused us to begin to think about the sensible 
(universe. We have thought a new object without sensing it. That is, 
we have thought an object for the sensible universe which has no 
existence there. We think in time, objects of the objective universe 
exist in space. 

4 Instead of the parallelism of Spinoza between things and ideas, 
things are made subject to ideas ; even the sensible universe itself 
exists for us only in subjection to law. 

5 Kant marks the fact that to think an object and to cognize it 
are by no means the same thing: we can think about an object 
which does not exist in the objective universe, but we cannot cognise 
it unless it exists therein. But he nowhere, I think, marks the fact 
that, for creation of any new object, we must think about it before 
we can create it for cognition. 

6 He must have started with what I have termed the schematic 
idea of a dynamo. For creation in the objective universe he must 
(have had the idea of a particular dynamo. 




MYSELF 


56 

exist in the sensible universe, exist in his imagination. 
He gave it existence in the intelligible universe. 

When he had done this he exercised the power of 
will and volition that he had, as a subject in the 
intelligible universe, over the sensible universe. He 
made a simple model of a dynamo and so gave it 
existence for the first time in space; he created in 
the objective universe an object which before did 
not exist there. 7 When once this object existed in 
the sensible universe it became a “ starting point ” 
for other men to think about. The result was some¬ 
thing akin to evolution in “ starting points ” for 
thought; something which led to the gradual appear¬ 
ance, as objects in the sensible universe, of more and 
more effective dynamos. But each stage of advance 
in the form of the dynamo as an object in the sensible 
universe was preceded by the existing of the form in 
imagination. The existence of any new object in the 
sensible universe is always contingent: it is 
contingent on its preceding existence in the imagin¬ 
ation of man. Existence of the object in the 
intelligible universe necessarily precede its existence 
in the Sensible universe. 

It follows that since man appeared on the earth the 
form of the sensible universe has been largely under 
his control; under man’s control because he is a 
subject of the intelligible universe. What we term 
the laws of Nature always hold sway, but man uses 
the laws for his own purpose. How can he use these 
laws? As a subject of the intelligible universe, not 
as a subject of the sensible universe. Will and 
volition are useless without imagination : all three 
have no existence in the sensible universe, they are 
external to it. It is will, volition and imagination 
which, as manifest in or marking man, enable him 

7 Darwin says that man does make his artificial breeds, for his 
selective power is of such importance relatively to that of the slight 
spontaneous variations. But any artificial breed must exist in man’s 
imagination before he can produce the breed in the objective universe- 


IMAGINATION AND THOUGHT 57 

o use the sensible universe for his own purposes, to 
:reate therein or vary its form. 8 

As a subject of the objective universe, the subject 
ixists with a material brain capable of movement, 
rhis relates it to the objective universe so that 
hrough its senses it can be affected thereby. 9 But 
is a thinking subject of the intelligible universe the 
;ubject thinks what is not presented to him by the 
ibjective universe : he thinks relations between the 
>bjects presented. The objective universe is merely 
he occasion for thought not of the objective universe 
)ut about it. It is as a subject of the intelligible 
iniverse that man has the power to think and he 
hinks about the sensible universe because it is 
^resented to him. The nexus between him, as in the 
ntelligible and the objective universe, is his brain, 
or which motion runs parallel with thought. 

But the subject has, also, further ideas in that he 
:an relate the ideas he has about the objective 
iniverse, one to another and so get derived ideas for 
lse. These relations of ideas one to another are not 
lecessarilv related in any way to the objective 
iniverse, they exist in the intelligible as distinct from 
he objective universe. But when they once exist in 
he intelligible universe they may possibly be used to 
create new objects in the sensible universe: the 
ibjective universe is subject to imagination. 

Herein we find the subjection of the objective 
iniverse to the intelligible universe. 

If man were no more than a subject of the objective 
iniverse and yet had also power to think the relations 
existing between existing objects, he could effect 
lothing; his will, desire, volition would be useless. 

8 Do not forget that we do not sense relations, so for ideas we 
nust, as subjects of the intelligible universe, have d priori knowledge 
n Kant’s use of the term. We must have the potentiality of know- 
ldge before presentation. 

9 We hereafter reduce the sensible universe as presented to motion 
,nd etheric form. Motion is a common dominator for the brain and 
iiis sensible universe. 


6 


5 8 MYSELF 

In such case he could only think about the objective 
universe as it is, there would be in him no foundation 
for the execution of any change therein. For the one 
and sole relation between man and the objective 
universe would be his thought about it as it exists, so 
that, admitting as we do in such case, thought to run 
parallel with brain movement, we leave without 
explanation the exercise of any power of the subject 
over the objective universe. For if man could think 
nothing new, he could invent nothing new. 

But human experience informs us definitely that 
man can imagine an object for the objective universe 
which does not exist therein, and that, after imagin¬ 
ing it, he has power to create it in the objective 
universe. It follows that man can do more than 
think about the sensible universe as presented, he can 
change the form of presentation. And this powei 
not only cannot be imported as in him as a mere 
subject of the objective universe, but thought aboui 
the universe as presented must be backed by the 
exercise of imagination about objects not presented 
Thought is related to imagination. It is because he 
is a subject of the intelligible universe that he 
exercises this power over the objective universe, over 
even, himself, as an object therein. 

What, then, is the relation of thought to imagin 
ation ? 10 

I do not deny for a moment that imagination is i 
power deep buried in the soul of man, as Kant holds 
Indeed, I refer imagination to the “ I am,” whicl 
may be treated as the same as Kant’s transcendenta 
subject. But at present we are considering th< 
relation of thought to imagination : we are thinking 
and so using ideas, which are relations. 

When we relate ideas to ideas and so get derivativi 


10 Never forget that thought and imagination are meaningles 
unless referred to self-consciousness and so to a self-conscious sut 
ject or Being. 


IMAGINATION AND THOUGHT 59 

ideas, then, if we use these derivative ideas for mental 
process, we are still thinking : we are using ideas for 
thought: so far as thought is concerned there is no 
distinction between ideas and derivative ideas. But 
the ideas we now use for thought are not ideas arising 
directly from objects sensed by us. The ideas are 
derived from imagination of objects not sensed by us. 
And it is because these ideas are derived from imagin¬ 
ation, that, once existing in the intelligible universe, 
the subject may have power to give them existence in 
the objective universe. It is said the subject “ may 
have ” such power, because imagination is free and 
unfettered, so that it may not only give rise to ideas 
which make creation possible in the objective universe 
but, as we shall see when we consider Dreams, can 
travel far beyond the bounds of all possible human 
experience. Thought is a conditioned form of imagin¬ 
ation. 11 When we think the relations between objects 
of the sensible universe we are using imagination. 
In such case imagination itself is limited in no way : 
it is its use that is limited. 12 The objective universe 
offers only a particular occasion for imagination and 
so requires only a particular and limited exercise of 
imagination in the form of thought, for thought about 
it. 

When we use derivative ideas, that is, think 
relations between relations, there is more extensive 

11 Imagination is the foundation of thought. Imagination is con¬ 
ditioned as thought because the brain inhibits the full imagination of 
the subject. The death of the body, may indeed be the end of the 
sensational use of our mind, but only the beginning of the intel¬ 
lectual use. The body would thus be not the cause of our thinking, 
but merely a condition contributive thereof, and, although essential to 
our sensuous and animal consciousness, it may be regarded as an 
impeder of our more spiritual life. By Kant. Cf. Immortality by 
William James, p. 57 . Kant uses the term thought in a very wide 
sense. 

12 We must distinguish between imagination and its use, just as 
(in Personality and Telepathy) we distinguished between memory 
and the use of memory. 


60 MYSELF 

use of imagination, but we are still thinking, because 
we are still using ideas. 13 

We can only define thought as a presentation to, 
or something used by, a self-conscious subject. We 
cannot define it as an act without confusing act, in 
thought, with something positive in the objective 
universe. 14 Thought about the universe as presented 
marks our lowest exercise of imagination, thought 
using derivative ideas marks a higher exercise, and 
thought about imagined occasions a still higher 
exercise. Imagination is always involved, it is its 
use which is subject to degree. What may be termed 
pure imagination, that is, exercise of imagination not 
confined to the use of ideas, must be considered later 
on when we come to Dreams. 

If we start with the “ Cogito ergo sum ” as 
confined to thought we make activity an implicit part 
of the personality. But what activity? Activity in 
the sensible universe. For the brain is an object 
and all thought is correlated to motion of the brain. 
With such an assumption there is no place for 
imagination : ideas can only exist for relations 
between objects sensed, these are the only ideas that 
thought can have for use. Ideas cannot be related to 
ideas, for ideas are confined to relations between 
objects already existing and sensed : 15 the relation of 
ideas to ideas requires the exercise of imagination 
and the scheme hypothesized has no place for 
imagination. Imagination remains unaccounted 
for, or must be—as it often is—treated as mere 


13 But we can imagine other sensible universes than that presented 
to us, under other laws than those of nature which govern our objec¬ 
tive universe. So we can imagine occasions for thought, other than 
the particular occasion of our objective universe. But still we are 
thinking, though our thinking marks an extensive use of imagina¬ 
tion. 

14 It is thus the error arises of holding thought to be creative, 
whereas it is the self-conscious subject who creates by the use of 
thought. 

15 Schematic ideas (which cannot be objectified) are necessary for 
such derived ideas. 


IMAGINATION AND THOUGHT 61 

surplusage or the result of irregular mental activity. 
Nor is any explanation given of what is held to have 
been proved, that creation by the subject in the 
intelligible universe must always precede creation in 
the objective universe; for creation in the intelligible 
universe requires imaginaton. My brain is made an 
implicit part of me and my brain is an object in the 
objective universe : there is no place for imagination, 
in that not only does all knowledge begin with experi¬ 
ence, but all arises out of experience. Kant denies 
that all knowledge arises from experience and, I 
think, most accept his allegation. If the allegation 
be sound we must have imagination “ at the back ” 
of thought. Even the most materialistic of men of 
science admit they use imagination. Can they claim 
that it is an “ emanation ” from the motion of the 
brain? And, if so, what is its genesis. In any case, 
all admit that the subject exercises imagination. 

For sound reasoning we must not start thus with 
the “ Cogito ergo sum : ” we must distinguish 
between the subject and its activity : in the deepest 
state of physical and mental coma, science itself 
admits that, even in such full state of absence of 
activity, the subject still remains as the same subject. 
And while we may not, perhaps, hold a priori that 
psychical activity is probable or improbable, we must 
hold that it is possible. 16 

Self-consciousness exists for each one of us; it is. 
And it is quite apart from its activity or indeed any 
content. 17 Herein we find the subject in the ultimate. 
The subject is related to the external by imagination 
“ deep buried in the soul of man,” but exercised by 
the subject when faced by the external. 18 


16 Many of our leading men of science accept telepathy. If they 
are correct psychical activity is highly probable, so highly probable 
that it may be taken as proved. Kant himself held telepathy to be 
possible, in that it contains no inherent contradiction. 

17 Herein is no denial of activity physical or psychical. 

18 In exercising thought we cannot get beyond some form 
(idealistic?) of duality. 


62 MYSELF 

With the above assumptions we can explain the 
relation between thought and imagination, and the 
fact that by creation in the intelligible universe the 
subject can create in the objective universe. 

The subject in the intelligible universe exercises 
imagination; the full exercise will be considered 
when we come to Dreams. The subject is embodied 
and its brain, as hereinafter shown (Cf. p. 75), 
relates it to the objective universe; that is, to the 
universe as sensed by us. 

It still, embodied, exercises imagination. But the 
universe as sensed by it is but part of its universe, 
it requires but little of imagination for comprehension. 
The imagination of the subject must be inhibited for 
comprehension of the “ occasion ” presented to it 
and, in some way, it must be related to the objective 
universe for comprehension. 

The subject, embodied, has a brain and this, 
through motion, relates it to the objective universe. 
By the exercise of imagination the subject sets the 
brain in motion. But the motion of the brain is 
determined by the constitution of the brain itself. So 
the subject exercises imagination only so far as the 
brain as a machine permits. The result is thought; 
an inhibited form of imagination, in that it is 
correlated to motion of the brain. By the use of 
imagination the subject sets the brain in motion 
whereby thought, an inhibited form of imagination, 
is produced. 19 

But if the subject be a conditioned state of the “ I 
am,” we have not yet exhausted the manifestation of 
imagination we should expect for the subject. We 
want, relatively, free exercise of the imagination, for 
the subject. 20 For the use of imagination by the 

19 Just as by the use of energy the subject sets an electric machine 
in motion whereby electricity, an inhibited form of energy, is pro¬ 
duced. 

20 We want some human experience, though exceptional, pointing 
to the fact that the subject is moved by “ free” imagination, though 
he uses it but partially. 





IMAGINATION AND THOUGHT 63 

subject has as yet been confined to thought, that is, 
confined round relations; and imagination, even for 
the subject, must give at least some glimmer of real 
reality. If we term relations a content of thought and 
find, as we have, a form of evolution for these 
relations, the ultimate for these relations is real 
reality. And we should expect at least a glimmer of 
presentation of real reality for the subject. But this 
question must be deferred : it will be considered when 
we come to Dreams. 


THE LAWS OF NATURE 


When man has created a new object in the intelligible 
universe, how is it that he is able, thereby, to create 
it in the sensible universe? This has not yet been 
fully explained. For, if we consider the universe 
alone as it is sensed by us, creation therein is 
impossible. 

Animals, lower than man, re-act instinctively to the 
universe as it is presented. 1 They take food as it is 
presented to them and live subject to environment 
over which they exercise no power. This is approxi¬ 
mately true of man when first appearing. Like the 
Australian aborigine, who still exists, he probably 
lived on the food which Nature produces, he was in 
subjection to the environment of Nature itself as 
given. Any creation in the sensible universe was 
impossible for him. 2 

Then he began to observe and to carry on, in time, 
what he observed, by use of his strange faculty of 
memory. He observed, possibly, that a branch 
rubbing against a branch does, on accasion, produce 
fire : he observed the form of growth of the animals 
and the vegetables that he lived on. Then, more and 
more, as time passed, he made use of his observation 
for his own purposes, he produced fire artificially, he 


1 This may not be altogether true, but the exaggeration will not 
affect the argument. 

2 This does not touch the question of what man was originally 
as a subject. It only touches the question of his relation to the 
sensible universe. Even a mute, inglorious Milton may exist 

64 


THE LAWS OF NATURE 65 

planted seeds and confined animals, at his own will, 
for food 3 . 

What does this mean ? It means that he found out 
that the sensible universe as presented to him is not 
anarchic; he found out that it is subject to, and its 
motion and evolution are directed by, the laws of 
Nature. He could not have done what he did unless 
the laws of Nature had been in existence : he used for 
action his partial knowledge of these laws. 

What then is it that man used in the past, and uses 
now, for his own purpose ? He does not use directly 
the sensible universe : he uses it as subject to the laws 
of Nature. If Nature were not so subject to law he 
could not use the sensible universe in any way for 
any purpose. It is the very existence of the laws of 
Nature which enables man, when he has created in the 
intelligible universe, to carry his creation into the 
sensible universe. 4 We must refer back his power of 
creation in the universe as presented, not to mere 
presentation, but to his knowledge of the laws of 
Nature. Presentation is the occasion for his creation : 
it is the laws of Nature which give him his power. 

We thus see how erroneous it is to say, without any 
qualification, that man is subject to the laws of 
Nature. There is subjection, but it is this very 
subjection which makes possible the exercise by man 
of power over the sensible universe. Man is not 
concerned with the universe as a thing-in-itself in any 
way; he is concerned only with the universe as 
presented and as governed and directed by the laws of 
Nature. When, even, he creates any object in the 
sensible universe he can only create it as subject to the 
laws of Nature. 

It is not the sensible universe but the laws govern¬ 
ing and directing it on which man depends for 


3 What more he has done up to the present time it is unnecessary, 
for the purposes of the argument, to define. 

4 Bacon said that Nature can be commanded by man ; but only by 
obeying her. 


66 MYSELF 

exercise of his power over it: the sensible universe 
is but the occasion for this exercise. Unless Nature 
had been governed by laws and Faraday had known 
something about these laws, he could never have 
created the dynamo as an object in the sensible 
universe. 

Man’s power over the universe as presented has for 
foundation the existence of the laws of Nature. 

Here mark this important fact. These laws of 
Nature had existence before man appeared as a 
subject of the universe as presented. When we say 
man reads the laws of Nature into the sensible 
universe we do not mean that he conceives the laws as 
coming into exfstence with himself: so far as he 
knows the laws of Nature, he thinks them as having 
been in existence before himself as a subject of the 
sensible universe. The materialist himself must think 
in this way, and no one can think the laws of Nature 
as coming into existence in time. 5 

We have seen that man, as a subject of the 
intelligible universe, exercises power of variation and 
creation in the objective universe : he does this as 
subject to the laws of Nature. But we have also seen 
that, for us, the laws of Nature exist in the intelligible 
universe. 

In the limit, it is the self-conscious in man to which 
his power so to vary or create must be referred. But 
man does not so create or vary directly : it is because 
the laws of Nature exist and because he can make use 
of them that his power exists. 

Imagination is free : even when the subject uses 
imagination in the inhibited form of thought, there is 
no bondage to the laws of Nature, unless he is think¬ 
ing about the objective universe or about something 
possible for the objective universe. Not thought 
itself, but the content of thought, is subject to the 


5 We can only think them, not out of time, but as existing in 
transcendence of time. As Kant points out, we can neither give be¬ 
ginning or no-beginning to the sensible universe. 


THE LAWS OF NATURE 67 

laws of Nature. By the laws of Nature we mean laws 
of the objective universe, not of the intelligible 
universe. These laws exist in the intelligible 
universe, they govern the objective universe. But, 
for us, imagination, will and volition, all that exists 
in the intelligible universe, is meaningless without the 
assumption of self-conscious subjects. Can we then 
make abstraction of the laws of Nature which also 
exist in the intelligible universe? If not, then when 
we consider that the conduct of all subjects is 
governed by these laws, does not reason point to their 
resulting from self-conscious transcendental Being? 6 


6 The laws of Nature are further considered in the chapter on 
“The Sensible Universe before Man’s Appearance.” 


IDEAS 


Now we can clear away the difficulty still facing us as 
to the foundation or origin of ideas. 

If we merely sensed the universe as presented we 
should have no presentations of relations and so ideas 
could not arise in the mind. 1 But, after presentation, 
man begins to observe that the objective universe is 
governed by what we term the laws of Nature. The 
form, motion, the very evolution of this universe are 
all observed to be under the governance of the laws of 
Nature. This spells, for us, relation for form, 
motion, and evolution itself. The form of the seed 
evolving into the form of the tree or plant: the growth 
of life-organisms generally; the motion and evolution 
in form, of matter itself; all reveal the governance of 
the laws of Nature. 2 

We sense the universe as presented as unrelated 
objects, so we cannot think these objects : we think 
about them; that is, we think their likenesses and 
unlikenesses to one another. In other words, we think 
relations between them. But whence come these 
relations which are not sensed, which are not given 
with the mere presentation of objects? From the fact 
we observe that all objects are bound together under 


1 Certain living organisms, it may be, merely sense the universe 
as presented. This may set up action and reaction between such 
living organisms and their environment. There may be instinctive 
action and reaction without self-conscious thought. This opens an 
enquiry into instinct as distinct from self-conscious thought. 

2 “ In explaining processes in Nature we use laws as major 
premises under which we subsume facts to reach conclusions.” 
Riehl’s “ Science and Metaphysics,” p. 235. Spite of Riehl’s objection 
we are justified in so doing. 


68 


IDEAS 


69 

one governance, the governance of the laws of Nature. 
It is the fact of the existence of the laws of Nature that 
not only gives us power to think but power to vary and 
create in the objective universe. The laws of Nature 
give us the relations which we require for ideas. 

Destroy the laws of Nature. Where is evolution ? 
Destroy man’s knowledge of the laws of Nature, while 
giving him full sensuous knowledge (assuming that is 
possible) of presentations. Where is man’s power to 
think about the universe as presented? Where is his 
power to create in the sensible universe? The powers 
of thought and creation are non-existent. 

We must therefore refer ideas not directly to 
presentations but to the fact of the existence of the 
laws of Nature which had existence before man 
appeared as a subject in the sensible universe. It is 
the existence of these laws that makes thought and 
creation by man possible 

But where do the laws of Nature exist? In the 
sensible universe? No. They exist, for us, in the 
intelligible universe : man thinks them, he does not 
sense them. 8 

We must refer man’s ideas not only to the existence 
of the laws of Nature but to his knowledge of these 
laws. Given ideas, man exercises power over the 
universe as presented. The occasion for his exercise 
of this power in relation to the sensible universe is 
found in presentation, the power itself is derived 
through the laws of Nature. 

The sensible universe is fully under the governance 
of the laws of Nature which exist, for us, in the 
intelligible universe. Man, as a subject of the 
intelligible universe, exercises like, but subordinate, 
power over the universe as presented to him. His 
power of thought is based on the existence of the laws 
of Nature. Destroy these laws, then thought is 
impossible. 


3 Even Haeckel with his closed circle of moments of evolution and 
devolution makes all subject to the eternal iron laws of Nature . 


MYSELF 


70 

The foundation of ideas, then, is in the existence of 
the laws of Nature. It is the laws of Nature which, 
for us, establish relations between presentations, and it 
is these relations which make ideas possible, and so 
render thought possible. The objective universe 
presents us with unrelated objects, a possible occasion 
for thought. But we think in the intelligible 
universe, and our power of thought therein arises 
because the laws of Nature, existing in the intelligible 
universe, present us with the relations we require for 
ideas. It is these ideas we use for thought. If we 
imagine these laws as proceeding from an ultimate 
self-conscious Being we may interpret them as 
preparation for the thought and conduct of self- 
conscious subjects in and about our objective universe. 

Imagination, which is exercised as a faculty by the 
subject, exists in transcendence of thought in that it 
is not confined to thought about the sensible universe : 
for we have seen that we can imagine objects which do 
not exist in the sensible universe as presented. So 
though the laws of Nature make thought about our 
objective universe possibly for us, the genesis of 
thought must still be found in imagination : it is only 
our objective universe that the laws of Nature govern. 

The same conclusion is come to thus :—When we 
read the laws of Nature into the objective universe, 
we do not get directly the ideas we want for thought. 
To have an idea of an object we must first have in the 
mind its schematic idea : we do not even use schematic 
ideas directly for thought : it is the relations between 
schematic ideas that we use for thought. We are still 
driven to the conclusion that thought is no more than 
an inhibited form of imagination which is “deep 
buried in the soul of man.’’ 

What, then is the relation between thought and the 
laws of Nature ? * 

The laws of Nature were in effect before self- 
conscious subjects appeared : they manifest, to us, 
activity on the part of transcendental Being. The 
result is that a form of evolution existed in the 


IDEAS 71 

objective universe before we as self-conscious subjects 
appear. 

When self-conscious subjects appear it is the fact of 
this pre-existing form of evolution which enables the 
subject to think about the objective universe. The 
self-conscious subject super-imposes on the existing 
form of evolution a further form of evolution, it varies 
and creates in the objective universe for the purposes 
of itself the self-conscious subject. 

Now it is imagination, deep buried in the soul of 
man, to which we refer back, ultimately, this power in 
the self-conscious subject to so vary and create. But 
this power is dependent on the existence of the laws 
of Nature, that is, dependent on pre-existing activity 
on the part of transcendental Being. We must, there¬ 
fore, from the point of view of the subject, give 
transcendent self-consciousness and imagination to 
transcendental Being or we have a breach in 
continuity. 

If we refer back the form of evolution under the 
laws of Nature to this transcendent activity, and—as 
human experience makes us aware—the after form of 
evolution effected by the self-conscious subject to the 
one origin, imagination, we have a continuity, though 
the imagination of the self-conscious subject is 
subjective to transcendental imagination. 

This gives us the following relation :—The laws of 
Nature proceed from transcendental imagination : 
thought is an inhibited form of imagination whereby 
the self-conscious subject can, while obeying, use the 
laws of Nature to superimpose a form of evolution on 
the form determined by the laws of Nature. 

We may here deal lightly with the question : — 

What does the fact of the existence, for us, of 
relations involve? The fact involved is that objects 
are not things-in-themselves, but all inter-dependent : 
it is the relations between objects, not the objects 
themselves, which, in thought, have reality for us. 
As before shown, we do not think objects, we think 
about them, think their relations inter se. And these 


MYSELF 


72 

relations could not exist unless objects were inter¬ 
related, inter-dependent. 

It follows that objects must be partial aspects of 
“ something,” or phenomena of what Kant terms a 
manifold . 4 They are, for thought, part of a whole : 
that is, we can think the sensible universe as present¬ 
ing to us discrete parts of the universe itself. To use an 
analogy taken from “ Personality and Telepathy,” it 
is as if some ultimate thing-in-itself were sensed by us 
through a vast number of separate peepholes, opening 
to us the sensing of apparently unrelated parts of the 
whole which in themselves, as sensed, are meaningless 
for thought. Insight makes us aware of this thing- 
in-itself, though it is beyond the purview of thought. 
This thing-in-itself is then at the background of the 
content of your thought and my thought, and this 
explains how it is that relations between objects can 
have meaning for thought. Relations between objects 
could not exist if each were a thing-in-itself : for 
relations we must be able to relate back each object to 
every other object and so, in thought, reach out to 
what is generally termed an ultimate unity for all; that 
is, to an ultimate thing-in-itself. 

This explanation is necessary to show what is meant 
when it is said ideas are not of objects, but of relations 
between objects : that we do not think objects, but 
think about them. For the meaning of “ relations” 
is in the air unless we have the thing-in-itself at the 
background of thought. The fact of relations infers 
the fact of the relatively, permanent . 5 

This thing-in-itself is beyond the purveiw of 


4 The meaning- I attach to “ manifold ” is determined, by the 
theory of an ultimate of “the accomplished in the accomplishing.” 

5 Kant speaks of the unity of the manifold of intuition in the 
internal sense. As I reject all sensuous knowledge, I do not use 
the term “ the internal sense.” The term intuition, also, I do not 
use, unless incidentally, for Kant, as before stated, gives it many 
meanings. He says, for example, the human understanding thinks 
only and cannot intuite. I hold the subject has the power of in¬ 
sight transcending thought. I do not think I thereby seriously 
oppose Kant. 


IDEAS 


73 

hought : insight, only, makes us aware that it is. We 
:an only determine it negatively as not a limit of 
thought in that it neither contains nor infers 
contradiction. And this thing-in-itself cannot be a 
thing of unity, for unity is no more than a limit of 
thought; it must transcend unity and diversity beyond 
the purview of ideas. 

Bergson says: — 

“ We can thus conceive of succession without 
distinction, and think of it as a mutual penetration, an 
inter-connexion and organisation of elements, each one 
of which represents the whole, and cannot be distingu¬ 
ished or isolated from it except by abstract thought.” 

For “ abstract thought ” I would read mental 
analysis. But, applying Bergson’s statement to the 
present argument, I interpret his meaning as involv¬ 
ing transcendence of the whole and part, beyond the 
purview of thought, or even conception, as the term 
is generally used. It is insight transcending thought 
and its ideas which makes us aware “ each one of 
which represents the whole.” 

Perhaps in music or the rhythm of poetry we find 
he nearest approach to feeling the existence of 
:ranscendence of the whole and part. In music, as 
Bergson shows, very beautifully, we cannot separate 
he whole from the part . 6 But we cannot think this 
ranscendence for the ultimate thing-in-itself : we can 
anly be aware of it through our faculty of insight. 

Even for insight this ultimate thing-in-itself is not 
ne and is not you. I follow Kant, not Berkeley. But 
[ suspect that in the transcendent there is some 
ranscendent relation (!) between you and me on the 
>ne hand and the thing-in-itself on the other. If this 
)e so, then transcendental Being transcends subject 
ind object. 


6 Music gives instance for “ the accomplished in the accomplish¬ 
ing.” Notes of music affect us sensuously, what we feel in music 
s the relation between the notes. 


7 


74 MYSELF 

In considering any ultimate we must travel beyon< 
the purview of ideas; we are travelling beyond thi 
universe of mere relations to which thought i 
confined. It is the power of insight which enables u 
so to travel. 


THOUGHT, BRAIN AND MOTION 


Science at this present time proceeds on definite 
hypotheses as to matter and motion which are of great 
importance, not only in themselves, but in the 
deductions which follow as to thought and brain. 
The statement which follows shows the hypothesis on 
which the argument of this chapter is based. The 
statement was sent me, by the courtesy of the Editor of 
Nature, from “ a distinguished man of science who 
has given particular attention to the question raised.” 

“ There is, of course, nothing novel in his (Mr. 
Constable’s) statement on the forms of matter, and I 
think most scientific men would agree that the atom is 
to be regarded as consisting of positively and negatively 
charged particles in motion and in equilibrium, and that 
the actual volume occupied by the particles is small 
compared with the ordinary accepted dimensions of the 
sphere of action of the atom. One must, of course 
suppose the presence of positively as well as negatively 
charged particles, and in the nucleus theory which I 
have advanced, the main mass of the atom is supposed 
to be concentrated in a positively charged nucleus of 
exceedingly small dimensions. If one believes in an om¬ 
nipresent ether, it consequently follows that the space 
occupied by the ether in matter is very large compared 
to that actually filled by the component entities, all of 
which are supposed to have exceedingly small 
dimensions. I think your correspondent is quite safe 
in basing his argument on this foundation.’' 1 

1 These entities, in size, as compared to the atom, are, in the 
average, as a pin’s head to the dome of St. Paul’s. Suppose the 
members of our Solar System are moving in free ether. Then re¬ 
duce the system to the size of an atom, and its members, in size, 
give some idea, in relation to the area of motion of the whole 
system, of the size of the entities to the whole etheric form, which 
gives the form of the object. 


75 


76 MYSELF 

Now all objects, from living beings and their brains, 
to pots and kettles, when we consider them solely as 
objects in the sensible universe, exist as forms of 
matter; we sense them as matter having form and 
resistance . 2 * And up to the present we have been 
content with the terms matter, form and resistence, 
without any attempt to analyse their meaning. But 
now we have found out something about matter which 
must seriously influence our ideas in relation to it. 

Form does not set up a material surface continuity 
as sensed by us, that is, as we see or feel it. We do 
not really see or feel any material continuity. For 
much the greater part of the object whose form we 
sense consists of ether : the constitution of the object 
is, mainly, exactly the same as the ether pervading 
space which, for us, has no form and sets up no 
resistance. It is the motion of the comparatively few 
component entities of the object which give rise to the 
form, surface and resistance which we sense. The 
form merely marks or expresses the area of the sphere 
of action of the entities contained in the object . 5 

Objects are, therefore, not continuities of the 
material as we sense them to be : they exist, qua form, 
merely as differing etheric areas of the sphere of 
action of certain entities . 4 And the resistance of 
objects does not exist in the material but in the sum 
of the motions of their entities. 

We find, scientifically, that the surface, form and 
resistance of objects as sensed are functions of 
motions: the properties of matter, as sensed, are 
functions of motion, motion of the hypothetical 
entities. Objects themselves do not exist in the 
material : they consist, mainly, of ether together with 
the motion of a comparatively few self-contained 


2 The best definition of form given is “ the configuration or out¬ 
line of a body by which it is recognised bv the eye as distinct from 
other bodies.” Cf. The Encyclopcedic Dictionary. 

5 It is the molecule which sets up, for our senses, the properties of 
matter, but the molecule consists of these entities. 

4 It is indifferent to the argument what we term these entities. 


THOUGHT, BRAIN AND MOTION 77 

entities. Their form is etheric, it expresses but the 
area of ether to which the motion of these 
comparatively few entities is restricted. 

The ether, the entities and their motion may be 
considered as all determined : they simply are, for us, 
beyond the purview of thought, just as the laws of 
Nature simply are for us. 

But what, then, is required for the creation of an 
object or to change the form of objects, that is, to 
make them other objects ? Given the ether, the entities 
and their motion, all required is restriction of the 
motion of the entities within the area necessary for the 
objective existence of the object imagined. 5 6 

According to this scientific hypothesis, the ether and 
the entities are unaffected, unconditioned by time and 
space : they simply are . Whatever motion may be 
or may not be, the motion of these entities, for us, 
always remains the same. Objects may come and go, 
may be many or few, but though their existence 
demands the pre-existence of the ether and the entities 
and their motion, the existence or non-existence of 
objects does not affect in any way the ether or the 
entities and their motion : for objects, there is required 
only restriction of the area of the motion of their 
entities. 6 

What, then, is required for the creation of an 
object ? Nothing but power 7 to restrict the area of 
motion of determined entities within imagined spheres 
of action. 

We have shown that before man can create an 
object in the objective universe he must first create it 
in the intelligible universe, he must first imagine it 
even though he uses but the inhibited form of 


5 By changing - the form of an object we can change the mani¬ 
festation of life. We do make our domestic breeds of living crea¬ 
tures and thereby make new manifestations of life. 

6 Conservation of energy and the determination of the laws of 
Nature are assumed. 

7 This power imports the existence of a subject or being who can 
exercise the power, and this infers a self-conscious subject or being. 


78 MYSELF 

imagination we term thought. And we have shown 
that man can imagine an object for the objective 
universe without ever making it an object in the 
objective universe. 

Therefore to be effective the power to create a new 
object in the objective universe requires creation in 
imagination before objective creation. 

We will now apply this line of argument to the 
question of thought and brain. 

Imagination is a power which we may regard as 
“ deep buried in the soul of man ” 8 and so, in itself, 
it exists quite apart from, it is dependent in no way on, 
the existence of the material brain. 

Thought is a conditioned form of imagination : all 
thought is correlated to motion of the brain. 9 This is 
one important fact of human experience which under¬ 
lies the following argument. 

Now we may give the brain any complexity of form 
we like and may consider the hypothesis that it moves 
and by movement produces thought. But by no 
possibility can we imagine any such machine pro¬ 
ducing more than determined thought. For any 
thought so produced is a function of the machine as 
it exists, however complex the machine may be. 
Thought in such case could not be creative; its pur¬ 
view would be determined by the possible movements 
of the existing brain, it could not cover what is not, 
and so could not create what is not. Much less could 
it be my thought or your thought. For such a machine 
imagination only exists in the form of thought, where 
the form of thought is determined by the motion and 
form of the brain. 

But thought is used for creation. It is the self- 

8 But imagination is used by the subject as a power. 

9 The entities of the brain, its (real?) materiality, are determined 
in motion. The motion of the brain referred to does not mean the 
motion of these entities, but the motion—the change in—their areas 
of motion. I admit the parallelism between thought and brain move¬ 
ment. But thought is an inhibited form of imagination, and the 
inhibition arises because of the parallelism. 


THOUGHT, BRAIN AND MOTION 79 

conscious subject who uses thought for creation. So 
thought cannot be a function of brain movement: it is 
the self-conscious subject who imagines and, through 
the brain, can use imagination in the form of thought. 
It is this use of thought by a self-conscious subject 
which makes possible the creation of objects which 
before did not exist in the objective universe. Thought 
of itself as a mere function of brain movement could 
not exercise this power. 

It is the self-conscious subject gifted with imagin¬ 
ation who uses the brain for thought. We are, 
further, aware that the motion of the brain does not 
determine thought, because the subject has the power 
of insight which determines thought as limited, that 
is, as giving information only as to relations. And 
what does all this mean ? It means that the thinking 
subject determines the motion of the brain. The brain 
is an instrument which the self-conscious subject uses 
for thought and, as the subject uses thought, so the 
brain moves. Thought functions the brain. 

But the brain is an object; my brain is an object to 
me, yours is an object to you. So the human 
personality has power to determine the motion of an 
object in the objective universe. And the possible 
movements or motion of this object, the brain, are far 
more complex and numerous than the movements or 
motion of any other object in our objective universe. 

The self-conscious subject when thinking does affect 
movement in the objective universe. 10 

Now let us turn to the objective universe and see 
what we have reduced it to. 

The so-termed material form of objects we have 
found not to exist: objects exist only in etheric forms 
and these etheric forms are determined by the areas to 
which the movements of certain entities are confined; 

10 The internal motion of any object is not here referred to; that 
is, its motion in relation to its own form. What man effects is 
change of form, which affects motion by restricting the area within 
which the motion exists. 


8 o 


MYSELF 


it is by the particular form of any object that we are 
able to distinguish the object from other objects. 11 
Objects exist, for us, in etheric form. 

Again, resistance has been found to exist in motion : 
it is the motion of the entities in any particular 
confined area that gives rise to the resistance of the 
particular object: motion sets up what w r e term matter 
and the resistance of matter. 

Now we not only do not sense the entities referred 
to but we know nothing about them. We may term 
them centres of force, or energy, ultimate matter, knots 
in or whorls of the ether, lacunae in the ether or any¬ 
thing else. 12 But any such definitions only reveal 
more clearly our ignorance, we might even relate them 
to ultimate unconsciousness in relation to ultimate 
consciousness. Neither sense nor thought gives us 
any information as to the nature of the being of these 
entities. It is etheric areas of motion only that the 
self-conscious subject is called on to use for change 
or creation in the objective universe by personal 
thought. Such change or creation is in form only, 
etheric form. 

Consider the first simple dynamo. How was it 
made ? By first determining in thought a new etheric 
form for an object. 13 The after creation of this new 
etheric form in the objective universe determined the 
area of movement of the entities in question. 
Faraday used his power to determine etheric 
forms of motion first by determining in idea 
the form of the new object, and then by creating it in 
the objective universe. 14 He had, at his service, 
command over etheric form ; with the entities he could 


U This helps us to understand how it is that knowledge is relative 
in itself. 

12 Would Leibnitz have termed them centres of consciousness? If 
so, how would he have dealt with etheric form? 

13 The choice of “ material ” to be given form to, lay between the 
materials Faraday had human experience of. 

14 When we do anything in the objective universe it is motion that 
we use. The entities and the energy or force of Nature are under 
the laws of Nature. But we use them for our personal purposes. 


THOUGHT, BRAIN AND MOTION 81 

deal in no way, their movement was under the laws of 
Nature. But he could restrict their movement within 
etheric forms determined by himself . He controlled 
the area of their movement. 

Again, bear in mind that, so far as sight and touch 
are concerned, we distinguish object from object 
only by etheric form; all objects so far exist for us in 
etheric form. 15 And, by thought, we can determine, 
we can afterwards create, these etheric forms, which 
exist in restricted areas of motion of the unknown 
entities. It is by restricting, by interfering with the 
areas of motion, that we create new objects. No other 
power is wanted in the subject to do what he does do. 

It may be objected that no reference has been made 
to the power of electricity which Faraday used : but 
the objection is baseless. 

Energy or force simply is, we know nothing of it 
unless manifest in form in our objective universe and 
manifest in relation to objects.™ Electricity is a 
particular manifestation in time and space of energy 
or force. How did Faraday use it ? He found that 
the movement existing in one object opposed to or in 
relation to the movement. 17 existing in another object 
made electricity manifest. He experimented in 
relating motion to motion and so arrived at the 
manifestation of electricity. 

Now consider together what we know about objects 
and what we know about thought and the brain. 

We want something to connect the self-conscious 
subject with the objective universe so that the 
objective universe may be not only an “ occasion ” 


15 But we do not think objects; we only think their relations 
inter se. 

16 We cannot think about force or energy. We can only think 
about the protean forms in which it is manifest to us in time and 
space. For thought, we find herein agreement with Kant when he 
accepts the statement that: In all changes in the world the substance 
remains, and the accidents alone are changeable. 

17 The argument is not affected if for “ movement ” we write 
‘‘ area of movement.” The question of Electricity being continuous 
or discontinuous is not now touched on. 


82 MYSELF 

for thought about it, but that the subject may be able 
to exercise power over it. 18 

We find this connection partly in the fact of the 
brain : treated as a machine we find in the brain 
parallelism between thought and motion in the 
objective universe : we think such motion. 

It has been shown that for the creation of any new 
object in the objective universe, the object must first 
be created in the intelligible universe. But how can it 
be created in the intelligible universe? By personal 
exercise of thought. But, again, when there has been 
this exercise of thought, it has been correlated with 
motion of the brain regarded as a synthesis of areas 
of motion. The fact of the exercise of thought in the 
intelligible universe is always accompanied by the 
fact of the motion of the brain, that is, there is an 
indissoluble link between thought in the intelligible 
universe, and motion in the objective universe : the 
brain is an object. The brain as an object imports 
parallelism between the thought of the subject and 
motion in the objective universe. The brain is, as it 
were, the receiving centre, for each of us, for motion 
in the objective universe and thought about the 
objective universe. The subject can imagine the new 
object as an object in the objective universe because 
its imagination, as thought, is correlated to motion in 
the objective universe. It could not think as it does 
think about existing objects in the objective universe 
without this correlation, and this correlation is, so far, 
all we want. For we cannot and do not want to think 
about energy and the entities, they simply are. We 
can only think about objects, and we have reduced 
objects to things of motion, of areas of motion. We 
can, in thought, objectify the idea of an object we think 
about. 

Now when the subject has created a new object in 
the intelligible universe, it has the power by will and 


18 As we have seen, the subject only wants, for creation in the 
objective universe, power over areas of motion. 


THOUGHT, BRAIN AND MOTION 83 

conduct to creat this object in the objective universe. 
And, by what has already been recorded, we are in 
some measure able to understand this power of will 
and conduct. 

For the objective universe is not only an “ occa¬ 
sion ” for our thought about it, but our thought itself 
is indissolubly linked through the brain with the 
motion of the objective universe. Motion once set up 
in the brain by thought in correlation to thought of a 
new object, merely requires such motion to be “ ob¬ 
jectified ” in the objective universe for the object to 
exist therein. For instance : you think out definitely 
a new machine possible of existence in the objective 
universe. When you have done this you can imagine 
it as an object in the objective universe, though it is 
not such an object. How is it you can so imagine ? 
Because your thought of the object set up correlated 
motion in your brain and this particular motion re¬ 
quires only to be transferred to or made effective in 
the objective universe for the object to exist therein. 
The subject, by will and conduct, can so transfer to 
or make effective in the objective universe, his 
thought. 19 

And for this transfer what is required ? There is 
required no power at all over the ether : there is re¬ 
quired no power at all over the entities, except in de¬ 
termining their areas of motion. I think we have 
reduced “ matter ” to these entities : that is, there is 
nothing which we can still term matter but these enti¬ 
ties. And, if so, no power over matter in itself is re¬ 
quired for the creation of an object. All required is 
the restriction of the etheric areas within which certain 

19 Never forget that this thought about the thing is a condition 
precedent for the “thing” to be materialised in the objective uni¬ 
verse. Why is it that you can imagine, even think about, certain 
things which you cannot create in the objective universe? It is 
because such thought is not correlated with motion in the objective 
universe. In any such case there may be correlated motion of the 
brain, but, if so, it is not of the brain as an object in the objective 
universe. 


84 MYSELF 

entities operate in motion : power to restrict motion 
within etheric form. 

Self-consciousness is faced by the determinism of 
the ether and the entities: it interferes with these de¬ 
terminants, per se, in no way. All the subject does 
is, through the motion of its brain, which is correlated 
to its thought, to imagine an object as existing in the 
objective universe before it exists there. Then the 
subject, as one of will and conduct, has power to “ob¬ 
jectify ” what it has created in the intelligible uni¬ 
verse. 

But the argument still remains defective, for no 
relation has been shown between the subject as one 
in the intelligible universe and as one of conduct and 
will manifest in the objective universe. No power 
has, as yet, been found in the subject, by which it 
can objectify in the objective universe that which it 
has created in the intelligible universe. 

If we consider our objective universe we find that, 
always, energy exists unchanging. We may, with¬ 
out affecting the argument, consider the entities as 
functions of energy, call them crystallisations of ener¬ 
gy if we will. But, so far as we can know, we must 
treat these entities as unchangeable : they, with ener¬ 
gy, must be treated as not subject to time and space. 

Before self-conscious subjects appear this universe 
exists as objects between which there is action and re¬ 
action under the laws of Nature. But this universe 
is not static, it evolves and evolves under the 
laws of Nature. It may be 20 taken that this evo¬ 
lution in inanimate nature takes place also in animate 
nature,—in living organisms,—before self-conscious 
subjects appear. Assuming that it does, then there 
is nothing, so far, in our universe but action and re¬ 
action under the laws of Nature. Objects are automata 
of the laws of Nature. 


20 It is written “ it may be ” because we are ignorant how or 
when self-conscious subjects first appear and because, by the argu¬ 
ment, life does not necessarily import self-consciousness. 


THOUGHT, BRAIN AND MOTION 85 

But then appears the self-conscious subject and, 
thus, a new and determining factor is introduced and 
there is breach of continuity in evolution. 21 The ob¬ 
jective universe still continues its same form of evolu¬ 
tion under the laws of nature but the self-consci6us 
subject is not an automatic subject of the laws of 
Nature. The self-conscious subject uses the laws of 
Nature for its own purposes; by itself determining its 
own action, it determines the reaction on it of other 
objects Before self-conscious subjects appear all ob¬ 
jects are subject to their environment: self-conscious 
subjects determine largely their own environment. 
The subject does not fight against the laws of Nature, 
it uses them for its own purposes. The laws of Nature 
still hold sway, but a form of evolution for the first 
time comes into existence which would not have come 
unless self-conscious subjects had appeared in mani¬ 
festation. 

The self-conscious subject becomes manifest on em¬ 
bodiment ; and, as embodied, it is manifest as an ob¬ 
ject in our universe,—it is an object even to itself : 
you think about your own body, I think about my 
own body. 

The subject then, as embodied, exists in the objec¬ 
tive universe. But this is a mere embodiment, a limit¬ 
ation, of the subject in the intelligible universe, which 
subject still fully exists. Let us trace how it is that 
by conduct the self-conscious subject can set up action 
which determines the reaction on it of the objective 
universe. Human experience informs us of the fact, 
we want as far as possible to explain the fact. 

The subject first of all, as a subject in the intelli¬ 
gible universe, thinks of an object for the objective 
universe which might, but does not yet, exist in the 
objective universe. It creates the object in the in¬ 
telligible universe. Human experience informs us 
that, having once got the idea of the object, the sub- 


21 Unless we assume the existence of Transcendental Being. But 
such a. Being is not now considered- 


86 


MYSELF 


ject can, afterwards, objectify the object in our uni¬ 
verse. How can it do this? 

It has been shown that to create any new object or 
vary any existing object in the objective universe no 
interference with energy and the entities in themselves 
is necessary : for us, they simply exist unchangeable. 
All wanted is interference with their etheric form : 
new objects exist, for us, merely in new etheric forms, 
variations of existing objects exist, for us, merely in 
variations of existing forms. 

When the subject arrives at an idea of a new object 
possible for the objective universe, it uses imagina¬ 
tion in the inhibited form of thought. The inhibition 
arises because thought cannot travel beyond the limits 
of motion of the brain. The brain is a machine which 
can only employ imagination in the form of thought. 22 
Imagination is applied to the machine and imagina¬ 
tion sets it working : but it can only produce thought. 

When imagination is so applied to the machine 
then, automatically, it sets up motion therein : im¬ 
agination produces motion in an object, for the brain 
is an object, it is the most complex object in our uni¬ 
verse. We have our relation between thought and 
motion in the objective universe. This is how the 
subject, having created an object in the intelligible 
universe, can imagine it as an object in the objective 
universe. 

But when the subject has an idea of, that is, has 
created an object in the intelligible universe, though 
thereby it can imagine it as an object in the objective 
universe, it cannot directly objectify its idea. 

But the subject is embodied, is embodied as an ob¬ 
ject ; not only this, we are all embodied as objects of 
automatic motion : 23 motion is implicit for our em¬ 
bodiment. 


22 If I have an electric cooking stove in a cottage the central 
supply of a vast amount of electricity can only cook at my little 
stove, so far as that stove is concerned. 

23 Motion under the laws of Nature may be termed automatic, 


THOUGHT, BRAIN AND MOTION 87 

Consider an imbecile, assuming that, for him, 
self-consciousness does not exist. He is as much an 
object of motion as other men. The only difference 
is that his motion is automatic, must be referred to him 
as an automaton. He does not, through self-conscious¬ 
ness, determine his own action and so determine re¬ 
action. Our bodies (including our brains) move as 
automata when self-consciousness is absent. 

Man enters the world, after nine months incubation, 
as an infant of automatic movement. There is, at 
first, no manifestation of the direction of motion by 
its self-consciousness. But it is not a mere material 
thing : it is an object which moves under the laws of 
Nature : 24 its movements are subject to its human 
form, and this form has evolved under the laws of 
Nature. 

We may next state as a fact, without considering 
the fact, that, as time passes, the new-born accumu¬ 
lates human experience. The result of this experience 
is that the self-conscious subject becomes more and 
more manifest in its direction of its body,—more and 
more manifest in the use, for its own purposes, of the 
master tool of motion placed in its hands. The sub¬ 
ject can make “ tools,” however complex, by use and 
only by use of the master tool (the body) which the 
laws of Nature have evolved and presented to him. 
The master tool and all other tools can only be effec¬ 
tive through motion. 25 

What we have arrived at, then, is this : — 

The subject as one in the intelligible universe cre¬ 
ates a new object for the objective universe or varies 
an existing object by creating it in the intelligible uni¬ 
verse. This exercise of thought is correlated to motion 
in the objective universe and thereby the subject can 
imagine the object it has created in the intelligible 

24 The movements of any animate organism are determined by its 
form. Specialization of function is dependent on complexity of form. 

25 The subject can only make energy manifest in the form, for 
example, of electricity by the relative motion of objects. 


88 MYSELF 

universe as an object in the objective universe. The 
subject, through embodiment, has given to it, under 
the laws of nature, the master tool of motion, the 
human body. It uses this tool to objectify in the ob¬ 
jective universe the object it has already created in the 
intelligible universe and imagined in the objective 
universe. 

We start with creation by the self-conscious subject 
in the intelligible universe and this creation is, 
through the brain, correlated to motion in the objec¬ 
tive universe. Thought sets up motion in the objective 
universe. The self-conscious subject, embodied, is 
presented by the laws of Nature with a master tool 
of motion : the body. It is the laws of Nature which 
have evolved the human body as a master tool. This 
master tool can, automatically, move only under the 
direction of the laws of Nature. But the self-conscious 
subject can use this master tool for its own purposes. 
The subject can use it to create and vary in the ob¬ 
jective universe. For the self-conscious subject is not 
an automaton of the laws of Nature, it can create and 
vary its own environment. 

The subject creates in the intelligible universe, it 
objectifies in the objective universe what it has created 
by use of the master tool presented to it by the laws of 
Nature. 26 

In considering the above argument, which may be 
difficult to follow, as opening, to some, a new line of 
thought, bear in mind what, it is assumed, has been 
established. 

By showing that resistance exists in motion and 


26 We may here indulge in what is, possibly, more than a conceit 
of imagination: The brain has been evolved under the laws of 
Nature and so exists as a machine for thought. But, even when 
its action is not directed by the self-conscious subject, it must be 
working; it is alive. This working is manifest in delirium. In 
delirium the machine is working quite apart from the supervision 
of the subject. So the ideas which arise and which are presented to 
the subject appear to the subject extraneous conceits of the imagina¬ 
tion, it cannot trace the origin of these ideas to itself as a self- 
conscious subject; its dreams are dreams of delirium. 


THOUGHT, BRAIN AND MOTION 89 

that the form of objects is etheric, we have gone far to 
bridge the gulf between the material and immaterial— 
unless the ether or the entities be termed the materi¬ 
al. 27 On the other hand, by denying the 
possibility of any sensuous knowledge and making 
the sensible universe merely an “ occasion ” for 
thought we have distinguished, vitally, between the 
intelligible and the sensible universe. But we have 
seen also the subjection of the sensible to the intelli¬ 
gible universe. Before the self-conscious subject ap¬ 
pears the sensible universe is subject to the laws of 
nature. And these laws exist in the intelligible uni¬ 
verse. 28 When the self-conscious subject appears 
he, as a subject of the intelligible universe, exercises 
command over the sensible universe. 

There is, for the subject, duality. 29 The ultimate 
entities and energy or force exist, they simply are, 
for us : they are external to us and we can affect them 
in no way. But, under the laws of Nature, the subject 
can use these entities and energy or force for its own 
purposes in the objective universe. It can do this be¬ 
cause the laws of nature exist. The subject, so long 
as it is conditioned in the body, is a thing of will and 
conduct and it can make its will and conduct effective 
in the objective universe because, through its brain, 
its thought is correlated to motion, and because the 
laws of Nature have presented it with a master tool of 
motion. 

Our power of insight makes us aware of the limit¬ 
ations of our thought in that the ideas which it uses 
open to us only relations,—give us no information as 
to the thing-in-itself. And what is above written ex- 

27 if any hypothesis as to the constitution of the ether be sound 
scientifically, then the ether must be subject to time and, perhaps, 
space. It cannot be a thing-in-itself. There must still be the thing- 
in-itself in the background. 

28 These laws are referred back to transcendental self-conscious 
Being. Only thus can we escape a breach in continuity. 

29 But the theory now relied on is neither dualistic nor monistic. 
n The accomplished in the accomplishing” transcends either theory. 

8 


MYSELF 


90 

plains, in reason, why thought is so limited. 30 For 
thought does not bring the ether or the entities within 
the purview of its field of action : it holds a form of 
command only over motion in our objective universe. 
And motion is not a thing-in-itself, we can think only 
relations between different manifestations of motion 
in our objective universe. This, again, shows why we 
cannot think objects but can only think relations be¬ 
tween them. 

The command, then, of thought over motion gives 
no command over the ether or the entities, over any¬ 
thing, in short, that can be termed a thing--in-itself. 
Thought can only use ideas which are things of re¬ 
lation. 

The above deduction is in agreement with what 
has already been proved as to the limited nature of 
thought. Insight, which transcends thought, alone 
makes us aware of the limited nature of thought. 

Without any attack on science we can now state a 
problem for science. 

Thought is correlated to motion of the brain : the 
man of science has the objective universe for his field 
of endeavour, his sole weapon is thought. 31 

But if he admit that thought in itself is relative 
only, can he know this by the use of thought ? Must 
there not be a power or faculty in him transcending 
thought, for him to be aware of the limitations of 
thought ? There must be. This power I term insight. 

And if there be, in the subject, this power trans¬ 
cending thought, does it not follow, in scientific rea¬ 
soning, that the motion of the brain cannot be held to 
evolve or produce thought of itself ? If we hold to 
any theory of parallelism between thought and brain 
motion as our ultimate, where is the subject of in¬ 
sight ? 

30 Thought cannot deal with energy and the entities unless 
manifest in time and space, that is, subject to relations. 

31 Science uses imagination, but imagination is useless for 
science unless ultimately inhibited in the form of thought. 



THOUGHT, BRAIN AND MOTION 91 

By the theory now adduced the subject’s power of 
creation in the intelligible universe must be exercised 
before creation in the objective universe is possible,— 
such after-creation we know is possible. 

That the subject can, by will and conduct, change 
the etheric forms which determine objects is a fact of 
human experience. But we know that to determine 
these etheric forms all wanted is power to restrict the 
areas of motion of the unknown particles. We only 
want power to affect areas of motion in the objective 
universe. So we want only some correlation between 
thought and motion, and a master tool of motion. 
We have found both. 

Must not psychology treated as a science take into 
consideration the power of insight which is in man ? 

But this power of creation only extends to objects 
in the objective universe. There can be no creation 
of love, beauty, truth, or justice, because they exist 
only for self-conscious subjects. A beautiful land¬ 
scape, or the representation of scenes suggesting love, 
beauty, truth or justice, contains nothing of love, 
beauty, truth or justice in themselves as objects : it 
is as mere manifestations in the objective universe for 
our ideals that they exist in themselves. The very 
ideals have no existence in themselves : they exist only 
for self-conscious subjects. And here, again, we mark 
the limited nature of the objective universe in compari¬ 
son to the wider purview of the intelligible universe. 
The brain, which gives us the nexus we want between 
thought and motion, has nothing at all to do with our 
ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice which has ex¬ 
istence only for self-conscious subjects; its purview is 
confined to manifestations of love, beauty, truth and 
justice. 

Self-consciousness is the one thing-in-itself which, 
for us, simply is. It is quite true that we have no 
human experience of self-consciousness without life. 
But it is quite possible that life itself may, in the 
future, be reduced by science to some complexity of 


MYSELF 


92 

motion. Indeed, when we know that self-conscious¬ 
ness can not only create in the inanimate but in the 
animate objective universe, thus exhibiting its power 
over even manifestations of life, the possibility is 
opened that self-consciousness has power over the 
principle of life itself. 32 

The subject has the power to regard his universe in 
the past and, accepting the principle of evolution, we 
find that there was a time of our universe when life 
was not manifest : life appeared in time at some after 
period. Now when the universe existed without life, 
can we assume self-consciousness did not exist ? 33 For 
reasons already given I think no such assumption can 
be made. 

Thought uses the brain to set up motion and so the 
subject, with its master tool, the body, is enabled not 
only to think about the objective universe, but to vary 
and create in it. We cannot speak of the life of the 
brain; we can only speak of life as a principle ani¬ 
mating man whose brain is part of his organism, and 
this apparent one life is, as has been shown, really a 
synthesis of innumerable lives. 

We sense the external. Through the correlation 
between thought and the motion of the brain we can 
think about what we sense and can exercise power as 
shown over the objective universe. But this power 
is limited. It extends only to power over manifesta¬ 
tions of love, beauty, truth and justice; there is no 
power over them themselves. 

Why we are embodied is beyond the purview of 
knowledge ; even insight gives us no assistance. But, 
from the human standpoint, we may indulge in a con¬ 
ceit of imagination. 

The subject is embodied for the fulfilment of duty. 


32 We know life only when manifest in material form : in ecstasy 
the self-conscious subject is, quite apart from manifestation in 
material form, Again, the self-conscious subject can determine the 
evolution of the manifestations of life from the simple to the complex. 

33 The word consciousness is useless, for it is meaningless unless 
we predicate consciousness in a subject or being. 



THOUGHT, BRAIN AND MOTION 93 

It is embodied as part of a universe of sin and suffer¬ 
ing and so partakes of the evils of sin and suffering. 
The universe, as external to the subject, is presented 
to it as a mirror for the manifestation or reflection of 
the transcendental ideal of love, beauty, truth and 
justice. But it is presented so blurred and dulled by 
sin and suffering, that its reflection is sullied by 
hatred, ugliness, falsehood and injustice. The duty 
cast on the subject is, through long long ages of pain¬ 
ful toil and strife in evolution, to clean the mirror 
presented till it reflects, in perfect purity, the trans¬ 
cendental idea. Therein we may, in thought, mark 
“ the one far-off divine event to which the whole cre¬ 
ation moves.’ * 

We have found the relation between thought and 
motion, reducing the sensible universe to one of 
etheric forms : we have found how, when the subject 
imagines an object, it can imagine it as an object in 
the objective universe : we have found that the laws 
of Nature have presented the subject, embodied, with 
a master tool for objectifying what it has imagined. 

But behind all stands the isness of the self-conscious 
subject. And behind all self-conscious subjects 
stands, for our reason , transcendental self-conscious 
Being. 


THE INTELLIGIBLE UNIVERSE AND THE 
SENSIBLE UNIVERSE (II) 


We find that the sensible universe is largely the result 
of creation by man. 1 More than this. Man is a sub¬ 
ject of the intelligible universe and we find that, before 
he can create any new object in the sensible universe, 
he must, by the exercise of imagination, create it in 
the intelligible universe. Without this creation in 
the intelligible universe there is no content for the 
exercise of his will and volition which he can use for 
creation in the sensible universe. So far, the sensible 
universe depends for its very existence on the intelli¬ 
gible universe. 2 

Though it is true that the universe must be pre¬ 
sented in some way for thought about it to begin, 
the intelligible universe is subject in no way to the 
sensible universe. Imagination is free, is not confined 
to that which must ultimately lead to creation in the 
sensible universe. Thousands on thousands of 
“ things ” may be imagined which never result and 
never can result in creations in the sensible universe. 
And this fact of the freedom of imagination from any 
subjection to the sensible universe we shall find of 
great importance hereafter, when we consider 
Dreams. 


1 Every new creation in the sensible universe forms for man a 
new starting point for thought. So a Plato, Aristotle or 
Archimedes born into our century, with the same brain power, 
might effect more than he did in his life, because he would be 
born into an environment of more starting points for thought. 

2 Schematic ideas cannot be objectified: they can only be used 
for the creation of objects in the objective universe, so far as that 
universe is concerned. 


94 


INTELLIGIBLE & SENSIBLE UNIVERSE 95 

But still the argument is in the air. 

Accepting it as proved that the sensible universe 
is largely a subject of the intelligible universe 8 and 
that, by will, volition and imagination, man can, by 
use of his master-tool the body, effect creation in the 
sensible universe, so that he has always evolving in¬ 
crease of power to determine the forms in which the 
universe is presented to us, we still find a lacuna in 
the argument. We still want self-consciousness. 

The conduct of man in exercising his power over 
the sensible universe is not that of an automaton under 
the direction of will, volition and imagination. It is 
man himself who uses these powers; they are used for 
personal purpose. And no man could exercise these 
powers without consciousness of self. The self-con¬ 
scious subject must exist before we can consider the 
intelligible universe and its governance, under the 
laws of Nature, of the sensible universe. This self- 
consciousness is. to each of us, a thing-in-itself. 

Completing the argument, then, so far as it has 
gone, we find man as a subject of the intelligible 
universe exercising power, even to creation, over the 
universe as presented to him. And this exercise of 
power we must refer to him as a self-conscious sub¬ 
ject : the self-conscious subject must exist. Con¬ 
sciousness exercises power over the unconscious as 
its subject. But consciousness is meaningless unless 
a subject or some Ultimate Being exists. Above all, 
supreme in power over the objective universe, are the 
lav/s of Nature, known or unknown to us. But these 
laws themselves, it is argued, must be referred to some 
ultimate self-conscious Being. 

After man appears we find the “I am ” holding 
large command over the universe as presented, even to 
creation therein. The subject is no more than a form, 
inhibited in time and space of the “ I am.” 


3 The sensible universe is fully a subject of the laws of Nature. 


THE SENSIBLE UNIVERSE BEFORE MAN’S 
APPEARANCE 


But before man appears? Has the sensible universe 
evolved without consciousness ? 

We must consider this question. And in consider¬ 
ing it, we must keep clearly in mind what it is we are 
considering. We are not touching directly on any 
question concerning man’s soul, his mortality or im¬ 
mortality : we are concerned only with the question 
of the presence or absence of consciousness as the ulti¬ 
mate factor in the evolution of the sensible universe 
before man appears. 

Indeed, we may more closely define the subject 
under consideration. We may consider the question 
to be whether or not consciousness was such a factor 
before what we term life appeared on the earth. 1 

When we consider the universe as presented, it is 
generally assumed something purely material is pre¬ 
sented to us. And this assumption there is no need 
now to quarrel with. 2 But if the presentation ended 
there, man by will, volition and imagination could 
exercise no power over the sensible universe. The 
presentation is subject to the laws of Nature and it is 
the existence of these laws that not only makes 
thought about the objective universe possible, but 


1 Do not forget that consciousness is meaningless unless there be 
“"something ” conscious, whether subject or pure Being. Thought 
is not creative, it is a self-conscious subject or Being who uses 
thought for creation. 

2 I rely on the existence of the unconscious, but do not rely on 
any vital contradictory distinction between the material and 
imTmaterial. 


96 


THE SENSIBLE UNIVERSE 


97 


makes man’s power, over the universe as presented, 
possible. Herein we find the subjection of the form 
of the “ material ” to thought and imagination. Man 
could not establish a new breed if there were no laws 
of heredity known to him : Faraday could never have 
created a dynamo if no laws governing matter and 
force had been known to him. Man cannot directly 
use mere presentation : he must first find out that the 
presentation is governed by the laws of Nature before 
he can think or exercise his power over the sensible 
universe. The laws of Nature in one sense dominate 
evolution, but it is these laws that man uses for the 
exercise of his power over the form of evolution. It 
is on the existence of these laws that his power is 
based. Without the existence of the laws of Nature 
man could not be in the position he is, that is, the po¬ 
sition of a subject with evolving increase of command 
over the universe as presented to him. The very ex¬ 
istence of these laws, so far as they are known to him, 
establishes the foundation on which his power in 
thought and action rests. 

Haeckel’s attempt to solve the Riddle of the Uni¬ 
verse fails . 3 He theorizes moments of evolution and 
devolution in a closed circle under the “ eternal iron 
laws of Nature.” By admission he gives supremacy 
to the “ laws of Nature.” He cannot read these laws 
into the material, for the material is presented to him 
merely as unrelated objects, as disjecta membra. He 
can only get the laws of Nature from observation : 
from himself as a self-conscious subject. And, 
from his own observation, he admits the supremacy 
of the laws as something external to the material. 

We read into Nature the fact that the universe as 
presented to us not only is subject but was subject 
before man appeared to the laws of Nature. It is our 
knowledge of these laws of Nature which not only 

3 Quite apart from his admission that he can find no evidence to 
support his theory that consciousness has evolved from the 
unconscious. 


MYSELF 


98 

makes ideas possible but enables man to exercise his 
power over the sensible universe : so far as man is 
ignorant of the laws of Nature, so far he is unable to 
exercise, consciously, his power over the sensible uni¬ 
verse . 4 

One conclusion would appear to follow. This may 
now be given, but we must not rush our fences and 
no full reliance is placed on it. 

At first sight it would appear reasonable to hold that 
there is no breach in continuity of evolution, no sud¬ 
den appearance in time of consciousness in an evo¬ 
lution of the unconscious. For, by admission, we 
have the laws of Nature transcendent of any condition 
of time : and, if we refer them to a supreme conscious 
lawgiver, we have consciousness always in existence 
unconditioned by time . 5 The “ I am ” for each of us 
thus become a particular manifestation of the all- 
embracing conscious Being and we have no breach in 
continuity of evolution. Here we come near to 
Spinoza’s theory. 

But it is sounder to start, at the other end, from 
reason and human experience, and see how far they 
lead us to a solution of our difficulty . 6 

The sensible universe is presented to us as objects, 
these objects are presented as unrelated objects. We 
do not think these objects, indeed any direct relation 
between thought and objects, reason informs us, is 
impossible . 7 We think about objects, we think rela¬ 
tions between them. 

But how can we think relations between objects 
which are merely presented to us as unrelated ? Any 
such thought is impossible. 

4 There is no question here of man’s exercising this power 
unconsciously as an automaton. 

5 This timelessness does not mean an “everlasting now.’’ It 
means “ something ” transcending past, present and future and so 
transcending thought. We must have Kant’s “duration.” 

6 There can be no solution in thought. But man has also the power 
of Insight. 

7 Kant says the senses do not judge at all. 


THE SENSIBLE UNIVERSE 99 

Here step in the laws of Nature. Man reads into 
the universe, as presented, the laws of Nature. His 
observation of the laws of Nature informs him that 
relations between objects exist. These laws of Nature 
govern not only the sensible universe as presented, 
but himself as an embodied personality. 

Now the power of man as a subject of the intelligible 
universe over the sensible universe has, it is assumed, 
been proved. And we do not—quite impossibly—de¬ 
fine this power as power directly over the sensible 
universe. We refer this power to the laws of Nature. 
And this we can do. For, the laws of Nature once 
admitted, we find, apart from man, that the universe 
as presented 8 is governed and directed bv law. What 
then does man do in the intelligible universe? He 
uses the laws of Nature already in existence and he 
uses them for his personal purpose. How does he 
do this? By the power he has, as a subject of the 
intelligible universe, over the sensible universe . 9 
When once, apart from man, apart indeed from all 
life, we make the sensible universe subject to law and 
give man some knowledge of these laws, we can under¬ 
stand that he may be so constituted as to make use of 
these laws, so far as known to him. For, so far as 
the sensible universe is concerned, all that man can 
create is by use of these lav/s for his own purpose. 

Now we can state our problem. 

It is self-consciousness which, in the ultimate, en¬ 
ables man to use the laws of Nature for his own 
purpose. Are we then to refer these laws, which 
consciousness does use for its own purposes, to an 
origin of unconsciousness? In other words, when 
we find we must refer the use of them to conscious¬ 
ness, are we to refer the laws themselves to the 
unconscious ? If so, the power of the conscious was 
evolved from the unconscious. 


8 The universe itself? Insight may possibly justify us in holding 
it is governed by transcendental law. 

9 Do not forget that self-consciousness is at the back of his power. 




100 


MYSELF 


The universe as presented is only the occasion foi 
thought; thought about this sensible universe is pos 
sible and only possible because it is governed by the 
laws of Nature. We reduce the sensible universe 
itself to a subject of the laws of Nature. And we re¬ 
late back the laws of Nature, qua their governance oi 
the sensible universe, to a time before the appearance 
of man, or indeed of any form of life. 

These laws of Nature exist, for us, in the intelligible 
universe; they do not exist in the sensible universe; it 
is their governance of the sensible universe that is 
made manifest, to us, in the existing forms of the 
sensible universe. So the intelligible universe has 
governance over the sensible universe before man ap¬ 
pears ; for the laws of Nature exist only in the intelli¬ 
gible universe . 10 

When man appears he, as a subject of the intelli¬ 
gible universe, exercises power of creation in the 
sensible universe. His power depends on his ex¬ 
istence as a conscious self, as the “ I am.” It is 
consciousness that, under the laws of Nature, exer¬ 
cises this power of creation. 

Then did consciousness suddenly appear with the 
appearance of man ? n Was there no “ I am ” before 
man appeared ? Did the laws of Nature always exist 
simply in themselves? If so, we have a breach of 
continuity in time evolution . 12 For we cannot get 
away from the fact that consciousness is a thing-in- 
itself. How, then, can it suddenly start into being 
in time with the appearance of man, or any other form 
of conscious life ? Do not forget that consciousness 


10 The laws of Nature must exist in the intelligible universe for 
the objective universe to be an occasion for thought: this existence 
is a condition precedent for the subject’s power of creation in the 
objective universe. 

n If, instead of man, we read amoeba or oyster, the argument 
might be the same. 

12 The theory that consciousness, under some material form, was 
introduced from the external into our universe at some moment of 
time, is not considered. It is simply the cutting of a Gordian knot. 
The conscious was in the ever, or evolved from the unconscious. 


THE SENSIBLE UNIVERSE ioi 

is meaningless without a self or some ultimate Being 
that is conscious, and that the “ I am ” is no more 
than an inexplicable fact for us. The “ I am ” is as 
inexplicable to us through our power of thought and 
Insight as any ultimate “ I am.” Thought and even 
Insight are presented to the “I am.” The theory 
of the evolution of the conscious from the unconscious 
involves denial of the existence of self, as a self-con¬ 
scious subject. 

I think I am in agreement with Kant when I sug¬ 
gest that the problem, so far as proof for the present 
argument is concerned, is insoluble. Any dialectic 
can be used only for the purposes of man’s reason . 18 

When we consider what we term proof, is not this 
proof merely a high degree of probability ? I suggest 
that in the realm of thought we can only deal with 
probabilities . 14 Knowledge being relative, proof is 
impossible for us as thinking subjects. We can only 
arrive at a certain high degree of probability which, 
in practice, we term, and are justified in using as, 
proof. So far then as thought is concerned we can 
only deal with probabilities. 

But man is also a subject of Insight and it is Insight 
which makes us aware of the limitations of thought. 
Insight, for us, proves this limitation. But the proof 
is useless, directly, for man as a subject of the universe 
as presented ; useless, directly, for his conduct therein. 
For it transcends thought. Insight merely makes us 
aware that “ something ” must be, which is beyond 
the purview of thought. 

So far we have no proof of anything. But I sug¬ 
gest that the probability is greater if we give real 
reality to some ultimate, conscious “ I am,” manifest, 


13 Mark that, if this statement be correct, it establishes at least 
the possibility of revelation. 

14 The Indian Evidence Act lays down that a fact is said to be 
proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court 
either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that 
a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular 
case, to act upon the supposition that it exists.” 




102 


MYSELF 


to us, through the laws of Nature in their governance 
over the sensible universe, than if we hold conscious¬ 
ness, a thing-in-itself, to have been evolved from the 
unconscious . 15 I suggest that this probability is so 
great that it attains the highest degree towards proof 
capable for reason. Do not forget that all reasoning 
must start with an assumption of self-consciousness 
in each of us as the “ I am.” 

We cannot think self-consciousness, it is but an in¬ 
comprehensible fact for each of us, which forms a 
condition precedent for the existence of our human 
experience 16 And so it is divorced from any question 
of the past, present or future, even for the self-con¬ 
sciousness of each one of us. 

By predicating this Ultimate Self Conscious “ I 
am ” we explain nothing in thought, we but get rid of 
the difficulty of consciousness as a Deus ex machina 
appearing suddenly in nature. 

Bear in mind, however, that this argument on 
probability is quite distinct from a previous argument 
adduced in proof of an Ultimate Conscious “ I am.” 
The “ I am ” in me and you, leads us in feeling, sup¬ 
ported by Insight, to belief transcending thought in 
the existence of an ultimate “ I am.” If we assume 
we each exist as “ I am,” the existence of an ultimate 
“ I am ” follows. And for this Ultimate Being we 
must have transcendence of time. 

The sensible universe has existence in time : trans¬ 
cendent of all in time and fact, exists Ultimate Being . 17 


15 If we hold to this opinion we are faced by the contradiction 
that self-consciousness, which is a thing-in-itself, is the result of 
evolution in time. 

16 S. T. Coleridge says it is groundless because it is the ground of 
all other certainty. 

17 The subject of this Chapter is considered again from another 
standpoint in the Chapter on “ The Universe without Self- 
Conscious Subjects.” 


FEELING (I) 


We have as yet considered the subject only as one of 
Imagination, Thought and Insight. We shall find, 
on further consideration, that human experience in¬ 
forms us we have not, thereby, exhausted the subject ; 
the subject is more than one of Imagination, Thought 
and Insight. We still want explanation of why the 
subject is active as a subject of Imagination, Thought 
and Insight: we still want explanation of what the 
driving force is which is at the back of the purposive 
conduct of the subject. 

The power of thought, in relation to the sensible 
universe, depends on the material constitution and the 
form of the brain . 1 So, other things being equal, we 
must hold that the man of greatest brain power will 
manifest in recorded thought and conduct, in the uni¬ 
verse as presented, the highest output of thought. 
That is, the man in possession of the finest brain 
machine, will turn out the finest work . 2 

But human experience teaches us that what is above 
stated is incorrect: the finest machine does not turn 
out the finest work. My thought does not work it¬ 
self : thought in itself is not my thought. It is some¬ 
thing external to thought which sets the thought of 
the subject to work and directs its course. It is de¬ 
sire, will, or something that comes under the head of 
feeling, that determines the use of and directs thought. 


1 Imagination is a power of the subject and transcends thought. 
Thought is an inhibited form of imagination. 

2 Varying environment for the man will vary the manifestation 
in output of his thought. This, however, does not affect the 
argument. 

103 


io 4 MYSELF 

The man with the finest brain but with weak desire or 
will may accomplish nothing in action or recorded 
thought, he may even not use thought at all for him¬ 
self. The man with strong desire, or will, but com¬ 
paratively feeble brain, may accomplish much in 
action or recorded thought; he may even use thought 
largely for himself. The brain machine, it is true, 
may possibly work of itself, as in delirium. s But 
then the output is sheer chaos; the output of brain 
work is effective for the subject only when under the 
governance of feeling. And feeling here imports a 
feeling subject : in delirium the subject does not work 
the machine : the thought is not his thought in its 
origin. 

The subject, therefore, is not only a subject of 
thought, but a subject of feeling. It is not denied 
there may be a subject of thought which is not a sub¬ 
ject of feeling . 3 4 But we need not consider any such 
subject, for human experience teaches us unquestion¬ 
ably that we, as subjects, are not only subjects of 
thought but of feeling also . 5 And it is ourselves that 
we are considering, not other possible or impossible 
beings. 

We find, that for the subject to be effective as a sub¬ 
ject of thought, it must, precedently, be a subject of 
feeling. The subject, as a subject of the sensible uni¬ 
verse, has a brain and thereby is related to the sensible 
universe as presented : so it can think about the sen¬ 
sible universe as presented. But for this thought to be 
effective for the subject, as it is effective, we must have 
something else : we must have desire or will or some¬ 
thing that comes under the omnibus term of feeling. 
Give that machine, the brain, any complexity you 
choose manifesting static efficiency of any kind. It 
will not work itself for the subject : for the dynamic, 
it wants the steam of desire or will or, generally, feel- 


3 The self-conscious subject does not then direct the work. 

4 Such a subject must be an automaton. 

5 Kant points out that the feelings of pain and pleasure and the 
will itself are not cognitions. 


FEELING (1) 105 

ing. And, too, it wants a subject not only to turn the 
steam on and off, but to regulate not only the steam, 
but the machine itself. 

We have already arrived at a conclusion that, as 
subjects of Insight, we transcend Thought. In the 
above argument, we find, further, that thought itself 
is ineffective without the existence of desire, will, or, 
generally, of feeling. 6 Though is not my thought, 
unless I am a subject of feeling. 

It being thus established that the subject is a subject 
of feeling, it becomes necessary to consider what we 
mean by feeling. The thinking subject that we con¬ 
sider, must be a feeling subject. For it is the feeling 
subject only that can think as a subject. When I 
think, it is feeling that starts my thinking. Thinking 
is not my thinking unless I feel. 

And now we enter on a path of great difficulty, for 
the expression “ feeling ” as used has infinite diversi¬ 
ty, while the relation of the feeling to the thinking 
subject is nowhere made clear. Admirable as is 
James Ward’s essay on psychology, I cannot but 
think that, in considering feeling and emotion, he is 
prevented from rising to the surface of his subject, so 
as to take in the widest possible view, from the clog- 
weight of the “ psychological I ” which keeps his 
head under water. Throughout the essay, it seems to 
me, he is himself conscious of the unsatisfactory point 
of view psychology obliges him to take, because he 
must treat it as a science : he must not transcend the 
facts of presentation. 

The James-Lange theory makes feeling a function 
of presentation. The gladness of a hungry child 
is created by the presentation of a cake; the presenta¬ 
tion of a bear to a man creates fear in the man. 7 * 9 

6 The word “ineffective” is here used in relation to the 
sensible universe as presented. We have seen that will must have 
imagination at its back. 

7 The expression of gladness in the one, or of fear in the other, 

is, I think, no more than outward sign of the feeling held to be 
:reated by the presentation. This question is considered hereafter. 

9 


io6 MYSELF 

The truth is that the presentation in either case has 
no effect at all on the child or man qua affection of 
feeling, except as a starting point for thought : it is 
no more than the occasion for thought. It is because 
the child has seen cakes before and remembers that 
they are good to eat, and the man has seen or read of 
bears, and remembers that they are dangerous, that 
the presentation sets up gladness or fear. 8 The sub¬ 
ject must be a subject of thought, memory and feeling 
in both cases, or the presentations would have no effect 
at all in causing the particular form of feeling. 9 

Imagine that you are before a cinematograph repre¬ 
sentation and see a hungry child with a cake presented 
to it, or a man running away from a bear. You see 
the expression of gladness on the child’s face, and the 
expression of fear on the man’s face. So far as you 
are concerned as an observer, we may assume you 
sense what appears before you in the same way as if 
you had sensed a real child and a real man and their 
real environment. But you cannot read conscious¬ 
ness or feeling into the eidola sensed by you and, so, 
you cannot read into them gladness or fear : you can 
only read into them expressions of gladness or fear. 
There is before you only a presentation of the mani¬ 
festations of gladness and fear in the universe as 
presented. 10 

We can even imagine so perfect a cinematograph 
representation that observers have no means of dis¬ 
tinguishing what they sense from what they normally 
sense in human experience. And this proves how 
mere presentations of objects have, in themselves, 
nothing to do 11 w ith consciousness, thought or feeling. 

8 The bilious child revolts at sight of a cake, the inured hunter 
feels gladness at the presence of a bear. Even physiologically the 
effect of the presentation depends on the “ state ” of the subject. 

9 If heredity is relied on, then some progenitor of the subject is in 
question. I do not think this effects the argument. 

10 It should be stated that any “automaton ” theory is rejected by 
the James-Lange followers. 

11 Except as starting points for thought. 



FEELING ( 1 ) 107 

Any presentation, therefore, cannot in itself evolve 
gladness or fear or feeling of any kind. When a 
beautiful tree is disfigured by a storm or a chaotic 
piece of marble is carved into some perfection of form, 
there may or may not be gladness or fear. We know 
nothing about this. It is ourselves we are investi¬ 
gating. 

The universe as presented cannot give rise to 
thought about it : it is because the sensible universe 
is governed by the laws of Nature that thought about 
the sensible universe, as presented, is rendered pos¬ 
sible. But thought cannot be effective for the 
subject without feeling to determine its use and direct 
it. We cannot, therefore, derive feeling from pre¬ 
sentation. 

The next step in considering feeling brings us to 
psychology treated as a science. Herein we find de¬ 
nial that feeling is a function of presentation ; we find, 
as it were, parallelism between feeling and present¬ 
ation. 

James Ward says : — 

“ The simplest form of psychical life, involves not 
only a subject feeling, but a subject having qualitatively 
distinguishable presentations which are the occasion of 
its feeling.” 

In saying this he is treating psychology as a science 
and must say it, because psychology, as a science, is 
not called on to transcend the facts of presentation. 
But he also tells us, definitely, that the psychological 
ego is not the same as the metaphysical ego. 12 
Science, quite rightly, ignores the possible existence 
3f any metaphysical ego : it does not transcend the 
facts of presentation. 

So, when he uses the term “ the simplest form of 
psychical feeling,” he uses it for the purposes only of 
psychology as a science : he leaves severely untouched 


12 He does not treat the psychological subject as exhaustive of the 


io8 MYSELF 

the question of the possible existence of the metaphysi¬ 
cal ego. 

In defining feeling, for psychology, he says it may 
mean— 

(a) A touch, as feeling of roughness, 

(b) An organic sensation, as feeling of hunger, 

(c) An emotion, as feeling of anger, 

(d) Feeling proper, as pleasure or pain. 

I think, considering the authority quoted, we may 
treat these definitions as exhaustive. 13 And if they 
are exhaustive, the definition of the simplest form ol 
psychical life given above, stands. But, as to what 
follows, bear in mind, as before stated, that James 
Ward makes them exhaustive only for the psycho¬ 
logical ego. 

Feeling, so far as it has as yet been defined, is sub¬ 
ject to, or runs parallel with, presentations. The 
former case we have considered : in the latter case, 
which we now consider, the form of feeling runs paral¬ 
lel with the form of presentation : feeling, as defined, 
is distinct from pure feeling. 14 Hunger or thirst, for 
instance, depends on the state of the stomach; ordin¬ 
arily, pleasure or pain is referable to external effect. 
Even when we listen to music, or read poetry, or look 
at a work of art, the psychological feeling of pleasure 
or pain we experience must be considered together with 
the presentation. And, in the same way, when we 
feel physiological pain, not from personal pain but 
from the suffering of another, we must consider the 
feeling together with the presentation. In all such 
cases feeling must be referred to the “ I ” of psycholo¬ 
gy, not to the “ I am.” 15 

13 They show on their face that, as their author says, some further 
definition is requisite for the omnibus term feeling-, even in 
psychology. But, still, psychology, treated as a science, cannot 
transcend presentations. 

14 Pure feeling is here used as meaning feeling without any 
presentation as defined. 

15 The ultimate effect on the “I am” opens another question. 
Bear in mind that if in the ultimate there is transcendence of the 
phenomenal, the phenomenal still has subjective existence. 


FEELING (1) 109 

But the term “ feeling,” as so far defined, does not 
include desire existing potentially in itself, free from 
the influence of any physiological or even psychical 
presentation. Does such desire exist for the subject ? 

The savage has self-consciousness, he is self-con¬ 
scious that he is faced by a universe which, as pre¬ 
sented, he cannot fully understand. He cannot think 
it, he can only think about it. To him, undeveloped 
as his power of thought may be, the universe as pre¬ 
sented imports “something” beyond his thought, 
and he naturally uses his imagination in thinking 
about this “ something.” He doubts, and rightly 
doubts, the evidence of his senses and, false as his 
form of thought may be, he gives reality to “ some¬ 
thing ” beyond the evidence of his senses, to “ some¬ 
thing ” beyond, dominating the material, though he 
may try to make this “something” manifest in the 
material in various ways. 

The savage can no more think the limits of his own 
thought about the sensible universe as presented to 
him than we can. But he also has the faculty of 
Insight. 16 

If we take Dr. Frazer’s definition of religion given 
in the Golden Bough :— 

“ A propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to 
man which are believed to direct and control the course 
of nature and of human life,” 

then it follows, in due course, that the savage would 
ultimately, if not at first, assume these “ powers su¬ 
perior to man ” to be “ conscious or personal agents ” 
in the universe he, the savage, exists in. We find 
the same assumption even in the present day amongst 
Christians. The transcendental Being, “ God,” was 
merely made manifest to us through Jesus Christ,— 


16 It is no reply to say he never uses the faculty. Vast numbers 
of us in the present day scarcely use even our faculty of thought. 


IO 


MYSELF 


made known to us, that is, so far as we could know. 
But probably most Christians define Him to them¬ 
selves as a personal, conscious Being in our universe : 
an anthropomorphic God. 

That the savage should attempt to propitiate or 
conciliate or even threaten powers superior to man is 
natural to him as a subject. But why does he believe 
in these powers superior to man ? 17 The belief must 
have preceded action resulting from the belief. His 
belief is founded on his feeling that something exists 
above and beyond his purview of thought, and that 
in some mysterious way he is related to this “ some¬ 
thing. ” 18 His desire to influence this “ something ” 
in his own favour follows. 

Can this belief of the savage in the spiritual be held 
to have been originated or evolved from his human 
experience? And, if so, is it unreal because it is a 
function of human experience ? Or has it arisen from 
his insight into the fact of the phenomenal nature of 
human experience, so that he has been driven by 
reason into belief in “ something ” transcending 
thought and human experience ? 

It is now argued that the latter explanation must be 
accepted because certain conduct on the part of the 
savage can only be explained by precedent belief as 
motive. 19 

This conduct on the part of the savage is to pro¬ 
pitiate, conciliate or threaten a power existing exter¬ 
nal to his, the savage’s, universe. The desire of the 
savage is to affect this power, external to him. His 
conduct to this end is to himself reasonable, however 

17 I would suggest that the earliest belief in man we can trace is 
in a power superior to man which, from the savage’s standpoint, is 
incomprehensible in its exercise of power in the universe. 

18 Belief is possible for the subject, because of the limitations 
of the subject’s power of thought. 

19 The savage falls back on belief in the supernatural not 
because his human experience leads him up, per se, to the belief, 
but because he is aware his human experience leaves “something” 
unexplained. 


FEELING ( 1 ) hi 

unreasonable it may appear to us. 20 And his conduct 
must be, in some measure, unreasonable; for not even 
the most moral and intellectual of men have such en¬ 
vironment that their conduct is purely reasonable. 

The belief must precede conduct, and, however ir¬ 
rational or immoral the conduct, the belief itself 
remains unaffected. A Torquemada, or Nero, whose 
conduct even the devil would shiver at, may be moved 
by this belief in “something” of transcendental 
power. 

The genesis of the belief is to be found in feeling as 
distinct from cognition, or even thought. 

Now, whatever the conduct of the savage, why does 
he do what he does do ? Because he is moved by 
blind desire to affect for his own benefit “ something ” 
which he is aware exists beyond and above that which 
he can think about the objective universe. 

His awareness is derived from insight, but it is 
because he is a subject of feeling that he can have 
desire. It is as a subject of feeling that not only the 
savage, but man of the present day, has built up his 
dogmatic forms of belief, from worship of a stick or 
stone as manifesting the unknown, to worship of an 
anthropomorphic God. 21 

Again, Darwin says :—“ The birth both of the 
species and of the individual are equally parts of that 
grand sequence of events, which our minds refuse 
to accept as the result of blind chance.” 

What does this mean ? That there must be some 
ultimate transcendental Being : for if we cannot refer 
back all to “ blind chance ” we must refer all back to 
transcendental consciousness. Darwin could not 
know this : he felt it. Insight made it possible for 
him to be aware of its truth though he did not pursue 
the course Insight opened to him. But I think Dar- 

20 We too often forget that in judging conduct we must judge 
from the standpoint of the actor, not from our own. 

21 Those of us who accept revelation as part of the subject’s 
experience must still admit our Insight into the fact that there is 
“something” in us or of us beyond the purview of thought. 


112 MYSELF 

win, perhaps above all other men, pursued truth in the 
abstract as what he was centrally interested in. He felt 
this interest and, therefore, in his conduct pursued 
it. Feeling determined his conduct. 

Huxley, again, who believed consciousness to be 
a thing-in-itself, as distinct from matter or force, felt 
the same interest, and therefore in his conduct pursued 
it. Feeling determined his conduct. 

We find that the savage, Darwin and Huxley, are 
subjects of feeling as distinct from cognition and 
thought. Feeling, however, so far as we have as yet 
defined it, means 

(a) A touch, as feeling of roughness; 

(b) An organic sensation, as feeling of hunger; 

(c) An emotion, as feeling of anger; 

(d) Feeling proper, as pleasure or pain. 

But the belief that the savage feels the desire for 
truth that Darwin and Huxley felt, cannot be brought 
under “ feeling ” so far as we have as yet defined it. 
We want a new term. Bear in mind that feeling 
must always be referred to a self-conscious subject. 

Where there is presentation we can give a fairly 
definite meaning to feeling. But even then reason 
raises a difficulty. For we cannot say there is pre¬ 
sentation to feeling : what we mean is that there is 
presentation to a feeling subjectP If we assume 
there can be no feeling without presentation, a certain 
deduction, which involves contradiction for science, 
follows. 

The subject must have the potentiality of feeling 
before presentation. It cannot be created a feeling 
subject, by mere presentation to it; the presentation 
cannot create the feeling. Unless we accept the 
James-Lange theory, the potentiality of feeling must 
have had existence before presentation. The present- 


22 Any theory of parallelism for feeling and presentation I 
ignore as not appealing ultimately to reason, though such a theory 
is sound and necessary for science. Science confines itself, at 
present, to a form of reason. 


FEELING ( 1 ) 113 

ation is merely the occasion for a form of feeling to 
be manifest. 

For psychology, then, we are not given a feeling 
subject. We are given a subject with the potentiality 
of feeling which becomes a feeling subject when there 
is presentation to it. 23 Psychology, quite rightly, 
considers the psychological “ I” as a feeling subject 
because the science of psychology is not called on to 
transcend the fact of presentation. Psychology starts 
with the assumption necessary for science of an im¬ 
pregnable bond between feeling and presentation, and 
so ignores the question of whether or not the very 
fact of what results from presentation infers pre-exist¬ 
ing potentiality of feeling in the subject. 

But it is this pre-existing feeing or potentality of 
feeling we now want to examine. We must travel 
beyond the bounds of psychology treated as a science. 

For the savage’s acceptance of the “ unknown ” : 
for Darwin’s state of mind in rejecting “ blind 
chance ” : for Huxley’s acceptance of consciousness 
as a thing-in-itself, 1 cannot find that feeling, as de¬ 
fined, applies; I cannot find any of the stated forms 
of presentation. Cognition is not involved : desire 
(as manifested), will, volition or conation is not in¬ 
volved. 24 

But here an explanation must be interpolated. 


23 The statement made would appear to be correct. But the 
statement has no meaning for science because psychology as a 
science does not transcend the fact of presentation. Here we 
find the contradiction above written of. 

24 Never forget that Insight is a faculty of the subject. So it 
is a fact for the subject, that “something” exists beyond the 
purview of thought The “thinking I” is a subject to the subject 
of Insight. 


POTENTIALITY OF THOUGHT AND 
FEELING 


When we speak of feeling being used in the sense of 
pure feeling, we do not define feeling as without pre¬ 
sentation. All we mean is that there is no presenta¬ 
tion as known to us, no presentation in relation to the 
universe as presented. So we mean simply that we 
do not know whether there is or is not presentation 
for this feeling that we term pure. We cannot know 
that there is or is not presentation which transcends 
the possible presentations of our sensible universe. 

What do we mean by potentiality of feeling? 

When we speak of potentiality of thought or intel¬ 
lect we know where we are. Milton had potentiality 
of thought which was made manifest by his work in 
relation to the sensible universe. A “ mute, inglori¬ 
ous Milton ” had the same potentiality of thought, but 
the potentiality was never made manifest by conduct 
in relation to the sensible universe. And here it is 
important to remember that we must not hold that the 
potentiality of the mute, inglorious Milton was sheerly 
wasted because never made manifest in our universe : 
we know nothing at all about this. We cannot hold, 
generally, that the potentiality of thought in us, as 
subjects, is exhaustively made manifest in our uni¬ 
verse. For human experience informs us to the con¬ 
trary that, under our existing social environment, only 
few subjects have opportunity to make manifest in 
conduct or record of thought their potentiality of 
thought. Is all this potentiality sheer waste? Is 
nature so wasteful that it normally employs a 
Nasmyth’s hammer to crack eggs? Can evolution 


THOUGHT AND FEELING 


"5 

explain the greatness of man's thought and imagin¬ 
ation and the littleness of their accomplishment in our 
sensible universe? 1 

If we consider any given generation of men we find 
that the potentiality of thought is never made fully 
manifest in relation to the sensible universe : the given 
generation would always have been marked by higher 
accomplishment if it had had a finer form of education 
and more favourable environment generally 2 This 
is always true of any generation. We find, then, 
for any generation, that the power of thought is only 
partially used so far as manifestation in the sensible 
universe is concerned : there is always a reserve of 
force or energy ready to take advantage of more 
favourable environment. 3 The potentiality of human 
thought exists : it is never made fully manifest. 

At first thought we should hold there is the same 
apparent wastage of potentiality of feeling as of po¬ 
tentiality of thought, and argument might be pro¬ 
duced in support. But as we cannot condition the 
“ I am ” in any way, we cannot hold it to be, or not 
to be, in itself, a feeling subject. We can only hold 
it to become a feeling subject when it, as a subject, is 
open to the resistance to self-expression which its en¬ 
vironment as a subject may make it encounter. 4 At 
the same time, as human experience informs us that 
the “ I am ” is conditioned as a feeling subject, we 
are justified in holding it has the potentiality of feel¬ 
ing, if and when conditioned as a subject. Beyond 
this we cannot go, in thought or insight. So, as 
we do not know why the “ I am ” is conditioned as a 


1 Meliora proboque deteriora sequor. 

2 Darwin finds the more efficient causes of progress in a good 
education during youth when the brain is impressible and of a high 
standard of excellence, inculcated by the ablest and best men, 
embodied in the laws, customs and traditions of the nation, and 
enforced by public opinion. 

3 Do not run away with any “ idea ” of Bergson’s Man vital. The 
idea neglects the one fact of self-consciousness. 

4 The term feeling has meaning, for us, as subjects, only when 
the subject encounters resistance to full self-expression. 


ii6 


MYSELF 


subject, we can scarcely hold that there is any waste 
of potentiality of feeling. 

Bearing in mind, however, how vague and exten¬ 
sive is the meaning we have as yet given to feeling, 
it were best to continue our attack on it directly. 




FEELING (II) 


Does or does not human experience make us aware 
of feeling not covered by the given scientific defin¬ 
ition ? Especially, does it make us as subjects of 
insight aware of feeling which cannot even be referred 
to feeling, proper, of pleasure or pain, of desire or 
will ? 

The argument will be in the affirmative. That is, 
it will be argued that we are aware of feeling which 
is not covered by the definitions given, feeling which 
cannot be referred, in itself, to pleasure or pain, desire 
or will. 1 Whether or not such feeling is free for the 
subject from any qualitatively distinguishable present¬ 
ations not yet defined we shall consider hereafter. 

We have established the fact that the brain, normal¬ 
ly, does not work itself. Thought, for the subject, 
results in correlated motion of the brain : our faculty 
of Insight makes us aware of the limits imposed on 
imagination when its use, as thought, is correlated to 
motion of the brain. And now it has been shown 
that something in or of the subject works the brain,— 
sets it in motion for particular work. 2 This is the 
feeling subject. 

But still our argument is defective : we have, as 
yet, ignored self-consciousness. The result of thought 

1 Bear in mind how very wide is the definition we at present 
assume for the term feeling, and that desire can only be evidential 
of preceding potentiality of feeling. 

2 However great the potentiality of thought of any subject, it 
will accomplish nothing in the sensible universe unless moved 
by something external to thought. 

117 


118 MYSELF 

accompanied by motion of the brain, cannot be my 
thought unless I am self-conscious of it. 3 

Now the “ I am ” exists for me outside the purview 
of thought. It is the one sheet-anchor in real reality, 
for me, that I have to stand by. And we have seen 
that thought to be my thought must be presented to 
me as a self-conscious being, as the “ I am.” 

But now we find something which apparently inter- 
venes between the “ I am ” and the presentation to it 
of thought. We have the feeling subject. Unless 
I, as a subject, am a feeling subject my thought cannot 
exist for me. 4 

How then are we, in the ultimate, to place feeling ? 
Where does it come from? From presentation? 
Self-consciousness ? Or must we seek further ? 

We are on the border-land between science and 
metaphysics, on unexplored ground. So our explor¬ 
ation may be unsatisfactory. Still we will venture 
into the desert and, to further our search, try what 
signposts we can find from human experience to as¬ 
sist us. 5 


When Wordsworth tells us that we enter this world 
trailing clouds of glory as we come, or Shelley sings 
that all things by a law divine in one another’s being 
mingle : when we listen to music or look at a work of 
art, we are affected in some way ; we are said to feel. 

Again, men from a sense of duty to God or their 
fellows, deliberately place themselves in environment 
which gives pain, not pleasure : the martyr is tortured 
or cruelly done to death : the reformer is subject to 
social annoyance or even ostracism : the altruist suf¬ 
fers death to save the life of another : the nurse, de¬ 
voted to comforting the bodily ills of others, and the 

3 To be a feeling subject I must be a self-conscious subject. 

4 If the reader & tearing his hair at my use of the term feeling , 
he has my deepest sympathy. 

5 We are not searching for any £lan vital unless it be referred to 
some ultimate transcendental Being. We must have the self in 
self-consciousness. 



FEELING (II) 119 

priest who labours to save men’s souls by conduct 
which he believes to be honest, abandon the normal 
pleasures of this world for acceptance of lives of toil 
and penury. All such are said to feel. Men even 
live, silent, unknown, rejecting the pleasures of this 
world and ordering their thought and conduct by sub¬ 
jection to abstract principle which is free from all 
given presentations. Such men are said to feel : their 
conduct cannot be referred to cognition, thought or 
even insight. 6 

Hut how are all these said to feel? 

Certain instances have been given above where the 
feeling comes under the scientific definition of feeling. 
But the later instances (the particular instances of the 
savage, Darwin and Huxley previously considered 
are now also in point) cannot be brought under the 
definition. We have not to consider whether men 
be fools or angels; we have to consider what human 
experience informs us is the conduct of sane men. 
And human experience informs us that not only sane 
men but the men marked amongst us as exhibiting 
the highest qualities possible for mankind, act under 
the promptings of principles which have nothing at 
all to do with presentation from the sensible universe : 
nothing at all to do with the promptings even of pleas¬ 
ure and pain. 

Are we now landed in a quagmire of thought? I 
think not. We may leave standing the definition of 
feeling as given for psychology. 7 But what about 
feeling without the given presentations ? 

I would suggest we may use, for the subject, the 
term “ desire for self-expression ” : that is, self-expres¬ 
sion of itself as the “ I am.” But if the word desire 
be used, it must be used strictly, not loosely. Its sole 

6 Belief in the ultimate which amounts to certainty for the subject 
personally is not now considered. 

7 Even when accepting this definition we must not omit con¬ 
sideration of the fact that by what is termed self-control, we 
can govern or even prevent our feeling being affected by pre¬ 
sentation. For instance, that which would raise anger in the 
ordinary man, leaves the philosopher unaffected. 


120 MYSELF 

aim must be held to be self-expression : its aim must 
be held to have nothing to do with pleasure or pain 
used, as they must be, as relative terms, nothing to 
do with desire or will in their ordinary meaning. We 
may term it “ blind desire.” 

This desire for self-expression, I suggest, is mani¬ 
fest in the subject’s constant struggle to destroy the 
tyranny of its environment and use environment for 
the purposes of its, the subject’s, own self-expression. 
The desire itself is a manifestation of the potentiality 
of the “ I am ” ultimately to express itself fully in spite 
of its limitations as a subject. The subject moved by 
this blind desire, struggles always, effectively or in¬ 
effectively, for full self-expression of itself as the “ I 
am.” The potentiality is manifest in the subject by 
desire for self-expression. 8 

Gautama’s teaching is part of human experience as 
is that of our Lord Jesus Christ. Gautama taught 
men to attain pure self-expression by the monastic 
principle : Maya is to be annihilated by each one in 
and for himself and by personal conduct for personal 
victory. Jesus Christ taught also the “ rightness” 
of the desire for self-expression. But He told us we 
could attain spiritual self-expression only by self- 
sacrifice in this world for others, not for ourselves : 
the “ I am,” the spiritual self, cannot directly free it¬ 
self from its bonds as a human being, for itself. It 
can attain full spiritual self-expression only by active 
life as a human being, where action is determined by 
the benefit accruing to others, not to oneself. 9 Gau¬ 
tama offered pure self-expression in passivity, our 
Lord Jesus Christ offered the same in activity. Con¬ 
fucius suggested, intellectually, an approximation to 
our Lord’s teaching. 

8 It is no objection to this theory if it be held that the tendency 
is implanted in the subject by a transcendental Being. The sole 
question is whether human experience offers evidence that the 
tendency itself exists. There is no question just yet of its origin. 

9 I would suggest that the Christian reward of heaven and 
punishment of hell are mere incidents. He who governs his life 
by hope of heaven and fear of hell can never attain that pure 
self-expression which fulfils the hope and avoids the fear. 


12 


FEELING (II) 

Many, if unsuccessful, have tried to carry out these 
forms of teaching and I cannot think these have all 
been influenced by desire for pleasure or fear of pain. 
Perhaps they may be said to have been moved by 
desire for the peace that passeth understanding. 
Even so, I cannot think the relative terms pleasure 
and pain should be said to have governed their con¬ 
duct : for pleasure and pain are subjects of thought. 
They would appear, quite apart from feeling as gener¬ 
ally understood, to have followed some tendency, even 
tyranny, deep down in their nature, free from any con¬ 
tent of desire for earthly wealth, power or rank, any 
content of desire for pleasure or fear of pain. 10 

When we listen to music that appeals to us, or view 
some glorious landscape or work of art: when we read 
of heroic self-sacrifice for others or of a life of grief 
and sorrow deliberately entered on and endured for the 
benefit of mankind, it is true our feeling has a content 
of pleasure and pain. 11 But is there not also some¬ 
thing else that affects us more powerfully ? Is not the 
feeling of pleasure or pain often subordinate to a 
deeper feeling? This deeper feeling I think is from 
satisfaction in self-expression to some degree, of our 
deepest self; we are touched in what we term our 
spiritual nature, there is appeal to the “ I am ” in 
each of us. Bear in mind we are not now relying 
on the mystic; the appeal is solely to human ex¬ 
perience. 

The argument runs thus :—Human experience in¬ 
forms us that we are not only subjects of thought but 
also subjects of feeling. And feeling is not only not 
cognition, but thought cannot be my thought unless 
I am a subject of feeling. 12 


10 I am not s-peaking of men who strive under desire for 
happiness in heaven or under fear of hell. 

11 Music or art may raise in us a feeling of melancholy. But 
even this we desire. 

12 Thought is not creative. Thought cannot be creative unless 
it is my thought or your thought: thought is used by the self- 

conscious subject for creation. Self-consciousness uses thought 
for creation. 


io 



122 


MYSELF 


Neglecting the James-Lange theory we find in psy¬ 
chology a definition of feeling. But, under this defin¬ 
ition, feeling runs parallel with presentation. 

It is now argued that human experience informs us 
that the conduct and recorded thought of certain hu¬ 
man beings must be referred to some abstract prompt¬ 
ing which transcends the psychological definition of 
feeling, in that it has no content of any of the given 
presentations. This abstract prompting governs the 
lives of such men and leads them so to formulate their 
thought and conduct that they may be as free as pos¬ 
sible from the bondage of human presentations. 
Instances of this have been given, but here a more 
general example may be offered. In times of national 
crisis a whole people may be found, abandoning all 
feeling for pleasure or pain, all feeling for personal 
material advantage, to fight, as one, for some ab¬ 
stract principle or ideal. 

If there be men of such conduct and thought; if, 
at times, even the people of any nation be found aban¬ 
doning self for an idea, even for an ideal in the ab¬ 
stract, then, I think, human experience informs us 
that this abstract prompting for self-expression of 
oneself as the “ I am ” does exist in potentiality for 
all of us , 13 and it can scarcely be referred to feeling 
as the term is generally used. The term elan vital 
I reject; for, as all roads are said to lead to Rome, 
so all reasoning leads to the one fact, incomprehen¬ 
sible but really real, for us, of self-consciousness . 14 

This abstract prompting cannot exist for the psy- 
chological“ I,” for there are no given presentations. 

The subject has the power of thought, the subject 
has also the power of Insight. This power of Insight 
transcends thought in that the subject, by it, is aware 
of the limitations of thought. But the subject is also 


is In human conduct it is manifest in varying degrees. 

H I cannot think Bergson has completed his philosophy. It 
must finally bring him to a transcendental self-conscious Being 
from whom dan vital proceeds. 


FEELING (II) 123 

a feeling subject; if it were not it could not start using 
thought. For desire is necessary for its thought. 

If we give to the subject this desire in the ultimate 
for self-expression as the “ I am,” we determine the 
origin and genesis of all the differing, even pettiest 
desires of man : they are ancillary to the ultimate 
desire. 

Feeling is manifest in differing forms in relation 
to differing forms of presentation : this is true for psy¬ 
chology treated as a science. A man feels hunger 
because as a subject he is opposed by the resistance 
of environment. He tries by conduct to appease his 
hunger; that is, to overcome the resistance of environ¬ 
ment. But the man who has never been hungry all 
his life has the potentiality of being hungry, of feeling 
hunger. A man, even, who has never been hungry 
during any particular week had, during that week, 
the potentiality of being hungry. We can, scientifi¬ 
cally, consider any form of presentation with which 
runs parallel any particular feeling. But in such case 
we must now give the subject precedent potentiality 
of feeling. We cannot now, on the contrary, consider 
any form of feeling which, scientifically, runs paral¬ 
lel with any particular form of presentation, and then 
find, somewhere, precedent potentiality of presenta¬ 
tion. For any presentation is passive and is not a 
subject to which potentiality can be given. 

For the conscious subject presentations are not 
fixed and immutable as they are for unconscious sub¬ 
jects. For the subject exists in the intelligible uni¬ 
verse and so has power to change, even to create, its 
own environment : it can change, even create, the 
presentations to it. It not only can, but does, do 
this. 

And in effecting this change or even creation, the 
moving desire is not to be found exclusively in Cyre- 
naic attention to immediate pleasure : the conduct of 
the subject is such that it chooses, not seldom, present 
pain for greater future happiness. This, even, does 
not exhaust its conduct. For frequently its conduct 


124 MYSELF 

proves that it is moved by desire for pain during its 
earthly existence to the end of pleasure in future life. 
Not only this. The subject is found to be moved by 
desire for self-expression quite apart from any ques¬ 
tion of pleasure and pain : 15 it seeks this self-expres¬ 
sion quite apart from the resistance of environment, 
though it may struggle, incidentally, to so change or 
even create its environment that it may be favourable 
to self-expression. 

In all these self-conscious struggles of humanity 
against the tyranny of the resistance of environment, 
we find at the background desire in the subject for 
self-expression. 16 It is in the forms of struggle that 
difference is manifest, not in the struggle itself. The 
desire of the hungry man for food appears, at first 
thought, to have no relation to his desire for self-ex¬ 
pression, as, in the same way, the desire of the archi¬ 
tect for well mixed mortar appears to have no relation 
to his desire that he may find self-expression by em¬ 
bodying his dreams of beauty in a material work of 
art. But these petty desires exist as ancillary to the 
ultimate desire for self-expression. We may, perhaps, 
use a wider analogy taken from the fact that the pres¬ 
sure of resistance of the water of an ocean increases 
with depth with the decrease of light. 

Imagine a mighty ocean inhabited by self-conscious 
subjects all struggling under desire for ultimate life 
in full light. The deeper the stratum of water in 
which they exist, the greater the resistance of their 
environment to light and so the more petty their 
struggle towards light. All are moved by the same 
one desire for ultimate life in full light, but the form 
of their struggle to that end is determined by the form 
of resistance of their environment. Those in a com¬ 
paratively low stratum may be moved by blind desire 


15 As shown above, this, at critical times, is true for humanity 
at large. 

16 Herein we find something like Bergson’s ilan vital which, as an 
ultimate, has close likeness to that of Schopenhauer. But we find, 
also, a reason for his ilan vital. 


FEELING (II) 125 

for full light though they appear, to themselves, to 
be merely struggling for more favourable environ¬ 
ment : their thought may be confined to thought 
about environment, though their desire transcends en¬ 
vironment. 17 

Generally, if the ultimate desire for self-expression 
as the “ I am ” exist for the subject, these differing 
petty desires in relation to environment must exist as 
ancillary : they are forms of the ultimate desire. 
However high the ideal for life of any subject, he 
must live in order to ensue it, and without the desire 
when hungry to eat, he would not live : however 
beautiful the building the architect has imagined may 
be, his desire for its manifestation in the objective 
world would never be fulfilled without satisfaction of 
his desire for mortar. We are justified in relating 
all these forms of desire, however insignificant in 
themselves, to a genesis of some ultimate desire. 18 

If we consider the question from the “ other 
end,” we must bear in mind we are considering con¬ 
scious, not unconscious, subjects. So we cannot hold 
that the desire of the hungry man for food is confined 
to the desire for eating. It is not merely satisfaction 
of hunger he desires. He desires to live and contem¬ 
plates the fact that satisfaction of hunger is necessary 
for him to live and think and act in the future after 
eating. So the desire of the ignorant workman in 
mixing mortar 19 cannot be confined simply to the mix¬ 
ing of mortar. Desire for the welfare of his wife 
and children, to say nothing of his own beer and to¬ 
bacco, comes in : he may even feel he is fulfilling his 
own desire by taking part in the creation of a beauti¬ 
ful building. 

17 The wife of the workman who desires that emblem of 
respectability, a parlour, is moved by desire for self-expression 
though, to herself, there is but desire for more favourable environ¬ 
ment. 

is “ Sermons in stones and good in everything.” 

10 It is assumed that he thinks : those who pass through life as 
automata, whatever their social position, we neglect in argument: 
they belong to the unconscious. 


126 MYSELF 

Human environment does change in evolution 
under the consciously exerted power of humanity to 
change and even create in the objective universe. 
This change and creation is the result of the conscious 
thought and conduct of humanity, and humanity 
thinks and does all this consciously for itself. Herein 
we find not only our elan vital but the reason for it. 
We find this reason in the constant struggle of the 
subject for self-expression of itself as “ I am.” 

Perhaps we may say that the “ I am ” or transcen¬ 
dental subject exists in potentiality of struggle for 
self-expression, which struggle becomes active when 
the “ I am,” conditioned as a subject, is opposed by 
the resistance of environment. 

If, in relation to the universe as presented, we give 
to the ‘‘I am” this potentiality of self-expression 
when conditioned as a subject, the manifestation of 
desire for self-expression in the subject follows, so 
that we have an explanation for its appearance in 
human experience. 20 

No question arises as to the “ I am ’” when free; 21 
for any such question is not only beyond thought but 
beyond the purview of Insight. The “ I am ” we con¬ 
sider is the “ I am ” conditioned as a subject in our 
sensible universe. So, if we give potentiality of self- 
expression to the “ I am,” it would naturally manifest 
this, as a subject, in desire for self-expression which 
would be shown in its efforts for freedom from the 
bonds of the flesh. The greater its freedom from the 
conditionings of the sensible universe or the more 
subject these conditionings are to itself, the fuller the 
self-expression of the ” I am ” as a subject. 

We find support for the above argument from, per¬ 
haps, an unexpected direction. 

Certain forms of feeling, it is generally held, can be 


20 Fichte’s theory as to the purpose of will may be here compared. 

21 Kant says transcendental freedom is impossible. I shall 
suggest the term is meaningless. 


FEELING (II) 127 

the subject of thought. 22 james Ward, as before 
stated, says feeling may mean : 

(a) A touch, as feeling of roughness; 

(b) An organic sensation, as feeling of hunger; 

(c) An emotion, as feeling of anger; 

(d) Feeling proper, as pleasure or pain. 

These exhaustive forms of feeling will, at first 
thought, be held to be subjects of thought. For 
touch, hunger, anger, pleasure and pain are all rela¬ 
tive terms, so we can think the degree or kind of each 
one of them : we feel hunger, for example, and can, 
in thought, compare our degree of hunger felt at the 
time with other degrees of hunger or its absence, felt 
in the past. 

But we do not really think the feeling; we think but 
the form of presentation with which, scientifically, 
the feeling runs parallel. We hold that the feeling 
is greater or less, because the t h un ger, the pleasure or 
pain, is greater or less. It is on this fact that the false 
James-Lange theory is founded. In truth, there is the 
one feeling subject which, as a subject of the sensible 
universe as presented, manifests, in relation to presen¬ 
tations, greater or less feeling. If we make feeling 
subject to presentation, then we have not one subject: 
we have a constantly changing subject in feeling, de¬ 
termined at any given time by presentation. 

Relying, however, on the original argument, let us 
assume potentiality of feeling exists for the “ I am,” 
so that feeling exists for the subject because of the 
resistance of environment. Then, this potentiality 
of feeling for the “ I am,” which becomes active for 
the subject because of the resistance of environment, 
cannot be the subject of thought. What can be the 
subject of thought are the presentations which make 
feeling manifest in relation to the presentations. 23 

22 If feeling itself,—not forms of feeling—can be the subject of 
thought, the argument that, for thought, the subject must be a 
subject of feeling, fails. 

23 This is in agreement with Kant who places the subject of 
thought in a subjective position to the subject of feeling. The 
categorical imperative is hereafter considered. 


28 


MYSELF 


Has then feeling, in the ultimate, no content for the 
subject ? Or can we say that desire for self-expres¬ 
sion is a content ? 

The argument is not easy to follow and difficult to 
put clearly in words. 

The “ I am ” is, for us, conditioned as a subject 
of the universe as presented. Self-expression may be 
said to be innate in the “ I am,” to exist potentially 
in its self-consciousness, 24 but the desire for self-ex¬ 
pression only comes into existence when the “ I am ” 
meets with resistance to its natural self-expression. 25 
As a subject of our universe it meets with such resist¬ 
ance and, in relation to this resistance, desire for self- 
expression is manifest in the subject. 

When, then, it is stated that the subject must be a 
feeling subject in order to think, we do not mean it 
must have qualitatively distinguishable presentations 
which are the occasion of its feeling : its only content, 
a priori, is desire for self-expression as the “ I am.” 
Even to speak of this desire as a content is question¬ 
ably correct. For the ” 1 am ” conditioned as a sub¬ 
ject desires, for self-expression, freedom from all 
qualitatively distinguishable presentations of our uni¬ 
verse : so far as they affect it in resistance, they pre¬ 
vent pure self-expression. 26 

But this freedom from qualitatively distinguishable 
presentations does not necessarily spell absence of 
such presentations : it does not drive us to accept Gau¬ 
tama’s theory. For the subject has power which 


24 There is no proof for this, but reason impels us to assume 
it, though thereby we travel beyond the purview of thought and 
Insight. We use imagination as free. 

25 What this natural self-expression may be we can only imagine. 
The question is whether human experience informs us that some¬ 
thing in us is constantly struggling against resistance, for freedom 
from resistance. On this human experience is founded the theory 
of evil being inchoate good. The desire for self-expression could 
not exist without constant opposition to fulfilment. 

26 From the subject’s point of view desire may be said to exist in 
order so to create its environment that it may be in agreement with the 
subject’s full expression of itself as “ I am.” Cf. Fichte’s theory. 


FEELING (II) 


129 


evolves to change the tyranny of environment into en¬ 
vironment favourable for its own self-expression. The 
subject ought to exercise this power. 

The above argument constitutes no attack on 
science. For psychology treated as a science never 
transcends the fact of presentation : it is not part of 
science to seek out the genesis of feeling. Science 
confines itself to a consideration of feeling when mani¬ 
fest in relation to presentations. That man does, for 
his own purposes, effect change and even creation in 
the objective universe is a fact of human experience : 
we have human experience of evolution being di¬ 
rected by man. Long before Bergson ever lived, 
reason had informed man that there must be some 
elan vital at the back of evolution and, whatever this 
may be, science remains unaffected. 

The elan vital is now traced back to the struggle 
of the “ I am,” conditioned as a subject, for full ex¬ 
pression of itself as the “ I am ” against the resistance 
of environment. This is manifest in the desire of 
the subject for self-expression. Feeling, as defined in 
psychology, still stands good for thought. But feel¬ 
ing, so defined, becomes in its manifest ramifications 
or desires merely ancillary to the ultimate feeling (de¬ 
sire) for self-expression. There must be an origin 
and genesis for the manifold forms of feeling to a 
consideration of which manifold forms science con¬ 
fines itself. This genesis and origin is now found in 
the feeling or blind desire of the subject for self-ex¬ 
pression of itself as the “ I am.” 

Herein, we find our categorical imperative. We 
trace back feeling in the ultimate to the categorical im¬ 
perative which exists for us all. 

The “ I am ” is; we may term it the pure self-con¬ 
scious subject. The self-conscious subject, embodied, 
is moved by desire for full expression of itself as “ I 
am.” This desire may be referred to feeling. It is 
because of this desire that the subject thinks and acts. 
The subject could not be one of thought and conduct 
unless it were one of feeling. For all thought and 






I 3 0 MYSELF 

conduct of a self-conscious subject centre round pui 
pose and, though the purposes of self-conscious sut 
jects vary almost infinitely—from desire for food fo 
sustenance of the body to sacrifice of bodily life for th 
spiritual welfare of humanity—the root of these pui 
poses is to be found in desire for self-expression. 

The psychological “ I ” may be termed the humai 
personality. The higher personality in each one o 
us,—the “ I am,”—strives for freedom from th 
bonds of its human personality, or to use the bond 
for such freedom. This is the moving force or elm 
vital which underlies the thought and conduct of tin 
human personality. 

Before the self-conscious subject appears there is i 
form of evolution in our universe under the laws o 
Nature. When the self-conscious subject appears i 
superimposes on this form of evolution a new form o 
evolution which it effects by its power of varying an( 
creating its environment. It is so active for itself 
for its own purposes. We trace back all its activity 
good, bad and indifferent to a driving force from th< 
“ I am ” under which the subject struggles to exp res* 
itself as “ I am ” against the resistance it encounter* 
from embodiment as a subject. 

Indefinite as the term feeling is we must refer th if 
driving force to feeling, and herein we shall find oui 
categorical imperative. 


;elf-expression and THE CATEGORI¬ 
CAL IMPERATIVE 


F, when man appears as a subject, we hold there is 
his constant struggle of the “ I am ” for self-expres- 
ion against environment and, so, constant struggle 
o get rid of the tyranny of environment and use it for 
he purposes of self-expression, we get our elan vital: 
>ut we refer it back to self-consciousness. We find 
n this struggle of the “ I am ” an explanation for 
he form of evolution which takes place in the objec- 
ive universe after self-conscious subjects appear. 1 
rhe subject must be self-conscious as “ I am,” before 
t can enter on the struggle for self-expression. What 
he subject struggles for is expression of itself as the 
‘ I am,” against the resistance of environment. The 
ubject changes, even creates, its environment with 
he design of fulfilling its own purpose. 

We refer this struggle for self-expression to feeling: 
vhat relation has it to feeling as psychologically de- 
ined ? 

Psychology deals with feeling only when manifest 
n relation to qualitatively distinguishable presenta- 
ions. It deals, not with feeling itself, but with feei¬ 
ng manifested in innumerable different forms deter- 
uined by the presentations. 

Now all men during their existence as conscious 
ubjects do something, they are “things” of con- 

l If we refer the laws of Nature to the unconscious there is a 
reach in the continuity of evolution when self-conscious subjects 
ppear. 


132 MYSELF 

duct. 2 And, to a certain degree, seeking each his 
own good, they will consider immediate, rather than 
ultimate good for themselves. One man conducts 
himself under the feeling that wealth, another that 
power, another that social rank is good, while many 
confine their conduct to acts for the mere preservation 
of existence by labouring only for daily bread. These 
examples mark forms of feeling and they determine, 
subject to environment, the form of manifestation in 
conduct. All these men desire something, and the 
form of desire is largely the result of environment. 3 

It is from these differing forms of desire that differ¬ 
ing conduct in men arises, and it is from the conflict¬ 
ing conduct of men, inter se, that the evils which bur¬ 
den us arise. It is not that the ultimate desire of man 
is evil, the evils arise from his desire being concen¬ 
trated on a particular form of desire without relation 
to other forms of desire. We may say that these are 
limiting forms of the ultimate desire for self-expres¬ 
sion. Evolution could not exist, for man, without 
desire in man : evolution could not exist without re¬ 
sistance to it. 

What is the basis of this desire ? What we want to 
do is to find some full explanation for human conduct 
and to this end we must determine how the basic 
desire in man arises. Let us consider two schools of 
thought. 

The theory of the Epicureans and that of the 
Platonists follow directly from the differing assump¬ 
tions that each school starts with. 

The Epicureans consider man as no more than a 
subject coming into existence at birth and going out 
of existence at death. They merely developed the 
theory of Aristippus. 

But every man is, and is rightly, a hedonist; every 
man has an absolute right to do what is best for 


2 In the sleeping state man is not, physically, a thing of conduct. 

3 The form of the subject’s brain is here considered as part of 
his environment. 


SELF-EXPRESSION 


133 

himself. The real and only question in dispute is 
“ What is man?” Is he merely a subject of time,— 
of three score years and ten,—or is he the “ I am,” 
so that his earthly life is merely a passing phase in 
a far more extensive existence? 4 To explain man’s 
conduct we must first find out, if possible, what man 
is. 

It is ridiculous to deny I am right in doing what is 
best for myself. The question is what am I . 5 For 
on the reply depend my thought and conduct in 
seeking what is best for myself: what is my best 
depends on what I am. 6 Or put the case in another 
way. It cannot be denied that I have a right to so act 
that I may attain the greatest personal happiness, if 
this is the best for myself. But here, again, the 
answer to what is the least, what is the greatest, 
personal happiness for me, depends on the answer to 
the question “ What am I ? ” 7 

As an Epicurean the subject confines his attention 
to his existence as a human personality, he has no 
other personality to consider. 8 The theory is 
practical., hence its attraction for so many : and it may 
lead to conduct which is worthy of praise : even 
Aristippus understood that it may be advisable to 
bear present ill for future greater good. 

But the Platonist starts from a different basis for 
thought and conduct. His subject is not a mere 
human personality. He starts with the “ I am,” so 
that, for him, the subject is a conditioned form or 
manifestation in time of the “ I am.” 

4 The Cyrenaic starts with man as a thing of the passing 
moment, though Aristippus is not consistent in his philosophy. 

5 When Spinoza distinguishes between the “natural” man and 
the “social” man and, so, between man in a natural state and an 
evolved state of reason, he does not consider the “ I am ” at all. 

6 Darwin considers only the fittest. The question whether the 
fittest is the best only arises when man as a conscious subject 
appears. 

7 And this involves the question of what happiness is in itself. 

8 I deny that Spinoza does this, for he gives to the human mind 
an eternity of (intellectual) love for God. 


MYSELF 


134 

The problem for the Epicurean is,—what is best for 
the subject? The problem for the Platonist is the 
same. But in the former case the subject is a passing 
thing in time; in the latter, the subject is no more than 
a passing manifestation in our universe of the “ I 
am.” It is because of the widely differing starting 
points for reasoning that the Epicureans and 
Platonists take, that the conclusions they arrive at 
differ so widely . 9 

For the Epicurean the desire of man can only be 
the desire of a passing subject in passing time. For 
man, by assumption, being no more than this, his 
desire, thought, insight and imagination, which must 
all arise so far as his personal purview extends, from 
himself, cannot outrun their source : their origin is to 
be found only in himself. And he is a thing of 
passing time. 

In this we find, as before said, the attraction for 
so maiiy : Epicureanism is practical, the “ I ” differs 
very little if at all from the psychological I. For if 
man be but a passing thing in time, then his feeling 
runs parallel with qualitatively distinguishable 
presentations. 

But for the Platonists the desire of man is the desire 
of a subject, conditioned in time, to get rid of the 
resistance of his conditioning or exercise command 
over it for his own purposes, in order that his desire 
for self-expression of himself as the “ I am ” may be 
attained . 10 

9 I do not refer to Aristotle for I cannot accept the distinction 
generally drawn between the basis of his philosophy and that of 
Plato. Aristotle seems to me to have differed from Plato in 
mainly centring his attention on the practical side of Platonism. 
The stoics, with Marcus Aurelius, though never for the most part 
directly admitting the soul in man, still, I think, want the soul 
in man to make their philosophy acceptable. 

10 I must ignore the possible theory that man is merely a passing 
thing in time, but inspired for conduct during his term of life 
by a transcendental Being. The theory is attractive, but I think 
human experience. points to our survival as personalities after 
death. Cf. the philosophies of Plotinus and of Laotze as to this 
survival. 


SELF-EXPRESSION 135 

Epicureanism, therefore, attacks the problem of 
*vhat is best for man during his human life. 
Platonism attacks the problem of what is best for 
man, assuming that man’s life on earth is but a pass¬ 
ing phase in a far more extended existence . 11 Hence 
arises thfe conflict, between the Epicureans and (he 
Platonists, as to the meaning of what is “ best .” 12 

Now for the Platonist no difficulty arises as to the 
:ategorical imperative. But this imperative must not 
De confounded with morality: for the Platonist 
morality is still merely a relative term; it is a subject 
:>f thought. Pure morality is a term which imports 
:ontradiction as fully as does absolute knowledge. 

When theory starts from an assumption of the “ I 
am,” we find explanation of man’s altruistic struggle 
for the abstract,—for love, the beautiful, truth and 
justice : we find explanation for his acceptance of an 
evil state in our universe and even in his desire for 
“ something ” which he can never attain on earth. 
But if man’s life is merely one of passing time, he is 
unreasonable in sacrificing it for the good of others, 
or in deliberately making it one of pain and suffering 
for the sake of abstract principle. Such conduct is 
inexplicable : 13 it is contrary to man’s seeking the best 
for himself. 

If, with the Platonists, we hold our life on earth to 
be but a passing phase in a far more extended 


11 “ It is meet, my friends, that we should take note of this :—that 
the Soul, being immortal, standeth in need of care, not only in 
regard of the time of this present life, but in regard of the time with¬ 
out end, and that it is now, even to-day, that the jeopardy is great, 
if a man will still be careless of his soul.”—The Phaedo. 

12 Thus what may be proved to be the greatest happiness for 
man by the Epicurean, may be proved to be the reverse for man 
by the Platonist. Before we can judge William James’s pragmatism 
must we not first determine what man is? 

13 Unless he is a thing of time directed by some external trans- 
pendeintal Being. Instinct alone cannot explain such conduct, unless 
instinct be held as a thing-in-itself tyrannizing over reason. Roman 
Catholics give a particular meaning to instinct. 


136 MYSELF 

existence, we can fathom the reason for certain form: 
of human conduct, even the choice of misery anc 
suffering, during the Tittle span of human life 
Aristippus himself says the reasonable man w-il 
choose present evil for greater future good : how 
much rather would the reasonable man prefer lh< 
passing evils of his short life in time for ultimate 
freedom from evil. 14 

Following the Platonists, in their theory as tc 
human personality, the categorical imperative is now 
found fn the imperative fact of the struggle of mar 
against resistance in order to attain self-expression as 
the “ I am.” It has been shown already that we find 
in human experience manifestations of this desire, 1 * 
and now reference may be made to the fact that we 
cannot reconcile the beautiful and the ugly, morality 
and immorality, good and evil, justice and injustice, 
we cannot get rid of inequality of opportunity; we 
cannot think the one without the other in our mind : 
in thought and conduct we compromise. But we 
desire to reconcile these contradictions , 16 while 
Insight makes us aware that in real reality they are 
and must be reconciled or subsumed under “ some¬ 
thing: ” Insight justifies without explaining our 
desire. This, again, would appear to mark desire for 
pure expression of the “ I am.” 

But desire is meaningless unless it is my desire : 
there must be self-consciousness. As subjects, we see 
but through a glass dimly, we err constantly in our 
attempts at self-expression. But, fail as we must, we 
always strive after full self-expression. 

Let us further consider the Epicurean philosophy. 
The main point to bear in mind is that it holds this 


14 This does not necessarily spell desire for ultimate happiness, 
though such an ultimate may be incidental. Cf. the Chapter on 
“ Pleasure.” 

15 This desire in its origin is blind desire ; we can only think 
about it when manifest in our universe in some determined form. 

ig It will ibe argued that the form of reconciliation we desire 
imports the subjection of injustice to justice etc. 


SELF-EXPRESSION 137 

life to be the only life : the death of the body marks 
the end of the personality. 

This philosophy teaches us what man’s conduct 
should be in order to attain what is best for himself. 
What such conduct should be must always be doubt¬ 
ful, there must always be wide differences of opinion. 
But, when we consider what human conduct is in fact, 
we have a firm foundation to build on : for conduct 
is part of human experience. 17 We can consider not 
only our own conduct, but that of others. 18 

Now the conduct of man is not of such a nature 
that his desire as a mere thing of passing time can 
explain it. Some men, it is true, pass through life 
apparently thinking and acting under the desire of 
the passing moment : they are Cyrenaics. Some, 
again, use little or no thought and act under the 
prompting of preconceived ideas determined largely 
by environment. The man of rank, power or wealth, 
the great mass of the labouring classes, use their 
power of thought, for conduct, largely under the 
influence of ideas resulting from relation to their 
differing environment. 1 ' 9 

But, stiff, as the many examples already given 
show, the conduct of man is frequently of a nature 
which is inexplicable if he is moved merely by desire 
as a thing of passing time. He, frequently, does not 
seek that which is best for himself as a being blotted 
aut at death : not seldom he deliberately so conducts 


| 17 He who alleges altruistic human conduct to be unreasonable, 
;till admit the fact of such conduct. Rightly, then, he should 
jive some explanation for the existence of such conduct. 

18 Bear in mind we are not now considering instinctive conduct. 
5o we find conduct to be the result of thought where thought is the 
esult of feeling. And this is not, I think, in opposition to the 
Spicurean philosophy. 

19 There is no obligatory dispute between capital and labour: 
jlisputes arise 'because the capitalist thinks under preconceived 
ideas of right determined by his environment as a capitalist and 
>ecause the workman thinks under preconceived ideas of right 
letermined by his environment as a workman. 


I 



138 MYSELF 

himself that his life on earth, which might be one of 
full happiness, is one of full misery. 20 

And this conduct of man does not lead necessarily 
to that tranquillity of spirit which Epicurus taught 
was the greatest good. 21 It may lead to strenuous and 
painful struggle in our universe as exemplified 
transcendentally in the life, passion and agony of Our 
Lord Jesus Christ. 

That the conduct of man is largely determined by 
environment is not denied; that the thought of man 
is largely the result of feeling determined by environ¬ 
ment is not denied. But there is a residuum of con¬ 
duct which is not so determined. We have seen, even, 
that the prompting to such conduct is potential in all 
mankind, though its manifestation is so largely pre¬ 
vented by the resistance of environment. 

Now such conduct cannot be reasonable conduct if 
the philosophy of Epicurus be sound; that is, if man 
be but a passing thing of time : it is not conduct 
which enures for the best. 

We find great beauty in the philosophy of 
Epicurus; the teaching of moderation, tranquillity, 
the acceptance of present ill for greater future good, 
equality of opportunity and common courtesy. But 
its object is what is best for man in his human life 
of time and the philosophy itself does not fully 
consider human experience, does not fully cover the 
conduct of man : does not give a full explanation of 
human conduct. The question seems never to have 

20 Happiness and misery are here used as relative terms. There 
is no denial that this conduct of man may result in feeling 
transcendent of happiness and misery—may result in real reality. 
This transcendental feeling is not a negative state, thougt 
beyond thought. But we cannot refer this transcendent feeling 
to a mere subject ■ of passing time. 

21 Epicurus made this tranquillity the end-all and be-all for man in 
opposition to or in distinction from Gautama’s Nirvana. For Gautama 
said he did not know what happens to man after the extinction of 
delusion. The later school of the Bhuddists did not, in the greater 
vessel, submit to Gautama’s doubt as to the effect of Nirvana. It 
taught that there is a soul in man. 


SELF-EXPRESSION 139 

been raised and met by the Epicureans of why some 
men—all men at times—manifest by their conduct 
rejection of what is best for themselves as things of 
passing time: why their conduct is that of men 
seeking something which cannot affect them in any 
way if dissolution of the body puts an end to them. 22 
If man is a passing thing in time, so that there is no 
basis for any desire in him for anything beyond bodily 
death, how can his conduct be prompted by desire 
for something absolutely foreign to and impossible 
for him ? Where does the desire come from ? This 
desire is implanted in man, and any philosophy for 
life, however admirable it may be for conduct during 
human life, must be held to start on some false 
assumption if it does not cover all human conduct. 

The philosophy of Epicurus does not account fully 
for human conduct. The Platonist philosophy does, 
even though it may on occasion deal too definitely 
with that which is beyond the purview of thought. 

The Cyrenaic starts with an assumption that man 
should treat himself as no more than a personality 
of the passing moment now, and it has been shown 
that if the ultimate “ I am ” does not exist, this 
assumption is not unreasonable. Granted the truth 
of the assumption, the expediency of the philosophy 
follows. 23 But the philosophy gives no full explan¬ 
ation of human conduct. 

The Epicurean starts with an assumption that the 
“ I am ” exists for a passing time; that is, exists only 
during the time of life on earth of the subject; for if 
the same subject did not continue in time, the same 
subject could not reasonably accept present ill for 
future greater happiness. Granted the truth of the 
assumption, the truth of the philosophy follows. 

22 As already shown, belief in this something must precede conduct 
towards it. 

23 Aristippus when he held man should entertain lesser present 
evil for greater future happiness admitted, perhaps unconsciously, 
that man is more than a thing of the passing moment. 


i 4 o MYSELF 

But, still, the philosophy gives no full explanation of 
human conduct. 

The Platonist accepts fully the “ I am.” I think it 
is not incorrect to say he holds the subject to be in 
no more than a passing conditioned state or manifest¬ 
ation of the “I am.” Granted the truth of the 
assumption, the underlying truth of the philosophy 
follows. The term “ underlying truth ” is used 
because the assumption made by the Platonists opens 
such vast vistas for human reasoning that, naturally, 
the deductions from the assumption differ largely one 
from another. The Cyrenaic and Epicurean may be 
said to be practical; the Platonist also is practical, 
though he opens the possibility of conflicting theories 
as to what practice should be. The Platonist 
philosophy, however, opens a full explanation of 
human conduct. 

But if we want to 1 determine what human thought 
and conduct should be, we must first determine what 
they can be. 

Now we have driven back man’s thought and 
conduct to desire, ultimately to the blind desire of 
the subject for self-expression bf itself as the “ I am.” 
All human thought and conduct results from this 
desire, which is manifest in infinite variation in 
relation to qualitatively distinguishable presentations. 
What man’s thought and conduct can be is therefore 
subjective to desire for self-expression as the ” I 
am.” 24 

It has been proved that man’s thought and conduct 
not only can be, but are, of such a nature that his 
mere desire as a passing thing of time cannot explain 
them. So far as this general course of reasoning 
goes, we find that the thought and conduct of man 
are of such a nature that we must assume he is some- 

24 That is, there is, in the ultimate, the categorical imperative. 
Kant is perhaps not quite clear in the distinction he relies on 
between freedom of the will and transcendental freedom. If there 
is no transcendental freedom for the subject, there is, for him, 
determinism in the ultimate: there is, for him, the categorical 
imperative. 


SELF-EXPRESSION 141 

thing- more than a passing subject of time and we have 
found our categorical imperative for the subject 
manifest in the subject’s desire for self-expression of 
itself as the “ I am.” Human experience informs us 
that this desire of the subject is manifest in conduct: 
the subject is always struggling against the resistance 
of environment in order to get rid of its tyranny and 
use it for the subject’s own purposes, where the 
ultimate purpose is self-expression as the “ I am.” 
This struggle not only can be, but is. 

But still our consideration of the categorical 
imperative is not exhaustive. For we have found it, 
as yet, in nothing but the blind desire of the subject 
for selT-expression of itself as the “ I am : ” we have 
formulated no moral good for mankind, we have no 
tyranny of the conscience in man. 25 

And here comes in a difficulty which must be faced 
and in facing it, though I may appear to oppose, I 
think I do not really oppose Kant. 

Proof of any ultimate definite goal, any ultimate 
tyranny of the conscience in man, is impossible for us 
as subjects : we can only be aware dimly of any such 
ultimate through our faculty of insight which 
transcends thought. 

But in thought, we can, as subjects, find evidence 
of such an ultimate goal or tyranny; and the evidence 
may be of such a nature that we may be justified in 
accepting it as proof. We have no proof, for 
instance, of gravity and its laws. 26 But the evidence 
is of such a nature that we may be justified, in reason, 
in assuming evidential proof has been arrived at. 

Herein we find the importance of the expression 
‘‘the accomplished in the accomplishing.” 


25 Transcendental free will is impossible for man: what we 
term free will is a meaningless term unless there exists some 
standard of determinism, whether transcendental or not. Free 
will, in itself, spells no standard for conduct and no personal 
responsibility. Riehl is on this, I think, unanswerable. 

26 In remote space we find bodies moving whose movements 
| cannot as yet be brought under the rule of gravity and its laws. 


142 MYSELF 

The thought and conduct of man in relation to any 
such goal or tyranny, exists in the accomplishing, 
never in the accomplished. But this accomplishing 
is not in opposition to the accomplished. For it has 
already been shown how false is the general 
assumption that rest and motion, the finite and 
infinite, even good and evil, are really real 
contradictions. They are real contradictions for us in 
thought but in the ultimate must be reconciled or 
subsumed under the transcendental. 27 

So man’s thought and conduct in the accomplishing 
towards the accomplished may be treated by us, for 
the purposes of reason, as part of the transcendental 
ultimate, as part of the accomplished in the 
accomplishing. We see now as through a glass 
dimly, but what we see is not false : it is incomplete 
truth, or truth in the accomplishing. 28 

The expression “ the accomplished in the 
accomplishing ” for the Ultimate, clears away, 
for metaphysics, many intolerable contradictions. 
If it be used for the interpretation of Kant’s 
philosophy we find at once what he meant by “ the 
manifold,” why he held that we can neither prove 
the world finite or infinite and, I think, it justifies in 
some measure, his dialectic. It is true that he says 
moral theology leads inevitably to the conception of 
a First Cause. But when we bear in mind that, 
before so writing, he had already shown that cause 
and effect can only exist in time, it is clear he must 
refer to a First Cause merely for the purposes of 
reason : he does not mean a First Cause in itself. 
He means a Primal Being, to use fiis own words, 
which to us, in thought, has the appearance of a 
First Cause. For this Primal Being we can only hold 
that there is transcendence of cause and effect. 

In considering the Categorical Imperative, Kant 
says: — 

27 Kant is followed directly here, but perhaps not Hegel as 
generally interpreted. 

28 Sight is here used as in a parable. 


SELF-EXPRESSION 


i 43 

“ I assume that there are pure moral laws which 
determine, entirely a priori (without regard to empirical 
motives, that is, to happiness) the conduct of a rational 
being, or, in other words, the use which it makes of its 
freedom 29 and that these laws are absolutely imperative 
(not merely hypothetically, on the supposition of other 
empirical ends) and therefore in all respects necessary. 
I am warranted in assuming this, not only by the 
arguments of the most enlightened moralists, but by the 
moral judgment of every man who will make the attempt 
to form a distinct conception of such a law.” 

But, surely, if we accept this assumption there is no 
more to be said : we have at once our Categorical 
Imperative. 30 No matter whether we give reality to 
these moral laws in themselves or refer them back to 
a transcendental Being, we have our Categorical 
Imperative : we have the driving moral force at the 
back of all human thought and conduct. 31 

I do not think we are justified in accepting the 
assumption : Kant makes it dogmatically and would 
appear to support it dogmatically without argument 
in support. 

We must be critical: we must consider our human 
experience of the thought and conduct of man to find 
whether for explanation thereof, we do, or do not, 
want any Categorical Imperative. We must not, 
dogmatically, introduce it as a dens ex machina and 
by its aid explain human experience. Our only firm 
foundation for argument is human experience. 

The argument I put forward relies on the moral 
judgment of man and the arguments of the most 


29 This does not mean transcendental freedom, it refers only to 
a form of freedom under the governance of pure moral laws. 

so This is a categorical imperative of reason. I find the 
categorical imperative manifest in the desire of the subject for 
self-expression of itself as the “ I am.” This desire, blind to us 
in itself, is manifest in differing ways by differing subjects,— 
manifest it may be said in impure desire. Kant, himself, finds 
the freedom of the subject in its freedom to act in accordance 
with its own true reasonable self. 

31 Shaftesbury discarded the moral sanction of public opinion. 


i 44 MYSELF 

enlightened moralists in no way : it is based on our 
experience of human conduct. We have traced back 
human conduct to ultimate desire in the subject for 
full expression of itself as the “ I am.” This desire 
of the subject is manifest in its conduct as struggling, 
against environment, for self-expression. It is thus 
we have arrived at the Categorical Imperative. 

But still we have not touched on free-will nor have 
we arrived at what may be termed “ moral good ” 
for mankind. 

If we consider the evolution of our universe, we may 
for the purpose of the present argument, divide it into 
two periods : the first when no beings have appeared 
manifesting self-conscious thought and conduct, the 
second when beings exist manifesting self-conscious 
though! and conduct. 

During the former period there is full determinism : 
evolution proceeds under the laws of Nature. The 
thought 32 and conduct of the existing beings are 
determined by the laws of Nature. So, for this 
period, though a form of the categorical imperative 
exists,—for thought and conduct if existent are 
determined by the laws of Nature,—the categorical 
imperative, as a tyranny of personal conscience, does 
not exist. For personal conscience cannot exist 
without self-consciousness. We are concerned, 
therefore, only with the second period when subjects 
exist manifesting self-conscious thought and conduct. 


32 I merely allege that thought may exist, but, if it is not self- 
conscious thought, the thought (and so necessarily the conduct) 
of existing beings is not determined in any way by themselves. 


THE UNIVERSE WITHOUT SELF- 
CONSCIOUS SUBJECTS 


But some consideration must be given to this first 
period before we proceed to a consideration of the 
second. For we are faced by an apparent breach in 
continuity of evolution : there would appear to be 
absence of moral law in the first period and its sudden 
appearance, from nowhere, in the second. 1 
Riehl says : — 

“ What always produces the confusion of determinism 
with fatalism is a certain widespread view of the reign 
of law in nature, which really gives these laws being, 
and makes them things. In explaining processes in 
nature, we use laws as major premises under which we 
subsume facts, to reach conclusions. This procedure 
really produces a sort of illusion by suggesting that 
the laws really precede the facts which happen according 
to law, that they are independent of these, and prior to 

them.By this false conception the real is 

as it were doubled for our minds.The 

objective world and its obedience to law are not two 
separate facts, but a single fact expressed in two ways, 
according as it is related to sense, intuition, or to logical 
thought.” 

Riehl is in error here. What he really does is to 
be scientific and make the laws of Nature run parallel 
with the manifestation of the laws. He writes as a 

1 There can be no moral law in itself, no personal responsibility 
except for a self-conscious subject. If the laws of Nature exist 
in themselves, there is a-morality. 

i45 


146 MYSELF 

psychologist, that is, he refuses to transcend the fact 
of presentation. But he cannot so refuse, for he is 
writing as a metaphysician. 

The fact is that the sensible universe as presented is 
merely the occasion for thought, and thought, as 
already shown, could not seize the occasion if the laws 
of Nature did not exist. The objective world and its 
obedience (subjection ?) to law are not one fact 
expressed in two ways. The objective world, indeed, 
is not a fact that we can compass, for we cannot 
think it; we can only think about it. 2 The sensuous 
merely presents us with unrelated phenomena. 3 
Thought spells relations which are not given with 
our sensing of phenomena : thereby we have power 
to think about the phenomena which we sense as 
unrelated. And these relations could not exist, for 
thought, unless the laws of Nature held sway over 
the objective world. If the objective world and law 
constitute one fact, the laws of Nature can have 
existence only with the existence of the objective 
world. What authority have we for holding this to 
be true, even if they have existence only for the 
objective universe ? None: any proof, if possible, 
would be transcendent of thought. On the other 
hand, the objective world has, for us, no existence 
unless under the governance of the laws of Nature. 
We cannot, of course, give precedence in time to the 
laws of Nature, 4 but we can say that the objective 
world would have no existence for us unless under 

2 We think the laws of Nature, not simply think about them. 
We can think about our objective universe because we can think 
the laws of Nature. For example, we think timeless continuity for 
the laws of Nature, but for the objective universe, even in 
mathematics, we have no continuous calculus, we have only an 
infinitesimal calculus. 

3 The meaning of sensuous intuition is doubtful. I think the 
sensuous cannot give rise directly to intuition, whatever intuition 
may mean. As in the argument throughout I use thought and 
insight I do not use intuition at all. 

4 The laws of Nature transcend time: the objective universe 
exists in time. 


THE UNIVERSE 


i47 

the governance of the laws of Nature. If the two 
constitute one fact, the one has as full governance 
over the other, as the other over the one. But the 
objective world exists to us merely in subjective 
manifestation of the laws of Nature and their 
governance. How can this mere, manifestation 
govern the laws of Nature ? The laws of Nature exist 
in thought: the objective world as presented is merely 
an occasion for thought: we can only think about it . 5 

The widespread view of the reign of law in Nature 
is sound for reason, sound for insight. 

Till beings appear with self-consciousness, there is 
full determinism in Nature : 6 the laws of Nature hold 
tyrannic sway. 

But during this first period our universe is not 
standing still, it is evolving . 7 From chaotic vapour 
or chaotic mass of discrete atoms, it is evolving into a 
form giving environment for self-conscious beings. 
This gives no proof, but it offers evidence of design. 

During this period life is a factor in evolution— 
the laws of Nature use life as a factor. Life, as a 
factor, appears manifest in various physical forms. 
It is the one principle, life, which is manifest equally 
in the forms of the amoeba and the elephant; the one 
differs from the other only in complexity of form and 
specialization of function. These manifestations of 
life in physical forms are innumerable in number, 
and no fixed period can be determined when they, or 

5 The laws of Nature exist in the intelligible universe. The 
subject, as a subject of the intelligible universe, is still subject 
to the laws of Nature when changing or creating in the sensible 
universe as presented. But by using the laws as reality it does 
change the form of the objective universe: the laws are, for us, 
fixed, immutable; the objective universe is not. 

6 I write “determinism in Nature.” What determinism means 
for the ultimate is considered hereafter. The subject reads 
determinism into nature. 

7 If this universe is evolving to some end under design, the 
design itself is beyond the purview of thought: the very infirmity 
of thought might be relied on for evidence of design. 


148 MYSELF 

any one of them, first suddenly appeared : they may 
be always appearing. 8 

But, at the same time, there is always, in regard to 
some of these forms, evolution in complexity of form 
and specialization of function. Why this form of 
evolution exists in our universe we cannot know. 
But I think we are justified in holding it cannot be 
fully accounted for by action and reaction between 
the living organism and its environment. It is quite 
true there is always a relation between the organism 
and its environment and we can well understand the 
survival of the fittest,—always bear in mind that the 
term the “ fittest ” has some relation to environment. 9 
But this does not explain why evolution in complexity 
of form and specialization of function should exist. 

It is a fact that living organisms of increasing 
well-balanced complexity of form and specialization 
of function, do evolve and do survive and increase 
in number, so that the evolution must find favourable 
environment. But this power of survival is not found 
in mere physical superiority: 10 beauty and love, for 
instance, are factors which have part in survival. 
It may be argued that beauty of form attracts sexual 
copulation and so leads to survival. But this explains 
in no way why the organism is so constituted that 
beauty attracts it. It may be argued that the love of 
the parent for the offspring makes for survival and 

8 Their appearance in time may be subject to evolved environ¬ 
ment which may be unfavourable to their appearance. But I 
cannot understand in what way we can fix any particular period 
for the first manifestations of life. 

9 The “ fittest ” must always be interpreted as in relation to 
environment. It is when man appears with power to determine 
his own environment that the question of the “ fittest ” being the 
“ best,” arises. Huxley was quite wrong if he held that man must 
fight against the laws of Nature. I think he meant man must 
use the laws in order to accomplish that which the laws of them¬ 
selves could never accomplish. 

10 How could ffie strong tiger survive if its feeble prey did not 
survive also? 


THE UNIVERSE i 49 

that survival only is the object of the love. But this 
explains in no way why the organism is so constituted 
that love moves it. There is no reason, if the laws of 
Nature have merely survival for object, why every 
offspring should not be born impervious in itself to 
all ills. In one view, nature seems clumsy in going 
out of its way to attack the offspring by evil while at 
the same time protecting it from evil by love. 11 

It is no reply to say that love and beauty are good 
in themselves : they exist and are good in themselves 
only for self-consciousness . Before self-conscious 
subjects appeared we may assume that beautiful 
forms existed in nature. But these were mere mani¬ 
festations of beauty, they were mere forms in the 
objective universe of beauty, and form has no beauty 
in itself. So,—if we assume self-conscious Being did 
not exist before self-conscious subjects :—beauty had 
then no existence : there was no self-consciousness 
for which it could exist. 

Again, still considering this first period, we find 
amongst living organisms the struggle for existence 
and the survival of the fittest. Herein do we find 
nature red in tooth and claw in its contempt for life ? 
We do not. Life is life, the laws of Nature interfere 
with it, in itself, in no way. The laws use life for 
manifestation in differing physical forms; they show 
their interest in life in using it for these innumerable 
forms. And they show contempt not for these 
forms,—for they bring them into existence,—but only 
for the time of their existence. So far, when we as 
self-conscious beings consider this first period, no 
question of morality arises. For there is no question 
qf morality involved in life being used for innumer¬ 
able forms of manifestation and none in the fact of 


ll Hippolytus was quite right in saying that nature would have 
Freed the world from all its evils arising from sexuality, if it had 
never introduced the dual state of man and arranged that children 
could be bought from the Gods at a price. If my memory serves 
me correctly, a higher price was suggested for a male child than 
for a female. 



MYSELF 


LSo 

the time during which any or all of these manifest¬ 
ations remain in existence, being long or short. 12 

But pleasure and pain ? 

Herein we find marked the crass conceit of man. 
As a self-conscious being he has power to use the 
laws of Nature for his own purposes: he can even 
create In the sensible universe as presented. It is man 
himself who has used these laws to introduce the 
evils of theft, murder, envy, hatred, malice, bloated 
wealth and chill penury; all the evils, in fact, which 
exist in our social state. And then he turns round 
and puts the responsibility for these evils on the laws 
of Nature; he libels them as being red in tooth and 
claw ! Not only this : instead of admitting that it is 
he himself who has introduced sin and misery into 
the world, he claps himself on the back as a godlike 
being, because he fights against the very evils which 
he has himself introduced. The laws of Nature are, 
at the lowest, a-moral : it is man who by his use of 
the laws of Nature introduces evil. 

But what do we mean by pleasure and pain ? What 
do they depend on ? Here we must at present enter 
on the commonplace: the question is more fully 
considered hereafter. 

Physical pleasure or pain can have no existence in 
itself: for the existence of either, or both, there must 
exist a subject with potentiality of feeling. The 
pleasure or pain of a man fully anaesthetized under an 
otherwise painful operation is as impossible as that 
of a piece of land 13 tortured by an earthquake. 
Pleasure or pain exists only for a feeling subject. 
There may be to us, manifestations suggesting 
physical pleasure or pain, but these are mere mani¬ 
festations unless-feeling exist. There may be, for 
us, physical appearance of pleasure or pain, where 

12 When we, as men, pray for long life on earth as a blessing 
we confound quality with quantity. As Bergson, though in another 
connection, has shown, we falsely measure quality by quantity. 

13 If assumed to be unconscious, 


THE UNIVERSE 


ESI 

neither is felt. A dead man may be made to laugh or 
cry, exhibit movements manifesting pleasure or pain; 
the cinematograph may bring before us any possible 
manifestation of feeling. But these are mere mani¬ 
festations : there is no pleasure or pain because there 
is no feeling subject. 14 

But we are considering the first period of the evolu¬ 
tion of our universe and during this period physical 
forms manifesting life have no self-consciousness and 
no subject can be a feeling subject without self-con¬ 
sciousness. Therefore, during this period pleasure 
and pain do not exist. So far, then, the laws of 
Nature are not responsible for either or both. 

It is quite true that during this period living organ¬ 
isms are never fully in agreement with their environ¬ 
ment ; it is on this very disagreement that evolution 
exists and the struggle for survival, in which the fittest 
are successful, takes place. 15 So when we, as self- 
conscious subjects, regard this period there is an ap¬ 
pearance of pleasure and pain for living organisms; 
there is, to us, manifestation of pleasure and pain as 
with the cinematograph. But these are mere mani¬ 
festations : for there are no feeling subjects. 

This argument, however, must not be pressed too 
far. For we do not know when self-conscious subjects 
first appear in our universe. I assume man is the first 
self-conscious subject, simply because 1 am myself a 
man and self-conscious of myself. If I were a tiger 
or even an oyster I might find myself a self-conscious 
subject. As to this I know nothing, and so leave the 
question raised unanswered. And the question may 
quite justifiably be left unanswered. For, even if 
other self-conscious subjects exist, I am certainly my- 


14 A man may be a feeling subject without experiencing pleasure 
or pain : his feeling may be potential only. But pleasure or pain 
can have no existence in itself unless a feeling subject exist. This 
would appear to open a good reply to the James-Lange theory. 

15 The “ fittest ” refers to those most nearly in agreement with 
the environment of the time. But this agreement may be of such 
a nature that it is beyond the purview of our observation. 



i 5 2 MYSELF 

self one of them and so justified in using my own self- 
consciousness in argument. 16 

The only point here made is that, while the laws 
of Nature hold full sway and self-conscious subjects 
are absent, pleasure and pain do not exist. It is when 
self-conscious subjects appear, with power to use the 
laws of Nature for their own purposes, that pleasure 
and pain come into existence. It is, using a sugges¬ 
tion of James Ward’s in another connection, as if the 
laws of Nature presented to self-conscious beings a 
neutral state which self-conscious beings analyse into 
pleasure and pain. 

All written in this chapter is in defence of the laws 
of Nature. At the lowest they are a-moral, though 
it is suggested that they are manifestations of what is, 
to us, an ultimate Being. It is when man appears 
as a self-conscious subject with power to use the law r s 
of Nature that, from our point of view, a-morality is 
differentiated and reintegrated into partials of 
morality and immorality—of pleasure and pain. The 
doctrine of original sin, as part of the laws of Nature r 
has been used by man in excuse for his own wrong 
doing. Linder that doctrine God made man as a 
thing of original sin, and then God died on earth to 
correct what He Himself had already done. By this 
means God is made responsible for man’s wrong¬ 
doing and man arrogates to himself credit for right- 
doing. If, however, the sacrifice of our Lord is re¬ 
garded as transcendental we can find in it a revelation 
to man for his assistance towards self-expression as 
the “ I am ” : the way was pointed out as to how he 
should struggle to use environment for spiritual self- 


16 The tiger plays with its prey. Finding pleasure in exercise 
of power or in anticipation of a meal? The prey finds the 
reverse of pleasure? I do not know anything about this. I 
cannot judge by mere manifestations. The tiger and its prey may 
be self-conscious; if so they, like man, are embodied in a universe 
of pain and pleasure. Why so embodied we cannot know. (Cf. 
the Chapter on Pleasure.) 


THE UNIVERSE 


i53 

expression. 17 But no such question is in point so 
ong as there are no self-conscious subjects in our uni¬ 
verse. 

Moral responsibility, pleasure and pain have no ex- 
stence till self-conscious subjects appear : we cannot 
ead them into the eidola of the kinematograph, for 
nstance, because the eidola have no self-conscious- 
less. 

The attacks made on the laws of Nature as being 
‘ red in tooth and claw ” are not to be justified. It 
s when and only when the laws of Nature are used 
3y self-conscious subjects that evil to be felt is brought 
into existence. Evil first appears when self-conscious 
subjects first appear. 

Moral law exists only for self-conscious subjects. 
So while the universe exists without self-conscious 
subjects we are powerless to hold that moral law does 
or does not exist. There is no breach in continuity. 


17 God is transcendent of those very laws of Nature which man 
can only use for self-expression. The supreme Sacrifice is an 
historical fact, but its interpretation is beyond the purview of 
thought: it must be transcendental. 

12 


FREE WILL AND THE CATEGORICAL 
IMPERATIVE 


We consider now the second period, when self-con¬ 
scious subjects make their appearance. 

If we assume the existence of the categorical impera¬ 
tive and also that of the freedom of the will we are 
faced by what is termed an antinomy of reason. 
Kant refers to this antinomy when he says that trans¬ 
cendental freedom of the will is impossible, while, at 
the same time, freedom of the will is not only possible, 
but exists. Riehl is more explicit: he finds an an¬ 
tinomy of the practical reason thus :— 

“ Responsibility, an unquestionable fact of conscious¬ 
ness, is not possible on the supposition that the will is 
free, or that it is not free.” 1 

When we accept the fact of the infirmity of thought 
and give to man, as a subject, the faculty of insight, 
we shall find we can attack this so-termed antinomy 
directly. Our first attack is indirect. 

If we consider the objective universe only we find 
no question of the freedom of the will exists : there is, 
for us, determinism under the laws of Nature. If, 
even, we make living organisms, whose conduct is 


l Responsibility, as an unquestionable fact of consciousness, I 
trace back to the desire of the subject for self-expression of itself 
as the “ I am.” For the struggle is not of one “ I am,” but of 
many interrelated “ I ams.” So far I follow Riehl. But free¬ 
will I hold to be a contradiction for thought of non-freedom of will. 


FREE WILL i 55 

istinctive, part of the objective universe, still no such 
uestion arises. d he question of freedom or non-free- 
om of the will only arises with the existence of self- 
}nscious subjects. Again, even if we assume that 
self-conscious subject can think or do anything 
ithout any exception at all, still no question of the 
eedom of the will arises. For freedom of the will 
1 a subject of thought and so freedom of the will is 
teaningless without its contradiction, non-freedom, 
eing also in the mind, and to think between these 
mits of contradiction there must be a standard of 
eterminism. Without such a standard freedom of 
le will is impossible. 

Here comes in a fact affecting freedom and non- 
eedom of the will which must be borne in mind. 
When we thing up to and between the limits of, 
>r example, o and oo, we necessarily take an arbi- 
ary standard to start from : this standard is unity, 
> before shown. We are dealing with quantity, 
hich imports time and space, and the unity involved 
not fixed, immutable, it is no more than an arbitrary 
mtre, a necessary assumption for the estimate of re¬ 
gions : it is a starting point for thought. 2 
But, when we consider freedom of the will, quanti- 
r , time and space are not in the question, do not come 
l at all. And yet, when we think up to and between 
ie limits of freedom and non-freedom of the will, we 
iust have some standard to start thought from,— 
lere must be some point to start thought in its pro- 
iss to freedom of the will as one limit of thought and 
;>n-freedom of the will as the contradictory limit of 
lought. This standard must be a standard of de- 
rminism. So even at this point of the argument 
e arrive, with Riehl, at the necessary fact of deter- 
inism before freedom of the will can be considered. 
As already stated we must, before we begin to con- 


2 The number one, or unity, may be taken to mean anything from 
elephant to an atom. 


156 MYSELF 

sider the question of the freedom of the will, assumt 
self-consciousness exists. Is it then enough to as 
sume the existence of one self-conscious subject ? 3 I 
is not; we must assume the existence of self-consciom 
subjects. We have no human experience at all a; 
to the relation of one self-conscious subject to the en 
vironment of our objective universe, though we try t( 
consider the objective universe as something fully ex 
ternal to ourselves and are greatly interested in oui 
attempts. 4 

But all such attempts fail. Make abstraction o: 
your relation to other self-conscious subjects, not onl) 
of the present but of the past and future. What re 
mains of yourself and your human experience ? Sup 
pose, even, that as the one solitary subject of self 
consciousness you were a Platonist, 5 6 what then woulc 
be your thought and conduct ? Any question of mor 
ality, of pleasure or pain, you would refer to yourseli 
alone, as the one self-conscious subject. You woulc 
be a pure hedonist, as the term is generally under 
stood. You would, as a Platonist, interprel 
“ pleasure ” as meaning what is best for yourself,' 
but you could not interpret “ pleasure ” as being in 
volved in any way in the pleasure of others, not your 
self; for you alone would exist. The ultimate oi 
morality—do unto others as you would others should 
do unto you—would be impossible for you. 

We may thus understand that though morality ex 
ists for each subject, a condition precedent for morality 
is that humanity should exist; it is because there are 
self-conscious subjects, not merely one self-conscious 


3 We ignore, at present, any question of an ultimate self-con' 
scious Being. 

4 This is why Robinson Crusoe always has such supreme interesl 
for all. Each one of us, in reading, puts himself in Crusoe’s place. 

5 You could not be a Christian ; the Supreme Sacrifice was foi 
humanity, and, for you, humanity has no existence. 

6 Kant says all hoping has happiness for its object. But th< 
meaning of happiness depends on what the subject is that teel; 
happiness. What hope may be depends on what the subject is. 


FREE WILL 


i57 

subject, that morality can exist. 7 And so we are en¬ 
abled to follow Riehl directly when he says : — 

“ Responsibility is a phenomenon of social ethics, and 
as such it is to be explained by social psychology. 
Individualistic psychology must pass helplessly by 
phenomena of the mental life, like duty and responsi¬ 
bility, which originate not in the single consciousness, 
but in the consciousness of the community.” 

So before any question of free will arises, we must 
have self-conscious subjects, not merely one self-con¬ 
scious subject; this is necessary for the standard re¬ 
quired to measure freedom of the will. 

The next step in argument seems to follow directly. 
We find full determinism for the objective world; 
that is, the tyranny of the laws of Nature. If then 
this common responsibility exist for humanity, it must 
have existence in the intelligible universe, not in the 
sensible universe as presented : it exists in thought. 
We may or may not manifest the thought in conduct. 

But we have already found the supremacy of the 
intelligible universe over the sensible universe as pre¬ 
sented : imagination determines the thought and, as 
a content of will, the conduct of humanity in destroy¬ 
ing the tyranny of determinism and using the laws of 
Nature for its own purposes. 8 

The position is this : the laws of Nature have full 
sway over the sensible universe as presented, that is, 
over the objective universe; so far there is determin¬ 
ism. But, so far, the intelligible universe has no 
existence ; 9 the intelligible universe comes into exist¬ 
ence with the existence of self-conscious subjects. 

7 Max Stirner in The Ego and His Own ignores this fact; his whole 
argument is based on a false foundation. Neitzsche, at times, is in¬ 
fluenced in his argument by building on the same false foundation. 

8 Imagination cannot bo exercised by the embodied subject 
unless the subject be moved by desire. 

9 Unless we refer back the laws of Nature to a Law Giver in 
what may be termed a transcendental intelligible universe. With 
any such question we are not now concerned. 


MYSELF 


158 

When self-conscious subjects come into existence, 
then comes into existence their power to use, not the 
objective universe, but the objective universe as gov¬ 
erned by the laws of Nature : they can and do use this 
universe governed by law for their own purposes. 
In other words, they can change, even create, their 
environment. It is self-consciousness, manifest in 
self-conscious subjects, not in one self-conscious sub¬ 
ject, which enables the subject to exercise this power 
over the tyranny of the laws of Nature. The subject 
is free, as a subject, to exercise this power. 

What do we mean by transcendental freedom? 10 
It is an unfortunate term and has led to as great con¬ 
fusion of thought as the terms absolute knowledge or 
ultimate unity. 

Freedom is a subject of thought and so cannot exist 
without the existence in the mind of its contradiction, 
non-freedom. Freedom gives no idea for thought 
unless the idea of its contradiction is also in the mind. 
Just as we cannot think infinity or nothing, but can 
only think up to and between such limits of contradic¬ 
tion, so we can only think up to and between the limits 
of contradiction of freedom and non-freedom. Trans¬ 
cendental freedom can no more exist in real reality 
than transcendental non-freedom. In the ultimate 
there is transcendence of both. 11 

Applying, again, for our ultimate, the expression 
“ the accomplished in the accomplishing,” we find, 
in the transcendental not transcendental freedom but 
an ultimate of freedom as accomplished in the accom¬ 
plishing. 12 We arrive at this transcendent through 
our faculty of insight, which informs us that in the 
ultimate the necessary contradictory limits of thought 


10 I deny that the argument now departs from Kant. 

11 Riehl does not distinguish between transcendental freedom 
of the will and freedom of the will: hence his antinomy for prac¬ 
tical reason. His antinomy will be shown to be false otherwise. 

12 Freedom accomplished takes on, for us, the aspect of the 
determined. 


FREE WILL 


159 

are and must be reconciled, though the reconciliation 
or subsumption is beyond the purview of thought. 

Now desire may be blind, 13 and potentiality of will, 
which exists for the subject, may be termed blind. 
But when we speak of the freedom of the will, we 
speak of will with an assumption that it has, in some 
way, been effective or non-effective in thought or con¬ 
duct. Will cannot be effective without content; there 
must be precedent desire and, as already shown, 
there must be the exercise of imagination in the intelli¬ 
gible universe before will can be effective for the 
conduct of the subject in creating or even changing 
its environment. At first thought, then, it might be 
fairly argued that the will is not free. 

But the argument is false, for it treats freedom as 
a thing in itself, whereas it is relative. Freedom of 
the will has no meaning unless there is resistance to 
its freedom. We are, again, confounding, in thought, 
relations with facts in themselves. Riehl himself 
made this error in stating his antinomy. 

Responsibility, an unquestionable fact of conscious¬ 
ness, we find in the ultimate imperative desire of the 
subject for self-expression of itself as the “ I am.” 
For the desire, in the accomplishing, of any particular 
“ I am,” ought not to conflict with the desire, in the 
accomplishing, of other “ I ams.” So far there is 
determinism for the subject. But we find in this very 
determinism the fact which is necessary before free¬ 
dom of the will can exist for us in thought. 14 We find 
the standard of determinism necessary for us to begin 
to think up to and between the limits of freedom and 
non-freedom of will. 

While will is potential merely, no question of its 
freedom arises. Where, even, it is effective in 
thought and conduct, no question of freedom arises 


13 The ultimate desire of the subject for self-expression of itself 
as the “ I am ” is a blind desire; it has no content unless faced 
by resistance to its self-expression. 

14 Never forget that freedom is a relative term. 


160 MYSELF 

unless its exercise has been against resistance. For 
us, as subjects, right and wrong exist and freedom to 
do right or wrong imports freedom not to do wrong 
or right; for freedom of will there must be, for the 
subject, the possibility of choice. 15 But if we destroy 
right and wrong, that is, if we have no standard deter¬ 
mining that this is right and that is wrong, where is 
freedom of the will? It is non-existent. Suppose, 
more generally, that your will is transcendentally free 
and unconditioned, so that you can think or do any¬ 
thing. Then freedom of the will has no meaning. 
Your character, will, desire can have no part in your 
exercise of will. For if character, will, desire be 
yours, they determine the exercise of your will : vour 
will is not transcendentally free. 16 So transcendental 
freedom of the will infers absence of your character, 
will, desire. In such case you exist as a mere unre¬ 
lated entity. 

For freedom of the will there must be a standard 
of determinism against which freedom can be 
measured; this standard must exist for the subject, 
otherwise choice could not exist. 

It has been said there can be no miracle from the 
standpoint of God, while there can be from the stand¬ 
point of man. It were better said that from the stand¬ 
point of God there is transcendence of the miraculous 
and non-miraculous. 17 B}^ analogy there is for the 
“ I am,” relatively to the subject, transcendence of 
freedom and non-freedom. 

The categorical imperative is found in the fact that 
the subject necessarily struggles against the resistance 
of environment, for self-expression of itself as the “ 1 
am”: there is always the accomplishing. The free¬ 
dom of will for the subject is found in its power so 

15 For choice to exist there must be some standard of determin¬ 
ism. 

16 But from the subject’s point of view it is free. For he ap¬ 
pears to himself to exist in his own character, will and desire. 

17 The former statement makes God subjective to transcendent 
laws of nature. 


FREE WILL 161 

to struggle in differing ways. From the subject’s 
point of view this is a real and free power; it infers 
choice. 

We, as subjects, are conscious that we exist in the 
ultimate as the “ I am ” : we are conscious, as sub¬ 
jects, of our responsibility to the “I am” and be¬ 
cause of this consciousness we necessarily struggle for 
self-expression as the ” I am.” Hence the categori¬ 
cal imperative. But this consciousness is at the back¬ 
ground of consciousness. In the foreground of con¬ 
sciousness the subject regards itself,—as a thing of 
thought and conduct,—as imbued with freedom of 
will in determining the form of its struggle for self- 
expression. What each of us holds is :—my charac¬ 
ter, my thought and conduct are my own and I use 
them as I myself desire. Therefore I have free will. 18 

If we take for our standard of determinism the im¬ 
perative struggle of the subject for self-expression of 
itself as the “ I am,” we find the subject has, for it¬ 
self, this freedom of will. Let us consider this state¬ 
ment further, for as yet no evidence in human experi¬ 
ence has been offered of its truth. 

Freedom is a relative term and, if the thought and 
conduct of humanity are effective in no way, then we 
find in human experience a negation for freedom and 
non-freedom. But, in the accomplishing, we find the 
thought and conduct of humanity are effective, and 
effective, from our point of view, towards some ulti¬ 
mate though unknown purpose. 19 

The intelligible universe holds sway over the uni¬ 
verse as presented and we find the thought and 
conduct of humanity effective in this way :—as time 
passes the thought and conduct of humanity effect 
constant change, even creation, in the objective uni- 


18 Or we may say there is for the subject an appearance of free¬ 
will. If we stop short at the psychological I, there is a form of 
reality for free-will. 

19 Do not forget freedom, as relative, exists in the accomplishing 
only; in the ultimate of the accomplished in the accomplishing, 
there is transcendence of free-will and the categorical imperative. 


162 MYSELF 

verse. Day by day, the form of this universe 
changes and this is brought about by the thought and 
conduct of humanity. More than this : this change 
is evolutionary; for day by day this sensible universe 
takes on more closely the form determined by humani¬ 
ty for its own purposes. There is the “ accomplish¬ 
ing ” for humanity and so far the thought and 
conduct of humanity are effective. The ideal we dimly 
pursue is an accomplished state when environment 
shall have so evolved that it is fully in agreement 
with the full expression of the subject, of itself as the 
“ I am.” 

There is direct evidence in human experience of the 
evolutionary increase of manifestation of power of 
the intelligible universe over the objective universe. 
In this the thought and conduct of man are shown to 
be effective : there is evidence of the accomplishing 
and so, from the subject’s point of view, of free will : 
humanity itself has effected, and is effecting, the evo¬ 
lutionary change for its own purposes. 20 

But, so far, we only find that the thought and con¬ 
duct of humanity have effected evolution in environ¬ 
ment. Still, however, though the change is in en¬ 
vironment only, we find the change effective for hu¬ 
manity in that, by bringing men closer together in 
time and space, it has made opportunity for closer 
brotherhood amongst them ; keener apprehension of 
likeness between us all. And, by reducing the time 
necessarily required for the support of the body, it 
has also made opportunity for men to employ more 
time in the exercise of brain power for mental, rather 
than physical purposes. They have more time to use 
for the improvement of their environment. The effec¬ 
tive change in environment has enured in some accom¬ 
plishment for the benefit of humanity. 21 


20 Darwin’s theory of evolution marks the accomplishing of 
“ something,” though this something be meaningless to us in 
thought. 

21 The accomplishing when past takes on, for us, the appearance 
of the accomplished. 


FREE WILL 


163 

But during this time of evolution in environment, 
does human experience inform us that humanity has 
been struggling effectively in any way for the ab¬ 
stract? Has it shown any desire for love, beauty, 
truth, justice? Is there any evidence that humanity 
is moved by desire, even blind desire, to accept, in 
thought and conduct, the principle :—do unto others 
as ye would others should do unto you ? Is the 
categorical imperative moral ? 

Can we, in the thought and conduct of man, find 
that the categorical imperative is manifest in power 
in any balance for man ? That is, can we, when we 
consider the diverse thought and conduct not only of 
individuals separately, but of humanity at large, hold 
that, for us, there is any ultimate standard or ideal of 
love, beauty, truth and justice? A standard towards 
which humanitv is blindly groping? 22 

Herein we find, again, the importance of our defin¬ 
ition of the ultimate as the accomplished in the accom¬ 
plishing. 

The subject exists in the accomplishing : the sub¬ 
ject, in relation to the “ I am,” is as the accomplish¬ 
ing is to the accomplished : it is a partial of the “ I 
am.” Man, as the “ I am,” is said to be made in 
the likeness of God : in a like way we may say the sub¬ 
ject is a projection in time and space of the ” I am.” 23 

But human ideals exist for human conduct only in 
and for the accomplishing : we even define ideals as 
“ something ” we can struggle towards, but never at¬ 
tain : if attained they cease to be ideals. But as they 
exist in the accomplishing, they are not phenomenally 
false : they are, or may be, partials of the ultimate 

22 If we cannot find this or any other ideal we are driven to 
Haeckel’s closed circle of moments of evolution and devolution. 

23 The noumenal -is not opposed to the phenomenal. I read the 
phenomenal as a partial of the noumenal. But I do not make use 
of either expression, for their use introduces confusion between 
the intelligible and the objective universe: though, as Kant used 
them he assumed the latter universe to be a subject of the former- 


164 MYSELF 

ideal or goal of the subject for full expression of itself 
as the “ I am.” 

So it may be possible, in human experience, to find 
some ideal in the abstract to which the thought and 
conduct of the subject move in the accomplishing. 
And if we can find this ideal, it is an ideal in the ac¬ 
complishing, that is, it partakes of real reality; it is 
a partial as it were of the accomplished in the accom¬ 
plishing. It represents dimly and partially the ulti¬ 
mate ideal for humanity, the full expression of the 
self-conscious subject of itself as the “ I am.” 

Now we find in human experience that we have the 
ideals of love, beauty, truth and justice. It is true we 
have these ideals because we falsely define the ulti¬ 
mate in a limit of thought,—just as we think God as 
unity or as immanent. But if anyone who takes love, 
beauty, truth or justice separately as his ideal uses his 
insight and reasons, he will at once find his error : 
he will find that the faculty of insight prevents us 
from holding that love can exist in the ultimate with¬ 
out beauty, 24 truth and justice, and so for each one of 
them. If, for example, we think love as an ultimate, 
insight pulls us up and makes us aware of the falli¬ 
bility of our thought in that this thought imports 
thought also of beauty, truth and justice. 25 The ideals 
of thought are, through insight, subsumed under a 
transcendental ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice. 
The ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice is itself an 
ideal transcending each detail. And yet each ideal 
exists in the accomplishing. 

Love, the beautiful, truth, justice, as subjects of 
thought, convey no meaning to us unless their contra¬ 
dictions are also in the mind so that, as subjects of 
thought, we never have human experience of any of 
these in the abstract ; 26 we can never have any ideas 

24 Forms of beauty are not referred to, for they are merely mani¬ 
festations of beauty. 

25 To a mother’s love, the ugliest child may be beautiful. 

26 For thought, absolute love, etc., are all impossible. 


FREE WILL 


165 

of them in the abstract. But, beyond thought, we are 
gifted with insight and imagination as part of human 
experience and so we may be aware of love, beauty, 
truth and justice as an ideal in the abstract. It is true 
this awareness has not the definiteness of thought. 
For we are aware that love, beauty, etc., in the ab¬ 
stract are for thought mere expressions; it is insight 
that we have into transcendence for them all. Beauty 
is meaningless without love, any one of the terms is 
meaningless without the others also. We cannot im¬ 
agine truth in the abstract without justice in the 
abstract. Any one imports all the others. At the 
back of our awareness there is transcendence. 27 

It is suggested that we can imagine a universe of 
pure love, beauty, truth and justice, but that, when we 
imagine it, there is at the back of our imagination 
some transcendent form of perfection where love, 
beauty, etc., are all subsumed under “ something ” : 
something beyond imagination. If so, there is a 
blind, transcendent ideal for humanity. 28 

But, if there be no categorical imperative, and so 
no freedom for the subject,' we must be able, in the 
same way, to imagine the contradiction of this trans¬ 
cendent ideal : we must be able to imagine a universe 
where love, beauty, truth and justice have no exist¬ 
ence. 

Bear in mind what the argument is. We can think 
between the limits of these contradictory ideals : we 
can think a universe where love and hatred, beauty 
and ugliness, etc., exist in differing degrees. The 
argument, however, is confined to insight and imagin¬ 
ation transcending thought. 29 

But the categorical imperative exists and I doubt 
greatly that we can imagine a universe of absolute 

27 The faculty of insight relates the subject to the transcendental. 

28 We find an ideal of an eternal and predestined harmony for 
mankind. (Cf. Leibnitz.) 

29 Insight and imagination are referred not to the soul of man 
alone, but to the subject also, subject to its embodiment. 


166 MYSELF 

evil. Imagination would appear to be constructive, 
not destructive. I doubt greatly that we can imagine 
a chaotic mass of humanity where no bonds of love, 
beauty, truth and justice exist at all. In such case 
each subject would, quite impossibly, have transcen¬ 
dental freedom of will, without any existing standard 
of responsibility. The sensible universe as sensed 
by us is meaningless for thought: there are given but 
unrelated objects. It is only when the bond of the 
laws of Nature is read into the objective universe that 
we can think about it. In the same way, I suggest, 
it is only when the bond of love, beauty, etc., is read 
into humanity as affecting it in some way, that we can 
even think about ourselves and our fellows. 

We are now considering human experience and it 
must be admitted we are on perilous ground. But 
the argument is of profound importance for any con¬ 
sideration of the categorical imperative. 

We are considering self-conscious subjects who, as 
subjects of the intelligible universe, have the power of 
thought and thereby can, by conduct, exercise power 
over the objective universe. We are considering 
these subjects in their relation to themselves and their 
fellows. 

Can we, by insight and imagination, picture to our¬ 
selves a universe for ourselves where love, beauty, 
truth and justice are absent ? When these, which 
form bonds between ourselves and others, are absent, 
what sort of universe is it that we can imagine? If, 
for me, love, beauty, truth and justice have no exist¬ 
ence, I am nothing but an unrelated entity and in such 
case it were difficult, I think impossible, for me to be 
a self-conscious subject : I could not only never use 
thought, but I.could not use insight or imagination, 
for both require the precedent assumption that I exist 
not only as a self-conscious subject, but as one of 
many such subjects; which imports some ultimate 
bond between us all. And, in fact, I do use insight 
and imagination. The physical and mental establish 
distinctions, not any bond, between human beings. 


FREE WILL 167 

If the bond is to be found it must be found elsewhere. 
In a universe of hatred, ugliness, injustice and false¬ 
hood it seems difficult for any such bond to be found. 

I suggest, as a further argument, that human ex¬ 
perience makes us aware of a general self-conscious¬ 
ness 30 for humanity, under which the self-conscious¬ 
ness of each subject, while still existing, is subsumed. 
And I suggest that, because of this, we cannot im¬ 
agine a universe of evil in the abstract, because in 
such a universe, this general self-consciousness would 
be wanting. 

On the other hand we are not in the same way pre¬ 
vented from imagining a universe of good in the ab¬ 
stract, for general self-consciousness is not therein im¬ 
possible. 

Again, as already shown, my existence as a self- 
conscious subject, infers necessarily the existence of 
other self-conscious subjects. My existence depends 
on that of others from which it follows there must be 
some underlying community or bond between all self- 
conscious subjects. But this bond cannot be found 
in human personality. For the human personality 
of each one of us exists in definite distinctions from 
his fellows,—in differing forms of body and brain. 31 
We must seek, therefore, for the bond between self- 
conscious subjects, elsewhere than in the objective 
universe or in human personality. 32 

30 This general self-consciousness is meaningless unless referred 
to a transcendental self-conscious Being. But such a question 
does not now arise. 

31 There is presented to each one of us the same objective uni¬ 
verse, our thought and conduct in relation to this universe differ 
because each one of us differs from his fellows: it is our regard 
of the universe that marks individual differences. Riehl himself 
says: He who separates men from each other psychically, as 
physically they stand over against each other, and treats psychical 
being and action as attached to the body of the individual, or even 
to some point in that body, shuts his eyes to the reality of the 
universal mind above the individual, the real subjects of which are 
not individuals as such, but the bonds uniting individuals. 

32 Human personality is here used as meaning personality con¬ 
ditioned by body and brain. 



MYSELF 


168 

Now, at present, we neglect any question of an 
ultimate transcendental Being. We cannot, then, 
give reality to love, beauty, truth and justice in them¬ 
selves : they have existence only for self-conscious 
subjects. Love, beauty, truth or justice cannot exist 
for me unless it is my love or my beauty as the case 
may be. So no one of them can have existence in 
itself; each has existence only for self-conscious 
subjects. 

The cinematograph may here again be used for 
illustration and we may move forward a little in time 
and assume that not only Nature and its beauties 
but the appearance, conduct and speech of human 
beings are presented to us. 

Assume that you are sensing a cinematograph play 
presenting to you beautiful scenery and men and 
women speaking and conducting themselves under 
the apparent influence of love, hatred,—of all the 
moving desires of humanity. 

Now consider what you sense, neglecting the effect 
it has on you. 

You are faced by expressions in manifestation of 
good, evil, love, hatred, beauty, ugliness, justice, 
injustice, truth and falsehood. But not one of these 
exists for any one of the eidola of men and women 
whose speech and conduct are manifest to you. And 
why not ? Because the eidola are not self-conscious 
subjects. 33 One of the eidola may deliver a speech 
on love, beauty, truth and justice; his conduct, his 
gesture, may represent deep feeling, heartfelt emo¬ 
tion. But love, beauty, desire, emotion do not exist 
for him, because he is not a self-conscious subject. 
You may endow the eidolon with any quality you 
like, you may even endow it with thought. But if 
it be not self-conscious, not even thought can be its 
own. 

When, however, you consider the effect on yourself 


33 Even if these eidola were exact copies of men and women but 
without self-consciousness this would still be true. 


FREE WILL 169 

of what you sense, you find that love, beauty, truth 
and justice can exist for you. The play you sense 
affects you as manifesting them. Why does this 
difference exist ? Because love, beauty, truth and 
justice do not exist in or for the objective universe: 
they exist only for self-conscious subjects and, so, 
they exist for you. 

Our universe, for example, is full of an infinite 
variety of manifestations of beauty. This fact in 
itself demands not only the existence of subjects or 
a Being for whom the Manifestations exist, but that 
beauty itself must be a “spiritual” ideal for the 
manifestations of which our objective universe is 
merely the “ occasion.” Self-conscious subjects de¬ 
siring love, beauty, truth and justice as rightly their 
own , have not only struggled against environment 
resisting their possession but have used the objective 
universe to make manifest that which they desire. 

Now the cinematograph play is part of the objective 
universe. And how has it come into being? Self- 
conscious subjects as subjects of the intelligible 
universe, moved by desire, have used thought, 
imagination and will to create it in the objective 
universe. Herein we find the genesis of the creation. 
And the play has been created by self-conscious sub¬ 
jects for their own purpose,—for their own pastime; 34 
they have created something in the objective universe 
for their own purpose. .Self-conscious beings have 
created in the objective universe material shadows of 
“ something ” which has no existence in the material: 
of “ something ” which has existence only in and 
for self-consciousness. 

If we consider, practically, all cinematograph plays 

34 Pastime marks time which humanity uses when free from the 
labour necessary to support life. In such time it naturally seeks 
the highest personal satisfaction ; under the influence of environ¬ 
ment it may find this satisfaction in a travesty of normal labour. 
But, thought being divorced from labour for support of life, 
insight and imagination may in such time be free to attain satis¬ 
faction in witnessing what ought to be. 


4 3 


MYSELF 


170 

of human thought and conduct, we find an under¬ 
lying appeal to love, beauty, truth and justice. The 
makers of the play thus appeal to the public because 
it pays, the appeal is to the strongest underlying 
desire of humanity. There are manifestations also 
in the play of hatred, ugliness, falsehood and in¬ 
justice. But this resistance is used most generally 
to emphasize the ultimate victory of love, beauty, 
truth and justice. 35 And, indeed, as every spectator 
exists as a self-conscious subject in the accomplishing, 
that is, exists in struggle against the resistance of 
environment, the thought and conduct of man when 
made manifest in the objective universe must be faced 
by this resistance against the ideal of humanity. But 
there is no ideal, no victory of an ideal, in the play 
itself: it appeals only to an ideal and the desire for 
victory of the ideal which exists in and for self- 
conscious subjects. The objective universe has been 
used by self-conscious subjects merely to portray 
love, beauty, truth and justice in order to touch our 
already existing ideal of love, beauty, truth and 
justice. 36 

It would appear, so far, that in human experience 
we have for the subject of insight and imagination 
an ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice, while we 
can find no ideal in contradiction, of hatred, ugliness, 
falsehood and injustice. If so,—bearing in mind that 
the subject existing in the accomplishing is a partial 
of the “I am” existing, relatively, in the accomplished, 
—we arrive at a remarkable conclusion :— 


35 Dion Boucicault and Kipling had to alter the ending of plays 
written by them in face of the public demand for a “ happy end¬ 
ing.” We like plays showing men and the universe as they ought to 
be not as they are. 

36 Cinematographs sometimes appeal to “beastly” sensuality in 
man. This is an appeal to falsely centred desire. Sensual desire 
is natural and it is also moral when the conduct resulting from it 
is reasonable. The desire is necessary for the continued existence 
of the race of men. Men and women must eat to preserve their 
personal existence, they must have sexual intercourse to preserve 
their race. 


FREE WILL 


lyi 

There is, for the subject, the accomplishing to¬ 
wards the ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice, and 
so we are justified in assuming that, for the ultimate, 
when the self-conscious subject attains full expression 
of itself as the I am, the ideal exists in transcendence 
of love, beauty, truth and justice as opposed to their 
contradiction. The transcendental ideal may be said 
to be presented to or involved in the existence of 
the “ I am,” while to each of us, as a partial of the 
“ I am,” it appears through a glass dimly, broken 
up into anthropormorphic ideals of love, beauty, 
truth and justice. 

And in considering this do not forget what human 
experience has taught us through the cinematograph. 
Love, beauty, truth and justice do not exist in the 
objective universe, do not exist in or for ourselves 
as objects 37 in the objective universe: they exist, in 
and for us, apart from the material. This human 
experience tells us. The cinematograph show merely 
manifests in the objective universe, expressions of 
love, beauty, truth and justice. The idea], the 
standard for each and all, exists only in and for us 
as self-conscious subjects. The cinematograph is, 
as it were, but a mirror reflecting the outward and 
visible signs of the inward and spiritual grace of love, 
beauty, truth and justice. The objective universe is 
but the occasion for outward manifestation of that 
which does not exist in it. In no way can we make 
our ideal subject to its occasion. 

If we consider the thought and conduct of humanity 
in general, we must be^r in mind not only the enor¬ 
mous strength of the resistance of environment but 
the fact that, in his present stage, man uses but little 
his powers of insight and imagination. So if we seek, 
in human experience, for evidence of man’s desire 


37 If the human eidola of the cinematograph existed in three, 
not only two, dimensions and had in themselves the resistance of 
matter, still, love, beauty, truth and justice would not exist for them. 


1 72 MYSELF 

for the ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice we can 
hope to find only the vaguest and slightest traces of 
it. Indeed if we can merely find the balance of man’s 
thought and conduct weighted towards the ideal we 
shall have all we can expect . 38 

The consideration already given to this question of 
balance, especially when we considered “ Self Ex¬ 
pression and the Categorical Imperative,” justifies us 
in holding that human experience establishes a proba¬ 
bility—which we may accept and use as proof—that 
the balance inclines towards the ideal of love, beauty, 
truth and justice . 39 

Herein is no denial that the social state of humanity 
is so evil that it would be unbearable but for its 
humorous inconsistencies, or that dogmatic forms of 
religion have been so used for evil purposes that 
many sincere and upright men have come to regard 
religion itself as a curse of humanity. The true 
wonder is that the thought and conduct of humanity 
should be as good as they are, when we consider the 
weight of resistance from environment and the fact 
that we use insight and imagination so little. The 
environment of rank, wealth and power and their 
contradiction, mindless and powerless destitution is 
so evilly resistant that, at first thought, it may appear 
almost ridiculous any man should dare to suggest 
that an ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice can 
exist as the ultimate desire of humanity. 

But the consideration we have given to the thought 
and conduct of man generally shows, I think, that 
we find always at their back this ideal, in spite of the 
fact that humanity has, apparently, so misused its 
power over the objective universe. And we may, 
further, rely on the fact that wit, humour, pathos, 
satire and irony have real existence for humanity. 


38 The fact that men live together in communities even as nations 
is strong evidence that this balance exists. Without it there would 
be anarchy. 

39 The noblest and best thoughts and acts of human beings pass 
in time unknown, unpublished. 


FREE WILL 173 

What is their basis? The ideal of a universe of 
hatred, ugliness, injustice and falsehood ? The ideal 
is the reverse; it is a universe of love, beauty, truth 
and justice. 

What standard, what ideal, does Swift assume 
against which to measure the meanness of man ? 
Love, beauty, truth and justice. Without such an 
ideal his satire and irony are meaningless. Thackeray 
was no cynic; it was against his own supreme ideal 
that he measured men and women and flagellated 
them (and himself!) for pretending to be what they 
are not; the wit, humour and pathos of Dickens live 
and delight us in appeal to our ideal of full brother¬ 
ly love; Hugo’s greatness exists in the fulness of his 
ideal background; the maze of Meredith holds at its 
centre its unapproachable Utopia, and Carlyle’s 
“ damned continued fraction ” marked his desire for 
unattainable perfection. Even Shakespeare, though 
he confined himself to so cruelly true a mirror of 
human nature, reveals his belief that the mirror is 
held in the hands of God . 40 

Deny to humanity an ideal of love, beauty, truth 
and justice, no matter how besmirched by evil en¬ 
vironment, then where are wit, humour, pathos, 
satire and irony ? 

The power of the ignoble to exploit their fellows 
is based not only on the average simplicity of man¬ 
kind but on its inherent respect for and belief in 
truth and justice. And, perhaps, the most striking 
instances of this are to be found in the political and 
diplomatic history of Europe. Prussia offers a glar¬ 
ing instance,—exceptional, possibly, but not unique. 
Its aggrandisement has been founded on deceit, dis¬ 
honour and the constant deliberate breach or falsifica- 


40 Great as George Eliot was, is it possible that we find a want in 
her writings? Our admiration is intellectual; the ideal of feeling, 
beyond this life, is not presented to us. Wherein lies the strength 
of the attack of such works as “ The City of Dreadful Night,” or 
“ The Martyrdom of Man,” unless against an ultimate ideal of 
good? 


MYSELF 


174 

tion of international treaties . 41 Even Carlyle, who 
regarded Frederick the Great as a demigod, expressed 
an opinion in writing that the Prussians were the 
greatest liars in history. 

But what, also, is true of Prussia and of Frederick 
the Great himself? In order that the people might 
put forward their greatest effort in support of un¬ 
disclosed political designs, appeal was always made 
to their ideal of national right and justice; no autocrat 
ever asked his people to fight under the banner of 
the devil; even if commanded to burn, ravish and 
murder, the people are always asked to so act under 
the banner of a God of right and justice . 42 Has there 
ever been any war between any two nations, when 
both the peoples were not told that God was fighting 
on their side? The facts are so obvious that they 
need not be dilated on. 

But, if it be a fact of history that rulers, politicians 
and diplomatists, however foul their objects, in¬ 
variably whitewash these objects with truth and 
justice before appealing to their peoples for assistance 
in carrying them out, it follows directly that they 
do this because they know, for the general conscious¬ 
ness of their peoples , there is a deep-down respect, 
prejudice if you will, in favour of truth and justice, 
and they know that only by trading on this prejudice 
can they rely on the support and call forth the 
strongest efforts of their peoples. Machiavelli while 
instructing rulers that for the preservation of their 
power they should always be ready to do the most 
inhuman, uncharitable and irreligious things, tells 
them also that they must always appear to their 

41 Events after August, 1914 , are not refered to; the personal 
equation might falsify argument. 

42 The past history of the Jews shows what horrors can be perpe¬ 
trated under a national God. But, even so, there is an appeal to 
truth and justice as believed in and respected by the people. The 
error arises from confining the attention of the people to their s.ense 
of their own truth and justice; in the glare they cannot see truth 
and justice for others. 


FREE WILL 


x 75 

subjects all goodness, integrity, humanity and re¬ 
ligion. A whole people may be inoculated for a 
time with a foul form of militarism; but, as they 
are inoculated, they are instructed that militarism is 
but an unpleasant method for attaining ultimate truth 
and justice. 

If hatred, ugliness, falsehood and injustice were 
man’s ideal, could what is written above be true? 
If, even, man had no ideal, could it be true? 

Deny to humanity an ideal of love, beauty, truth 
and justice, no matter how besmirched by evil en¬ 
vironment, then where is the power that rulers in¬ 
variably exploit to make their peoples strive after 
objects hateful to them ? Even Milton’s Devil argues 
the justice and right of his own offence. 

Again, consider human happiness. There is per¬ 
haps a scum of humanity marked in some, if few, 
of the idle rich and submerged ten thousand, capable 
only of happiness drawn from immediate environ¬ 
ment. But, for humanity at large, happiness would 
appear to be little influenced by environment. The 
meanest home where, however vaguely, an ideal of 
love, beauty, truth and justice holds sway, makes 
for greater human happiness than the great house 
where wealth, rank, power, social position or intellect 
is regarded as an end in itself. Let environment be 
what it may, he who most truly struggles towards 
the ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice is the man 
nearest to the “ best ” happiness . 48 

Even considering the intellectual, we find the best 
work done for humanity and the calmest form of 
happiness, for those men who have used their mental 
ability under governance of the ideal of love, beauty, 
truth or justice,—of truth especially. 

If this ideal exist for humanity it exists in the 
accomplishing, and we are justified by reason in 

43 Greville marks the fact that the giants of human success in 
war and politics often crop Dead Sea fruit, while the man of 
science or humble parson may feed on content. 


MYSELF 


176 

holding it is a partial of the ultimate which exists 
in the accomplished in the accomplishing. To this 
ultimate as a standard we may refer the struggle of 
the self-conscious subject towards expression of itself 
as the “ I am.” 

Herein we find the conscience and the “ moral 
good ” for man. 

The categorical imperative is found in the impera¬ 
tive desire, involving necessary struggle, of the 
subject for self-expression of itself as the “ I am.” 
The freedom of will of the subject is found in its 
form of freedom to struggle for self-expression. In 
Kant’s words the freedom of will of the subject is 
found in its freedom to express its true self . 44 

If we think the above explanation we are faced, as 
Riehl shows, by a contradiction: we have deter¬ 
minism—in the categorical imperative; we have the 
contradiction of determinism—in free will. But 
never forget we can only think between limits of 
contradiction,—they mark the boundaries of thought. 
It is insight which makes us aware these limits have 
reality only for thought: they do not exist for in¬ 
sight. 

To reconcile the contradictions of the categorical 
imperative and free will we can use only insight and 
imagination in transcendence of thought: no recon¬ 
ciliation of the contradictions is or can be offered for 
thought. For thought exists between limits of 
contradiction . 45 


44 I would suggest there is no freedom to express, but differing 
forms of freedom, in the accomplishing, towards expression. We 
thus get rid of the contradiction involved in Kant’s dictum. 

45 This reconciliation is considered in the Chapter “ The 
Accomplished in the Accomplishing.” 


PLEASURE AND HAPPINESS 


All now written about pleasure and happiness con¬ 
sists mainly of repetition of arguments already put 
forward and recorded by others. But the scheme of 
the argument demands consideration of the subject. 

Any consideration of what is termed eudaemonism 
is neglected for the same reason that the term in¬ 
tuition is not considered : it would lead to interminable 
consideration of what the term means. Even when 
the common terms pleasure and happiness are used, 
some preliminary explanation of the meaning now 
given them is necessary. 

Our sheet anchor for real reality we find in the 
self-consciousness of the subject. So I use “ happi¬ 
ness ” for what may be termed a state of the subject 
apart from all questions of presentation, as presenta¬ 
tion is generally used. At the same time it must be 
borne in mind that self-consciousness is a thing-in- 
itself to each of us, and therefore cannot, in thought, 
be conditioned in any way . 1 So we can in reason 
only treat happiness—as now defined—as a possible 
atmosphere, as it were, for the self-conscious subject. 
One peculiarity of happiness, as now defined, is that, 
if sought for itself, it is never to be found: it is not 
momentary, it depends on the past, present and 
future of the subject. But, as manifest, it must be 
held to vary in degree. We cannot think any ulti¬ 
mate for it but—without opposing reason—we may 

l This does not exclude conditions in the transcendental. But 
such conditions our reason cannot touch, we cannot hold that 
they do or do not exist. 


177 


178 MYSELF 

imagine an ultimate of the peace that passeth under¬ 
standing. 

Pleasure, as now defined, marks feeling running 
collaterally with presentations. The purely sensual 
we may neglect so, for the subject, pleasure imports 
mentality and, as we make the brain but a machine 
for thought, it follows that pleasure imports presenta¬ 
tion. Pleasure, if followed for itself, may be seized. 
But the possession is only lasting for passing time. 

We may find the genesis of all forms of pleasure 
in transmitted experience or, indeed, in anything 
else that has had origin in time. But, even so, what 
have we effected ? We have effected nothing towards 
discovery of why or in relation to what the subject, 
ab initio, has been so constituted that it can feel 
pleasure and happiness. Any such question is still 
in the air. For I reject any theory that the object 
for man’s creation is that he should feel pleasure; 
pleasure is merely a relative term. Men, indeed, 
may seek that which they think will be pleasurable 
for themselves; but, if we then attempt to give definite 
meaning to the word pleasure or, herein, its equivalent 
happiness, we find ourselves in a bog of thought— 
as has already been shown. For the word “pleasure” 
has infinite variety of meaning, even contradictions 
in meaning. Its meaning depends on what the 
subject is assumed to be and so varies from the 
pleasure of the Cyrenaic to the pleasure or happiness 
of the Platonist, while the Christian may find peace 
transcending happiness in the negation of what we 
ordinarily term happiness .” 2 

Now it has been shown that the moving force for 
man is to be found in his blind desire for full ex¬ 
pression of himself as a self-conscious subject, that 
is, of himself as “I am.” How, then, do pleasure 
and happiness come into the scheme? 


2 Cf. The Accomplished in the Accomplishing (p. 227). 


PLEASURE AND HAPPINESS 


179 

The categorical imperative is found manifest in 
he subject’s blind pursuit of the ideal of love, beauty, 
ruth and justice. The state of the subject or we 
nay say, perhaps more correctly, the feeling of the 
subject, varies almost infinitely between the limits of 
sure pleasure and pure pain. The word “ pure ” is 
lere used merely to mark the limits of thought be¬ 
tween pleasure and pain as necessary contradictions 
for thought. The subject’s state cannot be one either 
of pure pleasure or pure pain; it exists only between 
these contradictory limits. 

It will now be argued that the subject’s state ap¬ 
proaches the more nearly to the limit of pure pleasure, 
that is, to pure happiness, as the subject approaches, 
in thought and conduct, the more nearly to fufilment 
of its ultimate desire for full expression of itself as 
the “ I am .” 8 Happiness, in manifestation, varies 
with the degree of fulfilment of the duty which the 
subject owes to the categorical imperative; it exists 
not in itself but results from strife towards fulfilment 
of duty. 

The subject exists conditioned in the body, but it 
is in itself a subject of the intelligible universe and, 
in the ultimate, is found in the “I am.” Transcen¬ 
dental Being exists in the accomplished in the 
accomplishing; the “ I am ” in relation to Transcen¬ 
dental Being, exists in the accomplishing, only. 
Herein we find how the “ I am ” is a subject to 
Transcendental Being and yet savours of Trans¬ 
cendental Being. The “Tam,” though still a 
subject to Transcendental Being, exists in relation to 
the subject as the accomplished to the accomplishing. 

The above statement is given because to establish 
the present argument we must be evolutionary in 
method; we must consider first the embodied subject, 
then the subject as one in the intelligible universe 
and then as “I am.” We start with consideration 

3 This follows the argument that the subject’s ultimate desire 
is manifest in pursuit of the ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice. 


MYSELF 


180 

of the subject in its lowest state; that is, as condi¬ 
tioned in the body. We consider the bodily state 
alone. We then consider higher states. 


THE BODY 

In what state should the body be that the subject 
may be best conditioned to obey the categorical im¬ 
perative ? At first thought we should hold it must 
be in full agreement with its environment. But 
there are difficulties in considering what this agree¬ 
ment means. 

We speak ordinarily of the one life of each bodily 
subject. But there is not one life for each such 
subject. For example, every one of the innumerable 
red corpuscles and phagocytes of each subject has 
life and the life of the subject is made up of these 
innumerable lives. Disease, even death, follows for 
the subject on the disease or death of the corpuscles. 
There is no unity of life for any mere bodily sub¬ 
ject . 4 The form of life of the subject is a synthesis 
of innumerable other forms of life. 

What we want then for the human body is a 
sound, healthy state not for a single life but for the 
congeries of lives which go to its constitution. And 
this body includes the brain. 

The sounder and healthier the body the better 
adapted it is for reasonable thought and conduct. 
And the more reasonable thought and conduct, the 
better is the subject adapted to accomplish its desire 
for self-expression. Conduct depends in some 
measure on the mens sana in corpore sano. 

4 We have found any given so termed material body exists in 
etheric form and the motion, therein, of a comparative few cor¬ 
puscles or entities of “ something.” We must have form for mani¬ 
festation of life and form is etheric. For the bodily form of man 
there exist lives , not one life. Can unity of self-consciousness result 
from a synthesis of these lives, even if we accept Leibnitz’s theory 
of monads? 


PLEASURE AND HAPPINESS 181 

Herein we find the relation between self-expression 
md pleasure. For the sounder and healthier the 
Dodily subject, the more nearly does its state ap¬ 
proach to that of pleasure. 5 Very little argument is 
lecessary to prove what is above stated, for it is in 
ull agreement with human experience. Good health 
spells soundness in body, including blood and brain, 
md the nearer the approach of the subject to good 
lealth, the nearer its bodily approach to full pleasure. 
But, other things being equal, the better the health 
}f the subject, considered as a bodily thing, the 
Detter adapted it is to fulfil its duty to the categorical 
mperative. When we consider only the machine 
vhich the subject uses for conduct, we find the fitter 
he machine the more pleasurable the state of the 
subject. 6 

It is important to bear in mind also that the 
rounder the health of those we are surrounded by, 
he better placed we are to fulfil our duty to the 
categorical imperative, so far as the body is con¬ 
cerned. 


CONDUCT 

We consider, next, the conduct of man. And now 
ve must admit the fact of self-consciousness. For 
conduct, as defined, is always the result of some 
purpose and must be related back ultimately to the 
olind desire of the subject for self-expression. But 
low we consider conduct alone. 

Conduct, however, in practice, seldom or never 
ulfils the purpose which led to it; practice falls 
lehind theory. The dream-creation of the architect, 
)oet or writer, is seldom or never fulfilled when the 


5 Do not trouble now with the question of what it is that feels 
> lea sure. 

6 In the present war the introduction of a vast number of men 
o physical training new to them, has opened to them pleasure in 
nere life before unknown. 


182 


MYSELF 


dream becomes concrete in the objective universe; 
the mortar that the workman makes and the potatoes 
that the farmer produces generally fall behind pur¬ 
pose. This is why repetition of the same form of 
labour leads to better output,—by repetition environ¬ 
ment can be better and more directly used for ex¬ 
pression of dream-purpose. 7 

Man must labour, or get others to labour for him, 
in order to preserve his existence. It is an error to 
say men would not work unless obliged to; love of 
life is imperative. The categorical imperative uses 
life for labour. And when labour is free, that is 
when each man is engaged on that form of labour 
he is, physiologically, best adapted for, the labour 
is pleasant to him. 8 

The point above made is that while it is the duty 
of man to labour the better the work done by him, 
the greater the pleasure he feels; the nearer his 
conduct approaches to the purpose which induced it, 
the greater the pleasure he feels. 

It is necessary here to consider the fact that the 
purpose leading to the conduct in question need not, 
necessarily, be good in itself, for the pleasure to 
follow: the meanest form of labour is better than no 
labour at all. It has already been shown that mean 
desires are ancillary to the ultimate desire for self- 
expression,—to fulfil his dream of a beautiful build¬ 
ing manifest in the objective universe, the architect 
must have good mortar. The desire for wealth, 
power or rank is bad only when the subject concen¬ 
trates his desire on the particular purpose to the 
neglect of other desires. For, from the subject’s 
point of view, we may say that the ultimate desire 
for self-expression exists in a synthesis of mean 


7 In relation to conduct, thought in the intelligible universe is 
like to dreaming. 

8 Man varies from the laziest to the most energetic. But the 
lazy man will work rather than die,—just now he gets others to 
work for him. The average man enjoys free labour,—when he can 
get it. Labour is rightly a blessing, idleness a curse. 


PLEASURE AND HAPPINESS 183 

desires; evil results from men concentrating their 
desires on particulars of the synthesis. The mil¬ 
lionaire may make good use of the money he has 
accumulated by foul means, just as the thief may 
keep his family in sound health and even morality 
on the proceeds of his irregular proceedings. But 
the millionaire has found pleasure in accumulating 
wealth by foul means, just as the thief has found 
pleasure in his own form of attack against society. 
The labour even of the millionaire or thief is better 
than the loafing of the idler. 

We find that whatever a man’s purpose may be, 
pleasure results for him so far as he can carry it out 
in conduct. The laws of Nature give pleasure in 
return for conduct so far as conduct fulfils purpose. 
For the categorical imperative demands conduct on 
man’s part; he must not only dream, but do some¬ 
thing in pursuance of his dreams. He is conditioned 
in the body that dreams may result in action. It is 
from the welter of men’s conduct, good and bad, that 
the ultimate, transcending good and evil, is led up to. 

But pleasure is a relative term and the question is: 
Does human experience show that the nearer con¬ 
duct is to desire for self-expression, the greater the 
pleasure experienced ? This I would answer in the 
affirmative. But proof is impossible, for the evidence 
is evidence from human experience and so we can 
only arrive at that high degree of probability which, 
in reason, we may accept and use as proof. 

To determine the state of happiness of any subject, 
qua conduct, we must consider the subject in time 
generally, that is, in the continuity of its life from 
the cradle to the grave; we must not consider merely 
isolated moments of pleasure. 

The millionaire who by a “ corner ” has starved 
thousands of people and made his pile; the whore¬ 
monger who has raped a virgin; the woman of society 
who has injured her country by obtaining high com¬ 
mand for an incapable son, all experience moments 
of extreme pleasure which the simple individual who 


184 MYSELF 

has led a moral life in that station God has fitted 
him for, never feels. But the pleasure of such 
creatures is but momentary, their average life marks 
but a low level of happiness, even if conscience never 
upbraid them. Man does not, as a thing of conduct, 
live in these moments of pleasure; he lives in a con¬ 
tinuity of time from the cradle to the grave. The 
egoist’s moments of pleasure stand, marked and 
high, against the average low level of his pleasure 
in life; his very moments of pleasure must, for exist¬ 
ence as moments of pleasure, stand in relation to a 
general low level. For they are moments of personal 
pleasure. 

Unless, with Gautama, we treat our human ex¬ 
perience as embodied spirits as pure maya, that is, 
treat our subjection to environment as a blot on the 
scheme of Nature which the subject should strive 
to get rid of, we must hold that conduct, good and 
bad, is part of the scheme of Nature; as herein held 
the categorical imperative demands conduct on the 
part of the subject. And the differing conduct of 
each subject leads to differing forms of pleasure, even 
differing levels of happiness for each subject in 
passing time. All now alleged is that, on a general 
view of the earthly life of any subject, the level of 
happiness is higher the more nearly the subject’s 
conduct is in agreement with the dictates of the 
categorical imperative. 

Most of us accept Scott’s allegation that one hour 
of glorious life is worth an age without a name; the 
allegation is true and is false. 

World-conquerors have had their hours of glorious 
life when success has crowned their personal ambi¬ 
tion. But these hours are not worth the conquerors’ 
past ages of brutal conquest, if all have been passed 
in strife for personal success. Such men are not 
happy even in the moment of victory or, if sense 
of victory be read as happiness, the happiness is 
evanescent,—it begins and ends in personal achieve¬ 
ment and its crowded hour of glory. The soldier 


PLEASURE AND HAPPINESS 185 

on the other hand who, unknown to fame, has fought 
for duty and returned home maimed perhaps for life, 
carries with him, for all his future on earth, a higher 
level of happiness from the undying feeling of duty 
fulfilled. Such instances are commonplace, but they 
are not, for that reason, the less true for human 
experience. 

If we regard humanity at large we find that the 
vast majority of us pass through life as an age with¬ 
out name; it is but the few who experience what 
Scott has termed hours of glorious life. But this 
does not affect the question of the average level of 
happiness. Possibly the highest level is attained by 
those who have striven for these glorious hours and 
never attained them,—men who, nameless, have 
striven painfully through life towards some ideal for 
their fellow men and dropped unknown by the way- 
side. The man supremely victorious is he who has 
sacrificed himself in thought and conduct for an 
ideal,—an ideal never attained. Pleasure exists for 
itself, and exists but in momentary, passing time; 
real happiness is entered into under lasting feeling 
of constant strife towards the ideal; strife importing 
conduct. 9 

We are all influenced by personal ambition and, 
where personal possibilities justify desire for “ get¬ 
ting on,” the feeling is reasonable and constitutes 
a righteous spur to endeavour. But, if we want to 
find the genesis of pleasure or happiness, we must 
not depend on personal feeling; we must judge from 
some general point for humanity at large. So judg¬ 
ing, I think we find for each subject that happiness, 
even pleasure, follows duty fulfilled,—duty high or 
low. 

The question has nothing to do with the forms of 
conduct we choose for ourselves; as already pointed 

0 A Shelley, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Kant, Pasteur, or Darwin, 
who records for the benefit of mankind the product of his thought 
and imagination is a man of conduct. 

r 4 


MYSELF 


186 

out, we all fail in conduct, even in purpose for con¬ 
duct. We may feel almost ecstasy when we con¬ 
template the conduct of our Lord Jesus Christ; we 
may realise its glory and perfection. But, strive as 
we will, we stumble off the way when trying our 
hardest to follow in His footsteps. Still, down at 
the bottom of the heart of the overwhelming majority 
of mankind, we find desire that the world should be 
better than it is; the purpose of mankind is always 
ahead of its conduct. And though, for each of us, 
personal conduct is infirm, we all of us, when we 
regard the lives of others, can recognise the fact that 
the conduct of the simple man, who fulfils as nearly 
as he can his duty to the categorical imperative, 
attains for him a higher level of happiness than that 
of the man who centres desire on personal aggrand¬ 
isement. We generally admit this as true in theory, 
though in practice we do not follow it. 

The nearer the approach of the conduct of the 
subject to fulfilment of its duty to the categorical 
imperative, the higher its state of happiness. 

It is important to bear in mind also that the more 
closely those surrounding us seek by conduct to fulfil 
their "duty to the categorical imperative, that is, to 
struggle towards the ideal of love, beauty, truth and 
justice, the better not only can we ourselves so 
struggle but the greater our pleasure in life. The 
meanest man desires others to be noble, though 
possibly only that he may exploit their nobility. 


THE INTELLIGIBLE UNIVERSE 

We next consider the subject as a subject of the 
intelligible universe. Bear in mind that we have 
already established, under the laws of Nature, the 
command of the subject, as a subject of the intelli¬ 
gible universe, over the objective universe. The body 
of man and his conduct in relation to the objectiv€ 


PLEASURE AND HAPPINESS 187 

universe are subjective to man as a subject of or in 
the intelligible universe. 

The conduct of the subject is in relation to the 
objective universe. So we must now consider the 
conduct of the subject as determined by the subject 
as one in the intelligible universe; we consider the 
purposes which have determined conduct. 10 

The general tenor of what has already been written 
under several heads points to the conclusion we must 
arrive at when we consider the subject as a subject 
of the intelligible universe. So only a summary is 
now necessary. 

The purposes of men determining their conduct 
vary from those based on pure egotism to those based 
on pure altruism. The happy mean is that shown 
by Shaftesbury : n The man who recognises the fact 
that he does not exist alone, but as one of many; 
that as a self-conscious subject he exists not alone 
but as one of many self-conscious subjects, so that 
his object in life and his pleasure in life are, ex- 
tricably, parts of the objects and pleasures in life of 
others will arrive, by reason, at the conclusion that 
pure egotism spells pure altruism. 12 His object in 
life should be like to that of others : his pleasure in 
life should be like to that of others. 13 He and all 
others are mere subjects, so that not only must there 
be some bond between himself and others, but,—as 
he and others exist as self-conscious subjects—there 
must be transcendent self-conscious Being. The 
bond between us, as subjects, we have found manifest 
in blind desire for the ideal of love, beauty, truth 
and justice. The pure purpose of man is best mani- 


10 We neglect, now, psychical conduct in, for example, full sleep, 
though it is possible in that it contains no internal contradiction. 

11 What I am about to state is but an extended paraphrase of 
Shaftesbury’s theory. Perhaps I may be fairly accused of going 
beyond him. 

12 Reasonable conduct in the limit transcends egotism and 
altruism. 

13 This can be but an ideal to be striven towards, 


188 MYSELF 

fest in conduct following the command, “ Do unto 
others as ye would others should do unto you.” For 
any such man the physical distinctions between per¬ 
sonalities fade away into nothingness. But there is 
a higher form of personality opened to him. 

But where, now, is pleasure ? 

We have found that pure egotism spells pure al¬ 
truism. 14 In the same way we have found, when 
considering man’s life from the cradle to the grave, 
that the deprivation of exceptional pleasure leads to 
a higher general level of happiness for the subject 
than the pursuit of exceptionally high momentary 
pleasures. When egotism spells altruism, there is 
no destruction of either: there is transcendence of 
both. But the state of the subject is not then nega¬ 
tive, for the subject is still a thing of conduct. So 
the man whose conduct is ruled by the purpose to 
do unto others as he would others should do unto 
him, has reached no negative stage; his state may 
still be one of positive pleasure. 

But what do we mean by positive pleasure ? The 
term is unsatisfactory. It has been used merely as 
a contradiction of the negative. It must be amended. 

The man who regards the welfare of others as of 
equal importance with that of himself abandons a 
great part of earthly pleasures. If his conduct be 
free and, physiologically, he be built for conduct 
whether as a man of art, science or literature or as 
a hewer of wood or drawer of water, he will carry 
on that work he is best adapted for: he will act 
under the promptings of his nature. He will under¬ 
stand that happiness exists not in itself but as a 
measure of health and conduct expressing purpose. 15 

So such a man will pursue his labour for the sake 
of the labour itself, not for the happiness resulting, 


14 The word “ pure ” is here used, as before, merely to mark a 
limit of thought. There is transcendence of egotism and altruism 
for our ideal of human thought and conduct. 

15 As Emerson says, the reward of a thing well done is to have 
done it. 


PLEASURE AND HAPPINESS 189 

—by this means only can true happiness be attained. 
He may rise to high station in the world but not 
because he has sought it moved falsely by personal 
ambition: the attainment will be the direct result of 
natural causes. 

But men do find pleasure in striving for personal 
aggrandisement over their fellows whether in wealth, 
rank or power: they do find pleasure in centring 
their endeavour on personal aggrandisement. 16 All 
such pleasures in life the man who regards the wel¬ 
fare of others as of equal importance with that of 
himself, abandons. But this loss is accompanied 
also by gain : he is free from moments, even long 
periods, of chagrin on failure in strife for personal 
aggrandisement. 

To which men should we give the higher level of 
happiness or even pleasure throughout human life? 
To, on the one hand, a Darwin, Mendl, or General 
Booth, or on the other hand to the egotistic politician 
who, with the troublous existence of mixed success 
and failure involved in his form of life, attains 
supreme personal success ? 

In the limit, we may consider the man who has 
abandoned all earthly pleasures resulting from desire 
centred on personal success over his fellows and has 
confined himself to fulfilment of his duty, so far as 
possible, to the categorical imperative. That is, the 
man who, whatever his physiological constitution 
may be, uses it as best he may for purpose and con¬ 
duct under the rule, “ Do unto others as ye would 
others should do unto you.” 

Do not reply you are sick of the question just 
because it is so common-place and has been put to 
you before ad nauseam . Do not reply that such a 
man never has and never can exist. For that, if 
true, does not mark the whole truth. If in the limit 


16 It is more than doubtful if lasting pleasure in the form of 
happiness results from success in such endeavours, as already 
shown. 


igo MYSELF 

such men do not exist, thousands on thousands in 
all ranks of life make such a life their ideal and strive 
to attain it. There are thousands on thousands who 
deliberately refuse rank, wealth and power, refuse 
the pleasures of competition for such prizes and ac¬ 
cept quiet lives of duty in those stations they feel, 
under God, they can lead the best lives. And the 
lives of such men are strenuous in labour. It were 
scarcely exaggeration to term them the salt of the 
earth in that they keep humanity sound and pure. 

Now such men may be said to have abandoned 
all so-called earthly pleasures: their desire is con¬ 
fined to the fulfilment of duty. But happiness is not 
a thing-in-itself. It results, in the first place, in some 
measure from bodily health as already shown. Bodily 
health, however, is largely under the control of the 
subject as a subject in the intelligible universe. 
Happiness results also as already shown from pur¬ 
pose and conduct. And purpose and conduct are also 
under the control of man as a subject of the intel¬ 
ligible universe. 

When purpose and conduct are centred on personal 
aggrandisement, they are centred on the pursuit of 
personal pleasure. The result is moments of ex¬ 
ceptional pleasure on a dull background of a low 
level of pleasure; in any series, moments of pleasure 
can only exist when the other moments are relatively 
pleasureless: they can exist only in contrast. 

When purpose and conduct are centred on fulfil¬ 
ment of duty then, in relation to the physiological 
constitution of the subject, the moments of excep¬ 
tional pleasure (and exceptional pain) are lost. But 
there is a far higher level for happiness throughout 
life. This level we can regard as a high level but, 
when it is our own level, it appears to us as mere 
contentment with lot. 17 

If it be objected that competition for rank, wealth 


17 This explains the envy the simple man often feels for his 
fellows of rank, wealth or power. 



PLEASURE AND HAPPINESS 191 

and power makes the world go round, the objection 
is false. For this competition is confined to very, 
very few and those few not the picked few, morally, 
physically or intellectually. 18 The competition really 
prevents scientific competition for the overwhelming 
majority. And, further, the best work of the world, 
that is, the work which has best tended to advance 
the progress of humanity morally, intellectually and 
physically, has been carried out by men desiring the 
fulfilment of duty rather than personal aggrandise¬ 
ment. 19 

Happiness refuses to be caught. When pursued 
it cries, “ I am not to be caught, I am a servant of 
duty, I follow duty. You catch duty, then I will 
serve you.” 

We, as self-conscious subjects, are servants of the 
categorical imperative and, in reason, we must refer 
this imperative to Transcendental Being of trans¬ 
cendent self-consciousness. No bribe of pleasure or 
happiness is offered. It is by reason and human 
experience only that we can find out,—hardly, labor¬ 
iously and stumbling painfully by the way—that 
happiness is an appanage or the atmosphere of 
duty. 20 

We are, now, not in the region of thought, 
imagination or insight, we are in the transcendental: 
but the subject is related to the transcendental. For 
Transcendental Being exists in the accomplished in 
the accomplishing, while the subject exists in the 
accomplishing. 21 If we are all moved, blindly, to 


18 The philosophy of Max Stirner and Neitzsche is best only for 
the very few, it is evil for the overwhelming many. 

19 Almost without exception leaders in thought have been re¬ 
jected of men. But the practical men, to whom we give credit for 
human advance, base their conduct on the still living dreams of 
past leaders in thought. 

20 Aristotle said happiness comes from energy of the soul on the 
lines of perfect virtue and' in a perfect life. 

21 This is why reason entertains the possibility of ultimate 
absorption of self-conscious subjects in self-conscious Beings. 
Herein lies the importance, for us, of evidence that we exist after 
dissolution of the form of the Body. Revelation, too, is possible. 


192 MYSELF 

attain the ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice, 
we find manifestation, for us, of the categorical im¬ 
perative. We are involutions of the transcendental. 

We cannot attain happiness directly: if we catch 
at it we find it in itself a mere shadow, evasive and 
formless: we can catch but momentary forms of 
pleasure. But we can learn that happiness is the 
atmosphere of duty, so that companioned by duty 
we have it with us, always. We exist in the accom¬ 
plishing, but we are, thereby, part of the accom¬ 
plished in the accomplishing: we are, in human 
parlance, parts or involutions of the transcendental. 

Reason justifies us in holding that the nearer we 
approach, in thought and conduct, to fulfilment of 
our duty to the categorical imperative the nearer we 
approach to happiness. 

Happiness thus appears in the scheme of life as 
the atmosphere of duty: it has no existence in itself. 


MEMORY 

The human experience, including thought and 
conduct, of each one of us is stored up in each one 
of us, timeless and spaceless. This is memory. We 
use memory in time and, possibly, in relation to 
space. 22 

How does this use of memory in time and this 
storage of memory affect our pleasure or happiness ? 

The man, rich or poor, clever or stupid, finds the 
greater pleasure in his state, at any time, the more 
pleasurable the use of his storage of memory. Which 
storage is the more pleasurable when used,—the 
memory of duty honestly fulfilled throughout a life¬ 
time or that of effort concentrated on personal 
egotistic success? 

There is no question here of personal choice. Any 

22 The details of this theory are given in Personality and Tele¬ 
pathy. 


PLEASURE AND HAPPINESS 193 

entity of poor humanity, if given choice at any mo¬ 
ment of life, would probably choose to be a mil¬ 
lionaire, a prime minister or successful general,—if 
not a beautiful and attractive woman. The question 
is: when we regard others, not ourselves and our 
personal choice, to whom should we give the palm 
for nearest approach to pure pleasure when using 
memory ? 

There would appear to be no doubt as to the reply. 
Do not consider yourself, consider all the people you 
know; when you consider yourself the personal 
equation dominates you to the exclusion of sound, 
general reasoning. You will then find that those 
who have the healthiest and soundest bodies have, 
qua body, the highest level of pleasure in life: those 
who have most nearly been simply and honestly 
doing their duty in life, no matter what their station, 
have the highest level of happiness in life from the 
cradle to the grave. Wealth, rank and power do 
not in themselves necessarily give pleasure in life. 
They may and do exist as environment for pleasure, 
but it is the form of use of wealth, rank and power 
on which depends nearness of approach to pure 
pleasure. 

Whatever degree, then, a man may have had of 
wealth, rank or power, the pleasure he feels from 
using his storage of memory depends on how far he 
has used his opportunities for fulfilment of duty to 
the categorical imperative. Memory used is the 
happier the more it marks past fulfilment of duty. 23 

Memory in itself, if never used in the present, 
would appear also to affect the state of happiness 
of the subject,—in some possibly transcendent way,— 
during the subject’s passing existence in bodily form. 
It is true Beattie held that the memory of past good 
or evil gives neither present happiness nor pain. But 
I doubt this. I think human experience shows that 


23 We exist in the accomplishing, we look down on our past as, 
relatively, the accomplished. 


i 9 4 MYSELF 

the state of the subject at any given time is the 
happier as its storage of memory even if unused in 
the present, marks the closer approximation to past 
fulfilment of duty. What now follows may explain 
how our storage of memory, though unused in the 
present, may affect the degree of happiness (as what 
may be termed the state) of the subject. I give but 
a digest of that which is argued out at length in 
Personality and Telepathy. 

Human experience gives us awareness that we can 
dream a lifetime in a moment, as it were, of time: 
that even an external event may give rise to a dream, 
apparently long in time, 'preceding the event which 
gave rise to the dream. Human experience, again, 
gives us awareness that, at a crisis of life 24 we can 
be conscious, in an instant of time as it were, of all 
our past experience, that is, of all our storage of 
memory. 

Now we must hold that dreams cannot originate 
any power or faculty in the subject and that any 
crisis in life is equally futile to such an end. It 
follows that the dreams referred to merely give mani¬ 
festation for some power already existing in the 1 
subject not ordinarily exercised in his active life and 
that the crisis in life referred to shows merely an 
exceptional manifestation of this power inherent in 
the subject. 

In normal life we possess each our own storage of 
memory, stored up in time , but when stored up not 
conditioned in time. In normal life we use this 
storage piecemeal in time; but the storage being un¬ 
conditioned in time we can use it arbitrarily in time, 
—I can think now what happened ten minutes ago 
or ten years ago just as I choose and in any suc¬ 
cession I please. 

But human experience makes us aware that we 
can also, at a crisis, think all our past, that is, all 
our storage of memory, in “ a lump ” in the present 


24 For instance, at the time of experience of near death from 
drowning. 


PLEASURE AND HAPPINESS 195 

now. How is this to be explained when we know 
such a crisis cannot originate any new power in the 
subject ? 

The reply is that the subject is always being af¬ 
fected by its storage of memory in a lump, but that 
in normal life self-consciousness of this is confined 
to what we may here term the subliminal conscious¬ 
ness : the crisis in life is necessary for it to be made 
manifest to the supraliminal consciousness. 

But dreams ? How, for instance, can the pole of 
a bed falling on a man’s head, give rise to a long 
connected dream of trial before Robespierre, con-, 
demnation to death and death itself by the guillotine, 
—the long dream, precedent in time, being set up 
by the after event ? 

In dreams imagination is free, unconditioned by 
time. 25 It is only when we awake and regard our 
dreams as, necessarily, conditioned in time that we 
drag out the “ lump ” of our dreams into the suc¬ 
cessive chain of events in time. It is when tfie chain 
is “ reeled out ” that for the first time the blow takes 
its place as last. How the blow sets up the particular 
stream of free imagination we need not now con¬ 
sider. 26 But we can know that it relates the stream 
of free imagination to an event in the objective 
universe. 

The point now made is that the subject is always 
being affected by his storage of memory even though 
he does not use it in the present, passing now . 27 The 
probability follows that memory, though unused, 
affects the degree of happiness of the subject. This 
probability, I think, is so great that we may treat 
it as proof. 

Now until old age shadows life with its inherent 

25 Some dreams are in time. 

26 Free imagination exists, transcending time, for the “I am.” 
So, in itself, it includes all possible details : the fall of the pole is 
already in free imagination. 

27 The supraliminal self is a conditioned form of the subliminal 
self. 


196 MYSELF 

inactivity in the objective universe, the subject is so 
absorbed in the activity of the passing now that the 
question of degree of happiness from storage of 
memory seldom arises. It is when, in natural course, 
bodily activity begins to fail that the subject is 
thrown back on to the importance of his psychic 
existence. The question of happiness from storage 
of memory grows in importance with the growth in 
bodily age of the subject. 

A great deal that is erroneous has been written 
about old age,—possibly because most of that re¬ 
corded has come from the brains of those who have 
had no human experience of old age. 

For every subject death is a certainty. For every 
subject evolution towards age and old age is a cer¬ 
tainty. Age and old age themselves are certainties 
unless death itself step in untimely. We should, 
therefore, not only in reason but common sense, ac¬ 
cept age, old age and death with sheer indifference: 
they are all parts of determinism, though lying in 
the future. How pathetically foolish then it is of 
youth to talk of crabbed age, of its sorrows, its use¬ 
lessness, of its inactivity in the objective universe, 
when it is a determined part of youth itself ? It is 
far more pathetically foolish than for the child to 
cry because it must wash its face and teeth every 
morning,—for such actions are not determined. 
Would it not be more reasonable for youth to say: 
“ Youth is mine now, age and old age will be mine 
in the future; therefore, bowing to the inevitable, I 
will use my passing time of youth so that my future 
certainty of age may be the best for myself” ? Alice’s 
Duchess displayed profound philosophy. 

By crying before she cut her finger she took the 
pain out of the sting before it had come. Youth 
should follow her example; youth knows the sting 
of age will come. Then, by a reasonable life, let 
youth take out the pain of age before its sting has 
come. For old age, to the man with a storage of 
memory made up of earnest thought and action in 


PLEASURE AND HAPPINESS 197 

youth towards the performance of duty, has had the 
pain of its sting withdrawn before coming, so that 
even senility may thus mark a stage approaching as 
nearly as possible to that of pure pleasure. 

We are all so sick of the innumerable platitudes 
that have been written about old age that it may 
seem unwise renovare dolorem. But, still, let us 
venture. 

Put yourself out of the question and consider all 
your fellows that you know from duke to guttersnipe. 
Some, in age, are happy, some unhappy. Which 
do you find the happier, those with a storage of 
memory of long endeavour to fulfil duty or those 
with a storage of memory of long endeavour towards 
personal egotistic success ? The question we deal 
with is not one of rank, intellect or power but simply 
of happiness. 

The old agricultural labourer, sleeping, inactive 
before his fire, empty of thought, is happy from his 
storage of memory of past simple duty well per¬ 
formed. The old leader amongst men successful in 
past higher form of labour for self aggrandisement, 
sleeping, inactive, before his fire but still full of 
thought of past personal achievement, is unhappy, 
raging against his enforced inactivity: still self- 
centred on the past, which exists for him only as his 
own , he feels his personality passing away. 28 For 
to him personality spells his own personality in ac¬ 
tivity in the objective universe and that is passing 
from him. His storage of memory is meaningless 
to him without himself there as an active subject in 
the objective universe. It is where storage of 
memory marks past endeavour to fulfil the duty of 
the subject to God and His creatures that it brings 
the atmosphere of happiness. Where it marks but 
past endeavour to perform only the duty due to one¬ 
self, the atmosphere of happiness is wanting. 

We have already marked the fact that there is one 


28 Max Sfirner and Neitzsche ignore happiness for bare power. 


MYSELF 


198 

and one only objective universe, while each one of 
us has a different regard for this one universe. So 
this difference in regard must be based on differences 
between subjects in themselves , in what we term 
personality. But these differences cannot be found 
in subjects as bodily subjects fully dependent on 
environment. And on this has been based the argu¬ 
ment that the differences must be found in the sub¬ 
ject’s personality as “ I am ” : the really real subject 
is a transcendental subject, therein is really real 
personality found. 

But, from the materialist’s point of view, each 
self-conscious subject can only differ from his fel¬ 
lows in content of self-consciousness, the materialist 
finds his subject in the psychological I, not in the 
metaphysical I. So, as to the influence of storage 
of memory when unused, on the happiness of the 
subject, we may, even from the materialist’s point 
of view, use the following argument. 

Let us term the self-consciousness of each subject 
a box and assume that the differences of personality 
are found in the differences between the contents of 
the boxes, and not in any difference in the boxes 
themselves. 

Some boxes hold a content of past self-achievement 
for personal ends, some hold a content of past self¬ 
achievement for the benefit of humanity at large 
under a sense of duty directed from God. The time 
of activity for the box-holders is, we assume, waning 
or past. Which contents as personal possessions are 
the more valuable ? 

The possessions of past personal achievement for 
personal ends are no longer of any use : they are past, 
determined. And the interest of the possessor in 
them is past not future; though he can use them in 
the present, they have no relation for him to the 
future. Old age spells for him the waning of his 
personality: for his personality is centred in himself 
as an active subject of the past in the objective uni¬ 
verse. Such storage of memory, if of any effect, 


PLEASURE AND HAPPINESS 199 

cannot give the effect of happiness; it is too deeply 
coloured with regret for present inactivity, and it 
is of the past. 

The possessor of past personal achievement not 
for self but for duty, is faced by no regret for present 
inactivity. For his past activity has been for duty, 
not for self. And, though in natural course, his 
activity in the objective universe is waning, duty 
for humanity at large still lives on. His storage of 
memory is one not for self but humanity at large 
under the categorical imperative: his storage of 
memory is inextricably part of the storage of memory 
of all subjects who have been active in fulfilment of 
duty. 29 . This storage can never die and the pos¬ 
sessor, finding his own personality in that of others, 
has a direct interest in the future. The storage is 
his . 

Such storage of memory must involve the at¬ 
mosphere of happiness. The inactivity of old age 
is accepted with courage and without fear or hope : 
it is part of the inevitable. But there is also an ever 
present consciousness of obedience to duty during 
the past of activity and this must make for happiness. 
Spinoza’s philosophy is very beautiful 80 and I think 
its pursuit must make for happiness, even though 
he be held to deny survival of personality after death. 

But the appeal now made is personal, it is an 
appeal to the personal experience of each reader. 
Regarding not yourself but others, which class of 
men do you find the happier in their remembrance ? 
Those with a storage of memory of duty performed 
honestly to God and their fellows, or those with a 
storage of memory of a life passed in the selfish 
pursuit of selfish aims ? 

Happiness has no existence in itself, it is the at¬ 
mosphere of duty. 

29 The God of H. G. Wells is an anthropomorphic God. But even 
H. G. Wells relies on the transcendentalism of this argument. 

30 Though I have herein before tried to reduce it to support of 
my argument* 




THE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE 
ACCOMPLISHING 


On October 22, 1904, Professor Barrett took me to 
see Mr. C. C. Massey. A long correspondence 
followed thereon and on the 20th January, 1905, C. 
C. Massey wrote to me:— 

“ I am so glad we are in agreement as to the 
‘ Accomplishing given in Accomplishment. ’ We have 
here the absolute and the finite in one, and the dynamical 
in the statical and the necessity of the incomplete as a 
form of reality, and time in (or under) eternity. But 
much more elucidation is wanted .” 1 

It was C. C. Massey himself who first suggested 
to me the term “ accomplishing given in accomplish¬ 
ment ” and pointed out how useful it was as an 
expression for the ultimate. I thought over it long. 
It had meaning for me and yet it was meaningless 
in thought. It was not till many years after, when 
I arrived at the conclusion that as a subject I must 
have some power transcending thought, that I under¬ 
stood how what was to me meaningless in thought 
had some meaning for me. I then termed this 
transcendent power, insight, and the information 
which it gave, awareness, as distinct from knowledge. 
The term absolute knowledge I rejected as contra¬ 
dictory in itself. 

With this term as an ultimate, many difficulties 
in the way of philosophy seemed swept away and 


l Cf. Thoughts of a Modern Mystic , p. 109. Kegan, Paul & Co. 


200 


ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCOMPLISHING 201 

[ began to write the present book, I lay no claim 
o originality, I rely almost fully on Emanuel Kant 
md doubtless my line of thought owes much to the 
ong correspondence I had with C. C. Massey. 2 

Kant says: “ I am conscious of myself, not as I 
ippear to myself, not as I am in myself, but only 
:hat I am .” 

Now my self-consciousness as I am is mine and 
^our self-consciousness as I am is yours : The as¬ 
sumption we proceed on throughout is that this self- 
:onsciousness is the self-consciousness of each one 
if us as a transcendental subject; it exists for us 
:ranscendentally quite apart from any question of 
:ontent. It is in self-consciousness as a thing-in- 
itself for each of us that, as subjects, we reach out 
:o our ultimate personality as transcendental sub¬ 
jects; therein we are aware of the soul in man. 

The psychological “ I ” does not transcend the 
facts of presentation. But for the transcendental 
subject the question of presentation does not arise. 
We do not hold it either has or has not content; all 
we hold is that it transcends presentation in relation 
:o the objective universe. At the same time it must 
lot be forgotten that my human experience is mine 
and yours is yours. We are all faced by the same 
me objective universe, and so this difference between 
ynur human experience and mine must be found in 
difference between ourselves. The difference between 
)ne “ I am ” and another is transcendental, the differ¬ 
ence between the human experience of one subject 
md another is not transcendental. But the subject, 
through its power of insight, is linked to the trans- 
eendental. The transcendental does not destroy: it 
subsumes or reconciles. 

2 I saw him but once. A great and humble man of thought, 
3 ut thought too advanced for him to leave a name on earth. I 
vish he were here to help me to put my meaning into better 
vords. He died in March, 1905 . 


15 


202 MYSELF 

The subject is more than a thinking subject; it i: 
a subject of insight which transcends thought an< 
its ideas. It is this power of insight which make: 
the subject aware that its thought is merely relative 
and exists only between limits of contradiction. I 
is this power also which makes the subject awar< 
that contradictions cannot exist in real reality. A: 
Kant says: “Contradiction is the only criterion o 
impossibility in the sphere of pure a priori concep 
tions.” For “ pure a. priori conceptions ” I use th< 
term insight. The limitations of thought are markec 
by the fact that it exists in an intelligible univers< 
of contradictions; insight, transcending thought 
makes us aware of this limited nature of the intel 
ligible universe of thought. 

We must, then, for our ultimate of real realit} 
throw aside all ultimates of thought, for any ultimate 
of thought contains in itself its own contradiction 
in thought, good, for instance, is meaningless unless 
its contradiction is also in the mind. So we mus 
throw aside absolute good as a limit. And the same 
is true for all ultimates of thought,—faced only b) 
insight can they be reconciled, subsumed or other¬ 
wise transcended. But they do not disappear, the} 
still remain as partials, as it were, of real reality 
In thought we “see” dimly; in insight we “see’ 
more clearly. The nearest approach we can make 
to any ultimate of real reality must be by exercise 
of our power of insight: we must transcend ideas. 

Already this ultimate of insight has been defined 
as “ the accomplished in the accomplishing.” The 
definition necessarily uses words expressing ideas 
the accomplished and the accomplishing both express 
ideas. But the term “ the accomplished in the ac¬ 
complishing ” is used in a transcendental sense; ii 
has no meaning in idea, only a transcendental mean¬ 
ing in insight: neither the accomplished nor the 
accomplishing disappears. Both are subsumed oi 
reconciled transcendentallv. 

A consideration of existing theories shows, I think, 


ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCOMPLISHING 203 

that all are based on some limit of thought for their 
ultimate and thus involve contradiction. 

Consider for example the theories of monism and 
dualism, always remembering that we cannot really 
consider monism and dualism themselves but only 
the way in which the mind of the subject considers 
them : the question is what we think about them or 
are aware as to them. It will be found that when 
they are considered thought only is used—not in¬ 
sight. Monism cannot be considered without dualism 
as its contradiction also in the mind. For monism 
is an ultimate limit of thought and so meaningless 
without its contradiction also in the mind. The same 
is true for dualism. Only insight can transcend 
these contradictions: only in insight can ultimate 
truth (which exists free from or in transcendence of 
contradictions) be considered. 8 

As to monism, Sir W. Hamilton says: “If the 
subject be taken as the original and genetic, and the 
object be evolved from it as its product, the theory 
of idealism is established. On the other hand, if the 
object be assumed as the original and genetic, and 
the subject be evolved from it as its product, the 
theory of materialism is established.” 

The above might be taken as sound reasoning for 
thought if we could examine it from some external 
standpoint. But this we cannot do. For, whichever 
conclusion is arrived at, it is arrived at by a subject; 
in either case the pre-existence of the subject is de¬ 
manded. The hypothesis that the object is original 
and genetic is made by a subject which existed be¬ 
fore the assumption was made. The subject by 
exercise of the power of thought, which power does 
not exist in or for the object, arrives at a conclusion 
that it (the subject) has been evolved from the ob¬ 
ject. The thoughtless object has evolved power of 
thought and so power over itself in the subject: the 

3 For thought, subject and object have necessary contradictory 
existence. 


204 MYSELF 

intelligible universe is made subjective to the ob 
jective universe. On the contrary hypothesis th < 
subject dogmatically assumes that what is externa 
to itself was originated by or from itself. Hereir 
we find the necessary contradictions which fact 
thought when it invades the realms of insight. 

Dualism may be said to put the objective universt 
in a compartment water-tight from the intelligibk 
universe. But here, again, we cannot considei 
dualism as a thing-in-itself which can be or do any¬ 
thing of itself. When we say “ dualism may bt 
said” we predicate someone speaking: we assunn 
a pre-existing subject. 

Now for the objective universe it is true, as Kanl 
alleged, that “ the phaenomena of the past determine 
all phaenomena in the succeeding time.” But how 
far is this true ? It is true only so far as the laws 
of Nature have full sway. Even at this point we 
see that the process of Nature is not that of a machine 
which works itself, but one which is worked by the 
laws of Nature, external to Nature. And the laws 
of Nature exist in the intelligible universe. But 
when the self-conscious subject appears it uses the 
laws of Nature for its own purposes. Cause and 
effect still hold sway and, so far, the phaenomena 
of the past determine the phaenomena of the future 
in time, but the subject uses cause and effect for its 
own purposes: by obedience it commands. The 
mechanical water-tight compartment leaks: for the 
self-conscious subject must come first. 

Herein is no attack on monism or dualism as 
theories well based on thought; the fact that they 
conflict is implicit for thought. 4 The charge is that 
they attempt by the use of thought and its ideas to 
solve a problem which transcends ideas and so is 
soluble,—so far as it is soluble,—only in insight. 

4 Both take a limit of thought as their ultimate. These limits are 
limits of contradiction, so the theories stand in contradiction one to 
the other. 


ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCOMPLISHING 205 

Perhaps in solipsism we see most clearly the stone 
wall of contradiction against which thought bruises 
its head when trying to solve problems of insight. 

For assume we grant with the solipsists that “ I 
cannot transcend experience.” This involves the 
additional^ assumption that “experience is my ex¬ 
perience. But the idea of experience being my 
experience is meaningless unless I have in mind also 
the idea that your experience is yours: for the idea 
of anything being mine is relative and so has no 
meaning unless there is relation for it in the mind. 
And, in solipsism, this relation can only be found 
by opposing my experience to your experience. F. 
H. Bradley might affirm that, for himself, only he 
himself existed. But he could not stop there. For 
the theory is put forward as of general truth and so 
as true for each one of us: the solipsist, while alleg¬ 
ing the truth for himself, implicitly alleges it as true 
for others. He has in mind other personalities ex¬ 
ternal to himself. The statement that experience is 
my experience is meaningless unless meaning is 
given to the word my, and this cannot be unless 
your is also in the mind. If the solipsist be admitted 
to prove the unreality of the objective, he still admits 
the existence of something external to himself. 

Monism, dualism and solipsism, each, contains in 
itself its own contradiction, and this is explicable: 
: or our reason informs us that all such theories use 
nere thought and that thought exists only between 
imits of contradiction. What is attempted to be 
solved is insoluble in thought: reason using only 
hought operates but within the impregnable walls 
)f contradiction. 

In the present argument no weight is attached to 
he contradictions of the material and immaterial, of 
;ubstance and spirit. 5 The attempts made to formu- 
ate an idea of ultimate substance savouring of the 


5 Science itself tends to reduce matter to some form of mani- 
estation of energy. 


206 MYSELF 

spiritual as distinct from sublunary matter, have 
arisen from an assumption, possibly at the back¬ 
ground of consciousness, that personality cannot 
exist without some form of embodiment,—excursions 
into insight have been hampered by a clothing of 
thought. 

It is of interest, here, to contrast the philosophy of 
Kant with that of Berkeley. They both use limits 
of thought for their ultimate. 

Even for thought, apart from insight, we must 
have the self-conscious subject. But the subject is 
faced by the objective universe and, confining our¬ 
selves to thought, we must do one of two things: 
treat the external as illusory or give to it some sub¬ 
stratum of changelessness,—permanence of substance 
(or matter). These are limits of thought and so 
necessarily in contradiction the one to the other. It 
is apparent that these contradictory hypotheses are 
open to the same disproof, as with Kant’s antinomies. 

Now Berkeley treated the external as illusory, 6 and 
we can understand Kant when he says: 

“ We cannot blame the good Berkeley for degrading 
bodies to mere illusory appearances.” (Meiklejohn’s 
‘ Kant,’ p. 42). 

But what did Kant himself do ? He held that 

“ In all changes of phenomena, substance is 
permanent, and the quantum in nature is neither in¬ 
creased nor decreased.” (Meiklejohn’s ‘ Kant,’ p. 136). 

So far, Kant took the opposite limit of thought to 
Berkeley for his ultimate and, so far, his statement 
is open to the same disproof as Berkeley’s. But 
Kant was fully aware of this. For he qualifies his 
statement: he says that in making it he is consider¬ 
ing phenomena not any substantia noumenon and 
that : 


6 This is how Berkeley’s philosophy is generally interpreted : the 
interpretation may possibly be incorrect. 


ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCOMPLISHING 207 

“ This permanence is, however, nothing but the 
manner in which we represent to ourselves the existence 
of things in the phenomenal world.” 

Berkeley’s and Kant’s statements are sound for 
thought, 7 though contradictory: awareness of the 
contradiction arises for us because we have the power 
of insight which opens to us the fact that the con¬ 
tradictions which necessarily exist for thought can 
and must be reconciled or subsumed in the trans¬ 
cendental. Kant, I think, is clear as to this and, 
though I have not studied Berkeley’s Philosophy and 
so must write under correction, I think his philo¬ 
sophy was transcendental in that he did not make 
the object vanish for God but made God transcend 
subject and object. Both, I think, merely used limits 
of thought for argument. 

When we rely, as we now rely, on insight we do 
not cast overboard all theories like monism, dualism 
or solipsism: each and all may contain germs of 
truth. Thought is not false, it is an inhibited form 
of imagination. All we do is,—having by insight 
become aware of the contradictions implicit for all 
such theories because they are based on thought and 
its ideas,—to attempt to deal with the contradictions. 

We cannot touch the transcendental subject: that 
simply is: it is in Coleridge’s words “groundless 
because it is the ground of all other certainty.’’ Nor 
can we touch Transcendental Being for that is ar¬ 
rived at by direct and necessary implication from the 
existence of transcendental subjects. 8 

But we are all faced by a universe in flux, all 
faced by the fact that we exist in the passing now , 
moving in time between the past of the accomplished 
and the future of the accomplishing. We must now 
start with the self-conscious subject as existing and 

-7 They both reason soundly from contradictory hypotheses. 

8 Spinoza’s theory of ultimate absorption is, I think, met by human 
experience of our survival after death. 


208 


MYSELF 


with Transcendental Being as existing: we must start 
with them as facts though transcending thought. It 
is the flux in the objective universe, the flux in our 
thought and feeling as embodied subjects that lie 
open for our consideration 9 All this flux is a func¬ 
tion of time and it is for time that we find the 
accomplished in the past and the accomplishing in 
the march of the now and in the future. If, as the 
argument holds, time is not blotted out in infinity, 
but that, in the ultimate, there is transcendence of 
time, then we have for our ultimate the accomplished 
in the accomplishing. 

We cannot condition the power of Transcendental 
Being in the accomplished or its contradiction the 
accomplishing: it is manifest to us in both. All 
limits of thought, for example good and evil, both 
relative terms, point, for us, to an ultimate, though 
they exist—in manifestation—both in the accom¬ 
plished and in the accomplishing. We want some 
term transcending the contradictory limits of thought, 
transcending beginning and ending, 10 the permanent 
and the changing, not a term in opposition to and 
destructive of either the one or the other: beginning 
and ending, permanence and change, good and evil, 
must all still exist for thought: for insight transcends 
thought, does not destroy it. Insight simply makes 
us aware that the contradictions which have real 
existence for thought owe their reality to the fact 
that thought is an inhibited form of imagination. 
In real reality contradictions are not blotted out: they 
are transcended. 11 

If it be objected that the present argument involves 
mysticism, in that it is an attempt to transcend the 

9 Cf. Montaigne. 

10 Kant in interpreting his antinomies marks this want and, I 
think, supplies it. We must remember that he saidi Maimon was the 
only man who had understood his philosophy. 

11 Romance writers and poets of genius play largely with the 
occult relation between love and hatred, while Shakespeare said, 
“ There’s nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so.” 


ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCOMPLISHING 209 

ordinary powers of the understanding, the objection 
is not well based. For, though the argument is based 
on the limited power of thought, this limitation is 
accepted by all in the accepted fact that knowledge 
is relative. The argument really expands rather than 
contracts the purview of the understanding. For, 
while rejecting the term “ absolute knowledge ” as 
meaningless on account of its internal contradiction, 
it adds to the understanding the power of insight. 
The power of insight cures the infirmity of thought. 
For thought is infirm in that it lies between limits 
of contradiction, and it is insight which makes us 
aware,—as we are aware,—that these limits of con¬ 
tradiction exist for thought and yet in real reality 
are transcended. 

Perhaps the term now used, “ the accomplished in 
the accomplishing,” is the best we can find for what 
we want. It has been used already in the argument 
preceding, but is of such importance that it requires 
separate treatment. 

When taken as a definition for our ultimate, it 
throws further light on the contradiction between 
free-will and the categorical imperative. 

The argument as to free-will and the Categorical 
Imperative, may have been, so far, partially success¬ 
ful : for we have perhaps thrown a dim light on the 
contradiction between the two. But there has been 
no direct attack on the antinomy between free-will 
and determinism: the categorical imperative spells 
determinism. If the argument has been correct in 
finding manifestation of the categorical imperative 
in the constant struggle of the subject towards the 
ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice, for expres¬ 
sion of itself as “I am,” still this struggle marks 
determinism at its back and exists in contradiction 
to free-will. 

Riehl holds that responsibility, an unquestionable 
fact of consciousness, is not possible on the supposi- 


210 


MYSELF 


tion that the will is free or not free. This responsi¬ 
bility spells a categorical imperative. And Riehl 
does not get rid of its contradiction to free-will. 12 

Kant holds that the freedom of will of the subject 
is found in its freedom to express its true self. This 
statement without further explanation must be treated 
as merely dogmatic or it must mean that the freedom 
of the subject to express itself involves its non- 
freedom not to express itself. 13 In each case it 
amounts to no more than a statement that the subject 
has free-will because it does what it is obliged to do. 
The contradiction between determinism and free-will 
is left standing. 14 

But, during our consideration of this question, 
what have we been doing the whole time ? 

We have been treating the subject as a mere sub¬ 
ject of thought: with the use of ideas we have been 
trying to solve a problem which is beyond the pur¬ 
view of thought. Thought we have found exists in 
a universe of contradictions. We are aware of the 
contradictions of infinity and nothing, unity and 
diversity, good and evil, determinism and free-will, 
etc. We have assumed, quite wrongly, that by the 
use of thought we can deal with these contradictions 
of thought: we have, quite wrongly, assumed 
thought can transcend thought. 

Hence the existing confusion for human thought. 15 
The subject feels there is, for him, subsumption, 
reconciliation or an explanation of some kind for 
these antinomies. Treating himself as a mere think¬ 
ing subject he assumes he has power, by thought, 
to explain the antinomies and so offers to himself, 


12 He says the difficulty of solving this antimony is the sole reason 
why the question of freedom has not been settled. 

13 If not, there can be no categorical imperative. 

14 There are passages in Kant which show that he had the ex¬ 
planation in his mind though perhaps he does not make it clear 
in words. 

15 The transcendentalism of the Devanta is excepted from what 
is here alleged. 


ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCOMPLISHING 211 

innumerable impossible explanations which he in¬ 
volves in a maze of words and then rests—discon¬ 
tented. 

These antinomies exist in and for thought. They 
are therefore insoluble by thought. 

But the subject has a power transcending thought. 
It is a subject of insight. It is only as a subject 
of insight that it can be aware of the infirmity of 
its thought—that its ideas are relative and exist only 
up to and between limits of contradiction. As a 
subject of insight the subject transcends itself as a 
subject of thought; it denies contradiction in the 
ultimate. 

It is as subjects of insight we are aware that these 
contradictions exist for us as subjects of thought. 
As subjects of insight they do not exist for us: they 
would not exist for us consciously as subjects of 
thought unless we were subjects of insight trans¬ 
cending thought. How then can we get rid of the 
antinomies ? Thought fails us: ideas fail us. 

We must use insight, which gives us transcend¬ 
ence for the contradictions of the categorical im¬ 
perative and free-will. Insight makes us aware that 
we must have this transcendence—transcendence of 
thought and its ideas. This transcendence is ours 
as subjects of insight. Determinism is a limit of 
thought, free-will is its contradictory limit of thought. 
We cannot think these limits;.we can only think up 
to and between them. It is insight which makes us 
aware of these limits of thought and which also 
makes us aware that they cannot really really exist. 
We want something which, in transcendence, sub¬ 
sumes or reconciles them or which offers some ex¬ 
planation for them, by showing they are merely 
phenomenal aspects of the same “ thing ” or partials, 
as it were, of the same “ thing.” To attain what 
we want we must use our power of insight. 

The struggle of the subject towards the ideal which 
manifests its desire for self expression of itself as “ I 


212 MYSELF 

am” is its own struggle: we may give the subject 
free-will in the form of its own struggle. 16 And this 
struggle is always in the accomplishing. For, the 
ideal attained, there is no longer the accomplishing 
towards the ideal, there is no longer exercise of free¬ 
will in the accomplishing. The ideal attained, free¬ 
will in activity comes to an end. The ideal itself 
no longer exists. If the subject be once in agree¬ 
ment with its ideal there is accomplishment and, so, 
determinism: for any struggle on the part of the 
subject no longer exists, its state is determined. 

For thought, then, the relation of free-will to de¬ 
terminism is the relation of the accomplishing to 
the accomplished. 17 For thought we find a contra¬ 
diction : the accomplished is not the accomplishing, 
the accomplishing is not the accomplished: the ac¬ 
complished in the accomplishing exists only in and 
for insight. 

But, for thought, the free-will of the subject exists 
in relation to future accomplishing: it does not exist 
in relation to past accomplishing, for all past ac¬ 
complishing has taken on, for the subject, the aspect 
of the accomplished, the determined. And the de¬ 
termined is not a subject of free-will. So, even for 
thought, we find that change of time in regard of 
the accomplishing and accomplished, may make the 
one take on the aspect of the other and so may make 
that which is now the subject of free-will, not then 
the subject of free-will. 18 For instance, you exercise 


16 My struggle, good, bad or indifferent, is my struggle : Yours 
is yours. We are both conditioned in the accomplishing; these 
struggles exist in the accomplishing. 

17 Each past stage of the accomplishing when looked back on 
from the present moment now, exists in the accomplished. So, for 
thought, all stages of the accomplishing when looked back on from 
some ultimate now exist in the accomplished. 

18 Time determines whether a “thing” be in the accomplishing 
or accomplished. Thought exists in the “ now ” between the accom¬ 
plished and accomplishing. Should we hold our thought is relative 
because we are conditioned in time or that because thought is 
relative we have an idea of time? The argument follows the latter 
conclusion. 


ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCOMPLISHING 213 

your will in going for a walk. While you are taking 
the walk you are exercising your will freely. But 
when you have taken your walk you have no longer 
free-will to take the walk, for the walk is determined. 
So, even for thought, we find that whether a “thing” 
is to be regarded as accomplished or in the accom¬ 
plishing, that is, a subject of determinism or free¬ 
will, depends for the subject on whether he regards 
it in time as past or future from his standpoint of 
now , 19 For the subject, conditioned in time, the 
accomplishing is, from moment to moment, becoming 
the accomplished: from moment to moment free-will 
as an activity in the accomplishing is being deter¬ 
mined in that, from moment to moment, free-will 
falls back into determinism. 20 

What is above written shows not only that free¬ 
will and determinism are limits of thought but that 
for the subject conditioned in time any “ thing ” 
which the subject regards, now, as future and as the 
subject of his free-will becomes when, in a coming 
now f he regards it as past, not a thing of his free¬ 
will : it is determined. I think, even for thought, 
we see dimly that the thing as determined and the 
thing as subject to free-will are the same. The ap¬ 
pearance of difference results merely from the subject 
regarding the thing from differing standpoints in 
time. 21 

Determinism is a limit of thought: free-will is a 
limit of thought, so neither can be the. ultimate. 
Insight makes us aware that the contradiction be¬ 
tween the two cannot and does not result in real 
reality. What then is our ultimate? 

The categorical imperative for thought, spells 
determinism : the accomplished. Free-will exists in 


19 Now is not a fixed time, it is of continuous progression in time. 

20 Herein we see that the embodied subject exists in a con¬ 
stantly progressing now between determinism in the past and free¬ 
will in the future : determinism and free-will are functions of time. 

21 If time be eliminated, where, then, is the distinction between 
determinism and free-will? 


MYSELF 


214 

the accomplishing. Our ultimate must transcend 
both and it is to be found in “ the accomplished in 
the accomplishing.” We must refer back both free¬ 
will and the categorical imperative to God, the 
transcendental Being. We can only do this by 
giving to Him transcendence of both. It is by in¬ 
sight we reconcile the necessary contradictions of 
thought. 

I repeat that I do not allege the term, “ the ac¬ 
complished in the accomplishing,” has any meaning 
for us as subjects of thought. The very term trans¬ 
cends thought and is arrived at by us as subjects of 
insight transcending thought. For thought there is 
distinction between the term the accomplished and 
its contradiction the accomplishing: for insight the 
contradiction does not exist in the term “ the ac¬ 
complished in the accomplishing.” But it is not a 
merely negative expression for, if accepted, it clears 
away for us many obstacles now standing in the way 
of our reason. There is no language for conclusions 
of insight: we can only use parables of thought. 

If we assume that the categorical imperative is an 
unconditional command of conscience proceeding 
from God, the transcendental Being, 22 then we leave 
sin and suffering, even struggle towards an ideal, 
unaccounted for. Any such assumption is an as¬ 
sumption of thought and so, as subjects of thought, 
we may examine and criticize it. 

Under any such assumption man should and 
would have no free-will, he should and would be 
bound under command to be fully moral and fully 
happy. God Himself is made responsible for all sin, 
suffering and painful struggle by man towards an 
ideal. If we condition God in thought as fully 
revealed to us in power of command to be moral and 
happy and give Him power to make us obey His 
command then we find, in thought, He is One who 


22 This covers an assumption that free-will does not proceed 
from God, 


ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCOMPLISHING 215 

has deliberately made man’s lot immoral and un¬ 
happy. 

Under such an assumption God has given man 
free-will, that is freedom to sin and be unhappy: 
God Himself has given this free-will and man has 
exercised it under the command of God. Under such 
an assumption the belief,—still held by some,—in a 
personal Devil with power against God, seems to me 
reasonable in its excuse. 

Under such an assumption what do we mean by 
free-will ? It can only mean the contradiction of 
determinism,—of the categorical imperative. God— 
or the Devil—has given power to man by free-will 
to disobey the command of conscience. There ought 
to be peace surpassing understanding for all man¬ 
kind, a state of absolute rest in agreement with the 
unconditional command of conscience. Evolution, 
motion, struggle towards an ideal, are mere sur¬ 
plusage; they cannot be brought into the scheme. 
Why are we left to struggle towards that which God 
could give at once and for ever? 

But any such assumption conditions God in 
thought: we have set up for ourselves an anthropo¬ 
morphic God. And, in so doing, we have incidentally 
been obliged to treat our universe, intelligible and 
sensible, as mere surplusage,—indeed, we have not 
only failed to explain its existence in any way, but 
have made it a foul creation originating sin and 
suffering. 

It is insight which makes us aware that we cannot 
condition God in thought. It is true that as self- 
conscious subjects we exist in the accomplishing and 
that God to us, in relative thought, exists in the 
accomplished so that in each of us is something of 
God. But while we are aware of this link between 
ourselves and God, insight also makes us aware that 
God transcends both the accomplished and the ac¬ 
complishing and so, for insight, exists in “ the 
accomplished in the accomplishing,” a term mean¬ 
ingless for thought. The self-consciousness of each 


216 MYSELF 

of us is, as it were, a partial of the transcendent 
self-consciousness of God. 23 But we cannot, by 
thought, relate tour personal self-consciousness as 
subjects to transcendental self-consciousness. The 
term “ the accomplished in the accomplishing ” has 
meaning only for insight; so ideas, which are limited 
to relations, cannot touch its meaning. 

In the ultimate there must be transcendence of 
determinism and free-will. We can understand this 
imperative when we consider the fact that the con¬ 
tradictions of determinism and free-will exist only 
for time, whereas in the ultimate there is transcend¬ 
ence of time. 

We cannot fathom the reason why our universe 
exists and why self-conscious subjects are therein 
embodied and in their struggle towards self-expres¬ 
sion meet with resistance of environment which gives 
rise to sin and suffering. But if, from the higher 
platform of insight, we consider what we know about 
our universe and its sin and suffering, we find some 
explanation for the contradictions that exist for 
thought: we partly indeed explain away sin and 
suffering. 

Before self-conscious subjects appeared the universe, 
judged from the universe presented to us, existed 
under the laws of Nature : there was full determinism. 
But this universe was not static, it was dynamic. 
Evolution existed. And we can understand why 
evolution existed and exists in the universe as con¬ 
stituted. 

If all objects 24 from molecules to living organisms 


23 This must not be interpreted as Pantheism. Each self-conscious 
subject is not a partially integrated being, for that would make God 
not distinguishable from a full integration of humanity. 

24 Any ultimate entity we can only assume to exist in ignorance of 
anything about it, except its being. If we term this ultimate matter, 
then we are equaly ignorant of energy or force; we are aware only 
that it is. But in both cases we must have the pre-existence of the 
self-conscious subject. 


217 


ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCOMPLISHING 

were in full agreement with environment the universe 
would not be subject to evolution as it exists. Evolu¬ 
tion exists because in our universe as constituted, 
sven apart from our appearance as self-conscious 
subjects, objects are not in agreement with their 
environment. It is on this disagreement that the 
struggle for existence and survival is based; the 
struggle could not exist if the disagreement did not 
exist. And the result of this struggle is the survival 
>f the fittest,—that is, those most successful in the 
struggle. And those most successful in the struggle 
ire those nearest to agreement with environment. 25 
Reason informs us that our universe is so consti- 
uted. 26 

As it happens that we had nothing to do with the 
making of our universe, which existed before we 
existed, and as we had nothing to do with the laws 
3f Nature governing it we must accept it as it is: 
we must bow to the physical constitution of our 
miverse and have no choice but to submit to the 
aws of Nature. It is not only preposterous, possibly 
mpious, but supererogatory to criticize this universe 
ind the laws governing it. 27 

We have found that the foundation of our evolu- 
ionary universe before self-conscious subjects appear 
exists in disagreement of objects with environment. 
Ynd, as yet, sin and suffering do not exist. We 
ind, it is true, manifestations of love, truth, beauty 


25 As the universe is subject to evolution, this agreement is never 
n the accomplished but always in the accomplishing. The agree- 
lent is never more than an approximation to full agreement with 
nvironment. The strongest, physically, do not necessarily survive; 

: the tiger’s prey did not survive, the tiger would not survive. 

26 For evolution we must have not only variation and the sur- 
ival of the fittest but also absence of agreement, for the organism, 
'ith its environment. 

27 The laws of Nature gave us power to think. Can thought 
riticize its creator? Do we pretend to have exhaustive knowledge 
f these laws? 


16 



2 l8 


MYSELF 


and justice : but only manifestations. There are n< 
self-conscious beings for whom alone love, truth 
beauty and justice can exist. 28 

What, then, is the universe into which self-con¬ 
scious subjects are introduced ? It is a universe ol 
the accomplishing where the accomplishing exists 
because objects are in disagreement with their en¬ 
vironment. This is the universe to which the self- 
conscious subject, so long as it is embodied, musi 
bow down and whose laws it must obey. The sub¬ 
ject, embodied, exists as an object in this universe: 
embodied he is an object even to himself. 

Now with the self-conscious subject there come, 
for the first time, sin and suffering into the universe. 
Why do they come ? Because the self-conscious 
subject embodied finds itself in disagreement with 
its environment. 

I must repeat here that we are altogether ignorant 
of why the self-conscious subject is embodied and 
so embodied that it becomes a subject of sin and 
suffering. Fichte’s explanation that the object is 
that the self-conscious subject may conquer and 
subject environment to its own self-expression is very 
beautiful. But it is anthropomorphic: it is a beauty 
of thought. 29 All we can rely on is the fact that we 
are so embodied and,—as we have determined the 
universe as presented and the laws governing it into 
and under which we are embodied,—we can deter¬ 
mine the results of such embodiment. They are sin 
and suffering for us because, as embodied, we are 
in disagreement with environment. Unless this dis¬ 
agreement existed the accomplishing could not exist. 

(Sin). For our present purpose we may treat sin 
as two-fold: as original sin and as deliberate sin. 

28 These manifestations suggest, in thought, God as maker of th« 
laws. 

29 Transcendently, I argue that the ideal of love, beauty, trutf 
and justice exists for the subject. Possibly this transcendental idea 
justifies Fichte’s theory—for thought. 


ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCOMPLISHING 219 

rhis distinction is not raised with reference to the 
controversy between St. Augustine and Pelagius, for 
low sin must be treated for the greater part from 
m anthropomorphic point of view. 

If we regard the story of Adam and Eve as sym- 
Dolic of the first embodiment of the “ I am ” as a 
self-conscious subject in our universe, we touch the 
genesis of what is now termed original sin. Adam 
symbolizes the entrance of the self-conscious subject, 
is an embodied subject, into our universe. 

This universe exists in the accomplishing and so 
necessarily Adam, the first man, was in disagreement 
with his environment, a disagreement which pre¬ 
vented his full manifestation as “ I am.” He (and 
his descendants) was necessarily “guilty” of original 
sin in not fully expressing himself as “ I am.” This 
is and always must be true for all embodied subjects, 
while in the accomplishing. 30 But are we justified 
in terming this sin, sin against God ? The very term 
“ original sin ” shows that man is born “ involun¬ 
tarily ” into a certain state which we term original 
sin : in thought we make the sin God’s sin. For 
God made man. 

The error arises from our trying to fathom with 
thought what is too deep for thought. What we 
term original sin results necessarily from the con¬ 
stitution of our universe. But we are ignorant of why 
the universe is so constituted and so cannot hold it 
necessarily imports or does not import sin as an 
offence in its Creator. 

Original sin is a mere expression for the necessary 
consequences of the “ I am ” being embodied. It 
marks the conduct of the subject in the accomplishing 
towards the relatively accomplished, and as the ac¬ 
complishing cannot exist unless against resistance 
man may be said to be born into original sin. But 

30 The accomplishing exists only 90 long as there is failure to 
attain the accomplished : original sin exists, for thought, in failure 
of full accomplishment. 


220 MYSELF 

this sin is implicit in the universe which exists in 
the accomplishing. No responsibility then can be 
thrown on the subject for original sin. 

Can responsibilty be thrown on God ? It can in 
thought. But insight transcends thought and, in 
insight, no such responsibility exists. We reduce 
sin to mere disagreement with environment, where 
such disagreement is implicit in our universe of the 
accomplishing. 

The second form of sin has for content the thought 
and action of the self-conscious subject: there is 
personal responsibility to oneself and others. There 
are degrees of sin; for, in all cases where thought and 
conduct depart from full expression of the pure desire 
of the “ I am,” sin results, and, in no case, can we 
find this full expression. We must say that we are 
all, in degree, sinners. For original sin we have 
seen there is no responsibility for the subject and 
for the forms of sin we now consider there can be 
no responsibility for the subject unless there be in 
him self-consciousness of some standard against 
which he can measure the goodness or badness of 
his thought or action. But this standard we find 
and we find it in our general “ sense ” of responsi¬ 
bility to humanity which has, herein, been traced 
back to the categorical imperative,—to the necessary 
struggle of the subject for full self-expression as “ I 
am,” manifest to us in our ideal of love, beauty, 
truth and justice. 

But now, again, what have we reduced self-con¬ 
scious sin to ? 

The subject exists in the accomplishing, exists only 
in the accomplishing. So long as it exists in this 
state it is struggling for self-expression against re¬ 
sistance. So long as the struggle continues self- 
conscious sin continues and is implicit. But the 
sin, being self-conscious sin, infers the responsibility 
of the sinner. 

You object that the giving of this free-will to the 
subject establishes a contradiction to the determinism 





ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCOMPLISHING 221 

of God. And so it does,—for thought. But the 
solution of the difficulty is clear for insight, if in¬ 
comprehensible for thought. God does not exist in 
determinism or in free-will. He transcends both 
determinism and free-will. 31 We have seen that the 
subject is embodied in a universe of the accomplish¬ 
ing where self-conscious sin is inherent and this 
universe we can but relate back to God. This uni¬ 
verse is, to us, founded on determinism (the laws of 
Nature), but self-conscious subjects therein can use 
this determinism for free-will. If we hold there 
exists in real reality something transcending deter¬ 
minism and free-will 32 then we have for our universe 
an analysis as it were of this transcendent into deter¬ 
minism and free-will: thought analyses this trans¬ 
cendent into free-will and determinism, so that, for 
thought, both exist as contradictions for thought. If, 
unconsciously using insight, we consider these con¬ 
tradictions of thought, we arrive at the fact that they 
are limits, because we find we cannot think them,— 
we can only think up to and between them as limits. 

The contradiction between determinism and free¬ 
will is like to that between good and evil, unity and 
diversity: all are contradictions of thought: it is 
insight which makes us aware they exist as con¬ 
tradictions. 

Just as good and evil exist for us as subjects so 
determinism and free-will exist for us as subjects. 
We, ourselves, find determinism in the laws of 
Nature and free-will in our thought and conduct. 33 
We find in our universe both determinism and free¬ 
will. We find more. We find, for all the contra- 


31 We cannot, in thought, deny both determinism and free-will to 
God. But both are mere limits of thought. 

32 Insight makes us aware there must be this transcendence. 

33 When we use memory to recall in the present past thought and 
conduct, though they may still have the appearance of relative 
good and evil, they do not take on the same appearance as at the 
time of such thought or conduct. And, as determined, they no 
longer appear as subjects of free-will. 


222 


MYSELF 


dictions of thought, that they exist in our universe 
because it is a universe of the accomplishing in con¬ 
tradiction to the accomplished. We must then, in 
thought, refer free-will to the accomplishing and 
determinism to the accomplished . 84 

But God, transcendent of time, exists in the ac¬ 
complished in the accomplishing and so transcends 
free-will and determinism. They may, without 
danger to reason, be regarded by us as merely dif¬ 
fering as parts of the same “ thing .” 85 

(Suffering). It has already been shown that hap¬ 
piness is not a thing-in-itself. It is the atmosphere 
or appanage of duty fulfilled. The nearer the ap¬ 
proach of the subject in thought and conduct to 
expression of itself as “ I am ” the more fully is the 
subject environed by the atmosphere of happiness. 
But suffering is no more than a contradiction, for 
thought, of pleasure or happiness: increase of pleas¬ 
ure marks decrease of suffering. 

What then do we mean by suffering? 

In the first place for suffering to exist there must 
be a subject conscious of suffering. If a tree or a 
worm be assumed not to be self-conscious suffering 
cannot exist for it. 

Consider our universe before self-conscious or¬ 
ganisms appeared. It is generally held that there 
was manifestation of suffering and from this it is 
deduced that suffering existed in our universe before 
self-conscious subjects appeared. But suffering has 
no meaning without self-consciousness of suffering: 
manifestation itself has no meaning unless there be 
given a self-conscious subject for whom the mani¬ 
festation exists. If this be not so, then we make 


34 For good and evil it has been argued that the ultimate for the 
subject is full self-expression, manifest in the human ideal of love, 
truth, beauty and justice. 

35 We have seen that the same “ thing ” takes on for us the aspect 
of determined when viewed as past and as the subject of free-will 
when viewed as future. 


ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCOMPLISHING 223 

suffering exist in itself and manifestation exist in 
itself. 36 

The self-conscious subject has free-will to use the 
determined laws of Nature. And it is from the form 
of our use of these laws that suffering has mainly 
arisen. It is true that “ accidents ” of Nature may 
cause personal suffering: a volcano may be active 
or a tree may fall. But man, if we regard him at 
his present stage, is mainly responsible even for 
suffering arising from what we term accidents. In¬ 
deed, as time passes, the possibility of such “ ac¬ 
cidents of Nature ” decreases. 

Consider, for instance, our own country, England. 
Most of the objects we sense have been brought into 
their present form of existence by man as a self- 
conscious subject. Houses have been built, trees 
planted, roadways for forms of locomotion laid down, 
etc. So man, being responsible for the existence of 
these objects, is responsible for accidents arising from 
them : the very laws he passes to prevent or warn 
against accidents manifest his sense of responsibility. 
The bodily suffering of each one of us, morally, 
physically and intellectually, is the result, mainly, 
of personal failure in thought or conduct of ourselves, 
our progenitors or our fellows. Our nation has 
power, collectively, to put an end almost entirely to 
such personal suffering: it could prevent extremes 
of wealth and poverty, blot out the ignorance of the 
mass and, promulgating laws based on the principle 
that our 45,000,000 are spiritual beings and not mere 
things of labour give, to all, environment for rea¬ 
sonable lives. 37 

But we must not charge the idle and dissolute rich 
only with responsibility for our present state of 


36 Unless some ultimate of self-consciousness be predicated, love, 
beauty, truth and justice with their contradictions as thought of 
hatred, ugliness, falsehood, sin and suffering, cannot exist in or 
for a universe of unconsciousness. 

87 There is pungent reflection on our existing social state in the 
fact that warfare spells decrease of unemployment and crime. 


MYSELF 


224 

suffering. Most of those forming such a class are, 
by nature, unfeeling and weak-minded Cyrenaics: 
little, apart from wealth, has been bestowed on them. 
They are, by nature, largely incapable of feeling and 
so incapable of any useful action to get rid of the 
human suffering around them. The responsibility 
rests on us all collectively. Some responsibility, 
though slight, rests on the class referred to, but the 
main responsibility rests on those who feel most 
deeply the suffering of humanity,—the more a man 
has the more God claims from him. And, in the 
flesh, real feeling is expressed in real action: the 
man who feels acts or he is not doing his duty as 
an embodied self. 

On a large view we must hold that humanity in 
general is responsible for the use it makes of the laws 
of Nature and so is responsible for human suffering. 

Religion itself has been exploited to blind men to 
their collective responsibility; even the saying of our 
Lord, “ the poor ye have always with you,” has been 
prostituted in order to justify the social conditions 
which man himself has set up,—set up by misuse 
of the laws of Nature. The responsibility rests, in 
degree, on each one of us. And we cannot get rid 
of this responsibility by placing it on the shoulders 
of a class of mankind, the laws of Nature or, even, 
on God Himself. Only when humanity takes up 
its cross can there be full hope for social regeneration. 

Now in considering pleasure we have found the 
nearer the approach of the subject in thought and 
conduct to the fulfilment of the duty it owes to the 
categorical imperative the nearer its approach to 
pleasure in the limit. But suffering,—a wider term 
than that of pain,—is the contradiction, for thought, 
of pleasure. Both mark the “atmosphere” of the 
subject in its process of fulfilment of duty. So we 
find that the nearer the approach of the subject to 
non-fulfilment of its duty to the categorical imperative 
the nearer its approach to suffering. What is true 
for pleasure is true, in contradiction, for suffering. 


ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCOMPLISHING 225 

But God, in thought, exists in our universe in 
the accomplishing. In thought, therefore, He is 
responsible not only for the pleasure but the suffering 
Df His subjects. In thought, we make God offer us 
a bribe of pleasure for good thought or conduct and 
a deterrent of suffering for evil thought or conduct. 
We make God exist in a meaningless ultimate of 
absolute pleasure for us all. 38 

In such case we must make God responsible for 
suffering even for evil generally, as a reality. This 
must be true for any known God, any God of know¬ 
ledge. Laurie in his Synthetica understands and 
recognizes that this is true for his theory,—which 
gives reality to good and evil. He says: “Evil is 
the failure of God—creative to realize the ideal of 
the individual and of the whole on the plain of Being 
which man occupies. Does God truly fail ? Our 
answer must be, assuredly : and the failure is more 
conspicuous, the higher the grade of finite being.” 

The error arises from not recognizing the dis¬ 
tinction between the subject’s powers of thought and 
insight and the transcendence of the latter over the 
former. Good and evil with all its suffering are 
treated as things-in-themselves and so necessarily 
God is made responsible for both. It is true God 
is termed Being,—Becoming or the One—All. But 
Being and Becoming, One and All, are treated as 
things in themselves, whereas Being—Becoming and 
One—All should be treated as recorded ideas (con¬ 
taining contradictory limits of thought) intended to 
suggest that which is transcendent for thought. The 
term used in this argument,—the accomplished in 
the accomplishing,—is used merely as an attempt 
in words to express in suggestion the “ something ” 
we want transcending the accomplished and accom¬ 
plishing. 


38 Or absolute suffering for the many, with absolute pleasure for 
the few! 


226 


MYSELF 


God is not a God of Knowledge, He is a God of 
Insight transcending knowledge. 

God exists in the accomplished in the accomplish¬ 
ing. The fact is to us a fact of insight: it is 
incomprehensible in knowledge just as my self- 
consciousness or your self-consciousness is to you 
or me though it is incomprehensible as a fact in 
knowledge. Self-consciousness is the only real reality 
for you and me : it simply is or we could not be, 
as we are, subjects of insight, imagination and 
thought as embodied subjects. In the same way God 
is in the accomplished in the accomplishing: there 
is transcendence for Him of the accomplished and 
of the accomplishing. 

It follows, as before said, that why our universe 
exists, as it does, in the accomplishing is beyond 
thought, beyond even the awareness of insight. For 
us, the universe simply is: we cannot know or be 
aware why God has placed us, embodied, in our 
welter of pleasure and suffering. All we can arrive 
at is that in our universe of the accomplishing we 
are involved in an atmosphere the limits of which, 
for thought, are pure pleasure and pure suffering 
and that the nearer we approach to fulfilment of our 
duty to the categorical imperative the nearer our* 
approach to pure pleasure and the farther our dis¬ 
tance from pure suffering. 39 

Still, however sound our reasoning may be, we 
have not got rid of the fact of suffering. But now 
comes in the pertinent question,—what is suffering? 
Is it real ? 

Here human experience steps in to assist us. It 
assists our reasoning by proving that not only can 
we establish no hard and fast line between pleasure 


39 My suffering may be yours, vours may be mine. As our uni¬ 
verse evolves, the pleasure or suffering of the one tends more and 
more to be the pleasure or suffering of the many. 


ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCOMPLISHING 227 

and suffering, but that the one may take on the 
appearance of the other. 

It has been already shown that the subject not 
only at times chooses, as what is best for itself, 
present pain for future happiness but, even, an em¬ 
bodied life of ever present suffering under the 
prompting of fulfilment of duty. The self-conscious 
subject chooses suffering as best for itself: there is 
mystic self-satisfaction which outweighs the suffering. 

Instances of this are innumerable. We have, first, 
the supreme life sacrifice of Jesus Christ and on a 
lower stage that of Gautama. Amongst the saints 
and martyrs we find countless instances. 40 William 
James in his remarkable work, “ The Varieties of 
Religious Experience,” tells us of the founder of 
the Sacred Heart that: “ Her love of pain and suf¬ 
fering was insatiable.Nothing but pain,” 

she continually said in her letters, “ makes my life 
supportable.” Again, Saint Teresa wrote: ‘‘The 
soul after such a favour is animated with a degree 
of courage so great that if at that moment its body 
should be torn to pieces for the cause of God, it 
would feel nothing but the liveliest comfort.” Job 
does not stand alone in ultimate praise of God for 
personal suffering; cases are not few where what, 
scientifically, should cause intense suffering, results 
in intense pleasure. 

William James, again, and Harold Begbie, 41 give 
many instances of so-termed conversion. The sub¬ 
jects in .question have always lived, and so become 
habituated to, one form of life. At some period of 
their lives, termed the time of conversion, their re¬ 
gard for themselves and the external is affected; it 
may be, almost instantaneously affected. The result 

40 The question is not whether they were right or wrong, but 
whether they did or did not choose suffering under the influence of 
feeling it was best for themselves. 

41 Cf. Broken Earthenware , written after William James’ work. 



228 MYSELF 

is that their form of life, their thought and conduct 
undergo change. What formerly gave them pleasure 
now causes suffering, what formerly gave suffering 
now gives pleasure. As bodily things they remain 
the same, but there is change in them as subjects 
of thought and conduct. 42 

Even in our ordinary life we must often choose 
suffering under desire for what is best for ourselves. 
But is this suffering a thing-in-itself ? You have 
undergone a painful operation which has given you 
a healthy body you never enjoyed before. Can you 
think the past suffering as separate from the present 
happiness ? Is there not an indissoluble link between 
the two? Even during the pain of the operation 
you may have been contemplating the future happi¬ 
ness the pain would bring. 

Now all the instances given and referred to above 
are drawn from human experience. And they show 
that both pleasure and suffering are subject to man’s 
regard. They are subject so completely that, as the 
regard changes, the one may take on the aspect of 
the other. 

And here direct reference must again be made to 
the term the accomplished in the accomplishing. 
While suffering is in the accomplishing it may take 
on the aspect of suffering: when in the accomplished 
it may take on the aspect of pleasure. A man suffers 
during an operation; when enjoying after full health 
he may find pleasure in contemplating the past ^ac¬ 
complished suffering in relation to his existing health. 

We find, as we should expect, that suffering exists 
only in relation to pleasure. But we find more as, 
perhaps, we should not expect from human experi¬ 
ence. We find, for the self-conscious subject, that 
the one may take on the aspect of the other. It is 

42 These instances do exist as part of human experience. As 
William James himself says, no explanation of human experience 
can be acceptable to reason, unless it include explanation of these 
many instances. 


ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCOMPLISHING 229 

impossible, in human experience , to give real reality 
to either. 43 

In the limit of human experience suffering may 
mark the highest form of pleasure, pleasure may 
mark the deepest form of suffering: in thought we 
cannot travel beyond these limits of contradiction; 
but, even in thought, we find that the limits change 
place! Even for thought we find the subject cannot 
judge by his state in time whether pleasure or suf¬ 
fering is preferable for him : he must regard the past, 
present and future. While embodied the subject 
exists in a continuously progressing now; the past 
exists for him in the accomplished, the accomplish¬ 
ing exists in and from the continuously progressing 
now . The accomplishing, in continuity, is always 
falling back into the accomplished, free-will falling 
back into determinism. 

Man can regard the past, present and future and, 
when so doing, he finds not only that pleasure and 
suffering may change place, but the one may take 
on the aspect of the other. It follows that they are 
merely aspects of “ something ” which transcends 
them both. But so-termed sin is implicit: it must 
exist for man so long as he remains embodied in the 
accomplishing. 

By thus exercising our power of insight which is 
unconditioned by time we have got rid of the con¬ 
tradiction between determinism and free-will which 
exists for thought because thought, being exercised 
through its machine, the brain, is conditioned by 
time; we have arrived at some explanation for suffer¬ 
ing and found the place of sin. 

It is not pretended that any explanation has been 
given of why suffering exists in the world. But as 

43 The subject of insight makes itself, as a subject of thought, 
dimly aware of the fallibility of its own thought. Is physical 
suffering implicit for the embodied? Can we not imagine a future 
for man on earth when, by increased command over environment, 
he has blotted out such suffering? Mental and spiritual suffering 
result from failure in oneself or others to obey the dictates of duty. 


2 3 o MYSELF 

human experience informs us that the subject may 
determine suffering as preferable for itself to pleasure 
we find, even for thought, that some state must exist 
for the subject preferable to a state of pleasure or 
suffering; a state transcending both. 44 

(The Human Ideal). I think the dilemma to 
which Spinoza is said to be reduced between exten¬ 
sion and mind, is got rid of when we introduce the 
power of insight as transcending thought. I would 
suggest that what he had in his mind, though he 
gives no expression to it, was transcendence of ex¬ 
tension and mind. It was in trying to reconcile the 
contradiction in thought that his dilemma arose. 45 

But now we are not concerned with extension, we 
need only consider his treatment of mind. 

By making God infinite and not transcendent of 
the infinite and finite, Spinoza necessarily theorized 
absorption of the finite mind of man in the infinite 
mind of God. And yet he had, also, to hold that 
there is something of the infinite in the mind of man. 

This contradiction he argues is got rid of thus: 
He assumes he can speak of the human mind as 
part of the infinite thought of God while he gets rid 
of any reality for the human mind by holding no 
reality for it exists from the standpoint of God, the 
reality appearing, to us, from the standpoint of man : 
the finite exists only by abstraction and negation, so 
that in the presence of the infinite it disappears. 

It follows that he can consider, for man, only a 
personality which is human; make abstraction of all 
human passions and all human thought and conduct 
and, if we follow Spinoza as, I think, generally 
interpreted, no personality remains. 


44 We may surmise that spiritual law reigns which rewards and 
punishes justly, the injustice which arises from inequality of sin 
and suffering being in appearance only. For the subject, most 
strangely, has power to make pleasure and suffering change places 
in appearance. 

45 His use of the word modes suggests this. 


ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCOMPLISHING 231 

But here, I think, comes in the weakness of his 
argument. Consider the following statements of 
Spinoza himself:— 

Nevertheless there is necessarily given in God an idea 
which expresses the essential being of this and the other 
human body under the aspect of eternity. 

“ The human mind cannot be entirely destroyed with 
the Body, but of it something remains which is eternal. 

“ We delight in whatever we understand by the 
third kind of knowledge (intuition) and our delight is 
accompanied with the idea of God as its cause. From 
the third kind of knowledge necessarily springs the 
intellectual love of God. For from this kind of know¬ 
ledge springs joy accompanied by the idea of God as its 
cause, that is to say the love of God, not as though we 
regarded Him as present, but in so far as we realize His 
eternity and this is why I call the love of God 
* intellectual. ’ This intellectual love of God is eternal. 

“ Although this love towards God has had no 
beginning, yet it possesses all the charms (perfectiones) 
of Love just as though it had an origin, as we supposed 
just now. 

“ If we regard the ordinary opinion of men we shall 
see that they are conscious 46 of the eternity of their 
mind, but that they confuse this with duration and 
identify it with the imagination or memory supposed to 
remain after death. 

“ God loves Himself with an infinite intellectual love. 
The intellectual love of the mind towards God is the 
very love with which God loves Himself. 47 

Spinoza holds that personality can exist only in 
duration (of time) and not in eternity: he never con¬ 
templated the possibility of the persistence of per¬ 
sonality resulting from man’s eternal love for God, 
never, I think, contemplated a form of personality 

46 Mark this word “conscious.” Spinoza, I think, misses its 
importance. Must not this consciousness be self-consciousness? 

47 I have taken these passages in translation from J. Allanson 
Picton’s Spinoza (Archibald Constable & Company). 


MYSELF 


232 

higher than human personality. Kant on the other 
hand contemplated this higher form of personality 
in his transcendental subject. 

But if man have loye of God, whether eternal or 
not, this love requires for existence personality in 
self-consciousness: otherwise any such love is mean¬ 
ingless. Spinoza exhausts the content of self-con¬ 
sciousness so far as human passions, thought and 
conduct are concerned; but he does not get rid of 
self-consciousness, for he holds love remains for it 
as a content. 48 And, again and again, in our argu¬ 
ment it has been shown that we cannot condition 
self-consciousness in time: it simply is, for us. How 
can a finite consciousness have infinite content, if 
we hold, with Spinoza, that the finite disappears in 
the infinite ? 

And Spinoza does not stop here, he holds that the 
consciousness in man of eternal love for God, makes 
men feel blessedness transcending human happiness 
and human misery. This still more strongly imports 
the self-consciousness of a subject, apart from human 
passions, thought and conduct. 

Without going into the question of extension or 
memory, I think we must hold that Spinoza, while 
getting rid of the human personality, still holds 
really to man’s eternal existence as a transcendental 
subject. 49 

Again it has herein been attempted to prove that 
a human ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice 
exists for all humanity, pointing to a transcendental 
ideal for the “ I am.” And Spinoza offers an ideal. 
But it is not an ideal for all humanity: though it 
is transcendent it is yet for a class. He does not 
hold that all strive for his “ blessedness ” and that 


48 He says men are conscious of the eternity of their mind. How 
can a finite being be conscious that it exists in or is partly con¬ 
stituted by what is infinite in eternity? 

49 It does not follow that Kant gave the same meaning to the 
expression transcendental subject or that Spinoza’s meaning is now 
accepted. 


ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCOMPLISHING 233 

all attain some limited form of success while in the 
body. So far as mind is concerned he makes the 
“ I am ” to exist in each of us, 50 but it is effective 
during bodily life only for the few. It is the few 
who attain “ blessedness ” on earth, the many never 
do,—this appears to be the result of his philosophy 
as generally interpreted. 

And yet in reading one cannot, perhaps, help feel¬ 
ing he had in mind transcendence for God, and that 
a transcendental subject exists in and for each one 
of us. If so, we should hold he offered to all hu¬ 
manity a human ideal. We cannot hold that the 
infinite exists in itself and the finite in itself: there 
must be between them what we term, in thought, 
a relation. But errors constantly arise in useless 
attempts to define this relation in thought. The 
relation does not really exist in thought, if existing 
it is transcendent of thought: it may be said to exist 
in insight. 

Both Spinoza and Kant found their ideal in duty, 
reducing pleasure, happiness or blessedness to the 
atmosphere, as it were, of duty fulfilled. Kant finds 
the freedom of will of the subject in its freedom to 
express its true self. 51 His ideal follows. 

When we use the term the accomplished in the 
accomplishing for Transcendental Being we, pos¬ 
sibly, get rid of Spinoza’s dilemma 52 and we do not 
interfere with Kant’s philosophy, even with his 
Dialectic. 53 It is true he never defines insight as a 
power of the subject transcending thought and that, 
possibly, confusion arises from his use of the omnibus 
word tuition. But he assumes the power of insight 

50 Spinoza says the mind in man is eternal—or partakes of 
eternity? 

51 I read this not as freedom to express but freedom in the accom¬ 
plishing towards expression. 

52 This does not infer that as to extension he was either right 
or. wrong though, so far, I do not follow him. 

53 Dialectic Kant terms a logic of appearance not a doctrine of 
probability. His record was for the purposes of jeason. 


17 


MYSELF 


234 

when holding that, for the subject, the contradictions 
of our universe can have but phenomenal existence, 
coupled with his statement that all in our cognition 
that belongs to intuition contains nothing more than 
mere relations. 

The difficulties that arise from any such terms as 
Being-Becoming, One-All, as expressions for God 
arise from the terms being considered as conveying 
ideas: the same objection, indeed, might be raised 
against the term the accomplished in the accom¬ 
plishing. 

It must, then, be kept sedulously in mind that 
the term the accomplished in the accomplishing is 
not now used as conveying any idea. It has meaning 
only in insight, none in thought. It is but an ex¬ 
pression suggesting “ something ” which transcends 
the accomplished and the accomplishing. It is the 
same as with free-will and determinism : in thought 
we must give both to God. 54 But insight transcends 
thought and gets rid, for us, of the contradictions 
thought attaches to God. Insight makes us aware 
that for God there is transcendence of free-will and 
determinism. This conclusion is our own; insight 
opens transcendentalism to us as subjects. 

Herein is no denial of the unity or immanence of 
God, no denial for Him of any supreme attribute: 
all such definitions, indeed, may be left as sound for 
thought. But insight transcends thought and so 
denies that any limit of thought, even to supreme 
attribute, can define Ultimate Being. 

There must be, for Ultimate Being, transcendence 
of all limits of thought. The idea of “ one far-off 
divine event, to which the whole creation moves ” 
is very beautiful, but if we consider it we find it to 
be no more than a limit of thought. For if we refer 
it to God then, when the divine event is accomplished, 
God’s work is accomplished. If, on the other hand, 


54 Dogmatic forms of religion are of use for mankind. 


ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCOMPLISHING 235 

we refer it to man, then, when the event is accom¬ 
plished, the object of man’s existence is accomplished 
and we are driven to some ultimate like to that of 
Spinoza as generally interpreted. Gautama appre¬ 
ciated the difficulty for he said definitely that he did 
not know what happened when Nirvana was attained. 

Our ultimate cannot be found in any limit of 
thought. It exists, for us, in insight; in something 
transcending thought. And the term now used is 
“ the accomplished in the accomplishing.” 


f 



DREAMS 



















































» 
















DREAMS 


SLEEP 

If what has already been recorded be regarded as 
proof that the really real personality of each one of us 
is found in the “ I am,” even so, we must contemplate 
a difficulty for thought. For the ground of proof is 
personal in that it exists in self-consciousness, while 
self-consciousness itself is “ groundless because it is 
the ground of all other certainty.” In fact, when we 
use thought we can only arrive at evidential proof, 
that is, at that high degree of probability which we use 
and are justified in using as proof; the argument has 
led only to evidential proof. When we consider the 
foundation of thought, 1 we transcend thought in that 
we treat it as a mere limit of imagination. We have 
nothing to rely on absolutely but self-consciousness 
which is not thought, insight or intuition. It simply 
is : it is a positive, really real fact for each of us, per¬ 
sonally. So there is, therein, more than evidential 
proof : there is personal really real proof for each of 
us. Kant says the permanent must exist at the back¬ 
ground of phenomena. This permanent we find rela¬ 
tively in self-consciousness. 

This “ I am ” we may term the transcendental sub¬ 
ject or the soul in man. To it we give psychical ac¬ 
tivity in that imagination is “ deep buried in the soul 
of man.” More than this. When the subject is dis- 

l This foundation has been found in imagination. In the first 
part we had' to consider insight which transcends thought. 

239 


2 4 o DREAMS 

embodied we give to it full memory of its human ex¬ 
perience, though we are ignorant what aspect such 
experience may have for it. But when, as we now do, 
we reduce the subject to a mere passing embodiment 
in our time and space of the really real subject, we find 
a lacuna in the argument already preferred. We have 
assumed that all human experience has been con¬ 
sidered. In fact, what may be the most important part 
of human experience has scarcely been referred to. 
We have not considered the state of sleep and its 
dreams. 

In psychology treated as a science the subject is 
considered, and rightly considered, as one of activity 
in relation to the objective universe—psychology does 
not transcend the facts of presentation. Even in meta¬ 
physics the distinction between psychical and phy¬ 
sical activity is often lost sight of. 

But now we have reduced presentation to a mere 
occasion for thought in relation to our little material 
universe and we have found how limited is thought in 
itself. It follows that, for the “ I am ” while still em¬ 
bodied, imagination and memory remain even when 
this occasion for thought is absent and all personal 
physical activity in relation to our objective universe 
is possibly in abeyance. 

During the state of sleep, then, the “ I am ” still 
exists, the only difference is that it is not a thing of 
personal activity in relation to the objective universe 
as when in the waking state. In sleep, however, the 
embodied self may still think—arrive at ideas for the 
objective universe—though it cannot, as in the waking 
state, objectify its ideas. 2 

During the state of sleep, the subject has human 
experience and this experience we have not as yet con¬ 
sidered. Emanuel Kant himself never, I think, con¬ 
sidered our human experience as divorced from 
waking experience. He only touches on it in his 


2 Bear in mind there must be ideas for objects before such objects 
can be materialised. 



SLEEP 


241 

“ Dreams of a Spirit Seer,” and, therein, he laughs 
at himself for an excursion into the Ewigkeit. 

But now it will be argued that dreamland is not only 
part of the subject’s universe, but opens a fuller and 
wider universe than that of the waking state. 

That the subject is unconscious during the state of 
sleep is a false conclusion based on the fact that dur¬ 
ing sleep the subject is divorced from physical acti¬ 
vity 3 in relation, as an embodied self, to its objective 
universe. That sleep is merely a state of physiological 
rest from activity, for the storage of fresh energy for 
activity in after waking states, will be shown to be 
erroneous even from the scientific point of view. 

But though what has now been written would ap¬ 
pear to follow from the hypothesis, it is advisable to 
consider at some length the theory as to sleep which 
is very generally held. 


3 It is not divorced from the psychical activity of thought. 


PHYSIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL 
THEORIES 


Up to the present time Sleep has been considered al¬ 
most solely from the physiological point of view : it 
has been held as consisting of necessary physiological 
periods of rest from intervening periods of physiolo¬ 
gical activity. And as consciousness has, very gener¬ 
ally, been treated as running parallel with physiolo¬ 
gical activity in mind and body, it has been assumed 
that self-consciousness is in abeyance during sleep. 
The possibility of psychical activity during physio¬ 
logical inactivity has been practically ignored as part 
of human experience. 

But, following what it is assumed has been proved 
already, we must now approach our consideration of 
the sleeping state from a psychical 1 not physiological 
point of view. 

Personality has been found in the “ 1 am,” in self- 
consciousness. The subject exists in the intelligible 
universe. It is embodied and so is manifest as an ob¬ 
ject in the objective universe. As embodied it becomes 
a thing of conduct; through its brain it uses its master- 
tool, the body, for conduct. But its conduct is deter¬ 
mined by itself as a subject in the intelligible universe. 
The subject uses its will for volition, but its will is 
useless without imagination “ deep buried in the soul 
of man.” The subject is fully a psychical subject, its 
state physiologically is but a passing state in time. 

The objective universe is, then, merely an ” occa- 


l Rejecting psychological materialism, it is held now that the 
psychical is the same as the psychological. 

242 


PHYSIOLOGICAL THEORIES 243 

>ion ” for the conduct of the embodied subject under 
ts direction as a subject in the intelligible universe. 
3 nly a minute part of the subject’s power of imagina- 
:ion is used T in the inhibited form of thought, for con¬ 
duct as to this passing “ occasion” for conduct. 

The main distinction then—if the theory now ad¬ 
duced be sound—between the waking and sleeping 
states, is that in the former the subject is actively a 
hing of conduct in the objective universe while in 
:he latter it is not. In the latter state, being still em- 
Dodied, it remains statically a thing of conduct, for it 
:an create objects in the intelligible universe for the 
Dbjective universe. But, dynamically, it is not a thing 
3f conduct. For, during sleep, it cannot use its body 
to create in the objective universe what it has already 
created in the intelligible universe. 

Now we must, for our present consideration, use 
thought: we want to arrive at a decision in thought. 
So any proof, it must be repeated, is impossible; we 
can only attain that degree of probability which we 
are justified in assuming to amount to proof. 

Let us compare these two theories which may be 
termed physiological and psychical. 

By the former, personality in full self-consciousness 
is to be found only in the waking state. 2 And this is 
because the personality of man is to be found in him 
only as a thing of conduct; sleep marks but periods 
of physiological rest necessary for the subject to con¬ 
tinue his life of activity of conduct. 

But great difficulties stand in the way for any ac¬ 
ceptance of an explanation, fully physiological, of 
sleep. And these difficulties have been lately increased 
by the general acceptance of the phenomena of hyp¬ 
notism as veridical and by the acceptance by some of 
the existence of what Myers terms the subliminal self. 

2 Albert Moll in his Hypnotism holds there is in sleep, essen¬ 
tially, some disturbance both of consciousness and self-conscious¬ 
ness —by consciousness he must here refer to consciousness in 
relation to the objective universe. 


DREAMS 


244 

Under this theory we find no satisfactory explanation 
forthcoming to explain how sleep causes unconscious¬ 
ness. There is self-consciousness of the continuity 
of personality from the cradle to the grave and this 
is hard to reconcile with constantly intervening states 
when self-consciousness does not exist—for mere abey¬ 
ance of self-consciousness cannot come within the 
four-corners of the theory. 

Again, the theory offers no satisfactory explanation 
of what is termed exaltation of faculty during sleep. 9 

As, indeed, the theory holds that, during sleep, the 
cerebral material is recuperating for after work in a 
waking state and so is in a relatively bloodless condi¬ 
tion, this exaltation would appear to contradict the 
theory. For this exaltation of faculty is manifest 
through action of the brain and so demands expendi¬ 
ture of physical energy. In such case sleep can give 
no physiological rest for the accumulation of such 
energy. And how can the brain in its relatively blood¬ 
less condition manifest exaltation of faculty ? 

Again, during sleep, we dream. And we sometimes 
dream happy and comforting dreams which increase 
the physiological rest and refreshment in energy we 
find from sleep. This fact cannot be denied scientifi¬ 
cally. Some of these dreams it must be admitted are 
dreams of insight and so spell no expenditure of phy¬ 
sical energy. But some exist in thought: we dream 
perhaps most often anthropomorphically and some 
of these dreams give us restoration of physical energy. 

But all thought is correlated to motion of the brain : 
thought spells motion of the brain, and this imports 
expenditure of physical energy. How then can this 
expenditure result in accumulation of energy ? 

Again, if the real personality is to be found in the 
subject as a thing of conduct, the subject is not merely 
embodied : it is a thing of embodiment. Its body in 
such case is part of its personality, for only as a bodily 

3 This exaltation is considered in the following chapter on 
Waking and Sleeping Dreams. 


PHYSIOLOGICAL THEORIES 245 

thing can it be directly a thing of conduct. The sub¬ 
ject is a thing whose interest in existence is confined 
to its existence in time as a bodily thing : its conduct 
is but a passing phase in time and when its powers of 
conduct come to an end in time, its personality comes 
also to an end. But, if this be so, where is the per¬ 
sonality that can dream—as we all dream—of a state 
free from embodiment? 

It is because of the influence, sometimes uncon¬ 
scious, of the preconceived idea that man is a mere 
bodily thing of conduct, that we find such confusion 
and contradiction in attempts to interpret the relation 
between the sleeping and dreaming states. 

If man be merely a subject of conduct he is an auto¬ 
maton worked by the laws of nature. He may be 
worked, possibly, for some object but, if so, for an 
object not only unknown to him but in which he has no 
personal concern. For the conduct of each man in 
passing time can be but an infinitesimally small part 
of the conduct of humanity through the ages. And 
each man, having fulfilled his part, ceases to exist. 
Determinism stands fully established. 

In such case what relation has the sleeping state 
and its dreams to man as a thing of conduct? The 
sleeping state is reduced to states of physiological rest- 

But dreams ? Phantasy ? Ecstasy ? 

All absolute surplusage, all extraneous to the reali¬ 
ties of life; the very “play” of imagination itself, 
except so far as it is reduced to thought for conduct, is 
sheer incomprehensible waste. Our universe exists 
only so far as it can be reduced to eating, drinking, 
human strife and competition; to human endeavour 
for what is best for oneself as a bodily thing. 4 Self- 
sacrifice to put dreams into the reality of the objective 
universe; dreams of and longing for a better objective 
universe when one has oneself cast off the flesh; the 


4 If there be any ultimate purpose in man’s conduct, man per¬ 
sonally has no concern in it. 


DREAMS 


246 

ecstasy of awareness of the freedom of the soul from 
the body, are all not merely unaccounted for : they 
are sheer useless waste. 5 

If it be argued that the subject feels pleasure in such 
dreams and the pleasure of the subject be relied on as 
a reason for the dreams, it may be replied that the 
subject also feels the reverse of pleasure from dreams. 
But the main reply is that, if such a reason exist, it is 
extraneous to the subject’s existence as an automaton 
of conduct. Huxley said : “ Our mental conditions 
are simply the symbols in consciousness of the 
changes that take place automatically in the organ¬ 
ism.” At first thought this would make the subject 
an automaton of conduct. But now, while the paral¬ 
lelism between thought and organic brain changes is 
admitted, the argument makes this parallelism merely 
inhibit imagination as thought : thought determines 
the organic changes. Hypnotism gives direct evidence 
of this. We may thus explain Huxley’s statement. 
And it must be remembered he was only suggesting a 
theory while holding consciousness to be a thing-in- 
itself. 

Albert Moll, in his “ Hypnotism,” enters at large 
on the subject of sleep and dreams and refers at length 
and in detail to the authorities on the question, dis¬ 
cussing the various and conflicting theories on the sub¬ 
ject. He uses the terms self-consciousness and con¬ 
sciousness, conciousness being treated as non-existenr 
unless manifest in some way in relation to the objec¬ 
tive universe. 

But Albert Moll’s work need not be dealt with inde- 
tail, for it is now referred to solely because it not only 
shows there is no common agreement as to the relation 
of sleep and dreams to waking thought, but treats 
dreams as only a form of mental disorder; they are 
not brought within any one defined scheme of life for 


5 Unless the Supreme uses this Nasmyth’s hammer for some pur¬ 
pose extraneous to man to be fulfilled by man’s conduct on our 
infinitesimally small speck of universe. 


PHYSIOLOGICAL THEORIES 


247 

the subject. All exercise of imagination, which can¬ 
not be made manifest as of use for man as a thing of 
conduct, is treated as mere surplusage which has to be 
explained away as irregular mental activity . 6 The 
only realities for the subject are held to be realities of 
or related to the objective universe, so that all the 
powers of the subject which are exercised and which 
cannot be found to be related to the objective universe 
are necessarily held to be mere surplusage, or, in their 
manifestation, to result from irregularity in mental 
activity. There is confusion, also, between conscious¬ 
ness and its content. 

Now the argument at present adduced, based on the 
psychical, not the physiological, may be sound or 
unsound, but it at least covers all human experience 
and gives one scheme for the continuity of the subject 
under Transcendental Being. 

It is true it starts on hypothesis, the hypothesis that 
the subject’s really real existence is to be found in it 
as a self-conscious subject with the power of imagina¬ 
tion. But with this hypothesis the theory, I think, 
gives as full an explanation of human experience as, 
in thought, is possible. 

Bear in mind that the self-conscious subject simply 
is : we do not think it; we may, perhaps, say that we 
are aware of it outside the purview of ideas. So no 
question arises either of its beginning or ending : it 
simply is, in transcendence of time. Where there is 
transcendence of time, the question of any beginning 
or ending does not arise. 

The self-conscious subject becomes embodied as an 
object in the objective universe on conception 7 and we 
may consider it, for nine months, simply from the 

6 Moll admits that organic changes can be brought about by 
mental processes. But he refers nowhere to any recorded cases 
of dreams or telepathy which cannot be explained, scientifically, by 
psychology treated as a science. 

7 Man only is considered because I who write and those, if any, 
who read are men, using the term inclusively. 


DREAMS 


248 

physiological point of view . 8 It attains separate 
existence as an object at the end of the nine months. 
It so comes into existence with the powder of imagina¬ 
tion : it dreams. But such dreams have not at first any 
relation to the objective universe : the subject must 
have human experience of the universe to which it has 
just been introduced before its dreams can relate to 
that universe. It is embodied in a human body, a 
master-tool for activity in the objective universe—an 
automatic tool of motion. 

At first the motion of this master-tool is automatic 
under the laws of Nature which have evolved it. But 
as time passes the dreams of the subject take in human 
experience for content and so some of the dreams are 
related to the objective universe. Then the subject 
with its power of will 9 begins to use its master-tool for 
its, the subject’s, own purposes. It evolves into a 
subject of activity in the objective universe. For a 
time it remains a subject of such activity. Then its 
powers of activity begin to fail and end altogether—so 
far as its own master-tool is concerned—when the sub¬ 
ject is freed from embodiment. 

But, always, this activity is the result of purpose, 
of thought. No activity in the variation of any ob¬ 
ject or the creation of any new object in the objective 
universe is possible without a precedent idea of the new 
or varied object. Creation in the intelligible universe 
must always precede creation in the objective universe. 
The psychical always commands the physical. 

We shall find now from what is above stated the 
relation in human experience between the waking and 
sleeping states. 


8 If we accept Haeckel’s theory that the individual organism in 
its development is to a great extent an epitome of the form-modi¬ 
fication undergone by the successive ancestors of the species in 
the course of this historic evolution, we still want explanation of 
the psychical and can find it only—as he does—in holding that 
every living cell has psychic properties. But where, then, is self- 
consciousness? 

9 The will cannot be exercised without imagination at its back. 


PHYSIOLOGICAL THEORIES 249 

When the subject first comes into separate exist¬ 
ence as an object it is not a subject of activity based on 
purpose : its waking state is useless for it—except in¬ 
stinctively to demand and take in sustenance for its 
body and otherwise to act instinctively for the con¬ 
tinuance in life of its body. It dreams, but its dreams, 
at first, have no relation to the objective universe : 
that relation but slowly evolves. Its dreams do not 
require or demand physiological activity and so do 
not require the waking state for activity; it passes the 
greater part of its time in sleep. 

As in time its human experience accumulates, its 
dreams evolves more fully in relation to the objective 
universe : it grows more fully a subject of activity, 
and for this activity it requires more waking time. It 
passes more and more of its time in the waking state, 
till, its power of activity decreasing with time, it again 
passes more and more of its time in the sleeping state. 

We thus find an explanation for the relation be¬ 
tween the waking and sleeping states. The waking 
state is necessary for activity and so when the subject 
is most capable of activity it spends most of its time 
in the waking state. 

Again, when we first come into the world we find 
our dreams cruellv interfered with by the limits of 
time and space suddenly imposed on us. We cry for 
the moon, attempt to touch directly things at a dis¬ 
tance and delight in destroying the tyranny of space 
by throwing a ball away from us or by walking or 
kicking about our arms and legs. This shows that 
the subject from its entrance on objective life is exer¬ 
cising imagination, and so feels the inhibition embodi¬ 
ment has caused : the limitations of time and space 
are at first offensive to it as a thing, in itself, free from 
such limitations : it enjoys fighting against its en¬ 
vironment. 

The dreams of children are for the most part kept 
to themselves, grown-ups absorbed in conduct cannot 
understand them or, if told, may even punish for 
wicked display of fond imagination : what imagina- 


DREAMS 


250 

tive children have suffered from Gradgrind parents 
is too terrible for record. The objective universe is 
itself, at first, but a new restrictive dream, a dream 
that children retreat from when they can into their own 
faery land. 

And what is this faeryland ? It is a land of free im¬ 
agination, so far beyond thought, that waking sub¬ 
lunary existence seems so definitely an ugly prison- 
bound part of it that we delight, even when waking, in 
fairy tales which pretend we are not slaves to the ridi¬ 
culous limitations of time, space and the sloth, 
evolution. 10 

This experience of childhood is, again, what we 
should expect if we are introduced into the objective 
universe merely for a passing time in order that, by 
conduct we may accomplish something. On the other 
hand, if our really real personality is found in us as 
things of conduct, all this “ dreaming ” is mere sur¬ 
plusage and to be rejected as marking but irregular 
mental activity which not only is no part of the per¬ 
sonality but marks a blot on personality. 11 

And here we may consider the hypothesis of 
Haeckel which, rejecting the isness of personality, the 
freedom of will and any personality for God, makes 
our universe a closed circle of moments of evolution 
and devolution under the eternal, iron laws of Nature 
—laws existing impersonally in themselves. 

Under this hypothesis imagination must be con¬ 
sidered as sheer waste except in so far as it can be re¬ 
duced to thought for scientific activity. Man exists 
purely as no more than a thing of conduct and thought 
in time. 

It follows that Haeckel’s subject is a thing of evolu¬ 
tion and devolution in time : its time of full activity— 
of full personality—is its time when its thought is 

10 I suspect many “ grown-ups ” enjoy fairy tales as much as I 
do myself. 

11 Mental activity cannot explain all dreams: trance and ecstasy 
remain inexplicable. 


PHYSIOLOGICAL THEORIES 251 

most concentrated on effort and when it makes its 
activity most fully manifest in the objective universe. 

Now Haeckel considers the stages of man : 

(1) Childhood. 

(2) The stage of full activity in thought and 

action. 

(3) The ensuing stage of inactivity in old age. 

For thought and action he necessarily relies on the 
middle-stage as the highest and most trustworthy, 
treating the first stage as marking but inchoate per¬ 
sonality, the last but decay of personality. He makes 
childhood but a preparation for the evolution of the 
full personality and age to mark its gradual disappear¬ 
ance. 

Haeckel notices the fact that no few marked men 
have during their time of full activity in thought and 
conduct accepted, more or less, his (metaphysical ?) 
hypothesis; while, as age has crept on them, they have 
reverted to some theory of animism. And he holds 
that this change in age results from decay of faculty, 
from growing weakness in thought and action. So 
while he finds the change natural, he holds that the 
opinion of such men in age is relatively worthless. 

If Haeckel's hypothesis be sound this conclusion of 
his is sound : the opinion of men is most trustworthy 
when their powers of conduct are at the highest. 

But while he admits he can offer no evidence to 
prove the conscious is evolved from the unconscious— 
a necessary part of his hypothesis—he ignores imagi¬ 
nation, unless inhibited in the form of thought : he 
treats “ outside ” imagination as mere surplusage : it 
does not come within the bounds of his hypothesis. He 
gives no full explanation of human experience. 12 And 
in attacking this change of belief in age he ignores 
one fact:—the men who have changed their belief 
have not necessarily changed their belief in Haeckel's 
theory as a man of scientific thought : that stands. 

12 Human experience has been considered at length in the first 
part of this bools. 


252 DREAMS 

They disagree with him only when he dogmatises be¬ 
yond the boundaries of scientific thought. Incident¬ 
ally, they deny that a machine can not only work 
itself but think itself, and that the laws of Nature 
existing impersonally can evolve consciousness in 
subjects that they are governed by the unconscious 
laws which have evolved them. 

It would appear, then, that these men who have 
changed their belief have thereby manifested no 
weakening of their intellectual power, but merely 
change in their attitude towards intellectual conclu¬ 
sions touching the transcendental. 

On the other hand, though now we, too, start on 
hypothesis and the hypothesis leads us, through in¬ 
sight, to transcendence of thought, we do offer a full 
explanation of human experience so far as thought 
and insight will carry. 

The stage of embodiment marks only a mere pass¬ 
ing phase for the subject in time : it marks only a pass¬ 
ing time for conduct in the objective universe. But, 
during this passing time, the conduct of the subject 
is determined by its dreams as a subject in the intel¬ 
ligible universe. We find relation and continuity be¬ 
tween the subject’s passing stage of activity in thought 
and conduct and its previous and after stages. The 
subject’s conduct is not determined by all its dreams 
of free imagination, but by those only which create in 
the intelligible universe for the objective universe. 
Imagination must be inhibited in the form of thought 
for objective creation to follow on creation in the in¬ 
telligible universe. Instead of an incomprehensible 
inchoate mass of human experience where no person¬ 
ality is to be found and which is of use merely for the 
crystallisation in passing time of a personality of 
thought and conduct, we have the isness of personality 
embodied for passing time as a thing of thought and 
conduct. Free imagination is made part of human ex¬ 
perience and, instead of rejecting it or leaving it un¬ 
accounted for,we mark its share in the real personality. 

But while it is true that the conduct of man is de- 


PHYSIOLOGICAL THEORIES 253 

termined by himself as a subject of the intelligible 
universe, we must not degrade conduct. Man is em¬ 
bodied for conduct and, though we cannot know why 
he is embodied and so cannot know the ultimate 
scheme, if any, of earthly life, we can, in idea, sur¬ 
mise or “ make a shot at ” the scheme : we can sur¬ 
mise “ the one far-off divine event, to which the whole 
creation moves.” For the poet to create divine poetry ; 
the architect Kubla Khan’s palace; the legislator laws 
for the welfare of man, man must live and be a thing 
of conduct. And to live he must, most vulgarly, eat 
and drink to keep in good order his master-tool, the 
body. In the first part of this book it has been shown 
that the conduct of the subject, however mean, can be 
referred back ultimately for cause to a common ideal 
of love, beauty, truth and justice. 

As the argument proceeds we shall find more de¬ 
finitely that conduct results from dreams. For waking 
thoughts are like to dreams of sleep in kind : there is 
distinction only in degree, dreams of sleep come often 
from free imagination, waking dreams mostly from 
imagination inhibited in the form of thought. 

We shall find, even now when we consider the sleep¬ 
ing state, that conduct is founded on imagination. It 
i^as a subject in the intelligible universe than man de¬ 
termines his conduct. But he never knows fully what 
the result of his conduct will be; intention, indeed, 
generally, if not always, outruns conduct. Conduct, 
is based on ignorance and, so, on hope that conduct 
will have its intended effect. Conduct is little more 
than a domestic servant of imagination. 

Last of all we shall find in human experience of 
phantasy and ecstasy personal proof for some that the 
subject is a self-conscious subject of wider power, 
wider content than a mere subject of thought. 

Ecstasy must be considered, but considered apart 
from normal experience. For while therein is found 
proof for certain subjects, these subjects can offer to 
their fellows only evidence in the form of parable. 
The experience transcends thought and so can only 


254 DREAMS 

be brought within the purview of ideas in the form of 
parable. 

A simple experiment in hypnotism 18 may be here 
referred to, for it points directly to the subject being 
relatively spiritual, so that embodiment is, for it, 
merely a manifestation in inhibited form. 

A. is hypnotised. While hypnotised he is told that 
on awaking a table with an object on it will be pre¬ 
sented to him, but that he will be unable to see the 
object. This form of experiment is well known and 
human experience shows that it may be successfully 
carried out. 

A. awakes and is directed to look at the table with 
the object on it. He does look at the table, he does 
sense the table and the object on it But, in common 
parlance, he cannot “ see ” the object. Why is this? 

Because he merely senses the object and the senses 
do not judge at all. The presentation of the object 
establishes no more than an “ occasion ” for know¬ 
ledge. But now A. cannot use this “ occasion ” for 
knowledge, the mere sensing of the object does not 
make the object an object for A. Why is this? 

The effect of the object on A. through his senses is 
the same on A. as a bodily thing as in any normal 
case. But A. is not this bodily thing. A. exists in 
the intelligible universe, his existence in the objective 
universe is but mediate manifestation in passing time. 
He cannot use the “ occasion ” for knowledge offered 
him through his senses because as a subject in the in¬ 
telligible universe his mind has, by hvpnotism, been 
inhibited from using it. Instinctively—that is as a 
bodily thing without self-consciousness—A. still acts 
and reacts to environment. But as a self-conscious 
subject he cannot use this “ occasion ” for knowledge 
presented to him because its relations to other objects 


13 Hypnotism, whatever it may be, may be regarded as a form 
of sleep, differing from sleep in that the subject hypnotised can 
communicate to others its human experience while in this form of 
sleep. 


PHYSIOLOGICAL THEORIES 255 

no longer exist for him. So he can have no idea of the 
object and, though the object is sensed by him, he 
cannot think it because he cannot think about an object 
without an idea of it. The object has no existence for 
him in the intelligible universe in which he really 
exists. It is merely an “ occasion ” for thought, so 
that when divorced from thought it disappears. It is 
no longer a phenomenon for thought. 

These experiments in human experience point, I 
think, very strongly to the theory that the subject as a 
bodily thing of sensibility exists merely as an inhibited 
form of the subject in the intelligible universe and so 
support the argument that sleep is more than a state 
merely for physiological rest. 14 

During sleep the subject can still imagine and think 
for the objective universe, all he cannot do is to objec¬ 
tify his thought. But when the subject thinks in sleep 
and so expends physical energy, how can sleep spell 
restoration of physical energy—as happy dreams do ? 

It would appear probable that sleep, because it is 
associated with rest from the activity of conduct, 
thereby sets up opportunity for the inpouring of 
psychical energy. We thus find an explanation for 
the restoration of physical energy in sleep even when 
sleep gives rise to dreams. 


14 We can all have ideas of objects which do not exist objec¬ 
tively. So there is no magic when, by hypnotism, anyone is made 
to “ imagine ” an object which has no material existence. 


WAKING AND SLEEPING DREAMS 


Can we find in human experience the alleged like¬ 
ness between waking and sleeping dreams ? Are 
waking thoughts the same in kind as dreams of sleep ? 

In considering this question the term “ sub-con¬ 
sciousness ” must be ignored as meaningless. 1 For 
the very basis of the argument is the existence of the 
self-conscious subject, which simply is. The content 
of self-consciousness may differ, the manifestations of 
self-consciousness may take differing forms, but the 
self-conscious subject simply is. Normal conscious¬ 
ness is but a “ slice ” of full consciousness, as Myer’s 
held. 

Consider Clifford’s definition for dreams: “A 
dream is a succession of phenomena having no ex¬ 
ternal reality to correspond to them.” 

In sleep we use memory, so, in sleep, we may call 
up phenomena which have had for us external reality. 
At the same time, though the phenomena of sleep may 
have had, they may also never have had, external 
reality. 

But we have already seen not only that the subject 
must first think about an object in the intelligible 
universe before he can create any such object in the 
objective universe, but that he must have a schematic 
idea of the object before he can think about any al¬ 
ready existing object. 2 That is, he must first think 


1 But Myers’ distinction between supraliminal and subliminal 
consciousness is sound, though many commentators have misunder¬ 
stood and misapplied his meaning. 

2 We use schematic ideas for ideas auout objects in the objec. 
tive universe. 

256 


WAKING AND SLEEPING DREAMS 257 

about a succession of phenomena having no external 
reality to correspond to them not only before he can 
think about existing objects 3 but before he can create 
new objects in the objective universe. 

How, then, does this waking thought about any 
such succession of phenomena differ from sleeping 
dreams about them ? If we hold that dreams are con¬ 
fined to a succession of phenomena which, though 
having no external reality, might have such external 
reality, then there is no difference at all. 4 Imagination 
in the inhibited form of thought is the genesis of both. 

More than this : the mental activity of sleep in¬ 
volved in Clifford’s definition for dreams, is necessary 
as a precedent for conduct. The mental activity in 
sleep giving rise to dreams is the same as the mental 
activity in the waking state which necessarily precedes 
conduct in the objective universe. The waking state, 
then, so far as it gives effective power over the sensible 
universe, even power to think about such universe, is 
like to the sleeping state. The subject, so far, is the 
same waking or sleeping, except that in the latter state 
it is not a subject of conduct. 5 

Human experience informs us that men, at times, 
solve mathematical problems in sleep, invent new ob¬ 
jects in sleep, determine certain courses for future con¬ 
duct in sleep. Cases of this kind are so well known 
and so numerous that it is unnecessary to give parti¬ 
cular instances. 6 Indeed there are authentic records 
of such abnormal mental activity in sleep that some 
hold sleep makes possible the exaltation of faculty. 
The possibility of any such exaltation of faculty is 
denied : thought is an inhibition of imagination, the 


3 The presentation of objects is simply an “ occasion ” for 
thought about them. 

4 That is, no difference apart from the question of conduct. 

5 If you object to this reasoning it is because you claim for 
dreams more than mere mental activity. The objection is hereafter 
1 supported. 

6 Vol. XII. Pro. S.P.R., pp. 11 et seq., may be referred to for 
certain well-established cases. 



258 DREAMS 

inhibition being determined by the limits of motion of 
the brain : there can be no exaltation of these limits. 
All there can be is abnormal manifestation of power : 
and this we find in sleep. 

Whether the subject be waking or sleeping the 
mental activity in solving a problem, inventing a new 
object, determining on any course of future conduct 
is the same : we have no sound ground for holding 
there is any difference. There is in both cases mental 
activity in the Intelligible Universe and, waking or 
sleeping, this mental activity is a condition precedent 
to any conduct in the Sensible Universe. 

The man who has solved a problem in sleep wakes 
up and records the solution. Waking, he has for¬ 
gotten how he solved it in sleep. But what do we mean 
by saying he has forgotten ? All we mean is that he 
cannot use his memory in the present: the solution is 
his, but he cannot relate the process of solution to the 
present passing now in time. The process of solution 
took place by mental activity : on awaking the process 
is forgotten, the result is remembered. Any such “ de¬ 
fect ” in memory cannot affect what before took place. 
There has been accomplished exactly the same mental 
activity as if he had been awake when working out the 
solution. 7 

So far human experience supports us in holding 
there is no radical distinction between waking and 
sleeping dreams; both result from mental activity. 
Waking or sleeping this mental activity is a con¬ 
dition precedent for conduct. 

Returning to Clifford’s definition we have : “A 
dream is a succession of phenomena having no exter¬ 
nal reality to correspond to them.” But we have also 
found that unless, waking or sleeping, we first use 
mental activity in thinking about a succession of 
phenomena having no external reality, we cannot, as 


7 In sleep mental activity may be freer than in the waking state 
and so manifest abnormal results. Thereby the present argument 
is strengthened not weakened. 


WAKING AND SLEEPING DREAMS 259 

things of conduct, create any such external reality. 
The external reality can never exist unless it has been 
first an internal reality in the waking or sleeping state. 8 

Waking and sleeping dreams are, so far, the same; 
Clifford’s definition covers both. 

We find, then, that waking or sleeping the person¬ 
ality, the “ I am,” remains unaffected. In both states 
it remains embodied ; 9 in both states it remains a sub¬ 
ject in the intelligible universe; but in the former it is 
capable of activity in the objective universe, in the lat¬ 
ter it is not. Dreams of sleep, so far as we have con¬ 
sidered them, are the same as waking thoughts using 
ideas. 

Two peculiarities of dreams must be now noticed, 
though consideration of them must be deferred. 

In sleeping dreams where imagination is free to use 
the brain for thought without reference to activity, 
physiological rest may result. But, ordinarily, mental 
activity when the subject is awake absorbs energy and 
so causes physiological fatigue. We should naturally 
expect, as before stated, that the same physiological 
fatigue would follow from mental activity in sleep. 
But this is not always so. Dreams of sleep may cause 
fatigue, but they may, and often do, increase the 
physiological rest, that is, assist the restoration of 
energy which, physiologically, sleep is intended for : 
such dreams appear to have the result of storing up 
instead of absorbing physical energy for the subject. 

The second peculiarity is that when sleeping “ the 
objectivity of the dream images is usually unques¬ 
tioned. 10 While sleeping the subject, in dreams of a 
certain class, appears to itself to be as fully a subject 
in the objective universe as when waking and it is only 
when waking he thinks about his dream by the use of 

8 To think about the objective universe we must first read the 
laws of Nature into Nature. 

9 Freedom from embodiment, in ecstasy for instance, is considered 
hereafter. 

10 What this objectivity means is hereafter considered. 


26 o 


DREAMS 


memory that he holds his dream images were not ob¬ 
jective. This peculiarity is recognised scientifically. 
A deduction, however strange it may be, follows : It 
must be held to be within the bounds of possibility 
that at any moment the so-termed waking subject may 
really really wake up, and, from his then transcenden¬ 
tal state, contemplate his past life in the objective 
universe as a mere dream. 11 

So far we find no difference between waking and 
sleeping dreams; both result from intellectual opera¬ 
tion. Dreams that transcend thought have not as yet 
been considered. But such dreams are the same in 
kind as those resulting from mental operation; they 
differ but in degree : The latter are confined to imagi¬ 
nation inhibited in the form of thought. The former 
exist in a wider universe. 


ll In ecstasy something closely akin to this is experienced. 


MULTIPLEX PERSONALITY 


Before we proceed with the argument something 
further must be written as to the statement that the 
subject may really really wake up and, from his then 
transcendental state, contemplate his past life in the 
objective universe as but a dream. For we shall find 
this possibility is a fact of human experience. We 
shall also find, incidentally, a strong argument that 
the really real subject is the “ I am,” an argument 
which could not be considered in the first part of the 
book because it involves consideration of the sleeping 
state. 

Multiplex personality is a fact of human experi¬ 
ence, the evidence is too strong even for any scientific 
denial. 

If we consider any one of the recorded cases we 
find that one and the same brain is involved, no 
matter how many human personalities may be made 
manifest. 1 It follows that under any materialistic 
theory we have differing human personalities from 
one machine, the brain. But if we dissect the multiple 
personalities which exist for any one case we find 2 
they emanate from some one, single self. 

Consider the well known case of Miss Beauchamp. 
(Pro. S.P.R. Vol. XV. p. 466). But how are we 


1 In Sally Beauchamp’s case (Pro. S.P.R., Vol. XV., p. 466) there 
were four; in Louis Vive’s case (Myers’ Human Personality, Vol. I., 
p. 338) there were six; and in a case reported by Dr. Bramwell 
(Myer’s Human Personality , Vol. I., p. 171) sixteen manifestations 
of personality. 

2 Unless we accept the theory of possession which supports the 
theory now relied on. 

261 





262 DREAMS 

to consider it? From what point of view? From 
two points of view. In the first place from our own 
point of view as external subjects. 3 This is one point 
of view: we have, from the external, to consider one 
body and one brain. So, to us, Miss Beauchamp 
does not exhibit differing personalities: she exhibits 
but differing manifestations of personality. And, as 
she has but one body and one brain, we must refer 
each of these differing manifestations to partial and 
particular psycho-physiological activity of part of the 
one brain. 4 

But what, then, do we from our point of view hold 
as to those parts of the one brain inhibited from 
use? They still remain in existence. In what exist¬ 
ence? The existence of Miss Beauchamp. The 
inhibited parts of her brain are as fully part of her 
brain as those in use. They still have potential 
existence for Miss Beauchamp. 

It follows that each manifestation of personality 
exhibited by Sally Beauchamp is but a limited form 
of manifestation of her real personality: there is some 
one underlying personality of Sally Beauchamp. 

So far my argument is closely in agreement with 
that of Dr. Morton Prince. But now I must separate 
from him when considering what this underlying 
personality of Sally Beauchamp is. 

I shall assume that anyone who is sufficiently 
interested in this subject to read what is now written 
has at his command the full account of Dr. Morton 
Prince and has read and considered it. So 1 proceed 
at once to the chart set out by him on page 480. 


3 I do not consider the question of possession. For if possession 
is fact then the present theory that the really real self is fully 
psychical is established. 

4 The second point of view is that of Miss Beauchamp herself, 
which is considered hereafter. 


MULTIPLEX PERSONALITY 


263 



Now this chart is not clear for we find, amongst 
the differing personalities, duality in the origin,— 
the complete self is made up of Miss Beauchamp, 
the original self, and her subliminal self. We find, 
too, a confusing “ cross ” between the differing per¬ 
sonalities and the independent existence (subliminal 
self?) of Sally Beauchamp. 

Whence does this confusion arise ? From the 
starting-point being one of duality. 

How does the present objection come in ? It comes 
in from denial of the fact that Miss Beauchamp 
constitutes the original (or normal) self as against 
the other differing personalities. The error arises 
from treating the original (normal) self as a fact of 
personality against the other differing personalities 
as accidents . 

Let us consider this question. 

No single man ever appeared on earth who, in 
manifestation, exhibited his full embodied existence. 
No man ever lived with his body in that perfect state 
of health that it constituted as perfect a machine as 
it might have been for human conduct; 5 no man ever 
lived who, with differing environment of birth, 
wealth and education, might not have been more 
effective in conduct. Every man, as manifest as a 
personality, is an accident of birth, wealth and edu¬ 
cation. Consider two like street Arabs. The one 
encounters the accidents of slum-birth and a life of 

5 I except our Lord. It is a strange fact that we have no recorded 
evidence of His ever being subject to the normal ills of the flesh. 









264 DREAMS 

poverty for brain and body. The other (after slum- 
birth) encounters the accidents of a life of fullness 
for brain and body. 6 The two, qua personality, 
start from the same point. The one, by accident, 
ultimately manifests one form of personality, the 
other, by accident, develops another and altogether 
differing personality. 7 

Every one of us is conscious that his personality, 
as manifest, is an accident. Every one of us dreams 
of what he himself might have been, in manifestation 
of personality, had environment been more favour¬ 
able : the dreams are real and have sound foundation, 
their content is subject to accident. 

It is from this consciousness that the discontent 
with lot, the vanity and conceit of man, arise. The 
cow,—if we assume it is not self-conscious,—acts 
and re-acts instinctively in relation to environment. 
The man, conscious of power over environment and 
yet subject in some measure to it, is thereby conscious 
of how the accident of environment bars him from 
full expression of himself. He is, then, discontented 
with his lot or, dreaming of himself as he might be 
manifest in personality, falsely relies on this dream 
as objective reality and so regards himself as superior 
to the self he manifests to his fellows. Thereby he 
displays conceit or vanity. This false estimate of 
self is evil because man is not embodied to dream 
and to rely on dreams. He is embodied for conduct; 
that is, for activity in thought and action as manifest 
in the objective universe. 

What follows directly as to the Beauchamp case ? 

Miss Beauchamp’s “ original self ” is only an ap- 

6 Romance deals largely with these interesting accidents. 

7 The Vicar of Wakefield speaking of his two daughters says :— 
“ The one entertained me with her vivacity when I was gay, the 
other with her sense when I was serious. But these qualities were 
never carried to excess in either and I have often seen them ex¬ 
change characters for a whole day together. A suit of mourning 
has transformed my coquette into a prude, and a new set of ribands 
has given her younger sister more than natural vivacity.” 


MULTIPLEX PERSONALITY 265 

proximation to her real self as embodied. The other 
states of Miss Beauchamp are the same in kind as 
her original self. They differ only in degree, 8 how¬ 
ever great that degree may be. 

Every one of us is conscious that his personality 
as manifest is not full manifestation of himself as 
embodied. There is for each of us the “ what might 
have been.” And this “ what might have been ” is 
related, for each of us, to the underlying self. I 
would, therefore, on Dr. Morton Prince’s chart cut 
out Miss Beauchamp’s original self from its position 
as part of her complete self and relegate it to the 
same class as Bi, B2, etc. I would start with the 
subliminal self as the really real or complete self. 
We have then the following chart:— 


MYSELF 

THE TRANSCENDENTAL 



“ Myself ” exists in the transcendental: it is Kant’s 
transcendental subject. 

“ Myself Embodied ” exists in the intelligible and 
the objective universe. It is related to the trans¬ 
cendental through insight. The relation between the 
transcendental and intelligible universe is indeter¬ 
minate and so marked only by a dotted line. 

1 8 Bear in mind that even Sally Beauchamp was ignorant of the 
thoughts of B. IV. Even normally we do not always keep to one 
personality. We all are subject in degree to change, though not 
normally to the exceptional change marked in Dr. Jekyll and Mr. 
Hyde. 


19 






266 DREAMS 

Miss B. B., etc. are the personalities of Miss B. 
as embodied, which are manifest in the objective 
universe. 

Each reader must judge for himself whether or 
not the above chart is preferable to that of Dr. Mor¬ 
ton Prince : it is, at the least, simpler and, if accepted, 
leaves the main timbers of the doctor’s built up 
argument standing. 

We have first the “ myself ” which is transcendent 
and exists in the transcendental. 'This “ myself ” is 
embodied and, as embodied, exists both in the in¬ 
telligible universe and the objective universe. Bear 
in mind the intelligible universe holds sway over the 
objective universe. This embodied self is the 'po¬ 
tential embodied self. This potential embodied self 
is manifest in the objective universe as “ partials ” 
of personality. Each one of us is conscious of him¬ 
self embodied and conscious that this embodied self 
is but partially manifested. We compare our real 
embodied potential selves with these manifestations 
and so, in dreams, waking or sleeping, feel discontent 
with lot or, as before shown, exhibit to our fellows 
vanity or conceit. But our dreams, sleeping or even 
waking, of our existence as personalities other than 
we are in manifestation have sound basis in our 
potentiality. There is, for each of us, “ what might 
have been.” 9 

Herein, I think, lies a strong argument that our 
potential personality is real as against our manifest 
personality, and, if so, we find again the command 
of the intelligible over the objective universe. 
Dreams support the argument. 

But the chart, as I offer it, has another important 
bearing on the argument generally. 

The plane dividing the transcendental from the 
intelligible universe is marked only by a dotted line. 
The dotted line is crossed by Insight. And here we 


9 Even “ may be ” in some future. 


MULTIPLEX PERSONALITY 267 

are on firm ground. For the subject, even as em¬ 
bodied, has the power of insight transcending 
thought and its limits of relation lying between 
limits of contradiction. 

Insight cannot be referred to the brain : the brain’s 
motion only covers motion set up by thought. The 
subject embodied has therefore, in it, something of 
the transcendental and to this we must give pre¬ 
eminence in transcendence of thought. 

This is the fact relied on which relates the em¬ 
bodied self to the transcendental beyond the purview 
of ideas and which leads us, in reason transcending 
ideas, to regard the self as limited by embodiment, 
—that is as being in itself a transcendental subject. 

The chart I have given is general in form, except 
that I have marked the manifestations of the self as 
Miss B. etc., in order to bring the chart into likeness 
with that of Dr. Morton Prince. 

Miss B. may still be termed Miss B.’s original 
self. But that means only the embodied self mani¬ 
fested : it is still a “ partial ” of Miss B. as “ myself 
embodied.” Bi, B2, etc. are also “ partials ” though 
some exhibit a fuller degree than others of psycho- 
physiological activity of the brain. 

Now from our point of view we regard all these 
successive states of Miss B. as states of herself de¬ 
termined by time: we regard them as “partials” of 
personality. 

But Miss B., herself? 10 How does she, when 
manifest in any one state, regard her other states? 

We regard our fellows as subject to differing mani¬ 
festations of personality. Brown may be sane for 
four years, then insane for one year, then sane again. 
Papa is not the same personality when he comes 
home tired and cross and hungry as Papa rested and 
good-tempered after a well-cooked dinner. The for- 

10 We now consider the phenomena from our second point of view; 
that is, Miss B’s. 


268 DREAMS 

mer Papa we know would refuse our reasonable 
request; the latter grants it. 

But when we regard, not others, but ourselves we 
find we relate what is external to us, to ourselves as 
personalities in the particular form of manifestation 
of ourselves which exists for the passing time. The 
world is black to Brown rejected by Sophonisba, 
the world is bright and glorious to him accepted. 
Brown has nothing to do with the external world as 
a thing-in-itself. As a personality the only reality 
for him is its effect on him. And the little word 
“yes” or “no” has—for him—the Brobdignagian 
power of making the world—for the time being!— 
heaven or hell. 

Miss B. in any one state of personality regards 
her other states as non-existent or as foreign to her¬ 
self. In any one state,—if she can exercise her 
memory, in the present, to recall any other state,— 
she must treat that other state as foreign to herself : 
the Miss B., in that other state, is to her another 
person. The Miss B. in that other state is not part 
of Miss B.’s objective life,—she regards herself in 
that other state as a dream. So we find that what 
to us, from our point of view, is objective is, from 
her point of view, not objective. And as to this bear 
in mind that what is objective to the dreamer is not 
objective to him when he wakes. 

But evidence on one point is wanting, I think. I 
should have expected that in any state Miss B. would 
have had a feeling that she as an embodied self was 
not fully manifest. 

There is a remarkable case reported which illus¬ 
trates what I mean :— 

“ Lorsque je me trouvais seul,” said a patient of 
Krishaber, “ dans un endroit nouveau, j’^tais comme 
un enfant nouveau-n6, ne reconnaissant rien. J’avais 
un ardent d^sir de revoir mon ancien monde, de redevenir 
l’ancien moi: c’^tait ce dd-sir qui m’a empech^ de me 
tuer.” {Pro. S.P.R. Vol. IV. p. 502). 


MULTIPLEX PERSONALITY 269 

This man was still conscious of himself as exist¬ 
ing : his suffering arose from the divorce of his old 
content of consciousness from himself as a self-con¬ 
scious subject. This I should have expected to find 
in the case of Miss Beauchamp, but I can find no 
evidence on the point. 

Now when Miss Beauchamp in any one state re¬ 
gards her other states as foreign to herself, have 
they not, for her, fallen back into dreamland ? You 
dream you were a King: you wake and then regard 
the dream as a dream. But, while you dreamt, your 
dream was objectively true to you : you for the first 
time regard it as a dream when you wake. It follows 
that if Miss Beauchamp,— or you yourself,—could 
find your own personality in your potential embodied 
state, you would be fully “ awake ” n and regard your 
past states as dreams. 

If you object to this reasoning it is because you, 
are under the influence of the preconceived idea that 
the objective is real, the intelligible unreal,—no more 
than a reflection on the real. But, if you deny this 
relative reality of dreams, how do you account for 
the fact that certain dreams do not result in the ex¬ 
penditure of physical energy: that they do result, on 
the contrary, in the accumulation or restoration of 
physical energy? 

Just as our normal consciousness is but a “ slice ” 
of our full consciousness, so our normal personality 
is but a “ partial ” of our potential embodied per¬ 
sonality. And the form of this partial differs in time 
for each one of us. 

We all exhibit multiplex personalities. As to this 
I said, in Personality and Telepathy (p. 273) :— 

If, however, we hold our normal self-consciousness 

and these various phases of consciousness are but mani- 


ll So far as you can be while still embodied. 


270 DREAMS 

festations in our time and space of an unique and 
indissoluble self-consciousness, we get rid of the 
difficulty : we arrive at a real personality in each of us. 

And I cited Myers’ fine analogy:— 

But the question of origin will still remain : and it is 
not an hypothesis wilder than another if we suppose it 
possible that that portion of the cosmic energy which 
operates through the organism of each one of us wa$. in 
some sense individualized before its descent into 
generation, and pours the potentiality of larger being 
into the earthen vessels which it fills and overflows. 
{Pro., Vol. VI., p. 215). 

The fact of multiplex personalities supports the 
argument that on disembodiment we may really really 
‘ ‘ wake up ’ ’ and then regard our past states as states 
of dreamland. But, if so, we do not reduce our 
existing states to mere maya as Gautama does. We 
subsume our past in the transcendental. 


HALLUCINATION AND ILLUSION 
IN DREAMS 


In considering this subject we cannot do better than 
to begin with a statement taken from the Encyclo¬ 
paedia Britan nica, for a statement proceeding from 
that authority may be held to offer, at the least, a 
view generally accepted :— 

“ DREAM. The state of consciousness during sleep ; 
it may also be defined as a hallucination or illusion 
peculiarly associated with the condition of sleep, but not 
necessarily confined to that state. In sleep the with¬ 
drawal of the mind from the external world is more 
complete and the objectivity of the dream images is 
usually unquestioned, whereas in the waking state the 
hallucination is usually recognised as such.” 

This passage must be criticised. 

In the first place I would hold there cannot be 
different states of consciousness for the subject: the 
self-conscious subject simply is. What we really find 
is not differing states of consciousness itself but 
differences in its content and form of manifestation. 
There may be a state of sleep or of waking for the 
subject; there may be differences in the content of 
consciousness or in the presentations to or manifes¬ 
tation of consciousness. But consciousness—which 
imports a self-conscious subject or being—is no more 
to us than a really real fact beyond the purview of 
thought: it can be conditioned in no way. 

But the greatest error in the statement is, I think, 
271 


DREAMS 


272 

the underlying assumption that because, when the 
subject awakens, its past remembered dream appears 
to it to be the result of hallucination or illusion, the 
dream, therefore, was false to reality in being illusory 
or hallucinatory. To judge the dream correctly it 
should be judged from the point of view of the 
dreamer,—^the dream was the dreamer’s dream. 

Suppose that you could communicate with the 
dreamer during his dream and were to tell him his 
dream was the result of illusion or hallucination. His 
dream is objectively true to him: he would laugh 
you to scorn . 1 

Suppose someone were to communicate with you 
and tell you that your life on earth, objectively real 
to you, is but a dream, the result of illusion or 
hallucination. You would laugh him to scorn. 

What difference is there between the two cases ? 
There is none. If you reply: “ But no one ever has 
come to me to tell me my life is but a dream,*’ the 
reply is worthless: for if he were to come you would 
laugh him to scorn. To the dreamer personally his 
dream is as real as your waking experience is to you 
personally. 

Again, there is no evidence at all that the dreamer’s 
dream was not objectively true, apart from the fact 
that he can find no reflection of it on our objective 
universe when he wakes up. But what is this evi¬ 
dence worth ? Why, from moment to moment, your 
own body undergoes innumerable and intricate 
changes of which you are not only unconscious but 
which leave you, as a self, altogether unaffected. 
Your own body might, to your full ignorance, be 
used as a medium for the transmission of a wireless 
current of electricity which causes an objective ex¬ 
plosion at a distance. Faraday “ dreamt of ” a 
dynamo and this very dream enabled him to make 


1 Jf, under hypnotism, the subject criticises his own dream as 
hallucinatory or illusory, he is not -fully in dreamland. 


HALLUCINATION IN DREAMS 273 

a dynamo,—a thing which would never have existed 
but for the dream. If his dream was hallucinatory 
or illusory, then all objectivity is the result of hal¬ 
lucination or illusion. 

That dreams can be rightly judged from the 
waking subject’s point of view can only be justified 
by an assumption—by an assumption which influ¬ 
ences even the deepest reasoning of no few influential 
writers. * 

The assumption is that the subject, awake as a 
“ thing ” of conduct, is the really real subject and 
so holds command over the subject as one in the 
intelligible universe. We assume to be right in 
judging our dreams from the point of view of 
“ things ” of conduct; we make the “ self ” a thing 
of conduct,—we make the self to exist only as em¬ 
bodied. For, cut out all embodiment, and the self 
cannot be a “ thing ” of conduct in the objective 
universe. 2 

The writer in the Encyclopedia Britannica himself 
admits that, for the dreamer, “ the withdrawal of 
the mind from th^*external world is more complete 
and that the objectivity of the dream images is 
usually unquestioned.” What I think he means is 
that because the dreamer is divorced from external 
affects in the passing now, therefore his dreams take 
on the aspect of objectivity. He admits that from 
the dreamer’s point of view hallucination and illusion 
do not exist. 3 

I And what does he mean by objectivity ? If he 
means merely that what the dreamer experiences 
appears to him as fully veridical as waking experi¬ 
ences he is correct. But if he means dreams are to 
the sleeper as fully subject to the laws of Nature, of 
evolution, and to the resistance of matter as waking 

2 Disembodied it may, possibly, influence or affect the embodied. 

3 If they do, the dream is not a pure dream ; the subject is 
criticizing himself as a dreamer. 



274 DREAMS 

experiences he is wrong. It is largely because 
imagination in dreams is not subject to these inhibi¬ 
tions that, to the waking subject, they appear to exist 
in hallucination or illusion. 

We need not trouble about illusion for it may be 
held to arise from error in judgment as to external 
sensuous affects. 4 But hallucination, what does it 
mean ? 

Hallucination is said to mean the apparent per¬ 
ception of some external thing to which no real object 
corresponds. Now by a real object is here meant 
an object in the objective universe, so I think hal¬ 
lucination should be defined as the imagining of 
something which can but does not exist in the ob¬ 
jective universe or of something which cannot exist 
in the objective universe. For I do not know what 
“ apparent perception ” means. It can only mean 
a perception which is not real because impossible to 
be related to anything in the objective universe. And, 
if so, it gives real reality to the objective universe : 
it denies reality to the intelligible universe. 

If the present argument be sound, however, we 
find hallucination as to the imagining of things which 
can but do not exist in the objective universe, is 
necessary even for waking subjects before any new 
object can be created in the objective universe: 5 so 
hallucination is not peculiar to dreams, it exists 
equally for waking thoughts. For instance, Faraday 
had to “ see ” his dynamo, Bell had to “ hear ” his 
telephone, before either did or could exist as an ob¬ 
ject in the objective universe. 

Hallucination as to things possible of existence in 

4 Kant says an object of intuitioft may be thought. I suggest it 
can only be thought about. Illusion results from error of Judgment 
in thought about an object, not in thinking the object itself. What 
is real to the subject is the idea of, not the object itself. 

5 We consider sane men only. The irregular working of the 
brain is a question of pathology. The brains of Coleridge, Shelley, 
for example, worked normally. 


HALLUCINATION IN DREAMS 275 

he objective universe, is not a peculiarity of dreams: 
t applies equally to waking thoughts. 6 So far, then, 
he distinction between dreams as subjects of hal- 
ucination and waking thoughts as free from hal- 
ucination falls to the ground. And as pure dreams 
—that is dreams in full sleep where there is freedom 
rom external affects from the objective—are free 
rom external sensuous effect, the distinction between 
ireams as subject to illusion and normal waking 
houghts as free from illusion, also falls to the 
ground. 7 

But in dreams there is another form, as we have 
>een, of hallucination: dreams are not confined to 
images of things possible of existence in the ob¬ 
jective universe. 8 The imagining of things possible 
Df existence in the objective universe must be, either 
waking or steeping, before such things can be given 
existence to in the objective universe. The imagin¬ 
ing of things impossible of creation in the objective 
universe is useless so far as after creation in the 
ubjective universe goes. 

Hallucination and illusion exist equally for dreams 
and waking thoughts except so far as dreams may 
transcend the purview of thought. 

Hallucination is of two kinds or, rather, has two 
branches. The one, the imagining of things that 
might be given existence in the objective universe, 
the other of things that are therein impossible. The 
former kind of hallucination must exist for the sub¬ 
ject, sleeping or waking, before any new object can 
be created in the objective universe. It is the latter 
kind that we find more difficult to explain. 9 


6 Unless we hold that Faraday and Bell suffered from hallucina¬ 
tion before the objective existence of the dynamo and telephone. 

7 Dreams may be caused by external affect. Such dreams are 
act considered now. 

8 This may be true, also, for waking thoughts. 

9 Bear in mind that, without imagination, will and conduct can 
have no effect in the objective universe. 



DREAMS 


276 

But, at present, we need only point out the con¬ 
clusion forced on us as to the hallucination of dreams. 

So far as hallucination is defined as play of 
imagination round things possible of existence in 
the objective universe there is nothing abnormal 
about it: it is a condition precedent for the subject, 
sleeping or waking, to be able to create in, even to 
think about, the objective universe. The second 
branch marks free imagination round “ things ” 
impossible of creation in the objective universe. 

Thought exists as an inhibition of imagination 
where the inhibition is determined by the motion of 
the brain. Thought exists only so far as it can exist 
in relation to motion of the brain. 10 Imagination, 
through the brain, sets up motion in the objective 
universe which is all the subject, with its master-tool 
the body, wants for creation therein. 

In now considering hallucination and illusion we 
are assuming the brain of the subject to be healthy 
and normal. Illusion may involve error as to sense 
presentation but, the brain being assumed to be 
normal, it operates correctly with reference to what 
appears to be sensed. So we have nothing to do with 
the hallucination and illusion of the insane: that 
raises but a pathological or physiological inquiry. 
All we need note is that if, as the present argument 
assumes, the brain is no more than a machine which 
permits thought—a limited form of imagination—to 
operate on it for the setting up of motion then, if 
the machine be imperfect, the thought manifest will 
also necessarily be imperfect. And this is in agree¬ 
ment with modern medical views. For insanity is 
very generally held to be a symptom of imperfection 
or disease of the brain : insanity is not held to result 
from an insane mind manifest in a healthy brain; 
it is physiological, not psychical. 


10 But we shall see that free imagination may colour even thought. 


HALLUCINATION IN DREAMS 


277 

Hallucination and, in some measure, illusion 11 are 
part of normal human experience, waking and sleep¬ 
ing; they are not peculiar to sleep alone. They exist 
for the normal motion of the normal brain. Human 
experience informs us that human beings, with 
sound brains, do dream, and even think when 
waking, about things possible and impossible for 
the objective universe. 

It is now denied that the self is a mere thing of 
conduct, that it exists only in embodiment. And 
the hallucination and, in some measure, the illusion 
of dreams, waking or sleeping, form a normal part 
of human experience. To get at the “ self ” we 
must admit hallucination as part of human experience 
as fully as we admit normal conduct to be part. 

Physiologically we must admit that sleep, even 
with its dreams of hallucination, gives rest from con¬ 
duct to the self of consciousness, from conduct in 
relation to the Objective Universe. But, psychically, 
what place do we then give to dreams ? We find 
them definitely associated with the subject when in 
a state which gives physiological rest. This must 
mean, physiologically, decrease of expenditure of 
physical energy by the subject. But dreams, pleas¬ 
ant dreams certainly, increase rather than decrease 
the measure of physiological rest which sleep gives. 
If dreams import expenditure of energy, where does 
the energy come from ? 

Using the term psychical energy,.it is now argued 
that the expenditure of psychical energy on pleasant 
dreams spells rest from expenditure, even increase, 
of energy in a physical sense. And this makes 
physical energy subjective to psychical energy, just 
as "we have found the objective universe subjective 
to the intelligible universe. Or we might, on the 
other hand, say that pleasant dreams exist without 


ll Illusion, pure and simple, results from sensuous error, but it 
varies up to hallucination. 


278 DREAMS 

any expenditure of energy at all. If this be so then 
we want to know if dreams are possible beyond the 
purview of ideas; that is, without intellectual opera¬ 
tion ? For intellectual operation involves physio¬ 
logical motion of the brain and so expenditure of 
energy. 

The subject has the faculty of insight which trans¬ 
cends thought. Why should he not have some 
human experience of a universe of insight transcend¬ 
ing thought? Such human experience is possible 
for it contains, in itself, no contradiction. And, in 
itself, it involves no physiological expenditure of 
energy. 

Illusion we may leave for physiological investi¬ 
gation. Hallucination must exist for the subject, 
waking or sleeping, or he could not be, as he is, a 
thing of conduct. 

The sleeping state of the subject with all its hal¬ 
lucinations marks greater freedom for the subject in 
the intelligible universe than its waking state. In 
its waking state there is inhibition of the free play 
of imagination : the waking subject generally uses 
thought, only, for conduct in relation to the objective 
universe. The sleeping subject has free play of 
imagination without its being inhibited to the form 
of thought: so its content transcends the content of 
thought. 

The definition of “ Dream ” that we are consider¬ 
ing admits that “ in sleep the withdrawal of the mind 
from the external world is more complete ” than in 
the waking state. This external world is the objec¬ 
tive universe which, by the present argument, is but 
an occasion for thought. Imagination is not confined 
to thought about the objective universe: the objective 
universe is not exhaustive of real reality or even of 
reality. Dreams, then, have a content beyond, wider 
than, the reality of the external world. It follows 
that dreams must mark hallucination as to “ things ” 
not only possible but impossible for the objective 
universe. Dreams travelling beyond the limited 


HALLUCINATION IN DREAMS 279 

eality of our little objective universe must have for 
ontent what is impossible for our universe. The 
>nly reply to the above argument is, I think, that 
>ur objective universe exhausts reality. 


IGNORANCE, HOPE AND FAITH 


It has been shown that waking thoughts and sleeping 
dreams are alike in kind, the difference existing but 
in degree. Imagination, inhibited in the form of 
thought, is the foundation of one class of both waking 
and sleeping thoughts where sleeping thoughts take 
the aspect of dreams. But in sleep the. subject is 
divorced from the affect, in the passing now, of the 
external and so imagination is freer to colour 1 
thought. We find imagination colouring thought 
even in the waking state: much more must it colour 
thought in the sleeping state. In the sleeping state, 
also, the subject, being free from the inhibition of 
the external, can exercise more freely its power of 
imagination beyond the purview of thought. Dreams 
are higher in degree, have a wider purview, than 
waking thoughts. 

The subjection of the objective universe to the in¬ 
telligible universe and the command of the subject, 
—as a subject in the intelligible universe,—over the 
objective universe have been shown. And the sub¬ 
ject in the sleeping state remains a subject in the 
intelligible universe; it is simply divorced from 
physical not from psychical activity. 

We find, then, that the conduct of the subject 
being determined by purpose the subject, when 
divorced by sleep from activity as a thing of conduct, 
can still exercise imagination for the objective uni¬ 
verse though it cannot objectify what it imagines: it 
can still entertain purpose. 


l That is, thought itself manifests a background of free imagina¬ 
tion. 

280 


IGNORANCE, HOPE AND FAITH 281 

Hope and faith affect purpose and they have exist¬ 
ence in the intelligible universe : 2 there may be pur¬ 
pose which does not result in conduct. For conduct 
mports activity of the subject in the objective uni¬ 
verse whether in relation to objects or fellow-subjects. 
Conduct, then, demands the embodiment of the self 
in the objective universe. 3 

Can we find any relation between conduct on the 
Dne hand and hope and faith on the other ? If so we 
nay find conduct subject to faith and hope and thus 
again establish the command of the intelligible over 
the objective universe. 

The foundation of all activity in conduct of the 
embodied self exists in ignorance: if we were things 
:>f full knowledge embodied life would spell mental 
hell. As we are constituted we cling to life: the man 
suffering extreme physical or mental suffering clings 
to life; even the most confirmed idler would prefer 
abour to death. With full knowledge we should all 
seek immediate death. 

Consider what your state would be with full know¬ 
ledge. The statement of Kant that “ the phaenomena 
>f the past determine all phaenomena in the succeed¬ 
ing time,” 4 would be really true for you, not exist 
>nly in phenomenal truth. You would not only know 
everything generally but in detail. At every passing 
yow your future conduct and its results would be 
mown to you. Your “ memory ” would cover not 
>nly the past but the future: both, for you, would 
ie fully determined. For your future would be de- 
ermined by your full knowledge of what had to be. 
You would have lost the power of choice between 
iiffering courses of conduct and so your interest in 
mur own conduct would have disappeared : all com- 

2 So they have existence for the subject in both the sleeping and 
yaking states. 

3 Therefore conduct exists only for the waking state 

4 Meiklejohn’s Kant, p. 148. 


20 


28 2 DREAMS 

petition, noble or ignoble, with your fellows; all 
strife against environment; all effort to improve your 
own lot or that of your fellows, would be absent: 
there would be, for you, no standard of morality to 
judge what were best for you as a self-conscious sub¬ 
ject. You would exist as that awful “ thing,” a 
thing of determinism, with hideous self-knowledge 
of vour machine-like existence. 

What would be left you to live for? You cannot 
pretend you would live on imagination of. coming 
pleasures any more than you would live on imagina¬ 
tion of coming evils. For there would be no place 
in vou for imagination : your past, present and future 
would be determined and you would know fully what 
was determined. 

What constitutes one of the greatest of our human 
troubles? Monotony. And why do we feel 
monotony as an evil ? Because it bars imagination 
as to our future : we contemplate a determined future 
like to our past; like to something which we already 
know. 

If you try to imagine what your conduct would 
be as a thing of full knowledge you will find the very 
idea so preposterous that imagination fails you. In 
February you know that in the coming March you 
will break your leg; propose to someone who will 
reject you; speculate and lose a fortune; run a race 
and come in last; plant an acre of potatoes that will 
fail as a crop. What then is your state in February? 
You must , in the future, do all these things, for you 
the phaenomena of your past not only determine the 
phaenomena of your future but you know the future. 
Thinking, as you are now constituted, you will find 
it simply ridiculous to imagine you could remain a 
thing of conduct if with full knowledge. Your course 
of life exists and can only exist while you are ig¬ 
norant. Full knowledge would destroy the very 
foundation of your embodied life. 

But how is it that full knowledge would destroy 
the foundation of your embodied life? Destroy it 


IGNORANCE, HOPE AND FAITH 283 

by adding full knowledge ? An addition to life can¬ 
not destroy life. It must be that full knowledge 
would have effect in destroying something which is 
vital to your life as a self-conscious subject. There 
is no tertium quid. What is the reply ? 

The very foundation of your embodied life exists 
in hope : 5 hope is based on ignorance of the future, 
it could not exist without such ignorance. And this 
is a conclusion from human experience. Human 
experience informs us that all are moved by hope. 

As we accumulate human experience our knowledge 
of what will probably happen in the future enlarges. 
The probabilities that the sun will rise to-morrow at 
a known time; that if you drop an apple from your 
raised hand it will fall to the ground; that if you 
cut your finger it will hurt you, are all so highly 
probable that we are justified in treating the proba¬ 
bilities as involving proof. But we do not hope for 
all this that we practically know; knowledge excludes 
hope. The child who does not know the times of 
rising of the sun may hope that to-morrow, a holi¬ 
day, God may make it rise earlier than usual; the 
child who first drops an apple from its raised hands 
is surprised and pleased to see it drop to the ground 
and, dropping it again, may feel interest in specu¬ 
lation as to what it will do; the child who has cut its 
finger may not only hope it will not pain but may 
run to its mother to kiss it and stop the pain, and— 
mirabile dictu !—the kiss often does stop the pain. 
Where there is ignorance there is hope: where there 
is knowledge there is no hope. 

And here a strange fact as to ignorance may be 
again referred to. The more truly learned a man is, 
the fuller is the content of his consciousness of his 
own ignorance : the less learned a man is, the less 
is the content of his consciousness of his own ignor- 


5 Faith is considered later on. 


284 


DREAMS 


ance. Modesty marks the learned philosopher or 
man of science; dogmatic assurance and vanity mark 
the unlearned crank. Why is this? Because the 
more we learn the more closely is brought home to 
us our vital ignorance . 6 The limits of human know¬ 
ledge are more definitely appreciated by the philo¬ 
sopher than by the crank. The more developed 
man’s reasoning power as an embodied subject, the 
fuller his insight of consciousness into the limits of 
this reasoning power. Huxley perhaps of all men 
most boldly faced the problem of personality. And, 
if he rested on agnosticism, he not only admitted 
that the problem faces us but declared his belief in 
consciousness as a thing-in-itself. The unlearned 
man denies his ignorance: the learned man finds his 
ignorance vital. 


But when we hold that hope is based on ignorance 
what do we mean by hope ? We do not mean a 
vague indefinite longing, we mean something con¬ 
crete : hope always has content. What then is it that 
we hope ? 

We hope that our dreams may come true. Our 
dreams are real to us; we hope that this reality may 
be reflected in the objective universe. We hope that 
the internal objectivity may be reflected in external 
objectivity. The child must first imagine a fine day 
before it can hope for a fine to-morrow: there must 
be the idea created in the intelligible universe before, 
in any case, there can be hope that the idea may be 
objectified. Even for objective creation, Faraday 
could not be sure, when he had formulated a concrete 
idea of the dvnamo, that his conduct would result in 
objectifving it. His conduct was based on hope which 
existed because of his ignorance. 

Now bear in mind what we have already seen,— 

0 This is considered at length in the first part of the work- 
Cf. p. 13. 


IGNORANCE, HOPE AND FAITH 285 

that creation in the intelligible universe must always 
precede creation in the objective universe. 

We find that, for the self-conscious subject, his 
dreams are real; they are free in that they have no 
necessary relation to the objective universe: for they 
may be of what is impossible in or for the objective 
universe. They may or may not result in conduct 
leading to change or creation in the objective uni¬ 
verse : conduct, in this, may or may not be effective. 
We reduce conduct to a mere incident of dreams, 
just as in the first part of the book we have found 
the objective universe a mere “ occasion ” for 
thought. It is a part and only a very small part of 
our imagination that can be used for the purposes 
of conduct and when we use this small part we can 
never be sure that our conduct will have the effect 
we desire. Hope is based on ignorance. Hope is a 
certainty for the self-conscious subject, the detail of 
its objectivity in our little objective universe is an 
uncertainty. If you object to this statement it is 
because at the back of your mind you still give real 
reality to the objective universe. 

If we start with the self-conscious subject possess¬ 
ing the power of free imagination we find it embodied 
for a passing time. During this time it exercises a 
small part of its imagination inhibited in the form 
of thought, thought giving it relation to the objective 
universe wherein, using its master tool, the body, it 
is a thing of conduct. But this conduct is directed 
by imagination and the subject is always more or 
less ignorant whether its conduct will have the effect 
desired. The subject’s conduct is moved by hope 
for success : this hope is based on ignorance. 

If we start with the subject as a thing of conduct 
we can only consider imagination so far as it is in¬ 
hibited in the form of thought: free imagination is 
extraneous waste. We thereby relegate free imagina¬ 
tion to irregular mental activity or as marking some 
form of lunacy or superstition. We have no full 
explanation of human experience. 


286 


DREAMS 


Free imagination when not inhibited in the form 
of thought is sheer waste in relation to the objective 
universe. But why ? Because free imagination is 
extraneous to the personality ? No. It is because 
our objective universe is so infinitesimally small a 
speck of the universe open to free imagination that 
it requires only an infinitesimal part of free imagina¬ 
tion for its regard: it requires only an inhibited part 
of the psychical energy of the “ I am ”—inhibited 
in the form of physical energy—for command over 
it. If, with Haeckel, you refer the psychic back to 
each living cell, from where do you get the command 
of the psychic over the physical ? What evidence is 
there that the organism can determine its own en¬ 
vironment before the self-conscious subject appears ? 

Now imagination has nothing to do with ignorance 
or knowledge; in dreams imagination is free. 7 It is 
when we bring in our little objective universe we find 
the question of ignorance and its attendant, hope, 
come in. What we are ignorant of is how far our 
imagination inhibited in the form of thought may 
be successful for purpose in relation to the objective 
universe. We do hope; hope is a certainty of human 
experience. But the objectification of any purpose 
of hope is not a certainty of human experience. For 
instance, you can dream freely of success as to any 
purpose you have formed, your dreams are certain. 
What is uncertain is whether your dreams will have 
any effect in relation to the objective universe. You 
dream that Sophonisba accepts your offer of love and 
returns it. The dream is a certainty. But when 
Sophonisba—who is but an embodied self, however 
supereminent in charm—listens to you, the result is 
uncertain; uncertain, that is, till it is a thing of the 
past and so determined. Hence the uncertainty. 
Sophonisba consents: your dream is objectified. 


7 But in dreams a higher form of hope than that now considered 
is opened to us. 


IGNORANCE, HOPE AND FAITH 287 

Sophonisba refuses: your dream is not objectified. 
But the dream itself remains an implicit part of your 
memory. A happy or unhappy part? That, again, 
is uncertain; for your memory exists in transcendence 
of the past, present and future. You may feel un¬ 
happy at the moment of refusal, but when in after 
time you look back on it? You may rejoice in that 
which at the time gave you pain. But your dream 
remains a certainty for you, though it may have 
taken on a different aspect. 


Faith is used as having many differing meanings. 
As now used we may hold it exists in transcendence 
of knowledge, rather than in ignorance. For, as to 
faith, what we have to consider is the subject who 
determines his own conduct as a spirit surviving em¬ 
bodiment. Bowing to the categorical imperative he 
exercises his freewill as an embodied self under a 
full sense of duty. 8 His faith is not hope; 9 there is 
no content of earthly hope. For, as we have already 
found in the first part of this work, he may deliber¬ 
ately abandon all earthly hope and so conduct himself 
that, to his own knowledge, bodily and mental suf¬ 
fering will, on earth, probably be his lot. Some men 
do so conduct themselves, human experience is clear 
as to this, and any full explanation of human ex¬ 
perience must, as before said, include explanation of 
such conduct. Such a man may, indeed, have hope 
of ultimate spiritual happiness, but even so his idea 
(?) of happiness has no earthly content. He 
imagines happiness but as an atmosphere, trans¬ 
cendent of earthly ideas, that he may become ab¬ 
sorbed in from adherence to duty. 

Whether what is above written is based or not on 


8 The foundation of faith may be false. In any such case conduct 
based on a false sense of duty may have the most evil of results. 

9 Unless we term it transcendental hope. 


288 DREAMS 

sound reasoning must be decided by each reader for 
himself. All I can do is, from my own standpoint, 
to offer it as sound reasoning. And, with this hy¬ 
pothesis, we may compare the conclusion we now 
arrive at with that we arrived at in the first part of 
this work. 

In the first part we found that the self-conscious 
subject does, as a subject in the intelligible universe, 
exercise command over itself as an object in the ob¬ 
jective universe: it uses its body as a machine of 
motion to vary and create its own environment. And 
the environment of the self-conscious subject, that 
is, its objective universe, we reduced not only to a 
mere “ occasion ” for thought, but in a great measure 
got rid of its materiality. We reduced objects to 
appearances in etheric form, their appearance of 
materiality and resistance being traced back, for 
foundation, to motion. We found that the self- 
consciousness of the subject is the one real reality 
for it: it is “groundless because it is the ground 
of all other certainty.” To this “ I am ” we gave 
psychical activity and full memory of its past ( ?) 
stage of embodiment. 

We arrived at the above conclusion from consider¬ 
ing the human experience of the subject in a waking 
state. 

But, now, when we have been considering the 
human experience of the subject in relation to its 
sleeping state, what have we found ? 

In the sleeping state the subject remains fully a 
subject in the intelligible universe, it is simply di¬ 
vorced from physical activity; cannot use its machine, 
the body, for activity in its little objective universe. 
It still thinks, though its thought takes on the ap¬ 
pearance of dreams. If Faraday dreamt of an ob¬ 
jective dynamo, he did dream of it for a certainty: 
he, probably, also dreamt of numerous other 
“things” that he never objectified. Such dreams 
were certainties to him though never affecting in any 
way our material speck of universe. The uncertainty 


IGNORANCE, HOPE AND FAITH 289 

as to his dynamo existed in the question whether he 
would or would not objectify his dream. Dreams are 
as real as waking thoughts, and thought about an 
object (as a dream) must be before any new object 
can be objectified. The thought (or dream) is cer¬ 
tain for the self-conscious subject, its objectification 
in our Lilliputian objective universe is uncertain. 

In considering our human experience during the 
sleeping state we arrive at the same conclusion as 
when we considered the waking state. We, indeed, 
strengthen the conclusion for we find that the “ I 
am,” in sleep, exists in a wider universe than when 
awake. In sleep, its psychical activity may still 
exercise power over physical activity. 

Now comes a difficulty in the evolution of the 
argument, a difficulty that arises from there being 
at “ the back of the mind ” of most readers a stand¬ 
point of thought that the sleeping state is subjective 
to the waking state. Many commentators of estab¬ 
lished reputation start their consideration of Kant’s 
philosophy with an assumption that his really real 
subject is the subject he considers, whereas his really 
real subject is the transcendental subject and his 
subject is but a form, conditioned in time and space, 
of the transcendental subject. This has led, I think, 
to no little unjust criticism of his Dialectic. 

The transcendental subject exists with imagination 
deep buried in it: it exists transcendent of time and 
space. It is manifest in embodiment as a human 
being. What does this mean ? The soul of man, 
manifest in human form, exists as a subject inhibited 
in time and space. 

The subject exists in two states: the sleeping and 
the waking state. In both states it remains fully a 
subject in the intelligible universe, in both states it 
has full psychical energy. Even in the sleeping 
state it is, statically, a thing of physical energy but 
only when waking is it dynamically a thing of 


DREAMS 


290 

physical energy,—only when waking can it use its 
tool, the body, for physical activity, 10 

Reason, supported by human experience, informs 
us that the transcendental subject coming, in time , 
into manifestation as a subject must be and is ignor¬ 
ant of what its conduct, if any, as an object in the 
objective universe will be. But human experience 
informs us the subject is a thing of conduct. And 
as it is a thing of conduct based on purpose and is 
ignorant whether its purposes will be objectified we 
must find something which causes the conduct. 

We find that hope is the foundation, the cause of 
conduct. 

Dreams on which hope is based are certainties 
whatever their content may be. If, from our position 
as dreamers, we could fully consider the wider uni¬ 
verse in which we then exist, we should probably 
find some wider transcendental hope open to us: faith 
opens transcendental hope to us. For we exist al¬ 
ways in the accomplishing in relation to transcend 
dental Being. 11 

But dreams are not founded on earthly hope unless 
they are in the form of thought related to our ob¬ 
jective universe. Such hope comes in when dreams 
are for the objective universe and the hope is that 
the internal reality of the dream may be reflected in 
external reality,—as we term it,—on the objective 
universe. 

Our consideration of ignorance and hope has led 
to the conclusion that the state of sleep is a higher 
and freer state for the subject than that of waking. 
It is an intermediate state between the state of ac¬ 
tivity in the physical universe and the state when 
the subject is free from the limitations of embodi¬ 
ment. 

The sleeping state governs the waking state; for 

10 It may possibly, in the sleeping state, use its psychical energy 
for physical energy through subjects still embodied. 

11 The “ I am ” exists in the accomplished in relation to the 
subject. 


IGNORANCE, HOPE AND FAITH 291 

the subject, waking, could not be a thing of conduct 
without its dreams as a cause of conduct. But the 
waking subject uses, for conduct, only those dreams 
which are for the objective universe: the inhibited 
form of manifestation of the subject requires only a 
small part of its dreams for its conduct inhibited in 
time and space. 

These conclusions are in accord with those arrived 
at in the first part of the book. For, therein, we gave 
the subject in the intelligible universe command over 
itself as inhibited in form in the objective universe. 
Now, by making conduct depend on hope, we streng¬ 
then the argument. For hope exists in the intel¬ 
ligible, conduct in the objective, universe. 

The sleeping state governs the waking state, for 
the universe of dreams with its free imagination is 
wider than that of the waking state. The waking state 
is a particular of the dream state, demanding for the 
conduct of the subject only imagination inhibited in 
the form of thought. The dream-state sets the subject 
free, for a time, from its labour, its conduct, in our 
little spec of the objective universe : death sets the 
subject free, altogether, from such labour. Sleep gives 
partial freedom from embodiment, death gives full 
freedom. 

The subject, ignorant of what its conduct will be, 
is moved to conduct by hope. As subjects we have 
no human experience to give us information 12 as to 
any transcendental form of hope which exists for the 
disembodied. All we can arrive at is that imagination 
being deep buried in the soul of man, with full 
memory of its embodied human experience, the soul 
has psychical energy and so, in all probability, some 
transcendental form of hope exists for it. 

But hope’with its human content? Hope, varying 
from the dream of the agricultural labourer’s wife 
that she may in time possess a parlour to the dreams 
of Utopias for mankind ? We have, in the first part. 


12 That is, apart from ecstasy. 


DREAMS 


292 

traced back this hope to the categorical imperative 
manifest in the blind desire of humanity for an ideal 
of love, beauty, truth and justice. 

Man desires the best for mankind; but, ignorant of 
how his purpose may be reflected objectively on our 
earth, his conduct has made a very hell for us all. 
Why our universe is so constituted we cannot know. 
But we can mark, down through the ages, the 
evolving increase in command of the self-conscious 
subject over its environment and so the increasing 
responsibility of mankind for existing sin and suf¬ 
fering. Nothing else ? We can mark, too, I think, 
the increasing sense of responsibility in mankind for 
the existence of sin and suffering coupled with an 
increasing sense that sin and suffering oiight not to 
be. And, I think, human experience makes us aware 
that this increasing sense of responsibility is tending 
to evolve higher and purer purpose in man, so that 
the probability increases that his conduct, based on 
purpose, will tend more and more towards the 
amelioration of our human lot. 

Dreams, in their wide universe, are really real, 
they are certainties. Even Max Stirner could not 
deny that my dreams are mine and yours are yours. 
It is the objectification of dreams on our little material 
speck of universe that is uncertain. Nothing can be 
thereon objectified without a precedent dream. Con¬ 
duct only can produce this objectification, and con¬ 
duct is uncertain in that it is based on ignorance as 
to what it will be and what its effect will be. 

Disabuse your mind of the preconceived idea 13 that 
man is no more than an embodied self. Start thought 
from the “ I am,” the soul of man. Consider this 
“ myself ” as with psychical energy and the subject 
as merely this “ myself ” manifest in time and space 
with physical energy. Then, I think, you will find 
continuity in the argument and,—instead of treating 


13 It is only an idea 


IGNORANCE, HOPE AND FAITH 293 

imagination as sheer unaccountable waste in manifest 
creation, unless inhibited in the form of thought,— 
a reasonable relation established between the subject 
of thought and the transcendental subject of imagina¬ 
tion. 

The war now raging brings us, most strangely, 
light from on high. Why such foul sin and suffer¬ 
ing should exist we know not. But, in the presence 
of death, mowing down by thousands the best of 
humanity, it is brought home to us with overwhelm¬ 
ing force that death cannot be the end, death cannot 
spell sheer waste. We stand amazed at our ignor¬ 
ance, amazed at the foulness of human conduct our 
ignorance involves us in. But, behind all our mental 
and spiritual trouble, hope still stands firm. Stands 
firm? Hope stands stronger than ever before, even 
approaches the certainty of faith. Mankind, in its 
ignorance, crushes itself remorselessly under its 
grindstone of conduct, destroys itself materially with 
the foully material. But this very sin and suffering 
sets free the spirit of man; sets it free in hope and 
faith. 

“ Lord, forgive them, for they know not what they 
do.” 

If the subject be no more than an embodied self 
of conduct, then sleep can only be regarded physio¬ 
logically; that is, as existing in states of rest for the 
restoration of physical energy. For, then, the subject 
is no more than^ a thing of conduct in the objective 
universe : its very foundation is the material, so that 
the psychical has but subjective existence, existence 
manifest in the useless and meaningless vagaries of 
imagination outside the objective universe. The ob¬ 
jections to this physiological theory have already 
been considered. 

But it is apparent, without argument, that if the 
subject be more than an embodied self it must, at 
least, exist as fully in the sleeping as in the waking 
state. For, in the sleeping state, there is merely 


294 DREAMS 

absence of power to use embodiment in the objective 
universe: the power still exists, for the self is still 
embodied. But the power is static, not dynamic. If 
the subject be merely a physiological thing, there 
is difficulty as before shown to account for states of 
unconsciousness in states of sleep. But if the really 
real subject be the “ I am ” there is no breach in 
continuity. We find in sleep continuity of self- 
consciousness still existing: it is merely that the 
subject is freed from conduct in relation to the ob¬ 
jective universe. 

Now in the first part we marked the distinction 
between the subject of instinct, that is, the subject 
without self-consciousness and the subject with self- 
consciousness. It was shown that the subject without 
self-consciousness acts and re-acts instinctively in 
relation to its environment, its conduct being deter¬ 
mined not by itself but by the laws of Nature. And 
it was shown that the conduct of the self-conscious 
subject, while subjective to the laws of Nature, uses 
the laws of Nature for its own purpose. 14 The self- 
conscious subject varies and even creates its own 
environment. 

To this subject, in the ultimate, we gave imagina¬ 
tion deep buried in it as a soul, with full memory 
of its human experience during embodiment. 

Then we traced back the conduct of the embodied 
subject to its struggle for freedom of itself as the “ I 
am,” from the inhibiting bonds of its bodily environ¬ 
ment. This struggle we found manifest in the blind 
desire which, in the ultimate, moves all humanity 
towards the transcendent goal of love, beauty, truth 
and justice. We traced back to a dream the origin 
of human conduct. 

But now we are considering, directly, the sleeping 
state. And what have we found? 

In dreams, imagination is, relatively, free. For 


14 Herein we find a definition for instinct in relation to intellectual 
operation. 


IGNORANCE, HOPE AND FAITH 295 

we dream not only of what is possible but of what is 
impossible in and for our little material world. We 
must use an inhibited form of imagination, that is, 
we must use thought, before we can objectify our 
dreams. And please bear this in mind: we use mere 
thought not because imagination is useless in itself 
unless inhibited in the form of thought, but because 
our objective universe is so small and insignificant 
that it requires only an infinitesimal part of the 
imagination of the “ I am ” in order to enable the 
subject to grapple with it. 15 

We dream : dreams are and must be facts, before 
man can, by conduct, vary or create facts in his ob¬ 
jective universe. Dreams are certain, conduct is 
uncertain. 

The subject dreams and then tries, by conduct, to 
objective his dreams. He is ignorant whether his 
conduct will be successful. What nerves him to 
conduct ? Hope, real hope, that he may succeed in 
objectifying his dreams. 

It follows that the state of sleep is more real and 
free than the state of waking. For in sleep dreams 
are free from inhibition to what is possible in and 
for the objective universe. It is only when awake, 
when a thing of dynamic conduct, that the subject 
is faced by the impossible. The impossible arises 
only when we find it impossible to make certain real 
dreams exist objectively in or in relation to that little 
speck of materiality which we term our objective 
universe. It is to the dreams themselves we can 
give reality, not to their content: waking we are not 
in a state to judge the content. The object now in 
view is to point out that when we use the relative 
terms possible and impossible, the standard of possi¬ 
bility we judge by is objective. We hold a “ thing ” 
possible or impossible as it is possible or impossible 
in the objective universe. 


15 The materialist must treat imagination, unless inhibited in 
the form of thought, as sheer waste which cannot be accounted for. 


2 9 6 DREAMS 

But hope is concrete, it does not transcend pres¬ 
entation. Any particular conduct having purpose to 
some particular variation or creation in the objective 
universe or to purpose in relation to one’s fellow-men, 
arises from some definite, concrete hope. What then 
is the genesis of these forms of hope ? Again we 
find it is in blind desire, in transcendent hope, for 
the ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice. The 
argument for the sleeping state is the same as that 
already given for the waking state. But we find, 
too, that the realm of dreams opens a wider and freer 
universe to the subject: in this realm ignorance so 
far as the objective universe is concerned is absent. 

And, I think, the wider and freer state of dream¬ 
land is seen from another point of regard. 

The mystery of Our Lord’s supreme sacrifice shows 
us that spiritual advance lies through the suffering 
of physical ill. Down through the ages it is marked 
that he who forgets himself and, under God, lives 
for the betterment of humanity, must suffer some 
form of martyrdom. There is the beast in man which 
leads him to think only of himself as a separate 
entity from humanity at large and so to regard his 
fellows as but things existing and to be used solely 
for his own personal benefit. 

But where do we find the beast in man ? In his 
dreams, waking or sleeping ? No. Dreams waking 
or sleeping are harmless. Man can only manifest 
the beast in him after objectifying his dreams. 
Dreams must be objectified before man can martyr 
his fellow-man : physical evil has existence only in 
the objective universe. 16 In the wide realm of dream¬ 
land physical evil sinks back into a mere burden of 
the flesh borne for but a little passing time in space. 
Even waking we may look back on past human suf¬ 
fering as best for us ,—forsan et haec olim meminisse 
juvabit. It is only for the embodied self we can speak 

16 It is for this reason the despised and rejected can, by the 
spiritual, transcend physical evil. 


IGNORANCE, HOPE AND FAITH 297 

of the beast in man : for its existence there must be 
human conduct: in the realm of dreams, human 
conduct is in abeyance. Herein, again, we find that 
the sleeping is a wider and fuller state than that of 
waking. 

But it may be objected that dreamland opens to 
us dreams of suffering, even of horror; and this is 
true. 17 But most of such dreams are not pure dreams, 
they are dreams set up by physical environment,— 
Nicolai’s dreams, so far as set-up by a disordered 
stomach, give a case in point. 

Some of such dreams, however, arise from mental 
disturbance. It is in the memory of no few of us 
that children were once 18 imbued with living horror 
of hell as a future. They were taught that the re¬ 
sults of our Lord’s mystic sacrifice was that salvation 
was offered to us all, but that the offer was coupled 
with the threat that rejection meant everlasting 
misery. And they were taught that as millions on 
millions reject the offer, the probable result of the 
supreme sacrifice was that a majority of mankind 
were, by the sacrifice itself, doomed to eternal per¬ 
dition. 

Such teaching certainly must give rise to dreams, 
to dreams of suffering, even horror. And the dreams 
are not confined to childhood. 

But such dreams are not pure dreams; they are 
dreams coloured by, set up by, environment. The 
teaching impresses those taught with a preconceived 
idea of the ruthless cruelty of the Almighty and the 
preconceived idea may be so strong as to inhibit 
insight from getting through, to inhibit the full play 
3f insight. Many, many children, troubled by 
teaching of a personal devil, have prayed in secret 
to God for the poor, forlorn, hopeless creature; have 
3ven told God they cannot be happy though in 


17 The sexual theory of Freud is not, I think, supported by human 
;xperience, so it is ignored. 

18 Even now the same teaching may be extant. 


21 


298 DREAMS 

heaven while that poor wretch burns in everlasting 
flames. Children are logical, they are fully aware 
in their dream-land of a real reality where the con¬ 
tradictions that shackled thought sets up vanish into 
thin air: they feel transcendental Being. It is man 
who, in his ignorance, imbues his fellows with false 
anthropomorphic ideas of the ultimate and so makes 
them subject to false preconceived ideas which warp 
insight. The suffering, the horror of dreams has 
origin not in dreams themselves but in the colour 
given them by false anthropomorphic preconceived 
ideas. 

Hope, with faith in the background, gives rise to 
all conduct: ignorance exists in relation to conduct. 
This is why conduct fails to fulfil hope. 

Our master is hope and we want to be good work¬ 
men. But we are clumsy with our tools, ignorant 
how rightly to use them. The tools are sharp and 
well adapted for their master’s purpose. But we, 
ignorant, can only understand that purpose dimly so 
that we cut and wound ourselves and our fellows as 
we labour. 

But, faced on earth with ignorance, hope and 
faith, I think we can see some movement towards 
our transcendental ideal. Mankind grows more fully 
aware of its own ignorance, more fully aware that 
sin and suffering arise from this ignorance. And, 
so, it tends to take on its own shoulders, not leave 
on the devil’s, the burden of sin and suffering. So 
long as mankind denies this burden is its own, so 
long it will regard the devil as carrier. And the 
devil is ready and willing to protect the existence of 
evil for ever and a day. 

Christian carried his burden of sin and suffering 
on his own shoulders; he did not employ the devil 
to walk by his side and carry it for him. Christian, 
himself, after spiritual advance through physical evil, 
was able at last to cast away the burden. On the 
devil’s shoulders it would have remained through 
eternity. 


IGNORANCE, HOPE AND FAITH 299 

Carrying each his own burden of ignorance we 
must all plod forward through our earthly slough of 
despond stumbling and hurting ourselves by the way, 
stumbling against and hurting our fellows by the 
way. But always our eyes are fixed on, are guided 
by hope and faith. Hope shines eternal, timeless in 
the supreme. Most surely the slough of despond 
must be traversed, but it has to be traversed in time 
and in time we cast off our burden of ignorance. 

Sin as we may, suffer as we may, we have done 
our duty if, in our path through the slough of de¬ 
spond, we leave but one footprint of firmer ground 
for the easier passage of after pilgrims. Hope and 
faith remain for us eternal: human ignorance is but 
a passing ill of passing embodiment. Even when 
embodied we cannot exhaust thought. On the con¬ 
trary, the more we discover the greater is the vista 
opened to us for further discovery. This in itself 
points to the eternity of hope. 


DREAMS 


The argument so far as it has proceeded gives, if 
sound, evidential proof that dreams of sleep and 
waking thoughts are the same in kind. So hereafter 
the term “ dreams ” will be used as an inclusive 
term; that is, as covering waking thoughts. 

But dreams sometimes are within the purview of 
ideas and sometimes transcend the purview of ideas. 
I suggest now to divide dreams into dreams of phan¬ 
tasy and fancy: dreams of phantasy transcending the 
purview of ideas, 1 dreams of fancy marking dreams 
within the purview of ideas but coloured by imagina¬ 
tion. 

What is meant by ideas “ coloured by imagina¬ 
tion ” is this: Even when we think, we find thought 
with a background of insight. We think of—in 
ordinary parlance we imagine—space and time other 
than our own; we think in opposition to the tortoise 
form of evolution we, embodied, are subject to; we 
think ourselves other human personalities than those 
we are confined to in our space and time. There is 
something in us, at the background, which revolts 
against our human limitations,—even for thought 
imagination, beyond the purview of ideas, “ gets 
through ” and colours ideas. 

The argument, also, has offered evidential proof 
that the purposes of the subject’s conduct are realities 
for the subject, while its conduct towards the objec¬ 
tifying of purpose is subjective to this reality. For 
the subject is ignorant whether its conduct will fulfil 


l Bear in mind insight transcends ideas. 
300 


DREAMS 301 

its purpose: it is hope that its purpose may be ob- 
jectived that moves it to conduct. This hope, which 
is the foundation of conduct, could not exist without 
ignorance. The self-conscious subject differs radi¬ 
cally from the subject which is not self-conscious. 
Self-consciousness, a groundless certainty, enables 
the subject to change and even create its own en¬ 
vironments, a power non-existent in the subject which 
is not self-conscious. But the self-conscious subject 
must purpose to so change or create before it can 
do anything, and when it sets out to do anything it 
is hope of doing that inspires it,—not knowledge 
that it will succeed. 

Dreams involving hope are the genesis of the con¬ 
duct of the self-conscious subject. But there are 
dreams which end as dreams and result in no con¬ 
duct : such dreams are realities not followed by any 
resulting so-termed realities in conduct. The form 
of our infinitesimally small speck of objective uni¬ 
verse remains in such case unaffected. Whether such 
dreams have or have not effect in the wider universe 
of dreamland we cannot know. But do not forget 
these are dreams of insight transcending knowledge. 

Let us consider, first, dreams of fancy, that is, 
dreams within the purview of ideas. 

Such dreams are part of human experience. But 
the human experience of such dreams of each one 
of us differs,—from that of any Mr. Gradgrind to that 
of Coleridge. So when we refer to human experience 
we must refer to it as the average experience of the 
average man. 

The importance of dreams of fancy for our present 
argument lies in this: They show a revolt of the 
dreamer against the material limitations of his em¬ 
bodied personality; revolt against the restrictions of 
time and space and the subjection of evolution to 
tortoise time. 

This revolt is part of us as subjects, and how can 
it be an implicit part if the subject be no more than 


DREAMS 


302 

an embodied self ? For the embodied self all such 
dreams are mere surplusage. Where, then, do they 
come from ? What is their cause, their effect ? If 
there be nothing at all existing for the subject out¬ 
side embodiment, how can such dreams arise? 


ROMANCE AND FAIRIE 1 


Our daily life is really one of jog-trot romance and 
fairie. For we are not creatures of conduct; our 
conduct is based on imagination and imagination has 
for such content not what will be but what may be. 
Our real daily dreams of what may be are never fully 
accomplished in any reality of our objective universe. 

Excavate to its foundation human delight in ro¬ 
mance and fairie. It will be found to be built on 
revolt against the preposterous limitations in time 
of each one of us to one body and against our sub¬ 
jection to the tortoise progress of evolution : there is 
revolt against the unkind limitations of time and 
space. The subject feels it is more than a chrysalis 
and wants to break its bonds and be free. It feels 
there is something in it which ought to be free. 

The child entering on bodily life rejoices in its 
new plaything, the body. It moves the thing, makes 
it walk, laugh and cry, it exercises with delight its 
power to move other things in relation to its new 
plaything, the body. But, soon, the new come sub¬ 
ject feels a want: it finds itself, as a subject of 
imagination, hampered by its new plaything, the 
body. It thinks itself at the moon : why is it not 
there? It ought to be there, it is there in reality, 
in thought. And yet it cannot get away from its new 
plaything. For the body puts on the brake against 
the travel of thought. 

Note.—When I wrote this Chapter I had not read Stewart’s 
“ Myths of Plato.” If the reader will refer to Page 6 of the 
above work he will find a marked coincidence. 

303 


304 DREAMS 

And as we, still children, grow older ? We dream 
and our dreams are real, real in freedom from the 
bodily oppression which inhibits full self-conscious¬ 
ness. Perhaps we tell someone of our dreams: we 
are whipped or warned against nonsense or—worst 
of all—laughed at. So, as a rule, we tell no one of 
our clreams. 

And what are our dreams, our earliest dreams ? 
Dreams of ourselves, of reality; dreams amid clouds 
of glory which roll away when we are faced by the 
waking world. And later dreams of manhood? 
Dreams of revolt against the objective universe, of 
revolt against ourselves as objects therein. Dreams 
where we are Kings or Queens, 2 3 the whole world 
rich and happy, beautiful and true,—even we our¬ 
selves, though really Kings or Queens, making a 
pretence of not being richer or happier, more beauti¬ 
ful or truthful than our subjects. 

In fairy tales and, often, in romance we find mani¬ 
fest this revolt against the tortoise progression of 
evolution and our preposterous restriction to the 
limits of our body. We know the truth as children, 
sneakingly believe in it during manhood and, with 
hope, return to it in old age. For, in old age, our 
power as things of conduct begins to fail and we are 
driven to fall back on our higher selves. 8 In truth 
we feel that evolution is but a slothful thing of time 
and our bodies but “occasions ” in time for human 
conduct. 

Before Lewis Carroll the giant Emanuel Kant is 
but a puling child in long-clothes. The philosophy 
of Alice in Wonderland transcends the Critique of 
Pure Reason. 4 


2 Even in these dreams we, each one of us, want personally to 
lead the way to love, beauty, truth, and justice. 

9 In age the universe of objects takes on more and more a form of 
unreality, while the universe of insight becomes more and more 
real. 

* The Gryphon understood much more clearly than the human 
being, Alice, that nothing can be done without a purpose—it even 
showed transcendent freedom in spelling. 

3 03 


ROMANCE AND FAIRIE 305 

The freedom, for us, of romance, the restrictions 
of the objective, are well shown in Alice’s waking 
stage:— 

“ ‘ Who cares for you ? ’ said Alice (she had grown 
to her full size by this time). ‘ You’re nothing but 
a pack of cards! ’ ” 

She was coming back to poor human thought: she 
was now but Alice, fixed as before in size, in time 
and space; cards were but cards. She was leaving 
reality for the narrow prison of the objective. But, 
still, as her sister kissed her, she woke to love: she 
found love even on earth. 

But while she slept ? While she herself and her 
imagination were free, unrestrained by the common¬ 
place motion of her brain and its tortoise tyrant, 
evolution ? 

Something interesting was always going to hap¬ 
pen. What was going to happen she knew not, but 
she had always calm content in certainty that what¬ 
ever happened would be interesting. And it always 
was interesting,—and still is, even to you and me. 
And it was interesting to Alice because she was free 
from the common jog-trot of her waking life, and it 
is interesting to you and me because we, in reading 
about it all, are fi£e in imagination from the common 
jog-trot of our waking life. In reading, even time, 
evolution, the very laws of Nature bind us no longer; 
for our imagination is free. Such holidays “out of 
bounds ’’ are always interesting. 

The white rabbit with pink eyes that Alice first 
meets does just what all rabbits ought to do: it talks. 
It is rather funny for it to take a watch out of its 
waistcoat pocket, but still quite possible and extreme¬ 
ly interesting. And then Alice simply does what 
she ought to be able to do when awake,—she follows 
the rabbit down its hole. And then how reasonably 
she falls down the well! Not with a crash under the 
silly law of gravity, but so smoothly and slowly that 
she has time as she falls to see all sorts of funny 
and interesting things and think all sorts of funny 


DREAMS 


306 

and interesting thoughts. And then the long pas¬ 
sage and the little gold key and the peep through 
the little door into the loveliest garden you ever saw! 
How could she do and see such interesting things 
unless dreams were kind enough to carry her away 
from our fond little jog-trot world ? 

And though Alice cried because she was too big 
to get through the door, she knew she was going to 
get through somehow,—her size did not matter in 
such a sensible place. And, of course, she did get 
through; imagination, free from the servitude of 
matter, carried her through. And then? 

She was free: free in imagination. She was al¬ 
ways the same Alice; she had been still herself, even 
when she feared she might be someone else and was 
growing up bigger than an elephant or growing 
down smaller than a mouse. It was always she 
herself who was thinking she might be someone else: 
she only thought about change of body. And she 
was always in some interesting place, though she 
did not get directly to the loveliest garden you ever 
saw. 

The delightfullest part of the adventure, though, 
was the pleasure found in companionship. Alice 
made up all the people she saw and they were all 
made up of her, and she was made up of them : they 
were a happy family all living not in themselves but 
in one another. And they were all free and most 
interesting. The very first companions she met, the 
duck, the mouse, the Dodo and their companions, 
just took what bodies were most interesting and all 
manifested supraliminal intelligence in that they 
recognised the dryness of history as it is writ and 
the silliness of its dryness,—dryness which could 
not even dry feathers or fur or clothes! 

And how sensible the rabbit was in understanding 
it couldn’t burn down Alice and the house because, 
if it did, Alice would set Dinah loose! And how 
wise the baby in turning into a pig so that it might 
be a handsome pig and not grow up an ugly baby. 


ROMANCE AND FAIRIE 307 

nd the Cheshire cat ? It was natural, of course, 
tough a little puzzling, for it to appear and vanish 
) suddenly. Its habit, though, of leaving a grin 
shind it without a cat, was most interesting. 

And the Mad Hatter, the March Hare, the Queen 
id the King, the Duchess, the Knave of Hearts, 
id soup transcendently made of pepper ? All dream- 
^alities in their kingdom of her imagination : dream- 
;alities which a poor waking thing like you or myself 
are not even dream of shackling in the bonds of 
lought,—as well might a slug try to capture a wire- 
ss message running round the world. For all these 
things ” are Alice and are not Alice; time and space 
id the laws of our evolutionary universe do not bind 
tern : Alice herself is free. 

And, if you please, how could you and I criticize 
lese dreams, even if we dared ? From what point 
: view ? A dreamer dreamt them and,—scien- 
fically!—from her point of view they were objec- 
vely real! How could you or I, waking, and so 
Dund down to the inhibition of thought, reasonably 
idge the human experience of one free in imagina- 
on ? I do not suggest, for one moment, that Alice’s 
iventures were real, but then, also, I do not sug- 
est for one moment they were unreal: that is my 
Dint. What I deny is our right, waking, to criticize 
; all. Blinded, spiritually, by the inhibitions of 
jr waking state we can no more use our ideas for 
>und criticism of dreams than a mole can judge 
)undly of daylight experience. 

Assume, for the moment, that you have died and 
lat, disembodied, you are no longer a thing of con- 
uct in the objective universe. And assume you can 
:ill think, in remembrance, of your past human 
tperience. Assume further that in relation to your 
ow wider personality, you regard your past human 
tperience as a dream. Whose dream was it? 
'ours. Because, disembodied, it is a dream to you, 
oes this affect the fact that while you were in the 
Ddy it was all objectively true? Unless you make 



308 DREAMS 

self-consciousness a function of waking bodily fori 
there is no reply to the above statement. And, 
self-consciousness be such a function, you do n 
continue in being when disembodied; that is, you 1 
longer exist. And, as you no longer exist, you ca 
not answer the question I put to you! 

If the subject were a mere “ thing ” of the o 
jective universe and its laws, it could not procet 
beyond the limits of its being. But romance ar 
fairie prove that it does proceed beyond such limit 

When we consider the romance of life general! 
we find the same difficulty in the way for those w! 
hold we are mere embodied selves, existing on 
during embodiment. For romance colours the liv< 
of all, if in differing degree, from the dreams of tl 
guttersnipe round his “ penny dreadful ” to Col 
ridge’s dream of Kubla Khan. And all such dreari 
ing must be treated by the materialist as me: 
extraneous ‘ ‘ stuff, ’ ’ useless to the scheme of creatioi 
For, in a universe of a closed circle of moments < 
evolution and devolution, where are these dreams 
What part have they in evolution and devolution 
The materialist must necessarily hold they have r 
part at all; that they are mere extraneous “ stuff. 
But is not his position open to attack ? If, for ii 
stance, it be admitted by him that the ideas calk 
up by reading the penny dreadful have affected t! 
after-conduct of the guttersnipe, a fact hard to I 
denied, it must also be admitted that conduct is sul 
jective to ideas. Even in so extreme a case we fin 
the subject in the intelligible universe, holding swa 
over itself as one in the objective universe. 

But now let us consider our dreams of romano 
waking or sleeping, generally, and let us try to fin 
out what “ I am ” is. 

It has been said there are three John Smiths: or 
known to himself, one to his fellows, one to his Got 
Is this statement correct? Even if correct must 
not be read: There are three forms of manifestatic 


ROMANCE AND FAIRIE 


309 


personality for John Smith, one known to himself, 
3 to his fellows, one to his God ? Even so ex- 
:ssed its truth is doubtful, although in such form 
emphasize the fact that one really real John Smith 
1st be the foundation of the three forms of mani- 
tation. Still, even so, I think its truth doubtful, 
[n searching for Human Documents, that is, for 
ly honest records by human beings, revealing fully 
w they appear to themselves in fact, I have found 
ly three . 3 Good as so many other records are, 
y all, I think, involve some amount of self- 
imatization. John Smith not only does not know 
nself, but won’t know himself. He is made up 
his dreams, not of what he is, but of what he 
^ht to be or wants to be : he regards his environ- 
nt as sheer accident and finds himself as more real 
his dreams than he is as an object in his objective 
iverse. Charles Dickens, far away in the realm 
imagination, with his comrades Pickwick, Micaw- 
•, Tom Pinch, and their fellows around him, 
rked the real Charles Dickens. On the stage of 
n with a black, black coat starred by a red, red 
e, a staring, fixed, oiled curl each side of his face, 
very wrinkles theatrical, there was but the pathetic 
ible material of genius: the real Dickens never 
od there. 

Vnd you, sir or madam, who read, content as you 
y be with your earthly lot, do you not feel that 
ne change, however slight, in your environment 
Lild enable you yourself to find fuller expression ? 
p you the thing that is, or the thing that might 
or ought to be ? Do you not feel in you that you 
lly are the thing that might be, if environment 
e favourable ? 

Ve none of us rest content with ourselves as we 
; in the objective universe. We dramatize our- 

j(i) The Life of Benvenuto Cellini, (2) the Journal of Marie 
ikirtseff, and (3) Memoires de General Marbot, 


3 io DREAMS 

selves to ourselves, find our real existence in drearr 
not in objective waking reality. 

Thus dramatization of what ought to be may le; 
to discontent ending in despair. But far, far mo 
often it is this consciousness of what ought to be f 
oneself that leads to conduct in exercising the pow 
innate in man to change* and create his own enviro 
ment: to so change and create that the “ I am ” 
each of us,—the “ I am ” we try to dramatize 
fact,—may have greater freedom. 

In any case, this discontent with our personalit 
as manifest in bodily form, is meaningless was 
unless it marks in fact the struggle of some real 
real personality for freedom. The romance of life 
real; environment is accidental. 

Again, as you really exist, are you known to yo 
fellows ? Is there any one of you who will affir 
that in society he reveals himself as he really is ai 
tells those round him what he really thinks abo 
them ? Why, the very first thing we teach a chi 
is reticence,—the truthful child is an enfant terribt 
I would not suggest for a moment that reticence 
not advisable. Kant himself, while pointing out t) 
dangers, has pointed out also the benefits arisir 
from subservience to public opinion. The only poi 
I make is that the personality you offer to your f< 
lows is not that of yourself, even as known to yoi 
self, but a self-dramatization of yourself. 

And the John Smith known to his God? 

If there be no God and you rely on the beautif 
expression of elan vital as explaining all thing 
then no question arises. 6 But if there be a Go 
transcendental Being? 

Are you known to God as an infinitesimal spe 
of matter confined to conduct, the result of which 


6 In such case you make the impersonal evolve in your self-c 
sciousness. What do you mean? How could the impersonal e: 
for you unless you were precedently self-conscious? 


ROMANCE AND FAIRIE 311 

iknown to you ? Are you, to yourself , nothing 
3re than this Lilliput of conduct ? Where, in such 
se, is your imagination of what you might or ought 
be ? Where are your dreams, your romance of 
e ? How can you explain the bond that exists 
tween you and your fellows, manifest in you in 
>pe for their welfare ? How explain the conduct 
those who have deliberately placed on their own 
oulders and carried through earthly life, a cross of 
rrow and suffering ? Men who have sacrificed 
emselves to relieve their brethren ? How explain 
>ur own admiration for these fellow-altruists ? 

For all of us, as part of us, there is this romance, 
is self-dramatization. The “ I am ” exists and 
ruggles for self-expression. Each of us makes a 
shot ” by self-dramatization for freedom as the “ I 
n ” : slowly and painfully in time we grow better 
arksmen, but only in the supreme is the bull’s-eye 
ruck. 

In romance, in self-dramatization, the subject 
oves beyond his inhibited purview as a mere object 
the objective universe. He gets nearer to himself 
an he can in mere earthly conduct, though his duty 
3 S through such conduct. 

The really real John Smith is found in dreamland. 

The romance, the glamour of love, marks the soul 
1 man. From whence arises the contentment, the 
rength that the man and woman who love find in 
)mpanionship ? 7 There may be conflict of intellect 
3tween the two, difference in human aim, even no 
keness in choice of companionship. And yet these 
mtradictions may even increase the contentment 
id happiness each finds in the other’s company. 8 
Ve cannot trace the result to sexual or intellectual 
eling, we must go deeper into personality. 

7 This may occur between two of the same sex. 

8 “ For it carrieth a burden without being burdened, and maketh 
1 that which is bitter sweet and savoury.” 


DREAMS 


312 

The cause, I think, is thus found:— 

Each of us is the more content and the stronge 
as a personality as he is freer to express himself no 
only to others but to himself. The man in the society 
of the woman he loves 9 finds himself exceptionally 
free to express himself: he finds sympathy, sympathy 
transcending sexual attraction or any intellectua 
satisfaction from agreement in mere thought. Hi: 
dreams, his romance are hers,—and in mutual lov< 
her dreams, her romance are his. The bond existing 
between all human beings is, as it were, objectifiec 
on earth for these two. The two find in dreamlanc 
the reality of existence so that, in the presence ol 
love, mere earthly lot falls back into maya. 

Civilized man tries to destroy and vulgarize love,— 
Francis Galton, even, partially justifies the “ man oi 
ancient lineage ” who marries an heiress to suppori 
his house. And you who read, how do you regarc 
marriage? You may read and cry over King 
Cophetua and the beggar-maiden, but, if the choice 
were to come to you or yours, how would you, by 
conduct, decide? 

But still love lives on : it is the romance of life, it 
is the leading reality of dreamland. Even for those 
coupled together by wealth, rank, propinquity, or 
sexual bodily attraction, love remains a reality of 
dreamland: the very thought of what might have 
been strengthens the hope of what may still be in 
the future. Consider the woman hopeless in her 
marriage. What does hopeless mean ? It means 
that still in her is the contradiction, hope; the one 
is meaningless without the other in mind. Her hope¬ 
lessness of what is, exists in contradiction to her hope 
of what may still be. 

We are not personalities manifest in the knowledge 
of ourselves, the knowledge of our fellows and the 
knowledge of God. We are more than mere bodily 
things. 


9 The same is true if the sexes be reversed. 


ROMANCE AND FAIRIE 313 

It is in romance and fairie, in self-dramatization, 
that we most clearly, if still dimly, find our really 
real selves. The “ I am,” for us, simply is: a 
groundless certainty. And this groundless certainty 
must be for the vitality of our dreams of romance and 
fairie. 


22 



THE LIMITS OF ROMANCE AND FAIRIE 


Let us now consider how far Romance and Fairie sc 
far as they are matters of record proceed beyond the 
limits of the objective universe. 

The originators have indulged, as far as they can 
in phantasy: they have been in revolt against the 
tortoise evolution, the limits of time and space, the 
restriction of the self to one body : they have ever 
freed themselves from the laws of Nature. 

But these men have written down or spoken all the) 
have imagined; they have recorded their imagining! 
for the benefit of others. And words, spoken oi 
written, can do what ? Express ideas: they can dc 
no more. They can state the fact of insight but the) 
cannot deal with insight as they can with ideas. 1 

Romance and Fairie, therefore, only expres; 
imagination in the language of thought, though the) 
mark the revolt above written of. In fact, we an 
not, as yet, considering the full phantasy of dreams 
we are considering only the phantasy of dreams S( 
far as it can be reduced to writing or speech. Thi: 
is why I term such dreams dreams of fancy. Then 
is phantasy at their back but they are recorded mereh 
as coloured by imagination. 

Now, how do we ordinarily judge romance ant 
fairie ? As records of unreality, as excursions o 
imagination into the impossible. But, even so, w< 


l Writing and speech can only establish intercourse between sul 
jects to make others aware of one’s own ideas. Ideas preced 
writing or speech. 


3 M 


LIMITS OF ROMANCE AND FAIRIE 315 

make a distinction. When old Mother Shipton wrote 
of carriages moving without horses, and of ships fly¬ 
ing in the air, what she wrote was, at the time, treated 
as impossible romance. When, in after time, her 
imaginings became objectively real, we thought of 
her writing as prophetic. We ordinarily judge ro¬ 
mance and fairie from the point of view that nothing 
can be real unless it is or can be objectively real, it 
is so we distinguish between ,the possible and im¬ 
possible. 

But we have already shown the subjection of the 
objective to the intelligible universe. 2 Not only this: 
we have already shown that we have power to think 
about the objective universe because it is governed by 
the laws of Nature which have existence only in the 
intelligible universe. The very foundation for our 
ordinary consideration of Romance and Fairie is un¬ 
stable because nothing is possible in the objective 
universe unless made possible, previously, in the in¬ 
telligible universe. The possibilities of the objective 
universe are dependent on possibilities in the intelli¬ 
gible universe. 

Human experience informs us that man can im¬ 
agine a flying carpet or a flying trunk quite as easily 
as he can imagine a flying aeroplane : he can imagine 
“ the seven-leagued boots ” as easily as any 100 miles 
locomotive engine : he can imagine he is “ puss in 
boots ” or a mighty jin shut up in a tiny bottle as 
easily as that he is himself in human form : he can 
imagine sudden, not evolutionary, change. Imagin¬ 
ation outruns human experience. 

Now, if with Spinoza, we hold imagination to be a 
mere process of fictitious image-making, a travesty of 
things as they are, we treat this great power which the 
subject has as mere surplusage. Human experience 
is largely made up of phantasy, and if phantasy, 

2 A thing must be, to us, real in the intelligible before it can be 
real in the objective universe. 


3 i6 DREAMS 

which includes fancy, is mere surplusage, all this 
part of human experience is sheer waste. 3 

But imagination cannot be treated as mere surplus¬ 
age : man could have created no new object in the 
objective universe without some exercise of the power. 
So we must read Spinoza’s objection as meaning 
“ imagination is a mere process of fictitious image 
making unless the image it makes is one capable of 
existence as an object in the objective universe.” 

But, even so, how can we distinguish between the 
two forms of imagination, the possible and impos¬ 
sible? Was Daedalus’s imagination of flight mere 
surplusage because it ended in the death of Icarus, 
and Wright’s imagination not mere surplusage be¬ 
cause it has enabled so many to fly without losing 
their lives? If Faraday had fully imagined his dy¬ 
namo and then died and no dynamo had ever been 
made an object in the objective universe, can we hold 
his imagining would have been mere surplusage ? 
Faraday, as a self-conscious subject, used thought 
for immediate creation in the intelligible universe : 
his after creation in the objective universe was medi¬ 
ate. If there was any surplusage it was in the 
mediate creation. 

And what do we mean by surplusage? We mean 
that the vast power of imagination implanted in man, 
which is free from the limits of our little objective 
universe and free even from its laws, is absolute waste 
unless it can be used for the mediate “ occasion in 
time ” of our little material universe. What we 
really do is to make the subject a mere embodiment in 
the objective universe and then, faced by the indubit¬ 
able human experience of imagination, we are obliged 
to treat imagination as mere surplusage because it is 
in contradiction to our definition. 

Now, following out what it is assumed has been 

3 Herein a breach with Spinoza is marked. But I doubt if he 
ever worried out what the meaning is of “things as they are.” 
He was not a materialist. 


LIMITS OF ROMANCE AND FAIRIE 317 

already proved, let us consider Romance and Fairie 
from another point of view. 4 

The subject has the real power of imagination, the 
thinking subject exercises this power in the inhibited 
form of thought. For thought is correlated to motion 
of the brain and the brain is an object in the objective 
universe. The thinking subject is an inhibited form 
of the subject of imagination : imagination is the 
foundation of thought. So, even when exercising 
thought about the objective universe, the imagination 
of the subject beyond the purview of thought can still 
“ colour ” or “ play round ” the objective universe, 
[f the subject were merely a thinking subject it could 
only think about the objective universe as presented : 
: or in such case imagination would exist only in the 
nhibited form of thought. But human experience 
nforms us that the subject can exercise imagination 
:o colour its thought in relation to the universe as 
oresented : Romance and Fairie prove this. 

If we give reality to imagination in relation to 
hought as an inhibited form of imagination, we get 
*id of the difficulty of having to treat imagination as 
lealing with the possible and impossible. Imagin- 
ition is not only possible but is a fact for us all. 
rhere is no difference, in kind, between imagination 
>f the seven leagued boots and a locomotive engine : 
>efore either can become an object in our universe, it 
nust be created in imagination. The one can, the 
)ther cannot, become an object in our universe simply 
jecause of the limitations of our universe : that is the 
>nly distinction. 

If you object that the idea of seven leagued boots 
s sheerly nonsensical and I ask for a reply, the only 
eply you can give is that it is nonsensical because 
even leagued boots cannot be made an object in our 
miverse : no other reply is open to you : for you have 
magined seven leagued boots. Underlying your 


4 We still do not yet consider the full phantasy of dreams. 


DREAMS 


318 

reply is an assumption that our universe presents to 
us the only real reality. And for this assumption the 
sole ground you have is your experience as an em¬ 
bodied subject, whereas your own imagination carries 
you beyond the objective universe. Naturally, you 
must treat this imagination as mere surplusage, when 
you regard yourself as no more than an embodied 
thing. 

But, again, it may be urged that an aeroplane, 
locomotive engine or dynamo has meaning for you, 
while a flying carpet, seven leagued boots or the unem¬ 
bodied smile of a Cheshire cat has no meaning for 
you. And in this way it may be urged that the argu¬ 
ment carries us into the realms of the fictitious. And 
if by the fictitious is meant that which is impossible 
in or for the objective universe, the argument is 
sound. But unless the whole argument adduced is 
unsound, a full reply is possible. The argument 
throughout has been evolutionary. 

The subjection of the objective universe to the in¬ 
telligible universe 5 has been established. The power 
of insight is possessed by the subject and through 
that power the subject is aware of its limitations of 
thought. Thought has been shown to be an inhib¬ 
ition of imagination, and it has been shown that our 
power over and our thought about the objective uni¬ 
verse are rendered possible by this correlation be¬ 
tween thought and motion : it is by this correlation 
that the objective universe can be an “ occasion ” for 
thought and ideas can be objectified. 

But now a consideration of Romance and Fairie 
has carried us beyond the occasion of our objective 
universe; we have seen that, even when exercising 
thought, thought itself is coloured by imagination ; 
that is, when exercising thought we are, in relation 
to the objective universe , carried into the realms of 
the fictitious. 


5 The laws of Nature exist in the intelligible universe. 


LIMITS OF ROMANCE AND FAIRIE 319 

What, then, do we mean by the fictitious? We 
mean no more than something which is outside any 
possible explanation to be drawn from the objective 
universe. The fictitious means simply that we are 
aware, beyond the purview of ideas, of the limited 
lature of our objective universe,—that we are faced 
?y Carlyle’s “ damned continued fraction.” But 
imagination must be inhibited in the form of thought 
aefore the objective universe can be an “ occasion ” 
or imagination to touch it. So imagination, not so 
nhibited, must transcend the mediate Occasion. The 
;olouring of thought by imagination must be fictiti¬ 
ous if we accept the definition of fictitious which has 
oeen given. Where then is the present argument? 

The argument is that the “ I am ” exists, it exists 
vith the power of phantasy or unrestrained imagin- 
ition. What then is its experience ? 

This experience is unknown to us, except in the 
nhibited form of human experience, but we are 
iware of the fact that it exists because our thought is 
coloured by imagination transcending the occasion of 
our objective universe. The “ I am ” exists in the 
iccomplishing and so has experience, though such 
ixperience transcends human experience, transcends 
ill ideas. 

We can neither judge Romance and Fairie as fic- 
itious or not fictitious. For we cannot judge them 
it all: it is reason that makes us aware of this. 

When a subject thinks about anything in agree¬ 
ment or possible of agreement with its experience of 
:he objective universe, such thought is said to be 
reasonable : we have seen that such thought must 
ixist before objectification. When a subject thinks 
ibout anything not in agreement or in possible agree¬ 
ment with its experience of the objective universe its 
hought is said to be unreasonable. But the subject 
does think thus unreasonably. How then can such 
hought arise ? It can only be from free imagination 
colouring imagination inhibited in the form of 




320 DREAMS ' 

thought: it results from the influence of imagination 
beyond the limits of thought. 

All these “ imaginative ” ideas are, in relation to 
human experience of the universe as presented, un¬ 
reasonable, ridiculous, preposterous, fictitious,—add 
any terms that occur to you. But these ideas are 
yours and they are necessarily unreasonable etc. in 
relation to our little objective universe for the simple 
reason that they have little or nothing to do with it. 
If “ something ” exist beyond the purview of know¬ 
ledge, any experience of it must be, in relation to the 
known, unreasonable and fictitious. Why confine 
imagination to its reflection on the infinitesimally 
small speck of material on which we exist in the 
body ? 6 

Consider an anthropomorphic analogy. A man 
existed two thousand years ago. He dreamt and 
dreamt he lived in our present time. He found him¬ 
self, in his dream, travelling swiftly and noiselessly 
in a carriage with nothing propelling him. Over his 
head were men flying like birds : he was in darkness 
when suddenly a great sunlike ball above, untouched 
by hands, blazed down light: he was in Rome and 
his wife from Constantinople was talking into his 
ear : before his eyes was a moving picture showing 
in detail his marriage ceremony which, to him, was 
ten years past and gone : he was in a battle and the 
gods from above and from below the land and sea 
were dealing out death and destruction. 

Then he awoke and told his dream. As reason¬ 
able ? No. As unreasonable, ridiculous, prepos¬ 
terous, fictitious,—add any abusive terms that occur 
to you. 7 

6 Laurie in his Synthetica while admitting that the mystic is 
supremely right says :—“ In one aspect of things, indeed, reason is 
an impertinence.” I would rather say that the highest exercise of 
reason is in making us aware of our power of insight and so of the 
limitation of our power of thought. 

7 Cf. Edgar Allan Poe’s Thousand and Second Night. 


LIMITS OF ROMANCE AND FAIRIE 321 

But how do we, living now, regard his dream? 
We must regard it as not only a dream of things pos¬ 
sible in the objective universe but prophetic of objects 
which in the future were to be objects in the objective 
universe. 

His dream was objectively true to him while sleep¬ 
ing. How was it objectively true, when his “ dream- 
things ” were not objects? In exactly the same way 
that Faraday’s dynamo was objectively true to him 
when he made it an object in the intelligible universe , 
before he had made it an object in the objective uni¬ 
verse. We cannot, so far, distinguish between the 
exercise of imagination by the man dreaming two 
thousand years ago and Faraday “dreaming” yes¬ 
terday. Faraday had to dream his dynamo before 
he could make it an object in the objective universe, 
some one or more had to dream like the dream man 
of two thousand years ago before any of the things 
he dreamt of could be objects in the objective uni¬ 
verse. The objective universe is subjective to the 
intelligible universe. 

Now it is admitted generally that during sleep the 
objectivity of what is dreamt is usually unquestioned 
while it is held that in the after waking state the hal¬ 
lucination is generally recognised. 

The man who dreamt two thousand years ago 
found in sleep the objectivity of all he dreamt : when 
he awoke he regarded all he had dreamt as mere hal¬ 
lucination. Which judgment was right? The 
judgment of sleep or the judgment of after waking? 
If you hold his waking judgment was correct be¬ 
cause, at the time of the dream, what was dreamt of 
could not be objectified, you admit that objectivity 
is a subject of time. You hold that what is impos¬ 
sible to-day may be possible to-morrow, and therefore 
you hold that there is merely a question of time in¬ 
volved for contradiction between the possible and im¬ 
possible. Time reconciles the contradiction. 


322 


DREAMS 


If we make thought about the objective universe 
subjective to that universe as at any time it exists, we 
shall be involved in confusion of thought: for the 
dream of two thousand years ago must then be treated 
as fully hallucinatory,—the dream was of that which 
had no existence. If, on the other hand, we make 
the objective, subject to the intelligible universe, we 
have a full explanation. 

The man dreamt, for example, of the electric light 
in the same way as Faraday dreamt of his dynamo : 
there was exercise of imagination in the intelligible 
universe. The electric light existed for the dream- 
man as an object in the intelligible universe, in the 
same way as the dynamo existed for Faraday in that 
universe. Both were “ things ” possible of creation 
in the objective universe, but both had to be created 
in the intelligible universe before creation was pos¬ 
sible in the objective. 

You object,—but the dream-man was altogether in¬ 
capable of making the electric light he dreamt of as 
an object in the objective universe, while Faraday not 
only had such power but exercised it. And your ob¬ 
jection is sound. But it only strengthens the argu¬ 
ment. 

Let us put Faraday himself in place of the dream- 
man, in order to stave off any objection based on evo¬ 
lution of intellect. Suppose Faraday, besides living 
amongst us the other day, lived also two thousand 
years ago? 

Two thousand years ago he dreamt of the. dynamo 
just as he dreamt of it the other day. But then he 
could not make it an object in the objective universe. 
Why? His intellect was the same. It was because 
he had not the accumulated “ starting points ” for 
thought which two thousand years after he had at his 
command . 8 Two thousand years ago humanitv had 
not, for its activity in the objective universe, the vast 


8 Newton said he stood on the heads of giants. 


LIMITS OF ROMANCE AND FAIRIE 323 

umber of recorded ideas which humanity now has. 
)aedalus had the same schematic idea as Wright as 
0 man’s flying in the air, but he had not the same 
lumber of “starting points” for thought that 
Wight had and so could not deduct from his schem- 
tic idea the idea of a practical flying machine in the 
ntelligible universe which was a condition precedent 
or his making an effective flying machine an object 
n the objective universe. 

Two thousand years ago Faraday could imagine 
l dynamo but could not objectify it. In our days he 
ilso could imagine a dynamo and he could objectify 
t. What conclusion follows directly? Imagination 
s a fact, objectification a mere accident of time. 

When, then, anyone has a schematic idea in 
Ireams which he cannot reduce to an idea in the in- 
elligible universe and so cannot make it an object 
n the objective universe, the idea is fictitious : it is 
ictitious simply because it cannot be made an object 
n the objective universe. Daedalus’s dream of fly- 
ng, Mother Shipton’s dreams, even all dreams about 
)bjects not existing in the objective universe are fic- 
itious. But this simply means that the objects 
ireamt of are not yet objects in the objective uni¬ 
verse; they may or may not be in the future. We 
iraw the sting from the term fictitious. 

When waking, after dreams, we cannot use our 
vaking judgment to determine our dreams as reason- 
ible or unreasonable : our sleeping judgment that 
vhat we dream is objectively real is more trust- 
vorthy : in the cases for the man dreaming two thou- 
>and years ago and Faraday living two thousand 
vears ago, we have found that the sleeping judgment 
vas correct, the waking judgment incorrect. 

Romance and Fairie, recorded, are recorded 
ireams, showing the inroads of imagination on our 
deas about the objective universe and the laws of 
SFature. And it is not now alleged that the matter 


324 


DREAMS 


of Romance and Fairie is reasonable. The point 
made is that we cannot use our waking judgment to 
determine it as reasonable or unreasonable. To the 
Caliph, Scheherazade’s romance of the thousand and 
second night was false to reason : all her previous 
romance was true to reason. We, with the use of 
more “ starting points” for thought, laugh at the 
Caliph for holding what was reasonable as unreason¬ 
able and what was unreasonable as reasonable Many 
like instances can be imagined and they all show what 
a quagmire of thought we are landed in if we make 
the intelligible subject to the objective universe. 

What, then, are the limits of Romance and Fairie 
so far as we have now considered the question ? 

The argument is that Romance and Fairie are part 
of human experience : they mark that thought is col¬ 
oured by that free imagination which is the founda¬ 
tion of thought. Thought itself is an inhibited form 
of imagination, but thought itself reveals its origin 
in imagination in that it exhibits the colouring of 
imagination which is not inhibited in the form of 
thought. 

But in Romance and Fairie we are not dealing with 
imagination directly. For we have considered Ro¬ 
mance and Fairie as something which can be re¬ 
corded. That is, we have not considered Romance 
and Fairie directly as we think about them or are 
aware of them but as recorded ideas,—as recorded in 
words for all of us,—not only for the originators—to 
consider. We have considered them subject to 
record. 

In recording them words have had to be used and 
language has only been evolved to express ideas. 
Phantasy which transcends ideas is at the back of 
Romance and Fairie. But Romance and Fairie for 
record can only use ideas. Therefore Romance and 
Fairie can only express phantasy in parable. They 
try to express imagination, but, for record, can only 
express it cross-gartered by thought. This is why I 


LIMITS OF ROMANCE AND FAIRIE 325 

have referred Romance and Fairie to fancy as an in¬ 
hibited form of phantasy. 9 

It is when we come to consideration of phantasy 
itself which transcends ideas that our difficulties in 
expression become almost insuperable. 


9 In Murray’s Dictionary somewhat the same distinction is set 
ap between phantasy and fantasy. But, perhaps quite wrongly, 
he distinction therein set up appeared to me too fine for use now. 


PHANTASY 


Starting with the assumption that imagination i; 
deep buried in the soul of man we have found tha 
while thought is an inhibited form of imaginatioi 
even thought is coloured by free imagination—b] 
imagination, that is, beyond the purview of ideas 
And the attempt has been made, at the same time, t< 
show that human experience itself is of such a natun 
that if we do not start with our hypothesis of the “ 
am ” we must regard all imagination beyond the pur 
view of ideas as meaningless, incomprehensible wast 
in creation, although it is part of human experience 
For human experience proves that we exercise imagi 
nation beyond the purview of thought and, if we an 
mere embodied selves, the vast field of imaginatioi 
so opened is useless and meaningless except in it; 
detail of inhibition in the form of thought. 

We have already considered fancy as a form o 
phantasy, that is, we have considered thought abou 
the objective universe coloured by imagination no 
inhibited in the form of thought. But what is phan 
tasy in itself ? 

If you consider the definitions given of phantas; 
you will find that they all admit phantasy is some 
thing of which we have human experience : it is ad 
mittedly a fact of human experience. And, generally 
phantasy is held to mark the exercise of imaginatioi 
in relation to what is impossible for the objective uni 
verse. It is because imagination “ plays round ’ 
what is impossible for the objective universe that it i 
said to take the form of phantasy. The assumption i 
that real reality exists in and for the objective univers 
326 


PHANTASY 327 

only, so that phantasy, which travels beyond the ob¬ 
jective universe, is necessarily defined as irregular 
fancy, whim, caprice, the forming of unreal, chimeri¬ 
cal, or grotesque images in the mind, etc. 

And these definitions are sound if we give real 
reality to the objective universe. 

But now we deny this real reality of the objective 
universe, so the definitions must all be rejected. We 
hold, on the other hand, that the objective universe 
is no more than an occasion for thought, where 
thought is no more than an inhibited form of imagi¬ 
nation. The objective universe, then, only constitutes 
a mediate part 1 of the content of imagination.' 

If we give this real reality to the objective universe 
phantasy is sheer incomprehensible waste in creation : 
it gives rise to unreal images in the mind, unfounded 
ideas, distorted fancy, etc. In such case, when you 
brush your hair in the morning, consume a sausage, or 
powder your nose you are part of real reality. But 
when you dream of an ideal of love, beauty, truth and 
justice there is no real reality in you or in what you 
dream about: you do not exist in your dream and 
your dream itself marks but unfounded ideas result¬ 
ing from disordered fancy. 

It is suggested as more in accordance with reason 
to give real reality to dreams—even to dreams of love, 
beauty, truth and justice—than to confine real reality 
to what human experience informs us is an infinitesi¬ 
mally small speck of the ultimate universe. Even apart 
from personality dreams would appear to have a pur¬ 
view reaching far beyond what we see, hear and feel 
as mortals, and so to open a universe transcendent of 
that known to us, whether or not we have part in this 
transcendent. But how, in reason, can we imagine 
the existence of a subject with the power of dreaming 
about that which is altogether extraneous to itself ? 

l A mediate part means that the objective universe forms no 
necessary part of the content of imagination—it is merely an 
“ occasion ” for thought. 


328 DREAMS 

If you say the dream is merely in your mind, do you 
mean that your mind is not yourself ? Your finger is 
yours and yet if you cut off your finger you yourself 
remain. But a dream once yours is yours always : it 
remains stored in your memory. 

Now we have considered phantasy in the form of 
what I have termed fancy. But the purview of phan¬ 
tasy is wider than that of fancy. I suggest that fancy 
marks the colouring of ideas by imagination as al¬ 
ready stated. But phantasy in itself extends beyond 
the purview of ideas; we may term this pure phantasy. 
Such phantasy is within the realm of insight tran¬ 
scending ideas. 

It is this (pure) phantasy which we must now con¬ 
sider at large. And we must not confound it with 
ecstasy. Phantasy is imagination or a form of imagi¬ 
nation. Ecstasy is a state of the subject. Imagina¬ 
tion deep buried in the soul is transcendental. Phan¬ 
tasy may be defined as the exercise of imagination by 
the subject so far as the subject, still embodied, can 
exercise it. 

In considering human experience of phantasy we 
have, as yet, confined our attention to it as something 
which is evidential and so have met no insuperable 
difficulty in expression. But in pure phantasy, which 
we now consider, we travel beyond the purview of 
ideas : we are in the realm of insight which transcends 
ideas. And when we travel beyond the purview of 
ideas two difficulties face us which must, at the outset, 
be considered. 

The first arises from the fact that our language and 
speech have been evolved only for the full expression 
of ideas. When, then, we want to express our human 
experience of phantasy which travels beyond the pur¬ 
view of ideas, we are met by the difficulty that no de¬ 
finite means of expression have yet been evolved. 2 

2 For instance, in the extreme case when we want to state that 
for God the contradictory limits of thought of good and evil dis¬ 
appear we can only state that He exists in transcendence of good 


PHANTASY 329 

The second difficulty which attends the first is that 
though those who have had human experience of 
phantasy in dreams find therein real reality they find 
it only for themselves : they have no direct evidence 
to offer in words of their personal experience. For the 
only way in which they can manifest to their fellows 
what they have experienced is by the use of language 
and speech which can only express ideas. It follows 
that they can only express their experience in parable. 
This is why the manifestations in speech and lan¬ 
guage of those who have had human experience of 
phantasy is found so unsatisfactory and, even, contra¬ 
dictory. Preconceived ideas, too, come in and give 
personal colour to the parables. But it must be borne 
in mind that these, in some measure, false manifesta¬ 
tions by no means prove the falsehood of the experi¬ 
ence on which they are based. The most difficult false 
cases to unravel in Courts of Law are those which are 
based on a foundation of truth. 

And, here, to clean our way a most strange fact of 
humanity must be considered; for it marks, I think, 
an abnormal instance of inverted modesty. Can it, 
possibly, have part in the regard of the reader for 
what is now written ? 

So far as we can trace back the history of mankind 
we find a very general belief that man is more than a 
mere embodied self created at birth, lost and gone on 
death. And in the east this belief very generally 
survives. 

But, in the West, a large body of highly intellectual 
men discard this belief as involving unreasonable 
superstition. 3 These men hold that they themselves 
land their fellows are mere material things of passing 
time : they regard as victims of a baseless dream those 

and evil, where the term “ transcendent ” has no meaning in idea. 
Laurie in his Synthetics admits that the God man thinks is not the 
^reat God Himself. It is the God who has actualised Himself on 
|>ur plane that he considers. It is only this God of thought for 
Ivhom he assumes failure, 
j 3 No reference is here made to agnostics. 


23 



DREAMS 


330 

who believe that themselves and their fellows are more 
than mere material things,—are spiritual subjects of 
a universe transcending our little material world. And 
here comes in the strange fact of inverted modesty. 

These men of intellect, for the very reason that they 
hold themselves and their fellows to be so mean in 
degree, regard themselves as intellectually and even 
morally superior to their fellows who claim a higher 
status for mankind. What they claim against their 
dissenting fellows is :—We prove our superiority to 
you by our knowledge that both of us are mere 
material beasts. You prove your inferiority to us bv 
your belief that both of us are more than mere material 
beasts. 

It is strange that the acknowledgment, the very 
claim, of common inferiority should evolve personal 
pride in intellectual superiority. Such men cannot, 
with Malvolio, term their fellows idle, shallow things 
and claim themselves as of another element; for their 
pride is based on general likeness. Even Malvolio 
thought nobly of the soul. 

This inverted form of modesty is most interesting. 

That for some of us there is, in dreamland, phan¬ 
tasy transcending the purview of ideas is a fact of 
human experience. Before we consider phantasy 
itself can we find any reason for, or probability of, its 
existence? Let us consider this question. 

If we are mere material things of embodiment phan¬ 
tasy cannot exist. For the subject in such case could 
not travel beyond the purview of ideas which it can 
use through its brain : phantasy does travel beyond 
this purview. 4 

But when we make the subject a manifestation of 
the transcendental subject then phantasy is possible, 
though whether or not it exists must, for us as subjects, 
remain a question of human experience. For the “ I 


4 This fact is the very fact on which the materialist relies for 
froof that phantasy marks disordered fancy. 


PHANTASY 33 i 

am ” exists still, though manifest as the embodied sub¬ 
ject, and phantasy marks exercise of a form of imagi¬ 
nation. The “ 1 am,” then, having imagination deep 
buried in it as a soul, can still exercise imagination 
when embodied, but as an embodied subject can exer¬ 
cise it, only, subject to embodiment: this is what is 
now termed phantasy. But the recorded evidence of 
phantasy, as before said, can only exist in parable. 

Many of us, more indeed I think than is generally 
believed, suffer at times from a sense of the inade¬ 
quacy of embodied existence in thought and conduct. 
We try to think the best: we cannot. For all our best 
thoughts have in the mind, also, evil thoughts in con¬ 
tradiction : our best disappears if our worst is not also 
in the mind for comparison. We think to do good; 
our activity in conduct always imports some activity 
in evil. We find good always with a shadow of evil 
and we find, even, evil always with a shadow of good. 
Our perplexity seems to arise from the fact of em¬ 
bodiment. 

At such times we exercise imagination under the 
prompting of a want “ at the back ” of our minds to 
get rid of this conflict between good and evil: we 
want free psychical energy and for this we want free¬ 
dom from human conduct which is implicit to em¬ 
bodiment. 

I think what really prompts us is blind desire for a 
state of transcendence; we grope dimly after a state 
for ourselves beyond the purview of ideas, where there 
is freedom from the contradictions implicit for em¬ 
bodiment. 

This blind desire exists and it is either a senseless, 
meaningless parasite of reasonable creation,—born of 
and ending in nothing—or it must arise from and be 
part of the personality as it really exists. In the latter 
case it marks the struggle of the “ I am ” against the 
inhibition of embodiment. 

If we have this blind desire of the subject manifest 
in human experience and hold we exist as transcen¬ 
dental subjects, the blind desire points to the possi- 


DREAMS 


332 

bility of phantasy in dreams. It does more. It 
points to the phantasy of dreams resulting as a fact 
from the state of the subject being in sleep one, re¬ 
latively, free from embodiment. In sleep, the sub¬ 
ject, as already shown, still exists as a subject of the 
intelligible universe. And it is then free from the 
disturbing influence of physical activity : its imagina¬ 
tion finds less impediment to free exercise than in the 
waking state. 

But what is our human experience of phantasy in 
dreamland ? 

Children dream. As they grow into a state of full 
physical energy in conduct, they dream less. 5 For 
their imagination is then more nearly centred in 
thought for conduct. And this is right; man’s duty 
lies in physical activity. The Mother is righteous in 
making her Foster Child, man, ignore for passing 
time the glories he has known, for concentration on 
earthly duty. 

During manhood in its most active time of conduct, 
the subject dreams less : its imagination is centred on 
thought for conduct. 6 As the age of activity passes, 
the subject dreams more. Its objective life being less 
and less active in conduct, its imagination is less and 
less centred on thought for conduct: it is freer to 
dream. 

By what is above suggested we find made explic¬ 
able that continuity of personality which faces us all 

in human experience. And bear in mind we have 

/ 

5 The Youth, who daily further from the east 
Must travel, still is Nature’s Priest, 

And by the vision splendid 
Is on his way attended; 

At length the man perceives it die away 
And fade into the common light of day. 

6 But perhaps during this time moments of ecstasy are most 
likely. The contrast between free imagination and its inhibited 
form of thought is then greatest. 


PHANTASY 333 

nothing to do, as before shown, with any beginning 
or ending of the “ I am ” : it exists in transcendence 
of time : beginning and ending have no meaning 
where there is transcendence of time. 

If, on the other hand, we follow Haeckel’s theory, 
the subject is no more than a thing of conduct in the 
objective universe, coming into existence in time and 
going out of existence in time. In such case there 
would appear difficulty in explaining the timeless, 
changeless continuity in personality of the subject 
from one determined period to another in time. Again, 
1 cannot imagine consciousness without a subject or 
Being that is conscious and, if the reader will consult 
the essay on Psychology, by James Ward, as it ap¬ 
pears in the last and preceding editions of the En - 
cyclopcedia Britannica, he will find in the latter 
edition the statement, “We can imagine conscious¬ 
ness without self-consciousness.” But in the last, the 
eleventh, edition he will find this statement cut out 
root and crop. 

Now Haeckel must have an evolution of conscious¬ 
ness from unconsciousness if his theory is to stand. 
Where is his “self”? 

The “ I am ” during its most active time as an em¬ 
bodied self dreams least, and the reason for this has 
been explained. But it is during this time of greatest 
activity that we find the noblest conduct in man. It 
is quite true that ideas in the intelligible universe 
govern conduct, but it is by conduct only that the' 
lot of man in relation to material environment can be 
evolved towards betterment. 

Still, we are apt to forget that our ultimate founda¬ 
tion for the advance of humanity exists in thinkers. 
We glorify achievement so excessively that the basis 
of our highest form of legislation, the House of Lords, 
has representatives chosen almost exclusively of those 
who have survived by possession of personal power 
in personal acquisitiveness. If we consider the 
majority of noblemen we shall find their existing noble 


334 DREAMS 

families founded originally by some ancestor gifted 
with personal power of acquisitiveness in wealth and 
influence and blest by descendents with personal 
power to retain or even increase what their ancestor 
acquired. We do not find a Shakespeare, Milton, 
Turner, Faraday, Huxley, or De Morgan marked as 
founders of families. 

What is above stated is not in derogation of our 
nobles—who are all honourable men—but to mark our 
too definite worship of conduct. For it is men of 
thought like Shakespeare, Darwin, Pasteur, etc., who 
form the signposts for the advance of humanity, while 
the men of acquisitive conduct, however well they 
may use their wealth and power, mark but guardians 
for the continuance of environment as it is. 

It is during this time of greatest activity in conduct 
that our leading men of thought in politics, social 
economy, art, literature and science establish, by con¬ 
duct, signposts for the advance of humanity. It is 
during this time that men of objective conduct, fol¬ 
lowing the signposts, lay down firm, stable roads for 
the onward passage of humanity. 

And what follows ? That the more truly these sign¬ 
posts point to a common ideal of love, beauty, truth 
and justice the straighter and easier the roads laid 
down by men of objective conduct towards our blind 
desire for our blind, but noble ideal. 

Even when men dream least phantasy is at the back 
of their thought and conduct. 

As old age comes on and the subject finds his time 
of activity in conduct passing, he dreams more and 
more. And, if embodiment be but a passing stage 
in time, this is natural and what we should expect. 
Earthly life takes on more surely the aspect of mava. 
Personal interest in earthly life passing away, the 
sense of camaraderie with all mankind strengthens 
and the old man finds personal happiness and unhap¬ 
piness transcended bv wider sympathy, a closer 
bond, with his fellow-men. In this loss of earthly 
personality, he finds, too, a wider personality for him- 


PHANTASY 335 

self in a wider transcendent universe. Sleep, the 
gate to life through death, opens its portal more and 
more widely for him. 

And what are our dreams of phantasy ? Dreams 
from childhood ? 

The child on its mother’s knee, says, “ Mummy, 
I had such a beautiful dream last night.” 

“ What was it about?” 

“ Oh ! Mummy !” and on the little face there is a 
look of surprise at the question. “ Of course I don’t 
know now. It was just beautiful, really, really 
beautiful.” 

And the mother, if a wise woman, kisses her child 
and says no more; remembering, perchance, that she 
herself, long, long ago, had like dreams. 

Or the child, in no few cases, may have what we 
impertinently term a vivid imagination and may have 
read much from the Revelations to Hans Andersen's 
Fairy Tales. And so it may translate its dream in 
parable, tell of gorgeous palaces and beautiful scen¬ 
ery, of living beasts and trees talking man’s 
language. And as the tale is told it widens and 
widens. 

But, even so, there is the glamour of pure phantasy 
behind the ideas. 

‘‘And, Mummy, there was a beautiful lake and one 
beautiful fish I loved most. And then the fish was 
me and I was the fish. And yet we was everybody 
and everything else. It was so funny, but so very 
nice. But 1 can’t tell you right, can I ? It was too 
nice to tell. You understand?” 

Does the mother understand ? Have you, Mrs. 
Gradgrind, ever had one of your children tell you 
such a story for you to understand ? The first slap 
for telling lies closed the mouths of all your children. 

The Podsnaps and Gradgrinds of our time veneer 
human thought with gilt. But the wood is true. 
Peter Pan and the Blue Bird float into our universe 
and humanity crowds—paying its footing even with 
its adored gilt,—to stare at the strange visions. 


336 DREAMS 

Why ? They lift the eyes of humanity to that phan¬ 
tasy which exists outside embodiment and which hu¬ 
manity is conscious marks the really real in itself. 

Whence comes the pleasure which not only the 
young, but those in full activity of body and even the 
aged feel in the presence of Peter Pan or the Blue 
Bird? From the presentation of fantastic, useless, 
meaningless vagaries of imagination ? From dis¬ 
ordered fancy ? If so, what an incongruous creation 
each one of us is ! For we are but things of thought 
and conduct; things using, rightly, only that part of 
imagination which is inhibited in the form of 
thought. And yet we find the highest form of happi¬ 
ness for ourselves in using wrongly imagination of 
what is impossible for us as things of thought and 
conduct. How can that which is extraneous to our 
being appeal so definitely to our sense of happiness ? 

And bear in mind, if you please, that this pleasure 
we feel has physical effect on us,—helps to keep body 
and brain healthy. And how could pleasure which is 
not physical affect you if you are made up purely 
of the physical ? The only reply is to be found, I 
think, from Spinoza. There must be the External 
All Infinite Being who spiritually commands and af¬ 
fects us as physical subjects. 7 

Peter Pan, The Blue Bird, fairy tales, fairie and 
romance in general do exist for us all whatever their 
existence may be. And, I think, they affect us gener¬ 
ally thus :—they mark our revolt against the limits of 
our embodiment. They ignore the limits of space, 
the slow progress of time; they rebel against stereo¬ 
typed forms of wealth, rank, intellect, even against 
the confinement of each one of us to one material 
body. They all result from imagination of that 
which is impossible for us as mere embodied selves. 

Some of these records of imagination are bad, some 
good, some very good. But all of them, I think, we 
judge by one standard : we measure their goodness 


7 Spinoza’s philosophy has already been considered. Cf. p. 230 . 


PHANTASY 337 

►r badness by one standard. What standard is this? 
rhe transcendent ideal of love, beauty, truth and 
ustice. And what is it in these records that opens 
o us this ideal ? It is phantasy. Even Swift’s keen 
atire is meaningless to us unless we have in the back¬ 
ground of our mind the ideal of love, beauty, truth 
nd justice. 

For our ideal we must get outside, beyond our 
ittle universe and our embodiment in it with all its 
in and suffering. Phantasy alone can and does ef- 
ect this for us, phantasy gives us freedom and it is 
>ur feeling of this freedom, for the passing time, that 
ouches our sense of happiness. How could you 
)ossibly find pleasure in The Blue Bird if it were but 
l record of disordered fancy, of what is absolutely im- 
)ossible for you? In such case you would be 
>pprest by sadness at your own limitations. 

But you reply : Phantasy does open to me visions 
>f what is impossible for me. And the reply is sound, 
>ut sound only if you are a mere embodied self with 
10 future beyond the grave. In such case, however, 
r ou leave inexplicable the pleasure you feel in phan- 
asy. This pleasure does exist for you, it is yours, 
dow can it possibly be yours as a mere embodied 
‘thing”? What touches you is the phantasy at 
he back of the play. 

In phantasy you still remain embodied : the very 
ebellion of phantasy is against still existing embodi- 
nent. And, if this embodiment is you and you cease 
o exist on disembodiment, the rebellion is meaning- 
ess, hopeless. But phantasy does exist for you : the 
ebellion of phantasy does exist for you and, I affirm, 
ve feel in ourselves that the rebellion has meaning 
nd is based on sound hope. 

This hope lies in the future : phantasy opens this 
uture to us. 

Phantasy transcends the possible and impossible, 
"he analysis, as it were, of this transcendent into the 
possible and impossible only results when we bring 
fi the relation of our objective universe. It is in re- 


338 DREAMS 

lation only to that speck of the ultimate universe thu 
the question of what is possible or impossible arises 
we can even think the possible and impossible. 

Romance and Fairie exist as part of human exper 
ence and they show that imagination beyond the pu 
view of thought does colour thought itself. And thi 
leads, in reason, to an assumption that the genesis c 
Romance and Fairie must be found in the transcenc 
ent which we term phantasy. So far we can use th 
language of thought. But phantasy itself we ca 
only express in parable : there is no language for th 
transcendental. 


ECSTASY 


We have travelled from thought to phantasy and 
:hereby we have exhausted human experience in 
general as our ground for argument. 

For now when we enter on the consideration of 
ecstasy we have but the human experience of, com- 
laratively, a few to rely on for argument. And yet, 
is we shall see, the human evidence for ecstasy is of 
such cumulative force that some, though they have 
lever had experience of the state, hold the probability 
hat it exists to be so great that it amounts to eviden- 
;ial proof. 

The general acceptance of ecstasy as a possible state 
: or the subject appears from the fact that all diction- 
iries give definitions for it. But we may now confine 
>urselves to certain of those definitions given in Mur- 
*ay’s dictionary—they would appear to be the most 
nclusive of all proffered in attempts at definition. 


DEFINITIONS 

i. An exalted state of feeling which engrosses the 
nind to the exclusion of thought; rapture, transport. 
Mow chiefly, intense rapturous delight, the expres¬ 
sions, ecstasy of woe, sorrow, despair, etc., still occur, 
lut are usually felt as transferred. 1 


l That is, felt as in metaphor. There is still, for the subject, 
mbddiment, and so relations in thought. Or, may it be, that in 
cstasy, woe, sorrow, etc., are transcended, and yet there is aware- 
tess of their existence for embodiment? 

339 


340 DREAMS 

2. The classical senses of sxtSxtk; are “ intensity ’ 
and “bewilderment,” but in later Greek the etymo 
logical meaning received another application, viz. : 
“ withdrawal of the soul from the body,” “ mystic O] 
prophetic trance.” Hence in later medical writers thf 
word is used for trance, etc., generally. 

3. (Pathology.) By early writers applied vaguel) 
or with conflicting attempts at precise definition to al 
morbid states characterized by unconsciousness, a‘ 
swoon, trance, catalepsy, etc. 

4. (Modern Scientific use.) The term ecstasy ha< 
been applied to certain morbid states of the nervom 
system, in which the attention is occupied exclusivel) 
by one idea and the cerebral control is in part with 
drawn from the lower cerebral and certain refle> 
functions. These latter centres may be in a conditior 
of inertia or of insubordinate activity, presenting 
various disordered phenomena, for the most par 
motor. 

William James in “The Varieties of Religious Ex 
perience ” (p. 380) considers mystic states, by whicl 
I think he refers to states of ecstasy. He says : — 

“ The handiest of the marks by which I classify < 
state of mind as mystical is negative. The subject o 
it immediately says that it defies expression, that n( 
adequate report of its contents can be given in words 
It follows from this that its quality must be directly ex 
perienced : it cannot be imparted or transferred t( 
others.” 2 He says further (1) Mystical states seem t( 
those who experience them to be also states of know 
ledge. 3 They are states of insight (my italics) int< 
depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect 
(2) Mystical states cannot be sustained for long. (3 
In mystical states there is a feeling as of abeyance o 
personal will accompanied sometimes by the feeling 

2 For the state of ecstasy there is transcendence of ideas an 
language is confined to the expression of ideas, as we saw whe 
we considered phantasy. 

3 I suggest states of insight transcending knowledge. 


ECSTASY 341 

>f being grasped and held by a superior power. (4) 
>ome memory 4 always survives any mystic state and 
tlways a profound sense of its importance. 

It has been advisable to give the pathological and 
icientific definitions but they may now be ignored, for 
hey do not transcend the fact of presentation. But 
till we may note that in pathology there is difficulty in 
irriving at any satisfactory definition for ecstasy, 
vhile in science it would appear to be referred to the 
solated action of the highest cerebral centre. The 
iifficulty for science, generally, in arriving at any ex- 
laustive definition lies in the fact that, scientifically, 
icstasy must be treated as a morbid passing state but 
-as the patient does return afterwards to his normal 
;tate—he must still, during the morbid state , remain 
is a self-conscious subject. This “ isolated ” state of 
;elf-consciousness, science cannot deal with. 5 It must 
:onsider the state of ecstasy as one of unconsciousness 
ind so it must put an end to the subject during its 
norbid state and reinstitute it as a subject on return to 
lormal life. Without any reflection on science this 
loes not fully appeal to reason and, very possibly, had 
lome part in influencing Huxley towards his belief 
hat consciousness is a thing-in-itself. 

The definition for ecstasy now considered is :—“the 
withdrawal of the soul from the body.” Ecstasy is con- 
idered as a state transcending the waking and sleep- 
ng states of the embodied subject. In other words, 
t is argued that some have human experience of a 
tate transcending thought and embodiment so that 
hey have personal human experience of their really 
eal existence as “ I am.” This human experience 
hough only of the few may still be of such cumulative 
orce that those who have never experienced it may be 
justified in accepting it, for themselves, as evidence, 

4 This being memory of insight can only be recorded for the 
jenefit of others in the form of parable in ideas. 

! 5 The self-conscious subject as a thing-in-itself exists for science, 
ut science, quite rightly, ignores it. 


DREAMS 


342 

establishing that high degree of probability in reaso 
which may fairly be accepted as proof. Williar 
James, for instance, in his remarkable work, alread 
referred to, says ( Cf . p. 379) :— 

“ Whether my treatment of mystical states will she 
more light or darkness, I do not know, for my ow 
constitution shuts me out from their enjoyment almos 
entirely, and I can only speak of them at second hanc 
But, though forced to work upon the subject s 
externally, I will be as objective and receptive as I can 
and I think I shall at least succeed in convincing yo 
of the reality of the states in question, and of th 
paramount importance of their function. 6 7 

Spinoza, too, accepts ecstasy as a fact. He says 

“ The human Mind cannot be entirely destroyed wit] 
the Body, but of it something remains which is eternal.” 

Spinoza is said to have raised a distinction betweei 
time and eternity. What I think he really did was t< 
hold that time and duration are mere limits of thought 
his “ eternity ” transcended both. His ultimate, 
think, cannot be distinguished from “ the accorr 
plished in the accomplishing ” and if he be held to us 
the word “eternity” in this transcendent sense, hi 
theory is not weakened : it is perhaps made mor 
amenable to our comprehension. 

Again he says : — 

“ The supreme virtue of the mind is to know God o 
to understand things by the third kind of knowledge 

6 Ecstasy is not mystic for those who have experienced it: it i 
an integral part of their human experience. It is mystic for thos 
of us who have not experienced it. 

7 Bear in mind that Gautama said he did not know what resulte 
from the destruction of illusion ; he did not affirm the loss of a: 
transcendental personality for the subject 


343 


ECSTASY 

(intuition). 8 9 And this virtue is all the greater in pro¬ 
portion as the mind has a fuller knowledge of things 
by this kind of knowledge. Therefore he who knows 
things by this kind of knowledge passes into 

the highest perfection of man.Accordingly 

from this kind of knowledge springs the most perfect 
peace that can be given. 6 

Allanson Picton commenting on this, says : — 

“And it is this reality, unattainable to mortal thought 
except in some momentary ecstatic glimpse (my italics) 
which the Master has in view when he speaks of Body 
and Mind in the aspect of eternity.’’ 

Now when Spinoza speaks of the supreme virtue of 
the mind and its intuition, this mind he, for the time, 
assumes to be the mind of the subject. And when he 
says perfect peace follows this kind of knowledge he 
means perfect peace felt by the subject: this perfect 
peace exists in and for the personal human experience 
af the subject, though experienced only in momentary 
ecstatic glimpses. What then is to be deduced as his 
meaning ? 

He says that the subject though free from, tran¬ 
scending all thought, is self-conscious of absorption 
in the Deity. Not only this, he says the subject is self- 
conscious of perfect peace in such absorption. 10 The 
subject, as a human subject, is in a state freed from the 
limitations of body and thought, but still remains in 
existence in some form of self-consciousness. This 
3an but point to a transcendental subject. So 
Spinoza’s absorption in the Deity must be read to 
mean merely absorption of the human personality, 

8 Intuition, as here used, is a (transcendent?) form of knowledge. 

! use the term “ insight ” as transcending knowledge. 

9 I read this perfect peace as marking transcendence of happiness 
and unhappiness. 

10 It is contended that Spinoza’s statement is meaningless for us 
is subjects, unless this self-consciousness is assumed. 




344 DREAMS 

where transcendental personality still exists in self 
consciousness. 11 

If, on the other hand, we hold Spinoza’s theory oi 
absorption in the Deity imports full loss of personality 
for the subject, his argument is in the air. For he 
holds that the state of ecstasy can exist for the subjecl 
while still embodied. But, if this state spells full loss 
of personality how can any subject have human ex¬ 
perience of it ? How can you or I have human experi¬ 
ence of a state in which we have no consciousness ol 
self, even as transcendental subjects. 12 

In making the above allegation as to Spinoza’s 
theory it must be borne in mind what is meant by the 
“ I am.” It is what Kant terms the soul of man or the 
transcendental subject. Though there is for the “ 1 
am ” freedom in transcendence from the stage of 
human personality, personality still exists in self-con¬ 
sciousness. But if Spinoza be held to mean that ab¬ 
sorption in the Deity spells full absence of ultimate 
self-consciousness for the subject, then the state of 
ecstasy he refers to of which the subject has human 
experience is no more than the experience of the 
human subject : it cannot be the experience of the ulti¬ 
mate “ I am ” for any such “ I am ” has no existence. 
It is impossible, then, in such case, for the subject to 
be conscious of absorption in the Deity for neither the 
subject nor the really real subject exists for such con¬ 
sciousness. Still less could the subject feel perfect 
peace in such absorption. 

But, even if the above interpretation of Spinoza’s 
theory be rejected, he is still claimed as a supporter of 
the fact that the state of ecstasy, as it has been defined, 
exists for human experience. 

11 This conflicts with the general assumption (hat Spinoza was 
a pantheist, but I doubt whether the interpretation weakens his 
theory. 

12 Philo says that in ecstasy man enjoys the vision of God, though 
his consciousness disappears. Plotinus says that in ecstasy all 
thought is transcended and all consciousness of self lost in the 
absorbing ecstasy. But in both cases some form of self-consciousness 
must still exist. 


ECSTASY 345 

In considering phantasy we were considering what 
may be termed a content of self-consciousness. Imagi¬ 
nation is a power deep buried in the “ I am ” where the 
“ I am ” has self-consciousness beyond the purview of 
thought. And we have seen that though thought is 
an inhibited form of imagination, thought itself is 
coloured by phantasy. We have been dealing mainly 
with cognition. 

But now, in considering ecstasy, we get quite away 
from cognition, we are in the realm of feeling. 

We have already given consideration to feeling and 
found that the self-conscious subject, embodied, be¬ 
fore it can be active in thought and conduct, must be 
a feeling subject: for the subject as of feeling tran¬ 
scends the subject as of thought. The state of ecstasy 
may be said to be the ultimate state in feeling of the 
subject: ecstasy is, for some, part of human experi¬ 
ence. But in the present argument, good and evil, 
unity and diversity, etc., are treated as mere limita¬ 
tions of thought, they are contradictions which neces¬ 
sarily exist but exist only for thought. Insight is a 
power of the subject and it makes us aware of the 
limitations of thought in that as thought deals only 
with relations, its universe is one of contradictions. 
Insight transcends thought and so transcends its limits 
>f contradiction. This is why our ultimate is tran¬ 
scendental and, for it, the term is used the “accom¬ 
plished in the accomplishing.” 

We should expect, then, that when we do not tran¬ 
scend the facts of presentation and so consider feeling 
: rom the scientific psychological point of view, we 
should find manifestations of feeling which suggest 
)r point to ecstasy as the ultimate state of feeling, 
hough psychology does not bring this ultimate state 
vithin its purview. 

Now we have already seen that the relative state of 
lappiness of any subject does not depend on his 
iegree of intellect, physical strength, wealth, or social 
;tatus : the idiot, pauper, infirm, may be happy : the 
nan of genius, millionaire, goliath, may be unhappy. 

24 


DREAMS 


346 

The state of feeling of the subject depends on his re 
gard for the universe : the same one universe takes 01 
differing aspects for differing men. This is true fo 
all: the state of feeling determines the regard and th 
reaction of the same one universe on the subject: thi 
universe differs as the regard of the subject differs. 

The young girl wakened for the first time to th< 
mystery of reciprocated love sees and feels for the pass 
ing time what is to her a new universe. The grey 
gloomy world she knew has changed suddenly to on< 
of glorious beauty. But in truth she sees and feels th< 
same one universe : it is her regard that has changed 

Herein we find that though there be but one uni 
verse under the “ eternal iron laws of Nature,” you: 
universe is not mine, mine is not yours. Each sub 
ject finds a differing universe, because each subject ha: 
differing regard for the same one “ thing.” 

Even psychologically we are driven to acknowledg 
ment of the supremacy of feeling for the subject, and 
if feeling in the ultimate be as free from all ‘‘material’ 
environment as alleged in this argument, there mus 
be some ultimate state for feeling to which all feeling 
even when not transcending presentation, must be 
referred. I cannot distinguish this state from thai 
of ecstasy. 

In “ The Varieties of Religious Experience,” Wil 
liam James gives much attention to the “ Nev 
Thought” and ‘‘Mind Cures” movements in the 
United States, and as to the results he says: “ The 
blind have been made to see, the halt to walk; life 
long invalids have had their health restored. The 
moral fruits have been no less remarkable.” 

But what has been the principle used which has 
had these results ? 

The normal physician, for human ills, uses bodil) 
remedies. 13 The “ New Thought ” depends or 
changing the regard of the subject: its cures use the 


13 But self-suggestion is being used more and more, though offer 
sub rosa. 


ECSTASY 347 

nind. Like to all adventurers on new paths the ex- 
xmnders of mind cure and new thought claim far 
greater power and success than they possess. But 
hey have power and they effect numerous cures where 
iirect attacks on the body have failed. 

What is the basis of their method ? 14 It exists in 
he assumption that each man determines his own uni- 
/erse by his own regard and that each man can will 
what his regard shall be. 15 He who is a pessimist is 
nstructed to be an optimist, he is told to regard the 
universe as good and to ignore its evil. And, foolish 
is the teaching may appear to many, there are some 
who have not only found it not foolish but, by pur¬ 
suing it, have changed their state from unhealthy 
weakness to healthy physical strength, from unhappi¬ 
ness to happiness. 

What do these cures point to ? Reduce them to the 
lowest; assume the great majority of them never, in 
fact, took place. Still, there is a residuum of veridical 
cures left, and for any full explanation of human ex¬ 
perience these veridical cases must be accounted for. 

Consider the case of anyone who has been so cured. 

No material means have been used for direct 
material effect on the body or brain : no change in 
material environment even has been used. It is what 
we term the mind of the subject that has been used to 
affect the body and brain ; the mind has been used as 
having command over body and brain. We see, 
herein, the general principle applied that the intel¬ 
ligible universe has command over the objective. 16 

But what do we mean by the “ mind ” of the sub¬ 
ject? We do not, when using the term, refer to any 
degree of intellect, inborn or developed by environ¬ 
ment : we do not refer to any degree of bodily 


14 So far as it depends on the mystic it is not now considered. 

15 There is no necessary conflict here with my argument that 

will .is powerless without imagination. ... 

16 The cures effected by hypnotism exemplify this principle. 
Cf. Moll on Hypnotism and the many cases reported in the Journals 
and Proceedings of the S.P.R. 


348 DREAMS 

strength. We mean by the “ mind” something “at 
the back ” of all intellectual manifestations effected 
through that complex machine the brain. When we 
refer “ will ” or “ will based on imagination ” to the 
mind of man we are referring to something which 
commands intellectual operation. 

We refer the mind of man to something external to 
the brain and its working : to something which domi¬ 
nates the brain and its work. 

Where, then, is this “ mind”? I have my mind, 
you have your mind : my mind is not yours, yours is 
not mine. And this mind is external to body and 
brain : it exercises command over both, irrespective 
of the intellectual force it may cause to be mani¬ 
fested. 17 

We must refer this “ mind ” to each one of us as a 
subject who is not a mere subject of body and brain : 
the “ mind subject ” commands the subject of body 
and brain. 

The man as a “ mind subject ” has cured himself as 
a subject of body and brain, and the “ mind subject ” 
is purely spiritual in that it exercises command over 
the material and objective. 

I suggest, then, that what is above stated opens the 
possibility for the still embodied subject to dream 
veridically of itself as free from embodiment. For the 
mind is external to body and brain, and so may have 
moments of consciousness of divorce from body and 
brain. 18 The objective universe (the very body and 
brain of each of us) is but an occasion for thought and 
thought is an inhibited form of imagination. With¬ 
draw this occasion, withdraw or subsume all thought 
about it. Imagination remains and remains deep 
buried in the soul of man. May not the subject, then, 
experience moments of the withdrawal of the soul 
from the body ? Experience of ecstasy ? 


17 The degree of intellectual manifestation is but a degree of 
manifestation of the power of the mind. 

18 Desipere in loco. 


ECSTASY 349 

But ecstasy marks the withdrawal of the soul from 
the body : it marks the fact not only that the soul is 
a separate “ thing ” from the body, but that its em¬ 
bodiment inhibits its full freedom. For it finds this 
full freedom only when divorced from the body. 

Ecstasy, then, if accepted as a fact, constitutes our 
Ultima Thule for belief that man exists as a soul. 

Ecstasy, to those who have experienced it, is a 
transcendent fact: for those who have experienced it 
there is personal proof, beyond evidential proof, that 
they exist as souls. 

But what is the regard of those who have not ex¬ 
perienced it ? What evidence have they to rely on for 
proof? Evidential proof only is open to them, per¬ 
sonal proof is wanting. 

In considering the above questions we are faced by 
a difficulty which must be acknowledged : for it can¬ 
not be removed. The difficulty is that, for fully sound 
reasoning, we must have human experience in general 
to rely on, while in considering ecstasy we have only 
the human experience of a comparative few. With 
the use of reason we may find the possibility of human 
experience in general of ecstasy : but any fully sound 
philosophy is based, for proof, on human experience 
in general as fact. Our reasoning as to ecstasy may 
still be comparatively sound but it must rely in some 
measure on authority : we must rely on belief in the 
truthfulness of others when they allege they have had 
experience of a state that we ourselves have not had. 
I may be right in my argument that reason shows to 
us that the state of ecstasy is possible : I doubt if 
reason shows it is even probable. Consciousness that 
oneself as a soul is withdrawn from the inhibition of 
embodiment is, for reason, possible, but I cannot 
allege that it is probable. It is here that personal 
proof by personal experience steps in and supple¬ 
ments, does not contradict, reason. Laurie goes so 
far as to say that “in one respect of things, reason is 
an impertinence.” 


DREAMS 


350 

The relation of reason to human experience appears 
from Kant’s and Spinoza’s philosophies. Kant ad¬ 
mitted that, in reason, telepathy is possible, but he 
refused to consider it even as possible because, in his 
time, there was no sufficiency of human experience to 
support it. Spinoza, on the other hand, 19 holds that 
the personality of each one of us disappears on death. 
If, in his lifetime, there had been the human experi¬ 
ence we now have of survival of personality after 
death, he might have changed his form of reasoning. 20 

Reason is halt when it has not full support from 
human experience in general: but still reason can 
deal with the possibility of such experience. 

It may be objected that Spinoza himself, without 
personal experience, arrived at the certainty of ecstasy 
for some of us : but I doubt this. 1 think a full con¬ 
sideration of his life and conduct leads one to assume 
he had personal experience of the peace that passes 
understanding where there is full submission to the 
categorical imperative. 

Our greatest difficulty in attacking ecstasy exists 
in this :—There is no language available to us for 
any record of personal experience during the state of 
ecstasy. The state itself transcends ideas, the experi¬ 
ence itself transcends ideas, while the only language 
at our command does not extend beyond the purview 
of ideas. So the state itself and its experience can 
only be recorded in parable by those who have ex¬ 
perienced it : can only be recorded in parable , for the 
benefit of those who have not experienced it. 

It is true that Philo, Plotinus, and even Spinoza, 
try to express the inexpressible by vague negations 
—they try to raise ideas into the air of the transcen¬ 
dental 21 —and it is true that their records appeal to 
something in us. But this appeal is to something in 


19 I assume now that the interpretation usually accepted of 
Spinoza’s philosophy is correct though personally I do not accept it. 

20 I may be fairly accused of changing it for him! 

21 And fail as Daedalus failed. 


ECSTASY 


35i 

us transcending our being as subjects of thought and 
conduct. These negative records affect us directly 
only in parable. 

When we turn to the innumerable records which 
exist of the state of ecstasy and its experience, we are 
in a sea of trouble and contradiction. Any such 
record is coloured by the preconceived ideas of the 
writer : each writer gives us parables of his state and 
experience which are consonant with his own dog¬ 
matic form of faith or religion. Collate and compare 
these records : they will be found not only to differ, 
inter se, but to conflict directly. 

Are they, then, to be treated as wholly false and 
worthless? I think not. In science, art and litera¬ 
ture we find the false and the true, find them often 
pathetically confounded one with the other. In records 
of ecstasy we must also expect to find the true con¬ 
founded with the false, and even records from char¬ 
latans. But I agree with William James in holding 
there is at the lowest a residuum of truth in these re¬ 
cords which justifies us in assuming the state of 
ecstasy is experienced by some, if only a few. 

In the records of such men as Philo, Plotinus, even 
Spinoza, there is an underlying likeness which ap¬ 
peals to our reason. Reason informs us that if the 
state of ecstasy exist certain conclusions follow : — 
Freedom from the body spells freedom from the in¬ 
hibitions of time and space : freedom of imagination 
spells thought not lost but subsumed : as the state 
of ecstasy transcends happiness and unhappiness it 
may be well described as one involving the peace that 
passes understanding : as all anthropomorphic dis¬ 
tinctions from one’s fellows are subsumed, the per¬ 
sonality of ecstasy must be transcendent. 22 . All this, 
which we arrive at by a process of reason, is supported 
by the records of such men as Philo and Plot in us r 

22 My reason refuses to allow me to give meaning to “ world 
consciousness ” unless I refer this consciousness to transcendental 
Being. 


352 DREAMS 

But must we reject the more dogmatic records, 
which are so numerous and contradictory? I think 
we must accept some as veridical though coloured by 
preconceived ideas. 

Write down a simple story and read it to twelve 
honest men on whose word you fully rely. Let them 
each write down the story as heard. The probability 
is that not one record will be fully in agreement with 
the original; each record will differ from the others 
and some may even be in contradiction to others. If 
your story involve matters of faith or religion, the 
probability is that each record will be coloured by the 
preconceived ideas of the writer. In cases coming 
before Courts of Law, witnesses may be fully honest 
and yet give diametrically opposite evidence as to the 
same facts. 

And yet, in spite of the differing and contradictory 
character of these records, I think examination of 
them will show that all are attempts to describe some 
one underlying truth. 

Suppose, for instance, you offered the twelve 
records of your simple story to some independent per¬ 
son for perusal. I think he would find out for himself 
that from some underlying likeness in these records 
they were proved to be attempts, though failures, to 
portray the one underlying truth—the simple story. 

In the gospels, for instance, we find differences, 
even contradictions. We find more : we find the re¬ 
cord of each of the four writers coloured by precon¬ 
ceived ideas, resulting in great measure from personal 
constitution. But many of us, while rejecting the 
dogmatic statements, find an underlying truth in the 
mystic teaching and revelation of Our Lord. There 
is basic likeness in the four gospels, while the con¬ 
flicting dogmatic forms of belief which Christianity 
now manifests can be traced back as evolved forms 
from the differing original dogmatic records of the 
one underlying truth. 

If the records of ecstasy and its experience which we 
accept as veridical be considered, it is true we find 


ECSTASY 353 

them differing inter se, even contradictory. But I 
think they point to an underlying reality of the state 
of ecstasy and its experience. They all mark the sub¬ 
sumption of a material under a spiritual personality, 
the transcendence of time and space, the sense of 
“ oneness ” in God and one’s fellows. It is precon¬ 
ceived ideas which come in and, on this one sound 
foundation, erect differing structures. 

Phantasy we can bring wdthin the purview of 
human experience in general because it colours our 
ideas. But, for ecstasy, reason has not such experi¬ 
ence to rely on : human experience is halt. 

But is it for us to grieve over our comparative 
failure? Have we any right to expect that we, em¬ 
bodied as lilliputian objects in a lilliputian universe, 
ought to be able to solve the riddle of the transcen¬ 
dental universe ? 

Try to get rid of your consciousness as a self. You 
cannot. Your body, nerves, muscles, thought, in¬ 
sight, imagination, are yours, not mine. How can 
all this be yours, how can you be aware they are 
yours, unless you are a self-conscious subject ? 

Now try to define your self-consciousness. You 
cannot. It is groundless because it is the ground of 
all other certainty. If you cannot define your ultimate 
self, how can you define your ultimate state ? 

Reason informs us that the state of ecstasy is pos¬ 
sible More than this. It points to this state as the 
ultimate state of “ myself.” Must we not, then, be as 
incapable of defining in any way this state , as we are 
incapable of defining the subject—myself—of this 
state ? 


THE ETERNAL 


From the cradle to the grave each one of us is con¬ 
scious of his relatively permanent state as a subject 
of self-consciousness. This “ myself ” is not con¬ 
ditioned by time or space; it is transcendent of both. 
So to this “ myself ” we can give neither beginning 
nor ending. What we can give beginning and end¬ 
ing to is the process of manifestation as embodied 
selves in time and space. 

For each one of us the eternal exists in self-con¬ 
sciousness, transcendent of time and space. For— 
ignoring at present what meaning definitely or in¬ 
definitely we attach to the eternal—the reason of man 
revolts against any such succession as :—nothing, 
something, nothing. The succession is meaningless. 
Even if we relate back the universe to a genesis of 
chaos we mean by “ chaos ” something with the 
potentiality of evolving or being evolved into order. 
Beginnings and endings are mere ideas: insight 
transcends ideas. 

Nature exists in the eternal and, for us embodied, it 
exists in processes of Nature to which we give begin¬ 
nings and endings. You light a match; the flame 
begins and ends : you plant a seed; its evolution in 
form begins and ends : you are placed in the objective 
universe and manifest as an object; your manifesta¬ 
tion has a beginning and an ending. But at the back 
of your reason, at the back even of your thought, 
stands the eternal, transcendent of time and space. 
Time and space exist for us only in idea , they mark 
the conditioning of processes in the eternal. 

We cannot regard these processes in time and space 
as foreign to, as excrescences on the eternal : they 
354 


THE ETERNAL 355 

are conditionings of the eternal. That is why I hold 
time and space not swallowed up and lost in the eter¬ 
nal but transcended. The eternal is not an empty 
abstraction ; it is something in itself groundless be¬ 
cause it is the ground of all processes in Nature, phy¬ 
sical and psychical. We find analogy to Coleridge’s 
definition of self-consciousness as groundless because 
it is the ground of all other activity. 

But it has been shown that the objective universe— 
the physical—is subject to the intelligible universe— 
the psychical. Though, then, we cannot define the 
eternal in thought or insight, we can, for it, give 
supremacy of the psychical over the physical. Even 
Haeckel gives supremacy to the “ eternal iron laws ” 
of Nature, and, even he, cannot make these laws 
savour in any way of the material though he may 
claim parallelism for them and the material. 1 

The self-conscious subject exists and exists in the 
eternal. It may be that Spinoza’s philosophy as gener¬ 
ally accepted is sound, so that the ultimate of the sub¬ 
ject (or being) is absorption in the Deity. But, 
following Kant, I have argued that each one of us 
exists as a transcendental subject—as “ myself.” 2 
So, right or wrong, we must now pursue the same 
argument. 

What is man’s future in the eternal? 

We cannot know, we cannot all of us be aware 
even by insight though, as before shown, there 
may be personal proof for some transcending evi¬ 
dential proof. This personal proof, however, cannot 
be manifest in language : for it transcends ideas and 
language can but express ideas. It can only be mani¬ 
fest in parable. 

Are we, then, at the end of our tether of reason ? I 
think not. 

And now please do not forget that the eternal is not 

1 All theories of parallelism seem to me explanations of the 
riddle of the universe which, on their face, fail. 

2 The human evidence for our survival on disembodiment is very 
strong : it is considered in Personality and Telepathy . 



DREAMS 


356 

a solitary peak standing up alone and unrelated to an 
infinite number of processes in Nature which are not 
eternal. The eternal transcends, does not blot out, 
time and space and all the processes of Nature : they 
are all conditionings of or in the eternal. The eternal 
simply is so, for it, we cannot distinguish between 
what has been, what is and what will be : we cannot 
distinguish between the accomplished and the accom¬ 
plishing. That is, we must give to the Eternal tran¬ 
scendence in some such parable-form as “ the accom¬ 
plished in the accomplishing.” The eternal subsumes, 
does not blot out, all beginnings and all endings. 

But it may be objected that what is above written 
applies only to the physical, whereas I have given, 
for the eternal, supremacy of the psychical (or 
spiritual) over the physical. But 1 think the objection 
fails when dissected. 

For, even granting that the physical exists in the 
eternal, then, as it is subject to the psvchical, the 
psychical must in itself be eternal. But I myself find 
here a crux of duality which can only exist for 
thought: I must, beyond the purview of ideas, make 
the physical merely phenomenal. 3 And, then, 
psychical activity still remains eternal and, for the 
eternal, must be marked by the accomplished in the 
accomplishing: there is transcendence of perman¬ 
ence, transcendence of change. And when Kant’s 
explanation of his antinomies is fully digested this 
transcendence of permanence and change will be 
found, I think, not to be in opposition to his philo¬ 
sophy. 

We find, perhaps strangely, evidence in human 
experience for the eternal in psychical activity. 

There is no end to knowledge for, the more we 
learn, the wider is the field opened to us for more 
knowledge. There is no end to insight : for, the more 


3 It is strange that for a subject conditioned in three dimensional 
space not only objects in two dimensional but objects in four 
dimensional space are immaterial. 


THE ETERNAL 357 

we learn, the wider and more mysterious grows the 
field of insight opened to us for more insight. Do we 
not find herein, from analogy to human experience, 
eternal hope in an eternity of the accomplishing in 
psychical activity? 

Through eternity hope springs eternal.- It may be 
that on disembodiment from human form personal 
physical activity is at an end. But psychical activity 
which governs the physical still remains. Eternal 
hope is ours in the parable of eternal ignorance. 

You would solve the riddle of the universe? You 
would, as a pragmatist, ask for supreme knowledge in 
the ultimate ? What then would be your state ? What 
then would be left of you, what left of any value? 
When passed from human form we may or may not 
be manifest in other forms, physical or psychical: 
these forms may or may not be related to forms known 
to us. But, if any personality reach an ultimate of the 
accomplished, the personality has then come to an 
end. The accomplished is a function of time, a 
function of past time. Only so long as personality 
exists in the accomplishing in relation to the tran¬ 
scendental of the accomplished in the accomplishing 
can there be continuity of personality. 

If we contemplate the possibility of personality be¬ 
ing a mere function of bodily process and so begin¬ 
ning and ending with the process in time, then self- 
consciousness steps in and bars the way: for 
self-consciousness is groundless as the ground of all 
other activity. It may be, as Spinoza is generally 
assumed to have held, that the ultimate of “ myself ” 
is absorption in the Deity. But argument has been 
offered which, while supporting Spinoza’s philosophy 
in the main, brings it into agreement with Kant’s 
philosophy in holding each one of us exists as a tran¬ 
scendental subject. The present argument follows 
Kant. 4 

4 The great body of human evidence, yearly accumulating, towards 
proof that our personality survives bodily death, was not available 
in Kant’s lifetime. 




358 


DREAMS 


Transcendental Being we must leave as a fact of the 
incomprehensible, transcending thought, even in¬ 
sight. But for the transcendental subject—myself— 
there can never be the accomplished : there is the ac¬ 
complishing in the eternal; an eternal process in the 
transcendent of the accomplished in the accomplish¬ 
ing. 

Most surely for each one of us Karma, exists. Most 
surely for each one of us the more nearly we obey the 
categorical imperative in thought and conduct, the 
nearer we approach to pure manifestation of “ my¬ 
self.” And most surely, transcending all human 
ideas, the ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice is 
ours through the eternal. 

The eternal, for us as subjects, spells the eternal in 
the accomplishing. And if, through the eternal, we 
must for ever and a day be marching on in the accom¬ 
plishing to our transcendent ideal, we must bow to 
our subjection or contemplate annihilation in the ac¬ 
complished. 

Even on earth, eternal hope is ours; even on earth, 
more than eternal hope is ours. For he who honestly 
strives to do his duty in thought and conduct to God 
and his neighbour can, in transcendence of earthly 
happiness and unhappiness, attain the peace that 
passes understanding. 



-10 7 


Printed in Great Britain by Ebenezer Baylis 8? Son, Trinity Works, Worcester. 



























































